Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, the central issue arose during a countervailing duty investigation into phosphate fertilizers imported from Morocco and Russia. The International Trade Commission (Commission) collected information through questionnaires sent to various parties, including domestic and foreign producers. The Commission’s longstanding practice was to automatically designate all questionnaire responses as confidential, regardless of whether the submitting party requested confidentiality or whether the information would qualify for such treatment under the relevant statute. This led to heavy redactions in the administrative record when the investigation was challenged in court.A Moroccan producer, OCP S.A., sought review of the Commission’s injury determination in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT). The CIT initially remanded the injury determination due to insufficient evidentiary support. When the remand record again included substantial redactions, the CIT held a hearing to scrutinize the Commission’s confidentiality designations. After reviewing arguments from the Commission and affected parties, the CIT concluded that the Commission’s practice of automatically treating all questionnaire responses as confidential was unauthorized by law. The CIT found that much of the redacted information was either publicly available, generalized, or outdated, and thus not entitled to confidential treatment, with only a small portion warranting protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s Confidentiality Opinion and Order. The Federal Circuit held that the governing statute does not abrogate the common law right of public access to judicial records and that the Commission’s blanket confidentiality rule conflicts with statutory requirements, which demand public disclosure of non-confidential information and proper justification for confidentiality. The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s order that required the Commission to comply with statutory standards for confidentiality and to cease automatic confidential designation of questionnaire responses. View "In re United States" on Justia Law

In a dispute concerning antidumping and countervailing duties on mattresses imported from several countries, the U.S. International Trade Commission determined that domestic industry suffered material injury from imports sold at less than fair value and from subsidized imports. The Commission treated certain information submitted in response to its questionnaires as confidential. After the Court of International Trade issued a public opinion sustaining the Commission’s injury determination, it did not redact information the Commission had deemed confidential. The Commission requested retraction of the public opinion and sought redactions for specific company names and numerical data, arguing these deserved confidential treatment.The parties jointly moved for redaction, relying on the Commission’s practice of treating questionnaire data as confidential and citing statutory provisions. The Court of International Trade denied the motion, reasoning that the information was either publicly available or not linked to specific entities, and that some claims of confidentiality had been waived due to procedural oversight. The court also emphasized the common law right of access and transparency, but did not specifically address the statutory authority for disclosure.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the denial of the joint motion. The court found the case moot because the allegedly confidential information had already been publicly disclosed more than two years earlier, rendering any relief unavailable. The Federal Circuit held that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness did not apply, as the companion case decided that day resolved the same confidentiality issues. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded. View "In re United States" on Justia Law

Range of Motion Products, LLC owns a design patent for a body massaging apparatus, which is embodied in its product, the Rolflex. Armaid Company Inc. manufactures the Armaid2, an accused product in this suit, as well as an earlier version, the Armaid1, which was covered by a utility patent. RoM alleged that the Armaid2 infringed its design patent. Previously, RoM had filed a similar suit against Armaid in the same court, but that case was dismissed without prejudice following the denial of a preliminary injunction.In the subsequent action, the United States District Court for the District of Maine construed the design patent, carefully distinguishing between functional and ornamental aspects of the claimed design. The court found that many features, notably the shape of the arms and the base, were primarily functional, narrowing the scope of the claimed design. Upon reviewing the evidence, the district court concluded that no reasonable jury could find the design of the Armaid2 substantially similar to the patented design, and granted summary judgment of non-infringement in favor of Armaid.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s claim construction de novo and its grant of summary judgment under the First Circuit’s de novo standard. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the district court did not err in identifying the functional versus ornamental aspects of the claimed design, and finding that the designs were plainly dissimilar when considering only the ornamental features. The court further held that, even when comparing the accused and claimed designs alongside prior art, no reasonable jury could find substantial similarity. The judgment of non-infringement was affirmed. View "RANGE OF MOTION PRODUCTS, LLC v. ARMAID COMPANY INC. " on Justia Law

