Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Three nonprofit organizations filed a nationwide class action against the United States, alleging that the federal judiciary overcharged the public for access to court records through the PACER system. They claimed the government used PACER fees not only to fund the system itself but also for unrelated expenses, contrary to the statutory limits set by the E-Government Act. The plaintiffs sought refunds for allegedly excessive fees collected between 2010 and 2018.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia oversaw extensive litigation, including class certification and an interlocutory appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit previously affirmed that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under the Little Tucker Act and that the government had used PACER fees for unauthorized expenses. After remand, the parties reached a settlement totaling $125 million. The district court approved the settlement, finding it fair, reasonable, and adequate under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court also approved attorneys’ fees, administrative costs, and incentive awards to the class representatives. An objector, Eric Isaacson, challenged the district court’s jurisdiction, the fairness of the settlement, the attorneys’ fees, and the incentive awards.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction under the Little Tucker Act because each PACER transaction constituted a separate claim, none exceeding the $10,000 jurisdictional limit. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in approving the class settlement, the attorneys’ fees, or the incentive awards. The court also held that incentive awards are not categorically prohibited and are permissible if reasonable, joining the majority of federal circuits on this issue. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "NVLSP v. US " on Justia Law

Apple Inc. launched the Apple Watch Series 6, featuring technology to estimate the wearer’s blood oxygenation level. Masimo Corporation and Cercacor Laboratories, Inc. alleged that Apple’s importation and sale of the device infringed on several Masimo patents related to wearable blood oxygen measurement technology. Masimo filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission, asserting that Apple’s actions violated § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which prohibits importation of infringing articles if a related domestic industry exists. The patents at issue, called the Poeze Patents, cover user-worn devices utilizing optical emitters and photodetectors for physiological measurements.Following an investigation, an administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing and concluded that Masimo had established a domestic industry, Apple’s devices infringed some asserted claims, and several claims were not proven invalid. The ALJ found Masimo was not barred from enforcement by prosecution history laches. The ALJ’s decision led to a limited exclusion order barring importation of infringing Apple Watches. Both Apple and Masimo sought review by the Commission. The Commission affirmed the finding of infringement and the existence of a domestic industry, as to certain claims, and maintained the exclusion order.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Commission’s determinations under the Administrative Procedure Act, affirming its findings as reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. The Federal Circuit held that Masimo satisfied both the technical and economic prongs of the domestic industry requirement, that the Apple Watch infringed valid claims of the asserted patents, and that Apple failed to prove invalidity or prosecution laches. The Commission’s judgment and the exclusion order were affirmed. View "APPLE INC. v. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION" on Justia Law

Columbia University sued Gen Digital Inc., which markets Norton antivirus software, alleging infringement of certain claims in two patents related to methods for detecting anomalous program executions. These patents described techniques using an emulator to execute portions of software and compare function calls against models created from multiple computers, aiming to detect malicious activity. Columbia also sought to correct inventorship on a third patent owned by Norton. Norton’s products, including the SONAR/BASH feature, were sold both domestically and internationally. Columbia claimed that these products infringed the asserted patent claims by utilizing the patented detection methods.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia construed disputed claim terms largely in Columbia’s favor and denied Norton’s motion for judgment on the pleadings under 35 U.S.C. § 101, ruling that the claims were not directed to an abstract idea at Alice step one. Prior to trial, the district court struck Norton’s § 101 defense. At trial, the jury found willful infringement of four claims and awarded substantial damages, including damages based on Norton’s foreign sales. The district court denied Norton’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law regarding infringement, willfulness, and foreign sales damages. It also awarded enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees, partly relying on a contempt finding against Norton’s counsel.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment. The Federal Circuit held that the asserted claims are abstract at Alice step one and remanded for the district court to address step two. The court found no error in claim construction or in the denial of judgment as a matter of law for infringement and willfulness, but concluded that damages for foreign sales were improperly awarded. The contempt finding having been reversed in a companion case, the enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees awards must also be reconsidered. The disposition was reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY v. GEN DIGITAL INC. " on Justia Law

