Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jennifer Neal was employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) as a Field Examiner until her removal in August 2020 for alleged unacceptable performance. She challenged her removal before the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board), arguing that the VA violated the terms of a master collective bargaining agreement by failing to provide her with a performance improvement plan (PIP) prior to removal, and that the performance standards applied to her were unreasonable. During the pendency of her appeal, a Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) decision confirmed the requirement for the VA to provide a PIP before removing bargaining unit employees, as established in a prior arbitration. The administrative judge (AJ) found that the VA's removal of Neal was not in accordance with law and set aside the removal.The VA petitioned for review of the AJ’s decision to the full Board, arguing that the FLRA decision was factually and legally distinguishable. While the petition was pending, the VA voluntarily reinstated Neal, provided her back pay, and otherwise made her whole, effectively granting her all the relief she sought. The Board dismissed the VA’s petition as moot, recognizing that Neal had obtained complete relief. Neal then moved for attorneys’ fees. The AJ granted her request, finding her to be the prevailing party. However, upon the VA’s further petition, the Board reversed, reasoning that because the case became moot before a final Board decision, Neal was not a prevailing party and thus not entitled to fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision. The court held that Neal was a prevailing party because the AJ’s merits decision conferred enduring judicial relief that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties, and the subsequent mootness resulting from the VA’s voluntary compliance did not negate her prevailing party status. The court reversed the Board’s denial of attorneys’ fees and awarded costs to Neal. View "NEAL v. DVA " on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute between two companies involved in the production and sale of coiled tubing for the oil and gas industry. One company, having acquired assets and documents from a predecessor, developed a coiled tubing product and obtained several patents (the ’256, ’074, and ’075 patents) covering aspects of this technology. The predecessor’s documents disclosed a product with overlapping technical specifications compared to at least some claims of these patents. During the patent application process, the company submitted a related public reference to the Patent and Trademark Office (Chitwood), but did not disclose the predecessor’s internal documents (the CYMAX Documents) that contained additional details. Internal discussions reflected uncertainty among inventors and counsel about the relevance and necessity of disclosing these documents.After disputes arose in the marketplace over alleged patent infringement, the manufacturer of a competing product initiated litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, seeking a declaration of non-infringement. The patent holder counterclaimed for infringement and, as the case proceeded, the competitor amended its claims to include allegations of inequitable conduct (fraud on the Patent Office by withholding material information) and Walker Process fraud (antitrust liability for enforcing a patent obtained by fraud). The district court granted summary judgment to the competitor on the inequitable conduct claim, finding clear evidence of intent to deceive and materiality, and granted summary judgment to the patent holder on the Walker Process fraud claim, finding insufficient evidence of market power.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated both summary judgment rulings. The appellate court held that genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment on both inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud. The court remanded for further proceedings, allowing both claims to proceed, and affirmed the denial of summary judgment for the patent holder on inequitable conduct. View "GLOBAL TUBING LLC v. TENARIS COILED TUBES LLC " on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a company seeking a refund of customs duties (drawback) on imported petroleum derivatives, filed a drawback claim with U.S. Customs on March 10, 2020, identifying forty-eight import entries and seeking over $1.3 million. Customs did not liquidate the claim within one year, but on April 30, 2021, it liquidated the claim at zero, determining the plaintiff was not entitled to any drawback. The company's appeal did not challenge the merits of this determination but argued that, by operation of law, its claim should have been automatically (“deemed”) liquidated at the amount it initially asserted, because Customs did not act within one year. The critical factual issue was that, while all underlying import entries had been liquidated by March 10, 2021, not all had become final, as finality requires an additional 180-day period after liquidation.The United States Court of International Trade reviewed the case, focusing on the statutory provisions governing when drawback claims are deemed liquidated under 19 U.S.C. § 1504. The court concluded that because the relevant import entries had not yet become final within one year of the drawback claim’s filing, the “deemed liquidation” provision of § 1504(a)(2)(A) did not apply. Instead, the alternative procedures of § 1504(a)(2)(B) governed, which require additional steps by the claimant that were not taken. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment for the government.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that when the conditions of § 1504(a)(2)(B) are present—specifically, when underlying import entries are not yet final—automatic deemed liquidation under § 1504(a)(2)(A) does not apply. Customs’ action in liquidating the claim at zero was therefore lawful, and the lower court’s judgment was affirmed. View "PERFORMANCE ADDITIVES, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case, owners of a patent involving genetically engineered host cells containing recombinant DNA sequences, accused the defendants of infringing multiple claims of their patent. The technology at issue centers on human-made host cells that include a recombinant nucleic acid molecule encoding a specific adeno-associated virus (AAV) capsid protein, along with a heterologous non-AAV sequence. These recombinant molecules are created by artificially combining genetic material from different species, a process that does not occur in nature. The patented host cells are used in developing gene therapy products, including a product for treating Duchenne muscular dystrophy.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court concluded that the asserted claims were ineligible for patent protection, reasoning that they were directed to a natural phenomenon. The court analogized the claims to those at issue in Supreme Court cases such as Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. and Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., finding that merely combining natural sequences did not make the claimed invention patentable. The district court held that the claims lacked an inventive concept and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the decision de novo. The appellate court held that the patented host cells are not naturally occurring and possess markedly different characteristics from any product of nature, consistent with the Supreme Court’s guidance in Diamond v. Chakrabarty and Myriad Genetics. The Federal Circuit concluded that the claims are not directed to a natural phenomenon and are therefore patent-eligible under § 101. The court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "REGENXBIO INC. v. SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS, INC. " on Justia Law

