Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Chad Sheller, as the personal representative of the estate of his son Daniel Elias Sheller, sought attorneys' fees after voluntarily dismissing a Vaccine Act petition. Daniel passed away at two months old, two days after receiving several vaccinations. Sheller filed for compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, relying on the "Triple Risk Model" of vaccine-triggered sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) proposed by Dr. Douglas Miller. This model had previously been accepted in another case, Boatmon v. Secretary of Health & Human Services.The Special Master denied Sheller's request for attorneys' fees, concluding that the Triple Risk Model did not provide a reasonable basis for the claim. The United States Court of Federal Claims affirmed this decision. The Special Master also struck certain medical articles from the record, which were submitted after the petition was dismissed, deeming them irrelevant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Special Master abused his discretion by not considering whether the Triple Risk Model was a reasonable basis at the time of filing, given its prior acceptance in the Boatmon case. The court noted that the model was plausible and had succeeded before another special master, making it a reasonable basis for the petition when filed. The court also found that the Special Master did not abuse his discretion in striking the medical articles, as he assessed their relevance appropriately.The Federal Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case for the Special Master to determine, in his discretion, whether attorneys' fees should be granted, considering the Vaccine Act's objective of maintaining access to qualified legal assistance. View "SHELLER v. HHS " on Justia Law

NexStep, Inc. filed a lawsuit against Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, alleging infringement of nine patents, including U.S. Patent Nos. 8,885,802 and 8,280,009. The District Court for the District of Delaware granted summary judgment of non-infringement for the '802 patent after construing the term "VoIP" to require two-way voice communication, which NexStep's infringement theory did not meet. The '009 patent proceeded to a jury trial, where the jury found no literal infringement but did find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. However, the district court granted Comcast's post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding NexStep's proof inadequate.The district court's summary judgment for the '802 patent was based on the construction of "VoIP" as requiring two-way voice communication, supported by technical dictionaries and the agreed industry standard meaning. NexStep's argument that VoIP should include one-way audio transmission was rejected. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact and granted summary judgment of non-infringement.For the '009 patent, the jury found no literal infringement but did find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. However, the district court set aside this verdict, ruling that NexStep failed to provide the required particularized testimony and linking argument to support the doctrine of equivalents. The court found that NexStep's expert testimony was too conclusory and lacked specificity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. The appellate court agreed with the district court's construction of "VoIP" and its grant of summary judgment for the '802 patent. For the '009 patent, the appellate court found that NexStep's expert testimony did not meet the evidentiary requirements for the doctrine of equivalents, as it lacked particularized testimony and linking argument. The court dismissed Comcast's conditional cross-appeal related to the validity of the '009 patent. View "NEXSTEP, INC. v. COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, LLC " on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two companies over the enforcement of standard-essential patents (SEPs) related to the 5G wireless-communication standard. The plaintiff, a telecommunications company, had made a commitment to license its SEPs on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The defendant, another technology company, sought an antisuit injunction to prevent the plaintiff from enforcing injunctions it had obtained in Colombia and Brazil based on these SEPs.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina denied the defendant's request for an antisuit injunction. The district court applied a three-part framework to analyze the request, focusing on whether the domestic suit would be dispositive of the foreign actions. The court concluded that the domestic suit would not necessarily result in a global cross-license between the parties and therefore did not meet the threshold requirement for issuing an antisuit injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court vacated the district court's denial and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court concluded that the district court had erred in its interpretation of the "dispositive" requirement. Specifically, the appellate court held that the FRAND commitment precludes the plaintiff from pursuing SEP-based injunctive relief unless it has first complied with its obligation to negotiate in good faith over a license to those SEPs. Since whether the plaintiff had complied with this obligation was an issue before the district court, the appellate court determined that the "dispositive" requirement was met.The appellate court did not decide whether the defendant was ultimately entitled to the antisuit injunction, leaving that determination to the district court's discretion upon further analysis. The case was remanded for the district court to consider the remaining parts of the foreign-antisuit-injunction framework. View "TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON v. LENOVO (UNITED STATES), INC. " on Justia Law

