Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Celgard is a developer and manufacturer of battery membranes, used to separate chemical cell components in lithium-ion batteries, preventing contact between the positive and negative electrodes. The patents concerns a separator technology that uses a ceramic composite coating that helps prevent electrical shorting. This technology is used in rechargeable batteries in electronic vehicles and consumer electronic devices such as laptops and cellular phones. Celgard is headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina. SKI is a manufacturer of separators for use in lithium-ion batteries. SKI mainly supplies the separators to third-party manufacturers, but also manufactures batteries that include the separators it produces. SKI’s principal place of business is in Seoul, Korea. All of SKI’s design, manufacturing, and sales operations are based in Korea. Celgard sued SKI for infringement. Celgard sought to establish the district court’s jurisdiction based on allegations that SKI purposefully directed activities at the forum state through sales and offers for sale of its accused separators to residents of North Carolina. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, under either a purposeful-direction theory or a stream-of-commerce theory, noting an absence of evidence that SKI ever sold or offered for sale the accused products in North Carolina. View "Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

SpeedTrack’s patent, entitled “Method for Accessing Computer Files and Data, Using Linked Categories Assigned to Each Data File Record on Entry of the Data File Record,” describes methods for searching and accessing files stored on a computer system. The claimed methods require use of: “category descriptions,” corresponding to stored files; a “file information directory” containing information linking “category descriptions” to specific system files; and a “search filter,” to locate files that have “category descriptions” matching those in the filter. SpeedTrack sued, alleging that Walmart’s online retail website infringed the patent by permitting visitors to search for available products by selecting pre-defined descriptive categories. Walmart licensed and used Endeca’s software to achieve this functionality. After reexamination by the PTO, the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement , finding that, because the accused Endeca software uses numerical identifiers instead of descriptive words, users did not use “category descriptions” required by the patent. The Federal Circuit affirmed the claim construction. Speedtrack later sued Office Depot. The Federal Circuit affirmed judgment as a matter of law, finding that SpeedTrack’s claims were barred by res judicata and under the “Kessler doctrine,” which bars suits against customers for use of a product previously found not to infringe in a suit against the product’s supplier. View "SpeedTrack, Inc. v. Office Depot, Inc." on Justia Law

ICP imports products sold to food manufacturers, including “white sauce.” In 1998, Customs issued a Ruling Letter, classifying “white sauce” under Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the U.S. (HTSUS) 2103.90.9060 as “sauces and preparations therefor.” In 2005 Customs issued a Notice, without providing statutory notice and comment, reclassifying “white sauce” under HTSUS 0405.20.3000 as “[d]airy spreads,” effecting a tariff increase of almost 2400%. Waves of litigation followed. In 2007, Customs liquidated entries from 2003-2004 under the Notice, imposing a liability of $28 million. After Customs denied a protest, ICP unsuccessfully asked Customs for relief under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c). ICP did not ask Customs to voluntarily reliquidate under 19 U.S.C. 1501, nor seek administrative review of the protest denial, which became final and could not be suspended pending the Federal Circuit decision concerning the Notice. ICP sued without paying the $28 million owed. The Trade Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based on ICP’s failure to pay and for failure to state a claim. In 2014 the Federal Circuit held that the 2005 Notice was subject to the requirements in 19 U.S.C. 1625(c) and was void because Customs failed to comply. The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to the 2003-2004 entries. To invoke Trade Court jurisdiction, an aggrieved importer must file protest under 19 U.S.C. 1514. Once Customs denies that protest, the importer must pay “all liquidated duties, charges, or exactions” owed before commencing suit,28 U.S.C. 2637. The pre-payment requirement is a valid condition attached to the government’s waiver of immunity, and ICP lacked a constitutionally protected property interest. View "Int'l Custom Prods., Inc v. United States" on Justia Law

