Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A veteran who suffered a traumatic brain injury from an improvised explosive device while deployed sought financial assistance under the Traumatic Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance (TSGLI) program after experiencing a stroke within two years of the injury. The Army denied his claim, determining the stroke was a physical illness or disease, not a qualifying traumatic injury as defined by the relevant statute and regulations. The veteran then petitioned the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to amend its rules to include coverage for illnesses or diseases caused by explosive ordnance, arguing these conditions are analogous to those already covered under existing exceptions for injuries resulting from chemical, biological, or radiological weapons.The VA initially denied the rulemaking petition but agreed to further review as part of a program-wide assessment. After several years, extensive consultation with medical experts, and consideration of the petition and supporting materials, the VA issued a final denial. It concluded that expanding coverage to delayed illnesses or diseases linked to explosive ordnance would be inconsistent with TSGLI’s purpose, which focuses on immediate injuries, would deviate from the insurance model underlying the program, and could threaten its financial stability. The VA also found insufficient evidence of a direct causal relationship between explosive ordnance, traumatic brain injury, and downstream illnesses like stroke.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the VA’s denial under the highly deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that the VA provided a reasoned explanation addressing the petitioner’s arguments and the record, and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. The petition for review was therefore denied. View "MCKINNEY v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS " on Justia Law

Mr. Palmeri began his employment with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1997 and was promoted to the Senior Executive Service (SES) in 2020. He was not informed that joining the DEA SES would affect his appeal rights. In January 2022, the DEA proposed his removal based on alleged misconduct, but before the removal was finalized, Mr. Palmeri retired. The agency stated that, had he not retired, he would have been removed. He then appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board), claiming his retirement was involuntary and constituted a constructive removal.The DEA moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that SES employees in the DEA do not have the right to appeal adverse actions to the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 3151. After allowing for discovery and briefing, an Administrative Judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The full Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed and adopted this initial decision, explaining that DEA SES employees can only appeal adverse actions through procedures established by the Attorney General, but no such procedures or regulations have been promulgated.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered whether the Board had jurisdiction over Mr. Palmeri’s appeal. The court held that the governing statutes clearly exclude DEA SES employees from Board appeal rights and require any hearing or appeal to be decided pursuant to regulations issued by the Attorney General, which do not exist. The court rejected arguments that lack of notice or absence of regulations should confer jurisdiction on the Board, and clarified that any constitutional claims must be pursued in a different forum. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. View "PALMERI v. MSPB " on Justia Law

James Young, a veteran who served in the military during the mid-1980s, initially filed a claim for service-connected disability benefits in 1988, alleging head injuries from an in-service car accident. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regional office denied his claim in 1991, and after several years of proceedings, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the claim in 1999, citing Young’s failure to appear for scheduled medical examinations. Young did not appeal the Board’s 1999 denial. Years later, in 2017, following a new claim and medical examinations, the VA granted service connection for his head injuries effective August 17, 2012.Seeking an earlier effective date linked to his original 1988 claim, Young filed a motion in 2022 with the Board to vacate its 1999 denial, alleging due process violations because the Board had failed to ensure the regional office complied with orders to search for certain records. The Board denied the motion, characterizing the alleged error as a “duty to assist error” rather than a due process error. Young appealed this denial to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which dismissed the appeal. The Veterans Court found that while the appeal was timely regarding the denial of the motion to vacate, such a denial was not an appealable decision under its jurisdictional statute.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court’s dismissal. The Federal Circuit held that the Board’s denial of a motion to vacate under 38 C.F.R. § 20.1000(a), when based solely on alleged material error known at the time of the original decision, does not constitute an appealable “decision” under 38 U.S.C. § 7252. The court determined that allowing appeals from such procedural denials would undermine the statutory time bar and permit indefinite judicial review of Board decisions. View "YOUNG v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Crocs, Inc. owns two U.S. trademarks covering features of its Classic Clog shoes. In June 2021, Crocs filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission (ITC), alleging that several respondents violated Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 by importing or selling footwear that infringed or diluted Crocs’s trademarks. Crocs sought a general exclusion order (GEO) or, in the alternative, a limited exclusion order (LEO). During the investigation, some respondents were found in default for failing to participate, while others actively defended against the claims.An Administrative Law Judge conducted an evidentiary hearing for the three active respondents and, in January 2023, issued an Initial Determination finding no violation of Section 337. The judge concluded that Crocs had not shown infringement or dilution of its trademarks and had waived infringement contentions against the defaulting respondents. The Commission reviewed parts of this determination and, in September 2023, issued a final decision: it found no violation by the active respondents and determined not to apply the waiver to the defaulting respondents. For the defaulting respondents, the ITC presumed the facts in Crocs’s complaint to be true, as required by statute, and issued an LEO against them, finding no public interest factors weighed against exclusion.On appeal, Crocs challenged both the no violation finding as to active respondents and the issuance of only an LEO rather than a GEO for the defaulting respondents. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Crocs’s appeal regarding the active respondents was untimely and dismissed it. Regarding the defaulting respondents, the court affirmed the Commission’s decision to issue a limited exclusion order, finding no abuse of discretion or error in law. Thus, the appeal was dismissed in part and affirmed in part. View "CROCS, INC. v. ITC " on Justia Law