A veteran sought compensation from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for a neck injury, initially filing his claim in 2007. The VA denied the claim, and in 2008, the veteran, with the help of a non-attorney representative, filed a notice of disagreement (NOD) to appeal the denial. In 2012, the veteran retained an attorney, who entered into a contingency fee agreement and subsequently filed an additional claim on the veteran’s behalf for service-connected post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The attorney also submitted new evidence and arguments to support both the neck injury claim and a claim for total disability based on individual unemployability (TDIU), referencing both the neck injury and PTSD.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals later found the neck injury was service connected and remanded the neck claim to the VA Regional Office for a rating decision, while referring the TDIU claim to the Regional Office, as it had not been addressed previously. The Regional Office ultimately granted past-due benefits for the neck injury, PTSD, and TDIU, but awarded attorney’s fees to the attorney only for the portion of benefits related to the neck injury—finding that the PTSD claim was not part of the appealed case under the relevant statute. The Board affirmed this determination, and the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims also affirmed, concluding that the PTSD claim was not connected to the original NOD regarding the neck injury.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1) (2012), attorney’s fees may only be paid for services provided after an NOD is filed, and only for the “case” addressed by that NOD. The court affirmed that the PTSD claim was not part of the same case as the neck injury claim appealed in the 2008 NOD, and therefore attorney’s fees were not authorized for services related to the PTSD claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Veterans Court. View "HOLSTEIN v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

The dispute centered on technology for streaming media over networks, specifically a method described in a now-expired patent for reducing latency and improving stream quality using intermediate “helper servers” to cache and coordinate content distribution. The patent’s method claim at issue involved several steps, including receiving a request for a streaming media object from a client at a helper server, allocating a buffer at the helper server to cache part of the requested object, downloading that portion to the client while concurrently retrieving the remaining portion, and adjusting the transfer rate. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s system infringed this method claim by directing third-party edge servers to perform these steps.The United States District Court for the Central District of California previously granted summary judgment of noninfringement in favor of the defendant. The district court found that the accused system did not perform the required steps in the order set out in the claim and that it did not use the kind of “specialized buffer” the patent required. On a prior appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed some claim constructions, vacated the summary judgment, and remanded for further construction of the term “buffer.” On remand, the district court construed “buffer” as “short term storage associated with said requested SM object,” determined that claim 16 required both a specialized buffer and a specific order of steps, and again granted summary judgment for noninfringement.On the present appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in limiting the claim to a specialized buffer, but correctly construed the claim to require the first two steps to be performed in sequence. Because the accused system did not perform the steps in this required order, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment of noninfringement. View "Sound View Innovations, LLC v. Hulu, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, owner of U.S. Patent No. 7,679,637, claimed infringement by the defendant, Google LLC, concerning a patent related to web conferencing systems. The patent describes systems that allow participants to view sessions in real time, with time-shifting capabilities so that sessions can also be viewed with delay or after completion, and at different playback rates while maintaining consistent audio quality. The asserted claims permit asynchronous review of multimedia presentations, such as going back to review one aspect while another continues live.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington reviewed the complaint, in which the plaintiff alleged infringement of claims 2–5 and 7–9 of the patent. Google moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing the asserted claims were patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, finding the claims were directed to an abstract idea without an inventive concept that would make them patent-eligible. The court also denied the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint, citing futility.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo, applying the Alice two-step test for patent eligibility. The appellate court affirmed that the claims were directed to the abstract idea of asynchronous review of presentations and did not disclose a specific technological improvement or inventive concept. The court found that conventional components and result-oriented language did not suffice for eligibility and agreed that amendment of the complaint would be futile. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case. Costs were awarded to Google. View "US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC " on Justia Law

A physician brought suit against several related companies, alleging that they induced surgeons to infringe claims of three patents covering surgical techniques and tools for treating spinal deformities. These patents involve methods and devices for correcting misaligned vertebrae, including the use of “handle means” and “cross-linking members” in en bloc derotation procedures. The defendant companies manufacture derotation devices that, according to the plaintiff, infringe the asserted patents when used in certain configurations. The dispute centered on whether the accused devices contained the claimed “handle means” and whether surgeons actually used the devices in infringing ways.In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the parties disputed the meaning of “handle means,” and the court adopted the plaintiff’s proposed construction. During the trial, the plaintiff presented testimony from two experts: one on infringement and another who conducted a survey on surgical practices. The defendants moved to exclude both experts under Daubert, challenging the reliability and relevance of their methods and opinions. Initially, the district court denied these motions, finding that the experts’ application of the court’s claim construction and survey methodology affected the weight of their testimony, not its admissibility.However, following the experts’ testimony at trial, the district court reversed its earlier decision, excluded substantial portions of both experts’ testimony as unreliable and contradictory to the court’s claim construction, and then granted judgment as a matter of law to the defendants due to the lack of admissible evidence supporting infringement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert testimony and erred in granting judgment as a matter of law. The appellate court reversed the district court’s rulings, holding that the excluded testimony did not contradict the court’s claim construction and that any methodological concerns went to evidentiary weight, not admissibility. The case was remanded for a new trial in which both experts may testify. View "BARRY v. DEPUY SYNTHES COMPANIES " on Justia Law