Gaymar ‘s patent is directed to a patient temperature control system, including a blanket that can conductively warm or cool the patient. In 2008, Gaymar sued CSZ, asserting that CSZ’s Blanketrol device infringed claims of the patent. The PTO granted CSZ’s inter partes reexamination request and issued a first Office Action rejecting all claims of the patent as anticipated or obvious over prior art cited in CSZ’s request. The district court denied Gaymar’s motion for a preliminary injunction and granted CSZ’s motion to stay the case pending the conclusion of the reexamination. The PTO reaffirmed its rejection of all claims of the patent. Gaymar filed an express abandonment of all claims in 2010, and the PTO concluded the reexamination, cancelling all of the claims. The district court lifted the stay. CSZ unsuccessfully sought attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. 285, alleging that Gaymar’s litigation position was frivolous and that Gaymar had engaged in litigation misconduct. Following the Supreme Court’s 2014, decision, Octane Fitness, CSZ unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. The Federal Circuit affirmed a finding of a lack of objective baselessness, but reversed the exceptional case finding insofar as it was based on CSZ’s purported misconduct. View "Gaymar Indus., Inc. v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Prods., Inc." on Justia Law

Fluorescent lamp fixtures typically regulate electric current by an electronic ballast, which maintains current levels high enough to start the lamp but prevents current from reaching destructive levels. When a lamp is removed from its holders or when a filament is broken, current provided by the ballast ceases to flow and dissipates back into the ballast, which can destroy the ballast and create an electric shock hazard. LB’s 529 patent discloses an electronic ballast able to shield itself from destructive levels of current. LB sued ULT, asserting infringement. ULT argued that the term “voltage source means” is governed by 35 U.S.C. 112 and that the claims are invalid under 35 U.S.C. 12 as indefinite because the specification fails to disclose what structure corresponded to the “voltage source means” limitation. The district court concluded that the term “voltage source means” had sufficient structure. A jury awarded LB $3 million in damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that claim construction is an issue of law that it reviews de novo. The Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of its holding in Teva Pharmaceuticals (2015), that while the ultimate question of claim construction is a legal question, there may be underlying “subsidiary” factual findings related to the extrinsic record that are reviewed for clear error. On remand, the Federal Circuit affirmed. Because the district court’s factual findings demonstrate that the claims convey sufficient structure, it was correct to conclude that the term “voltage source means” is not governed by section 112. View "Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Electronics, NA" on Justia Law

Scott served on active duty in 1972. In 1999, Scott tested positive for hepatitis C. He applied for disability benefits in 2005, alleging that he contracted hepatitis C in service from air-gun inoculations. The VA denied service connection. Scott was incarcerated during his appeal. The VA acknowledged Scott’s request for a video conference hearing, and requested the date on which he was expected to be released. Scott responded “January 13, 2017,” and “next parole review date is scheduled for March of 2009.” The VA notified Scott that his hearing was scheduled for March 14, 2008. Scott, still incarcerated, failed to appear. On March 23, Scott requested a rescheduled hearing. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals found that Scott had “not shown good cause,” with no mention of Scott’s incarceration. The Board denied Scott’s claim for service connection, noting that Scott “failed to report for his scheduled hearing.” Before the Veterans Court, Scott, then represented by counsel, did not raise the hearing issue. The Veterans Court vacated based on an inadequate medical examination. In 2011, the VA continued the denial without mentioning the hearing issue. Scott submitted a re-certification of appeal form which checked “YES” in answer to “WAS HEARING REQUESTED?” Scott did not raise the hearing issue with the Board, which affirmed, noting that Scott “has not renewed his request” for a hearing. Before the Veterans Court, in 2013, Scott raised the hearing issue for the first time since March 23, 2008. That court affirmed, stating that raising the hearing issue “amounts to … undesirable piecemeal litigation” for no compelling reason. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The obligation to read filings in a liberal manner does not require the Board or the Veterans Court to search the record and address procedural arguments when the veteran fails to raise them. View "Scott v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Delisle served on active duty in the U.S. Army, 1952-1954, and injured his left knee in a ski accident. After that injury, Delisle also began to experience chronic pain in his other knee. In 1978, the Department of Veterans Affairs granted Delisle’s claim for entitlement to a service connection for his right-knee disorder and assigned a 10 percent disability rating. Despite continued treatment, the condition of Delisle’s right knee continued to deteriorate. In 2009, Delisle unsuccessfully sought an increase to the 10 percent disability rating for his right knee. While appeal to the Board of Veterans Appeals was pending, he underwent the total right-knee replacement. As a result, the VA assigned a 100 percent disability rating for the period from April 7, 2010 to May 31, 2011, and assigned a 60 percent rating, along with a total disability rating based on individual employability for the period following May 31, 2011. Delisle challenged only the determination that he was not entitled to a higher disability rating for the nine months before his surgery. The Board rejected the claim. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit dismissed. The Veterans Court’s determination concerned questions of fact, which are beyond the court’s jurisdiction, 38 U.S.C. 7292(d)(2) View "Delisle v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Following a 1996 investigation, the Department of Commerce declared that freshwater crawfish tail meat imported from China was subject to antidumping duties. In 2001, JCOF imported that product from Yangzhou, which qualified as a “new exporter” under 19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(2)(B). JCOF obtained, from AHAC , a one-year, continuous $600,000 bond, 19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(2)(B)(iii), made two entries from Yangzhou, and declared a 0% duty rate, the deposit rate then in effect for shipments by Yangzhou. Commerce conducted administrative review of 2001-2002 entries; the final results assigned Yangzhou a 223.01% rate. Customs liquidated the entries and billed JCOF, which failed to pay. Customs sought payment from AHAC, which filed protest. Another exporter challenged Commerce’s 2004 administrative review. Following dissolution of a resultant injunction, which had not applied to Yangzhou, Customs nonetheless reliquidated JCOF’s entries, issued new bills, and denied AHAC’s protest. AHAC did not appeal, but filed another protest, which was denied. Customs demanded $1,157,898.22. AHAC asserted that the collection action was moot because the erroneous reliquidations voided the previous liquidations, so that no valid liquidation occurred and the entries should be deemed liquidated under 19 U.S.C. 1504(d) at the initially-declared 0% rate. The Court of International Trade and Federal Circuit held that AHAC was obligated to pay. The reliquidations voided the original liquidations, but AHAC failed to preserve its rights by timely litigation; the reliquidations became final, “whether legal or not.” The court remanded the issues of equitable and statutory prejudgment interest. View "United States v. Am. Home Assurance Co." on Justia Law