A Canadian company, J.D. Irving (JDI), challenged the U.S. Department of Commerce's assignment of an antidumping duty cash deposit rate of 11.59% on its softwood lumber products from Canada. This rate was determined in the final results of the second administrative review (AR 2) of an antidumping duty order. JDI argued that its cash deposit rate should remain at 1.57%, the rate assigned in the first administrative review (AR 1). JDI filed a complaint with the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), asserting that the CIT had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the court's residual jurisdiction.The CIT dismissed JDI's case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that jurisdiction under § 1581(i) was not appropriate because jurisdiction could have been available under § 1581(c). The CIT noted that JDI's action was essentially a challenge to the final results of AR 2, which is reviewable under § 1581(c). Additionally, the CIT found that JDI had not demonstrated that the remedy provided by administrative review and binational panel review under the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) would be manifestly inadequate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT's dismissal. The court held that the true nature of JDI's suit was a challenge to the AR 2 final results, making § 1581(c) the proper jurisdiction. The court also determined that JDI had not met its burden to show that the alternative remedies of administrative review and binational panel review would be manifestly inadequate. The court emphasized that binational panels have the authority to review and remand final antidumping determinations, and Commerce must take action consistent with the panel's decision. Therefore, the CIT's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1581(i) was affirmed. View "J.D. IRVING, LTD. v. US " on Justia Law

Provisur Technologies, Inc. owns patents related to food-processing machinery, specifically high-speed mechanical slicers and a fill and packaging apparatus. Provisur sued Weber, Inc. and its affiliates, alleging that Weber's food slicers and SmartLoader products infringed on these patents. The case was tried before a jury, which found that Weber willfully infringed several claims of Provisur's patents and awarded Provisur approximately $10.5 million in damages.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied Weber's motions for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on noninfringement and willfulness, as well as a motion for a new trial on infringement, willfulness, and damages. Weber appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of JMOL for noninfringement regarding the '812 and '436 patents, as Weber conceded its noninfringement arguments were no longer available due to an intervening decision. However, the court reversed the district court's denial of JMOL for noninfringement of the '936 patent, finding that Provisur failed to provide sufficient evidence that Weber's SmartLoader could be readily configured to infringe the patent.The court also reversed the district court's denial of JMOL on willfulness, ruling that the evidence presented, including testimony about Weber's failure to consult a third party, was insufficient to establish willful infringement. Additionally, the court found that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Provisur to use the entire market value rule for calculating damages without sufficient evidence that the patented features drove customer demand for the entire slicing line. Consequently, the court reversed the denial of a new trial on damages.The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Federal Circuit's decision. View "PROVISUR TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. WEBER, INC. " on Justia Law

The case involves the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) and Apple Inc. WARF accused Apple of infringing U.S. Patent No. 5,781,752 (the '752 patent) with its A7 and A8 processors in a lawsuit filed in 2014 (WARF I). WARF later filed a second lawsuit (WARF II) accusing Apple's A9 and A10 processors of infringing the same patent. In WARF I, the jury found that Apple’s A7 and A8 processors literally infringed the '752 patent. However, Apple appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the jury's verdict, finding that no reasonable jury could find literal infringement under the plain and ordinary meaning of the term "particular" as used in the patent claims.In the district court for WARF I, WARF had abandoned its doctrine-of-equivalents theory in exchange for Apple not presenting certain evidence at trial. After the Federal Circuit's reversal, WARF sought to reassert the doctrine-of-equivalents theory, but the district court denied this request, citing WARF's prior abandonment and the preclusive effect of the Federal Circuit's interpretation of "particular."In WARF II, the district court stayed proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal in WARF I. After the Federal Circuit's decision, WARF attempted to continue WARF II under the doctrine of equivalents. The district court found that WARF I precluded WARF from proceeding in WARF II, citing issue preclusion and the Kessler doctrine, which prevents repeated litigation of the same issue against the same party.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions in both WARF I and WARF II. The court held that WARF had waived its doctrine-of-equivalents theory in WARF I and that issue preclusion and the Kessler doctrine barred WARF II. The court concluded that the A7/A8 and A9/A10 processors were essentially the same for the purposes of preclusion and that literal infringement and the doctrine of equivalents are part of the same overall issue of infringement. View "WISCONSIN ALUMNI RESEARCH FOUNDATION v. APPLE INC. " on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Realtime Adaptive Streaming LLC, sued DISH and related Sling entities for alleged infringement of three patents related to digital data compression. The district court found the asserted claims of one patent ineligible as abstract under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Defendants filed motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court denied, opting to rehear invalidity arguments after claim construction. The district court later stayed the case pending inter partes review (IPR) proceedings, which resulted in some claims being found unpatentable. The stay was lifted after the IPR proceedings concluded, and the district court eventually granted summary judgment of invalidity for the remaining patent claims.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado awarded attorneys’ fees to the defendants, citing six "red flags" that should have warned Realtime that its case was flawed. These included prior court decisions finding similar claims ineligible, Board decisions invalidating related patent claims, non-final office actions rejecting claims in the reexamination of the patent at issue, a notice letter from DISH warning of potential fees, and expert opinions from DISH’s witness. The district court found that the totality of these circumstances rendered the case exceptional.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision and vacated the award of attorneys’ fees. The appellate court found that some of the red flags cited by the district court should not have been given weight, such as the Adaptive Streaming decision and the Board’s decisions on different patents. The court also noted that the district court failed to adequately explain how certain factors, like the notice letter and expert opinions, constituted red flags. The case was remanded for the district court to reconsider the attorneys’ fees award in light of the appellate court’s findings. View "REALTIME ADAPTIVE STREAMING LLC v. SLING TV, L.L.C. " on Justia Law