A veteran who suffered a traumatic brain injury from an improvised explosive device while deployed sought financial assistance under the Traumatic Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance (TSGLI) program after experiencing a stroke within two years of the injury. The Army denied his claim, determining the stroke was a physical illness or disease, not a qualifying traumatic injury as defined by the relevant statute and regulations. The veteran then petitioned the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to amend its rules to include coverage for illnesses or diseases caused by explosive ordnance, arguing these conditions are analogous to those already covered under existing exceptions for injuries resulting from chemical, biological, or radiological weapons.The VA initially denied the rulemaking petition but agreed to further review as part of a program-wide assessment. After several years, extensive consultation with medical experts, and consideration of the petition and supporting materials, the VA issued a final denial. It concluded that expanding coverage to delayed illnesses or diseases linked to explosive ordnance would be inconsistent with TSGLI’s purpose, which focuses on immediate injuries, would deviate from the insurance model underlying the program, and could threaten its financial stability. The VA also found insufficient evidence of a direct causal relationship between explosive ordnance, traumatic brain injury, and downstream illnesses like stroke.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the VA’s denial under the highly deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that the VA provided a reasoned explanation addressing the petitioner’s arguments and the record, and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. The petition for review was therefore denied. View "MCKINNEY v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS " on Justia Law

Mr. Palmeri began his employment with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1997 and was promoted to the Senior Executive Service (SES) in 2020. He was not informed that joining the DEA SES would affect his appeal rights. In January 2022, the DEA proposed his removal based on alleged misconduct, but before the removal was finalized, Mr. Palmeri retired. The agency stated that, had he not retired, he would have been removed. He then appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board), claiming his retirement was involuntary and constituted a constructive removal.The DEA moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that SES employees in the DEA do not have the right to appeal adverse actions to the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 3151. After allowing for discovery and briefing, an Administrative Judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The full Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed and adopted this initial decision, explaining that DEA SES employees can only appeal adverse actions through procedures established by the Attorney General, but no such procedures or regulations have been promulgated.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered whether the Board had jurisdiction over Mr. Palmeri’s appeal. The court held that the governing statutes clearly exclude DEA SES employees from Board appeal rights and require any hearing or appeal to be decided pursuant to regulations issued by the Attorney General, which do not exist. The court rejected arguments that lack of notice or absence of regulations should confer jurisdiction on the Board, and clarified that any constitutional claims must be pursued in a different forum. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. View "PALMERI v. MSPB " on Justia Law

James Young, a veteran who served in the military during the mid-1980s, initially filed a claim for service-connected disability benefits in 1988, alleging head injuries from an in-service car accident. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regional office denied his claim in 1991, and after several years of proceedings, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the claim in 1999, citing Young’s failure to appear for scheduled medical examinations. Young did not appeal the Board’s 1999 denial. Years later, in 2017, following a new claim and medical examinations, the VA granted service connection for his head injuries effective August 17, 2012.Seeking an earlier effective date linked to his original 1988 claim, Young filed a motion in 2022 with the Board to vacate its 1999 denial, alleging due process violations because the Board had failed to ensure the regional office complied with orders to search for certain records. The Board denied the motion, characterizing the alleged error as a “duty to assist error” rather than a due process error. Young appealed this denial to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which dismissed the appeal. The Veterans Court found that while the appeal was timely regarding the denial of the motion to vacate, such a denial was not an appealable decision under its jurisdictional statute.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court’s dismissal. The Federal Circuit held that the Board’s denial of a motion to vacate under 38 C.F.R. § 20.1000(a), when based solely on alleged material error known at the time of the original decision, does not constitute an appealable “decision” under 38 U.S.C. § 7252. The court determined that allowing appeals from such procedural denials would undermine the statutory time bar and permit indefinite judicial review of Board decisions. View "YOUNG v. COLLINS " on Justia Law