In the “NOVA” decision, the Federal Circuit approved a plan requiring the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to identify and rectify harms caused by wrongful application of former 38 C.F.R. 3.103. The Plan required that the VA notify every claimant who received a final Board decision during the specified period and did not receive full relief. If a claimant had a case outside of the Board’s jurisdiction, but mandate had not issued and the appellate court’s judgment was not final, the VA was obligated to offer to submit a joint motion for remand. If the mandate had issued, the VA was required to offer to submit a joint motion to recall mandate and a joint motion for remand. Smith served in the Army, 1963-1965. In 2000, Smith filed an unsuccessful claim for compensation for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In 2008, Smith was awarded service connection for PTSD with a 100% disability rating and a 2006 effective date. Smith appealed to the Board, which, in 2011, denied entitlement to an earlier effective date. The Board did not apply the invalid Rule interpretation. The Veterans Court affirmed and, days before the NOVA decision, entered judgment. In 2013, the parties filed a joint motion to recall that judgment. The decision fit the search terms profile under the Plan and triggered the VA’s obligation to offer to submit a joint motion. Smith did not claim that VA failed to comply with 38 C.F.R. 3.103(c)(2) or any prejudice in the conduct of the Board hearing. The Federal Circuit affirmed denial of the motion, stating that neither its decisions nor the Plan preclude appropriate denial. View "Smith v. McDonald" on Justia Law

INTTRA owns patents relating to online methods for coordinating containerized shipping. GT sought a declaratory judgment that INTTRA’s shipping methods patents were invalid. While the case was pending, GT petitioned the PTO to review the patents as covered-business-method patents. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted review, but granted INTTRA leave to file a motion to dismiss on the ground that section 325(a)(1) barred the reviews because of the civil action. GT argued that INTTRA had waived that objection by not presenting it within the 14 days allowed by the rule giving a right to seek reconsideration. The Board granted INTTRA’s motion and “terminated” proceedings, without addressing patentability, reasoning that section 325(a)(1) is a statutory limit on Board “jurisdiction.” The Federal Circuit dismissed and denied mandamus relief. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. 325 declares that “review may not be instituted . . . if, before the date on which the petition for such a review is filed, the petitioner … filed a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent.” GT identified nothing that precludes the Board from reconsidering an initial institution decision or invoking the 325(a)(1) bar on its own, or inviting the patentee to file a motion after more than 14 days. View "GTNX, Inc.. v. INTTRA, Inc." on Justia Law