Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

AVC manufactures cooling systems for integrated circuits. Asetek’s patents are directed toward liquid computer cooling systems to cool integrated circuits. Asetek brought infringement lawsuits against other competitors and sent a letter accusing AVC of infringement, based on Asetek’s mistaken belief that AVC manufactured Liqmax 120s. AVC responded that it did not manufacture Liqmax 120s, but requested a meeting. Asetek responded that if AVC was not making Liqmax 120s there was no reason to meet; that it had unsuccessfully tried to cooperate with AVC previously; and that it does not license its patents. The letter stated, “Please be advised that Asetek believes that AVC is likely selling other infringing products” and that Asetek enforces its IP. A meeting ultimately occurred ; Asetek offered AVC a license at a royalty rate of 16%. AVC then filed suit alleging that AVC had designed and built certain liquid cooling products and seeking a declaration that its products did not infringe the Asetek patents and that those patents are invalid. Accepting Asetek’s assertion that it did not know that those products existed before AVC’s complaint, the district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit reversed. AVC alleged sufficient facts that, “under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” View "Asia Vital Components Co. v. Asetek Danmark A/S" on Justia Law

Murata and Daifuku manufacture and maintain automated material handling systems that use robotic vehicles suspended in semiconductor cleanrooms to move and manipulate semiconductor components. Murata sued Daifuku, alleging infringement. Daifuku petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeals Board for inter partes review of three patents and moved to stay the litigation pending the outcome, citing the traditional three-factor test, considering: stage of the proceedings; potential for the stay to simplify; and undue prejudice to the non-moving party or a clear tactical advantage for the moving party. Murata asked that the court consider a fourth factor: potential for a stay to reduce the burden of litigation on the parties and the court. The court, relying on four factors, stayed the case, but granted leave for Murata to amend its complaint to add two Additional Patents. Murata amended, moved to lift the stay with regard to the Additional Patents, and sought a preliminary injunction. Again applying the four factors, the court declined to lift the stay, then stated that “[b]ecause the court has now declined to lift the stay, the Motion for Preliminary Injunction is denied without prejudice to renew at a later date, if appropriate.” The Federal Circuit upheld refusal to lift the stay, but found that the “cursory denial” did not satisfy FRCP 52(a)(2), which requires that a court state findings and conclusions supporting denial of a preliminary injunction. View "Murata Mach. USA, Inc. v. Daifuku Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

Polar, a Finnish company based in Finland, owns U.S. patents directed to a method and apparatus for measuring heart rates during physical exercise. Polar sued, alleging infringement directly and indirectly, through the manufacture, use, sale, and importation of Suunto products. Suunto is a Finnish company with a principal place of business and manufacturing facilities in Finland. Suunto and ASWO (a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in Utah) are owned by the same parent company. ASWO distributes Suunto’s products in the U.S. Suunto ships the accused products to addresses specified by ASWO. ASWO pays for shipping; title passes to ASWO at Suunto’s shipping dock in Finland. At least 94 accused products have been shipped from Finland to Delaware retailers using that standard ordering process. At least three Delaware retail stores sell the products. Suunto also owns, but ASWO maintains, a website, where customers can locate Delaware Suunto retailers or order Suunto products. At least eight online sales have been made in Delaware. The Federal Circuit vacated dismissal of Suunto for lack of personal jurisdiction. Suunto’s activities demonstrated its intent to serve the Delaware market specifically; the accused products have been sold in Delaware. Suunto had purposeful minimum contacts, so that Delaware’s “assertion of personal jurisdiction is reasonable and fair” and proper under the Delaware long-arm​ statute. View "Polar Electro Oy v. Suunto Oy" on Justia Law

In 2007, Hutchison imported furniture from China through Orient International. The Commerce Department assigned Orient an antidumping duty margin of 216.01%. The Court of International Trade (CIT) entered an injunction and directed that the entries be liquidated “in accordance with the final court decision ... including all appeals.” In February 2013, CIT sustained Commerce’s remand redetermination, including a rate of 83.55%. Orient did not appeal; in June CIT ordered that Orient’s entries be liquidated in accordance with the February Final Judgment. In September, Customs liquidated the entries at 83.55%. Hutchison filed an unsuccessful protest with Customs under 19 U.S.C. 1514. In October 2014, Hutchison sought review under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i)(4), asserting that the entries should have been deemed liquidated at 7.24%, citing 19 U.S.C. 1504(d): “[w]hen a suspension required by statute or court order is removed, [Customs] shall liquidate the entry . . . within [six] months after receiving notice of the removal,” and, if the entry is not so liquidated, it shall be deemed "liquidated at the rate of duty, value, quantity, and amount of duty asserted by the importer” at the time of entry. Hutchison argued that Commerce’s liquidation instructions misidentified the date on which suspension of liquidation was lifted and that the suspension expired with the Final Judgment. CIT dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, stating that the “claim involves a protestable [Customs] decision,” which Hutchison could have appealed under 28 U.S.C. 1581(a) if its protest was denied. The Federal Circuit affirmed; regardless of whether the Final Judgment constituted a final court decision or constituted notice to Customs, starting the six-month period in 1504(d), a party may not invoke jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i) when jurisdiction under another subsection could have been invoked. View "Hutchison Quality Furniture, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Dr. Arunachalam owns the 178 patent, which has been undergoing reexamination since November 2008. In 2014, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board affirmed the rejection of claims 9– 16, but designated a new ground of rejection for claim 16. Arunachalam elected to reopen prosecution of the claims, after which the examiner issued a final rejection in June 2015. Rather than appeal the examiner’s final rejection to the Board, Arunachalam appealed to the Federal Circuit, which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to hear a non-final appeal from the Patent Office. A patent owner dissatisfied with an examiner’s rejection of a claim in reexamination may proceed with a two-step appeals process. First, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 134(b) (2002), a patent owner in any reexamination proceeding may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Board. If the patent owner is dissatisfied with the Board’s final decision, the patent owner may appeal the decision to the Federal Circuit, 35 U.S.C. 141. View "In re: Arunachalam" on Justia Law