This case concerns a patent dispute involving input devices for computers. The plaintiff, Genuine Enabling Technology LLC (GET), claimed that Sony’s PlayStation 3 and 4 controllers and consoles infringed several claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,219,730. The patent addresses the problem of limited computer resources by combining data streams from multiple input devices, such as keyboards and sensors, into a single stream. The contested claims include a means-plus-function limitation called “encoding means for synchronizing,” which requires synchronizing two input streams and encoding them into a combined data stream.The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware handled the case initially. It interpreted the “encoding means” as a means-plus-function limitation and identified logic block 34 in Figure 4A of the patent as the corresponding structure. During litigation, GET’s expert, Dr. Fernald, failed to address most of the elements in logic block 34 when analyzing infringement, focusing primarily on the bit-rate clock signal. The district court excluded Dr. Fernald’s testimony on structural equivalence and ultimately granted Sony summary judgment of noninfringement, finding GET had not raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding infringement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that GET’s infringement analysis was deficient because it did not adequately account for the full structure of logic block 34 required by the patent specification. The court emphasized that GET failed to explain why it was permissible to omit certain elements from its equivalence analysis. Thus, GET lacked sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find infringement. The district court’s exclusion of expert testimony and summary judgment were affirmed. View "GENUINE ENABLING TECHNOLOGY LLC v. SONY GROUP CORPORATION " on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a patented pre-lit artificial tree owned by Willis Electric Co., Ltd., which features separable, modular trunk portions that mechanically and electrically connect to one another, enabling attached lights to illuminate automatically regardless of trunk orientation. The prior art required separate mechanical and electrical connections, but Willis’ patent integrates both functions in a single step. Willis accused Polygroup of infringing claim 15 of its patent, specifically targeting Polygroup trees with the “Quick Set” feature that establishes simultaneous mechanical and electrical connections.After Willis initiated the lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, Polygroup filed multiple inter partes review petitions at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) challenging various claims of Willis’ patent. The PTAB upheld claim 15, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed that finding. The district court proceedings continued with only claim 15 at issue. Polygroup filed a Daubert motion to exclude Willis’ damages expert, which was denied. At trial, the jury found claim 15 infringed and not invalid, awarding Willis over $42 million in damages. Polygroup then moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on obviousness and a new trial on damages, but the district court denied both motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of JMOL and the motion for a new trial. The court held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that a skilled artisan would not have been motivated to combine prior art with coaxial barrel connectors as claimed in claim 15, thus affirming nonobviousness. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the damages expert’s testimony, finding the methodology sufficiently reliable under Rule 702. As a result, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "WILLIS ELECTRIC CO., LTD. v. POLYGROUP LTD." on Justia Law