The case centers on Midwest-CBK, LLC, a Minnesota-based retailer of Christmas ornaments. Midwest operated its corporate office in Minnesota and managed inventory and warehousing in Ontario, Canada. Merchandise was purchased from foreign suppliers for export to Canada, stored in Ontario, and sold to U.S. customers by Midwest’s U.S.-based sales staff. Orders were processed in Canada and shipped from Ontario to the United States, with purchase orders stating “FOB Buffalo, NY.” Between 2013 and 2016, Midwest entered merchandise with U.S. Customs and Border Protection using “deductive value.” Customs extended the liquidation deadline and conducted a regulatory audit to determine the correct valuation method, ultimately concluding that “transaction value” should apply, resulting in a recalculated duty assessment.The United States Court of International Trade reviewed Midwest’s challenge to Customs’ appraisement and its extensions of liquidation. Midwest argued that Customs lacked authority to extend liquidation beyond June 14, 2014, when all requested information had been provided, and asserted that the sales were domestic, not “for exportation to the United States.” The CIT found that Customs had a reasonable basis for the extension, given the ongoing audit and internal review, and determined that the transactions qualified as sales for exportation under the relevant statute. The CIT denied Midwest’s motion for partial summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the government.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s decision. The court held that Customs properly extended the liquidation period and did not abuse its discretion. It further held that Midwest’s sales were “for exportation to the United States” under 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(1), making transaction value the appropriate basis for appraisement. The judgment of the Court of International Trade was affirmed. View "MIDWEST-CBK, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology owns three patents related to fuel management systems for spark ignition engines, which are exclusively licensed to Ethanol Boosting Systems, LLC. These patents describe a system that uses both direct and port fuel injection to mitigate engine knock and optimize performance. The system operates with varying injection mechanisms depending on engine torque or manifold pressure, and includes a three-way catalyst to reduce emissions. The patents contain claims focusing on the interplay of injection types with engine operating ranges and the use of anti-knock agents.Previously, Ford Motor Company petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) for inter partes review (IPR) of all three patents. The PTAB initially denied institution, largely due to a claim construction that restricted the definition of “fuel” in a manner consistent with a district court’s prior interpretation, which required the directly injected fuel to differ from the port-injected fuel and to contain an anti-knock agent other than gasoline. After the Federal Circuit, in Ethanol Boosting Sys., LLC v. Ford Motor Co., vacated the district court’s construction regarding the “different fuel” requirement (but did not address the anti-gasoline requirement), the PTAB granted Ford’s rehearing request and instituted the IPRs.On appeal from the PTAB, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s final written decisions, which found the relevant claims of all three patents unpatentable as obvious. The Federal Circuit rejected EBS’s arguments that the Board lacked authority to delay its rehearing decision and that the Board was bound by the non-appealed portion of the district court’s claim construction. The court affirmed the Board’s adoption of the plain and ordinary meaning of the disputed terms and found substantial evidence supporting the Board’s factual findings regarding obviousness. The holding is that the PTAB’s decisions finding all challenged claims unpatentable as obvious are affirmed. View "ETHANOL BOOSTING SYSTEMS, LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY " on Justia Law

Several property owners upstream of the Addicks and Barker Dams in Houston, Texas, experienced flooding on their land during Hurricane Harvey in 2017. The Army Corps of Engineers, responsible for the design and operation of these dams, had long maintained a protocol to protect downtown Houston from flooding, which involved allowing reservoir water to inundate upstream private property under extraordinary storm conditions. The Corps had previously considered purchasing all land that would flood during such events but ultimately acquired only a portion, leaving other private lands at risk. When Hurricane Harvey produced record rainfall, water exceeded government-owned land and flooded privately owned properties, resulting in significant damage.The property owners brought suit against the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging that the government’s operation of the dams constituted an uncompensated taking of their property under the Fifth Amendment. The court consolidated and subdivided the cases, held a liability trial for thirteen bellwether properties, and found the government liable for taking flowage easements. The court later denied a motion for class certification on grounds of untimeliness and selected six bellwether properties for a damages trial, awarding a total of $454,535.03 plus interest.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’ findings of liability and its denial of class certification. With respect to damages, the Federal Circuit affirmed the awards for leasehold advantage, damaged personal property, and the offsetting of FEMA relief, but vacated the awards for lost rent, displacement, and the valuation of the flowage easement for one property owner, remanding those issues for further proceedings. The main holdings are that the government’s operation of the dams constituted a permanent physical taking of flowage easements, and that certain categories of damages were compensable while others were not. View "ABLAN v. US " on Justia Law