Platinum Optics Technology Inc. (PTOT) appealed a final written decision from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) regarding U.S. Patent No. 9,354,369, owned by Viavi Solutions Inc. The patent relates to optical filters with specific properties of hydrogenated silicon. PTOT challenged the patent's claims, arguing they were unpatentable due to obviousness based on prior art references. The PTAB ruled against PTOT, finding that the prior art did not render the claims unpatentable.Previously, Viavi had sued PTOT for patent infringement in two cases in the Northern District of California. The claims related to the '369 patent were dismissed with prejudice in both cases. PTOT then petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of the '369 patent, leading to the PTAB's decision that PTOT failed to prove the claims were unpatentable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. PTOT argued it had standing to appeal based on potential future infringement liability from continuing to supply bandpass filters and developing new models. However, the court found PTOT's arguments speculative and insufficient to establish an injury in fact. The court noted that the previous lawsuits were dismissed with prejudice, and PTOT did not provide concrete plans or specific details about new products that might infringe the '369 patent.The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal, concluding that PTOT failed to demonstrate a substantial risk of future infringement or a likelihood that Viavi would assert a claim of infringement. Therefore, PTOT did not have standing to appeal the PTAB's decision. View "PLATINUM OPTICS TECHNOLOGY INC. v. VIAVI SOLUTIONS INC. " on Justia Law

Koss Corporation (Koss) owns several patents related to wireless earphones. Koss filed a patent infringement lawsuit against Bose Corporation (Bose) in the Western District of Texas, alleging infringement of three patents. Bose challenged the venue and also filed for inter partes review (IPR) of the patents with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). Concurrently, Bose sought a declaratory judgment of noninfringement in the District of Massachusetts. The Texas court dismissed Koss's case for improper venue, leading Koss to file counterclaims in Massachusetts. The Massachusetts court stayed the case pending the IPR outcomes.In parallel, Koss's infringement action against Plantronics, Inc. was transferred to the Northern District of California. Plantronics moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the patents were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The California court agreed, invalidating all claims of the patents. Koss amended its complaint but eventually stipulated to dismiss the case with prejudice, without appealing the invalidation order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the PTAB's decisions on the IPRs. However, since the California court had already invalidated all claims of the patents and Koss did not appeal this decision, the Federal Circuit found the appeals moot. The court held that the invalidation order from the California court was final and precluded any further action on the patents, leading to the dismissal of the appeals. View "KOSS CORPORATION v. BOSE CORPORATION " on Justia Law

Backertop Licensing LLC and Lori LaPray appealed the U.S. District Court of Delaware’s orders requiring LaPray to appear in-person for testimony regarding potential fraud and imposing monetary sanctions for her failure to appear. The District Court identified potential misconduct in numerous related patent cases involving IP Edge and Mavexar, which allegedly created shell LLCs, assigned patents for little consideration, and directed litigation without disclosing their ongoing rights. The court was concerned that this arrangement concealed the real parties in interest and potentially perpetrated fraud on the court.The District Court ordered LaPray, the sole owner of Backertop, to produce documents and appear in-person to address these concerns. LaPray moved to set aside the order, citing travel difficulties and requesting to appear telephonically, which the court denied. The court rescheduled the hearing to accommodate her schedule but maintained the requirement for in-person testimony to assess her credibility. LaPray did not attend the rescheduled hearing, leading the court to hold her in civil contempt and impose a daily fine until she appeared.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the District Court’s orders were within its inherent authority and not an abuse of discretion. The court found that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, which limits the geographic range of subpoenas, did not apply to the court’s sua sponte orders. The court affirmed the District Court’s orders, emphasizing the necessity of in-person testimony to investigate potential misconduct and assess credibility. The monetary sanctions for LaPray’s failure to appear were also upheld. View "BACKERTOP LICENSING LLC v. CANARY CONNECT, INC. " on Justia Law