An inventor and his exclusive licensee filed a lawsuit alleging patent infringement against a manufacturer, asserting claims of a patent related to an apparatus for maintaining a crop harvester’s header at a designated height above the soil. The patent described a device using a controller interface, head controller, and hydraulic control system. The parties agreed that the “control means” term in the patent invoked means-plus-function claiming under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), and further agreed on the basic claimed function and the corresponding structures described in the specification. However, they disagreed over whether the specification sufficiently disclosed the structure for “control means,” particularly regarding whether the disclosure required an algorithm for microprocessor-based controllers.After the case was transferred from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, the district court concluded that the patent’s “control means” limitation was indefinite. The district court found that the only sufficiently disclosed controllers were microprocessor-based versions, which would require a disclosed algorithm that the patent did not provide. The court excluded an earlier version of the controller that used logic circuitry, not a microprocessor, from the corresponding structure. Based on this, the district court held the asserted claims invalid as indefinite and entered judgment for the defendant.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the district court erred by excluding the non-microprocessor-based controller from the corresponding structure, as it performed the claimed function and did not trigger the algorithm disclosure requirement. The Federal Circuit clarified that a means-plus-function limitation need only be supported by one embodiment of corresponding structure. Therefore, the judgment of indefiniteness and invalidity was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. Costs were assessed against the manufacturer. View "GRAMM v. DEERE & COMPANY" on Justia Law

Implicit, LLC owned two patents that named Edward Balassanian and Scott Bradley as the only inventors. Both men worked for BeComm Corporation, Implicit’s predecessor. Sonos, Inc. filed petitions for inter partes review (IPR) with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, arguing that the claims in both patents were unpatentable due to prior art, specifically referencing a patent by Janevski. Implicit responded that the inventions were conceived and reduced to practice before the Janevski filing date, involving work by engineer Guy Carpenter. The Board found Implicit’s evidence insufficient to establish Carpenter’s role or that any reduction to practice benefited the named inventors, and determined the challenged claims were unpatentable.After the Board’s final written decisions in 2019, Implicit appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, raising Appointments Clause challenges based on Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for proceedings consistent with Arthrex. After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Arthrex, Inc., the case was again remanded to allow for Director Review, which was denied. During this period, Implicit sought and obtained certificates of correction to add Carpenter as an inventor. The case was remanded to the Board to consider whether these corrections affected the prior IPR decisions. The Board held that judicial estoppel, waiver, and forfeiture barred Implicit from relying on the corrections to revisit the prior decisions.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that forfeiture can apply even when inventorship is corrected under 35 U.S.C. § 256. The court found no abuse of discretion by the Board in determining that Implicit forfeited its new inventorship arguments by waiting until after final decisions to seek correction. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decisions. View "IMPLICIT, LLC v. SONOS, INC. " on Justia Law

Exafer Ltd. owns two patents related to optimizing communication paths in virtual network environments. Exafer brought suit against Microsoft, alleging that Microsoft’s Azure Platform, specifically its Smart Network Interface Cards and Virtual Filtering Platform Fastpath technology, infringed these patents. To support its damages claim, Exafer submitted expert reports quantifying the technical and financial benefits Microsoft allegedly obtained through the accused features. The damages expert, Mr. Blok, based his analysis on the value of additional virtual machine hours made possible by the accused features.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas excluded Mr. Blok’s damages testimony, reasoning that his use of unaccused virtual machines as the royalty base improperly included non-infringing activities, relying on Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co. The district court also denied Exafer’s motion to reopen discovery to present an alternative damages theory and granted Microsoft’s motion for summary judgment due to an absence of a remedy, entering final judgment against Exafer.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the damages expert’s testimony. The appellate court found that Mr. Blok’s methodology—linking the value of the accused features to the additional virtual machine hours they enabled—was sufficiently tied to the patented inventions and did not improperly expand the patent’s scope. The court clarified that there is no categorical bar against using an unaccused product as the royalty base if there is a causal connection to the alleged infringement. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s exclusion of Mr. Blok’s testimony, vacated the orders denying reopening of discovery and granting summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "EXAFER LTD v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION " on Justia Law

The dispute involves two patents held by Magnolia Medical Technologies concerning devices that improve the accuracy of blood tests by reducing contamination from skin microbes. When a blood sample is drawn, contaminants are most likely present in the initial portion, which can cause false positives and unnecessary treatments. Magnolia’s patents aim to sequester this initial blood volume, improving test reliability. Kurin, Inc. manufactures the Kurin Lock, a device that separates the initial blood draw using a porous plug that functions first as a vent and then as a seal.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware initially addressed claim construction. Regarding Magnolia’s U.S. Patent 9,855,001, the court determined that the term “diverter” was a means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), restricting infringement to devices with corresponding structures detailed in the patent specification. The parties stipulated that the Kurin Lock did not infringe the ’001 patent based on this construction. For U.S. Patent 10,039,483, the case proceeded to trial on the claims related to “vent” and “seal” limitations. The jury found that Kurin Lock infringed these claims. However, Kurin moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), arguing that the Kurin Lock did not have two separate structures corresponding to the “vent” and “seal” as required.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court's claim constructions and JMOL grant. The court held that the district court did not err in construing “diverter” as a means-plus-function term for the ’001 patent. It also affirmed that, under the plain and ordinary meaning and precedent, the ’483 patent required separate structures for “vent” and “seal,” which the Kurin Lock did not possess. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Kurin, finding no infringement. View "MAGNOLIA MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. KURIN, INC. " on Justia Law