In August 2021, following the withdrawal of U.S. military and diplomatic personnel from Afghanistan due to the Doha Agreement with the Taliban, the U.S. government vacated several leased properties in Kabul, comprising five residential villas owned by Abdul Mutakaber and two military vehicle storage lots owned by Hamidullah. These leases were executed between 2013 and 2020, during Afghanistan’s Ghani administration. After the Taliban seized control of Kabul, they occupied all the properties previously leased by the U.S., preventing the owners from regaining access. The U.S. government then sent notices to terminate the leases, invoking force majeure, and requested refunds of advance rental payments from both landlords.Both Mutakaber and Hamidullah filed certified claims with the State Department under the Contract Disputes Act, seeking unpaid rent, restoration of possession, or purchase of the properties. After the contracting officer denied their claims, they appealed to the United States Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. The Board denied their breach of contract claims, finding that the government did not properly terminate the leases under the force majeure clause but did validly terminate for convenience under the leases’ termination provisions. The Board also determined the government was not obligated to return physical possession of the properties, as the leases did not impose such a duty. The Board awarded judgments for unpaid rent and refunds based on pre-paid amounts: Mutakaber was found to owe the government $115,429.85, while Hamidullah was awarded $193,270.15.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s legal conclusions de novo. The court held that the leases did not expressly or impliedly obligate the government to restore physical possession of the properties to the landlords upon termination, nor did Afghan law require such action under the circumstances. The court affirmed the Board’s judgments. View "Mutakaber v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

Micron Technology and its subsidiaries, along with the State of Idaho, were sued for patent infringement by Katana Silicon Technologies in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The patents at issue related to technology for shrinking semiconductor devices and had expired. In response, Micron asserted a counterclaim under the Idaho Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement Act, alleging that Katana had made bad faith assertions of patent infringement. Katana moved to dismiss the counterclaim, arguing that the Idaho Act was preempted by federal patent law. The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, where the State of Idaho intervened to defend the statute. Separately, Micron filed suit in Idaho state court against Longhorn IP, alleging similar bad faith assertions and seeking the imposition of a bond. Longhorn removed that case to federal court and also moved to dismiss on preemption grounds.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho denied both motions to dismiss, holding that federal law did not preempt the Idaho statute. The court also imposed an $8 million bond on Longhorn and Katana pursuant to the Act, finding that there was a reasonable likelihood that a bad faith assertion of patent infringement had occurred. Katana and Longhorn appealed these decisions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court determined that there was no final judgment from the district court, as the only decisions made were the denial of motions to dismiss and the imposition of a bond, neither of which ended the litigation on the merits. The Federal Circuit also found that none of the exceptions for interlocutory appellate review applied, including those for injunctions, the collateral order doctrine, or mandamus, nor was pendent jurisdiction appropriate. View "Micron Technology, Inc. v. Longhorn IP LLC" on Justia Law

David S. Brimer, a disabled veteran with preference eligibility, was employed as a GS-13 Supervisory Human Resources Specialist for the Naval Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. He applied for a merit promotion to a GS-14 Assistant Human Resources Officer position with the Naval Education and Training Command. Although the position was open to current permanent employees, VEOA eligibles, and DoD Military Spouse Preference eligibles, his application was not initially referred to the hiring official due to an erroneous belief by the agency that he had not met the time-in-grade requirement. After Brimer filed a complaint with the Department of Labor, the agency acknowledged the error but determined, upon review, that Brimer was not among the most highly qualified candidates for the position.Brimer subsequently appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, alleging that the agency obstructed his right to compete for employment and violated his veterans’ preference rights under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1). The administrative judge denied his request for corrective action, stating that the initial error had been remedied through a proper merit review. The Board affirmed, relying on Kerner v. Department of the Interior, 778 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and concluded that § 3304(f) does not apply to veterans already employed by the federal government, thus denying Brimer corrective action as a matter of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision. Applying the standard set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c), the court held that the Board correctly interpreted precedent and the statute, affirming that 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) does not entitle currently employed federal veterans to corrective action under VEOA for merit promotion vacancies. The Board’s decision denying Brimer's claims was affirmed. View "BRIMER v. NAVY " on Justia Law