Diamond sued the auto companies, alleging infringement of its patents. The district court dismissed the actions finding that agreements between Diamond and Sanyo, the original assignee of the patents-in-suit, did not confer patentee status on Diamond, allowing Diamond to sue without joining Sanyo. The court later held that nunc pro tunc agreements executed by Diamond and Sanyo after its decision in Diamond did not affect its determination. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The original agreements did not convey all of the substantial rights in the patents to Diamond. Precedent bars consideration of the subsequent agreements. View "Diamond Coating Techs., LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am." on Justia Law

Heartland, an LLC organized and existing under Indiana law is headquartered in Indiana. Kraft, organized and existing under Delaware law, has its principal place of business in Illinois. Kraft filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware alleging that Heartland’s liquid water enhancer products infringe Kraft’s patents. Heartland moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or to transfer venue to the Southern District of Indiana. Heartland alleged that it is not registered to do business in Delaware, has no local presence there, has not entered into any supply contracts in Delaware or called on any accounts there to solicit sales, but admitted it ships orders of the accused products into Delaware. In 2013, these shipments, 44,707 cases of the product, generated at least $331,000 in revenue, and were about 2% of Heartland’s total sales of the accused products. The Magistrate Judge determined that it had specific personal jurisdiction over Heartland for claims involving the accused products and rejected Heartland’s arguments that 2011 amendments to 28 U.S.C. 1391 negated precedent governing venue for infringement suits. The district court denied Heartland’s motions. The Federal Circuit denied Heartland’s petition for mandamus to either dismiss or transfer the suit. View "In re: TC Heartland LLC" on Justia Law

Sneed, who served on active duty 1964-1968, suffered service-connected disabilities. In 2001, Sneed suffered a spinal cord contusion from a fall, leaving him quadriplegic. In 2003, he died of smoke inhalation while living in a home for paralyzed veterans. His widow sought dependency and indemnity compensation, 38 U.S.C. 1310, alleging that Sneed’s service-connected spondylosis and spinal stenosis contributed to quadriplegia and that his service-connected PTSD and hearing loss prevented him from exiting during the fire. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed denial,mailing notice on April 5. Sneed’s notice of appeal was due 120 days after that mailing. On April 13, Sneed contacted attorney Eagle, requesting representation. According to Sneed, at the request of Eagle’s secretary, she transmitted case materials to and had oral communications with that office. On August 2, Sneed received a letter from Eagle, stating that the claim “does not meet the criteria,” declining representation, and stating that notice of appeal was due "no later than August 5.” The correct deadline was August 3. Several lawyers declined her case. Sneed filed notice on September 1, explaining her circumstances. The Veterans Court dismissed the appeal as untimely. On remand, Sneed argued attorney abandonment, warranting equitable tolling. The Veterans Court held, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, that equitable tolling was not warranted absent an agreement between Eagle and Sneed and that Sneed did not act diligently. View "Sneed v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Rembrandt sued, alleging that JJVC’s Acuvue Advance® and Oasys® contact lenses infringed Rembrandt’s patent. Rembrandt relied on expert testimony from Dr. Beebe, who presented test results, to prove that the accused lenses met the “surface layer” and “soft” claim limitations. During cross-examination, Beebe drastically changed his testimony regarding his testing methodology. JJVC relied on expert testimony from Dr. Bielawski that its lenses did not meet the “surface layer” limitation, but did not present expert testimony concerning the “soft” limitation. In his testimony, Bielawski impugned Beebe’s credibility. The court ultimately struck Beebe’s testimony regarding the testing and granted judgment as a matter of law that Rembrandt failed to prove that the accused lenses were “soft.” The Federal Circuit affirmed. After trial, Rembrandt received information suggesting that Bielawski testified falsely. Although the court denied Rembrandt’s request for post-trial discovery, Rembrandt received much of what it sought from Bielawski’s employer, the University of Texas, through an open records request. The parties no longer dispute that Bielawski testified falsely on material issues. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial. The district court erred in requiring proof that JJVC or its counsel was complicit in Bielawski’s false testimony. View "Rembrandt Vision Techs., L.P. v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc." on Justia Law

MPHJ’s 381 patent, entitled “Distributed Computer Architecture and Process for Virtual Copying,” issued in 2004 and discloses a method and system that “extend[] the notion of copying . . . to a process that involves paper being scanned from a device at one location and copied to a device at another location.” “What makes Virtual Copier as simple as its physical counterpart . . . is the fact that it replicates the identical motions that a user who is making a copy using a physical photocopier goes through.” On inter partes review initiated by HP, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board found certain claims not patentable as anticipated and one claim (13) not unpatentable as anticipated. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting HP’s argument that the PTO should have reviewed claim 13 to determine whether it was unpatentable as obvious. The court stated that it cannot review the decision not to institute. View "HP Inc. v. MPHJ Tech. Inv., LLC" on Justia Law