The appellants, including trustees of several trusts and Hall Atlas, LLC, held coal mining rights to the Hall Ranch in Wyoming, containing significant coal reserves. In 1985, the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality (WDEQ) determined that a portion of the Hall Ranch was located on an alluvial valley floor (AVF), which limited mining under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA). For decades, neither the appellants nor Exxon Coal Resources, the lessee at the time, pursued a coal exchange. In 2010, Hall Atlas applied to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) for a coal exchange. BLM initially rejected WDEQ’s 1985 determination but changed position in 2014, and Hall Atlas submitted a mine plan. In 2016, BLM determined the Hall Ranch AVF coal had a value of $0. In 2017, BLM reiterated its $0 valuation and rejected the appellants’ proposed exchange tract, instead proposing alternatives based on the same valuation.The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed the appellants’ takings claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the claim was time-barred because it was filed more than six years after the claim accrued. The appellants argued that their claim did not accrue until BLM’s 2017 letter, but the court found that the relevant accrual date was in 2016, when BLM finalized its $0 valuation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision. The Federal Circuit held that any takings claim accrued no later than 2016, making the 2023 filing untimely under the Tucker Act’s six-year statute of limitations. The court rejected arguments for equitable tolling and the application of the continuing claim or stabilization doctrines, and concluded the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was correct. The judgment was affirmed and costs were awarded to the appellee. View "WYOMING TRUST CO. v. US " on Justia Law

A United States Army veteran who served in Vietnam from 1969 to 1972 sought increased disability compensation from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). After his retirement from a construction consulting career, the veteran was granted service-connected disability compensation for PTSD, and his rating was eventually increased to 50 percent. In 2021, the veteran applied for a total disability rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU) under 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(b), asserting that his PTSD rendered him unable to secure or follow substantially gainful employment.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the TDIU claim, finding that the veteran’s education, training, and work history demonstrated adaptability, and that he was physically and mentally capable of performing certain jobs with limited social interaction. The Board listed warehouse worker, assembly line worker, and custodian as illustrative occupations he could perform. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) affirmed the Board’s denial, reasoning that the Board was not required to identify actual jobs in the market and that any error in doing so was harmless, relying on precedent that TDIU determinations do not require analysis of specific job market opportunities.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the Veterans Court may have committed legal error in its harmless-error analysis, specifically by misreading precedent and by applying a rigid rule inconsistent with the proper harmless-error standard. The court vacated the Veterans Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, instructing it to reconsider the challenge regarding the Board’s use of illustrative jobs in its TDIU denial. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "JANICH v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Jennifer Neal was employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) as a Field Examiner until her removal in August 2020 for alleged unacceptable performance. She challenged her removal before the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board), arguing that the VA violated the terms of a master collective bargaining agreement by failing to provide her with a performance improvement plan (PIP) prior to removal, and that the performance standards applied to her were unreasonable. During the pendency of her appeal, a Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) decision confirmed the requirement for the VA to provide a PIP before removing bargaining unit employees, as established in a prior arbitration. The administrative judge (AJ) found that the VA's removal of Neal was not in accordance with law and set aside the removal.The VA petitioned for review of the AJ’s decision to the full Board, arguing that the FLRA decision was factually and legally distinguishable. While the petition was pending, the VA voluntarily reinstated Neal, provided her back pay, and otherwise made her whole, effectively granting her all the relief she sought. The Board dismissed the VA’s petition as moot, recognizing that Neal had obtained complete relief. Neal then moved for attorneys’ fees. The AJ granted her request, finding her to be the prevailing party. However, upon the VA’s further petition, the Board reversed, reasoning that because the case became moot before a final Board decision, Neal was not a prevailing party and thus not entitled to fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision. The court held that Neal was a prevailing party because the AJ’s merits decision conferred enduring judicial relief that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties, and the subsequent mootness resulting from the VA’s voluntary compliance did not negate her prevailing party status. The court reversed the Board’s denial of attorneys’ fees and awarded costs to Neal. View "NEAL v. DVA " on Justia Law