The dispute centers on whether imported plastic shelf dividers containing magnets are subject to U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty orders covering raw flexible magnets from China. Fasteners for Retail, Inc. imports shelf dividers composed of flexible magnets bonded to rigid plastic, which makes the magnets inflexible. The United States Department of Commerce had previously issued duty orders with scope language covering certain flexible magnets, regardless of shape, color, or packaging. Fasteners for Retail requested a scope ruling from Commerce to clarify whether their shelf dividers fell within the scope of these orders.Commerce issued a final scope ruling, finding that although the plain language of the duty orders might appear to include Siffron’s shelf dividers, prior scope rulings and interpretative sources (known as (k)(1) sources) provided further guidance. Based on these sources, Commerce determined that magnets rendered inflexible by attachment to other materials, such as plastic, are not included within the term “flexible magnets” under the duty orders. The United States Court of International Trade reviewed Commerce’s ruling and upheld it, finding Commerce’s determination reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case de novo, applying the same standard as the Trade Court. The court held that Commerce has discretion under the current regulations to consult (k)(1) sources in interpreting scope language regardless of apparent ambiguity. The court concluded that Commerce’s determination that Siffron’s shelf dividers are not “flexible magnets” under the duty orders was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law. Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Court of International Trade, sustaining Commerce’s scope ruling that the shelf dividers are not subject to the duty orders. View "MAGNUM MAGNETICS CORP. v. US " on Justia Law

This case involves a challenge to the validity of a patent owned by DivX, LLC, which claims systems and methods for streaming partly encrypted media content. DivX sued Netflix, Inc. for patent infringement, leading Netflix to petition for inter partes review (IPR) before the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). Netflix argued that the patent’s claims would have been obvious in view of specific prior-art references. The dispute centered on the proper construction of a claim limitation relating to the location of "encryption information" within the system described by the patent.After the IPR was instituted, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board first issued a final written decision holding that Netflix had not shown the claims were unpatentable, basing its conclusion on issues unrelated to claim construction. Netflix appealed that decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which vacated and remanded. On remand, the Board adopted DivX’s proposed claim construction, holding that the limitation required the encryption information itself to be located within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video, and again found in favor of DivX. Netflix appealed again.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s claim construction de novo. The appellate court held that the Board erred in its construction of the disputed limitation. The correct construction, the court explained, is that only the encrypted portions of the video frames, not the encryption information, must be located within the requested portions of the selected stream. The court found that, under this construction, the asserted prior art meets the limitation. The Federal Circuit therefore reversed the Board’s claim construction, vacated its decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC " on Justia Law

Several technology companies challenged instructions issued by the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) that guided the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) in deciding whether to institute inter partes review (IPR) proceedings. These instructions, known collectively as the NHK-Fintiv instructions, outlined factors for the Board to consider when parallel patent litigation was occurring in district court. The challengers argued that these instructions resulted in too many denials of IPR petitions and were contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, and issued without the required notice-and-comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of California initially found all challenges to the PTO’s instructions to be judicially unreviewable. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit previously held that while the challenges based on statutory and arbitrary-and-capricious grounds were unreviewable, the claim regarding the lack of notice-and-comment rulemaking could proceed. On remand, the district court determined that the instructions were exempt from notice-and-comment requirements because they were “general statements of policy,” not substantive or legislative rules.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court agreed that the Director’s instructions were general statements of policy exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). It emphasized that there is no statutory right to IPR institution, that the instructions do not bind the Director, and that the Director retains unreviewable discretion to institute or deny IPR. The court found that none of the legal standards or precedents cited by the challengers required a different result, and it affirmed the district court’s judgment rejecting the APA-based challenge. View "APPLE INC. v. SQUIRES " on Justia Law

The petitioner received a Prevnar 13 pneumococcal conjugate vaccine and soon after began experiencing symptoms that ultimately led to a diagnosis of Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS). He sought compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, alleging that the vaccine caused his condition. To support his claim, he presented expert testimony advancing a molecular mimicry theory, arguing that components of the vaccine could trigger an autoimmune response resulting in GBS. The government countered with its own expert, disputing this causation theory.A special master in the United States Court of Federal Claims evaluated the evidence and found that the petitioner failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the vaccine can cause GBS. The special master determined that key elements of the petitioner’s expert’s theory lacked support from reliable scientific literature and that the evidence did not sufficiently establish a causal connection. As a result, the special master denied compensation. The United States Court of Federal Claims reviewed and affirmed the special master’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the special master did not require the petitioner to provide direct medical literature establishing causation, which would have been contrary to the standard set forth in Althen v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 418 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Instead, the special master properly considered the absence of supporting literature as one factor in evaluating the reliability of the causation theory, consistent with governing law. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s decision, noting concern about inconsistent outcomes among special masters on similar facts but finding no legal error in this case’s resolution. View "GAMBOA-AVILA v. HHS " on Justia Law