Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Delisle served on active duty in the U.S. Army, 1952-1954, and injured his left knee in a ski accident. After that injury, Delisle also began to experience chronic pain in his other knee. In 1978, the Department of Veterans Affairs granted Delisle’s claim for entitlement to a service connection for his right-knee disorder and assigned a 10 percent disability rating. Despite continued treatment, the condition of Delisle’s right knee continued to deteriorate. In 2009, Delisle unsuccessfully sought an increase to the 10 percent disability rating for his right knee. While appeal to the Board of Veterans Appeals was pending, he underwent the total right-knee replacement. As a result, the VA assigned a 100 percent disability rating for the period from April 7, 2010 to May 31, 2011, and assigned a 60 percent rating, along with a total disability rating based on individual employability for the period following May 31, 2011. Delisle challenged only the determination that he was not entitled to a higher disability rating for the nine months before his surgery. The Board rejected the claim. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit dismissed. The Veterans Court’s determination concerned questions of fact, which are beyond the court’s jurisdiction, 38 U.S.C. 7292(d)(2) View "Delisle v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Following a 1996 investigation, the Department of Commerce declared that freshwater crawfish tail meat imported from China was subject to antidumping duties. In 2001, JCOF imported that product from Yangzhou, which qualified as a “new exporter” under 19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(2)(B). JCOF obtained, from AHAC , a one-year, continuous $600,000 bond, 19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(2)(B)(iii), made two entries from Yangzhou, and declared a 0% duty rate, the deposit rate then in effect for shipments by Yangzhou. Commerce conducted administrative review of 2001-2002 entries; the final results assigned Yangzhou a 223.01% rate. Customs liquidated the entries and billed JCOF, which failed to pay. Customs sought payment from AHAC, which filed protest. Another exporter challenged Commerce’s 2004 administrative review. Following dissolution of a resultant injunction, which had not applied to Yangzhou, Customs nonetheless reliquidated JCOF’s entries, issued new bills, and denied AHAC’s protest. AHAC did not appeal, but filed another protest, which was denied. Customs demanded $1,157,898.22. AHAC asserted that the collection action was moot because the erroneous reliquidations voided the previous liquidations, so that no valid liquidation occurred and the entries should be deemed liquidated under 19 U.S.C. 1504(d) at the initially-declared 0% rate. The Court of International Trade and Federal Circuit held that AHAC was obligated to pay. The reliquidations voided the original liquidations, but AHAC failed to preserve its rights by timely litigation; the reliquidations became final, “whether legal or not.” The court remanded the issues of equitable and statutory prejudgment interest. View "United States v. Am. Home Assurance Co." on Justia Law

In the “NOVA” decision, the Federal Circuit approved a plan requiring the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to identify and rectify harms caused by wrongful application of former 38 C.F.R. 3.103. The Plan required that the VA notify every claimant who received a final Board decision during the specified period and did not receive full relief. If a claimant had a case outside of the Board’s jurisdiction, but mandate had not issued and the appellate court’s judgment was not final, the VA was obligated to offer to submit a joint motion for remand. If the mandate had issued, the VA was required to offer to submit a joint motion to recall mandate and a joint motion for remand. Smith served in the Army, 1963-1965. In 2000, Smith filed an unsuccessful claim for compensation for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In 2008, Smith was awarded service connection for PTSD with a 100% disability rating and a 2006 effective date. Smith appealed to the Board, which, in 2011, denied entitlement to an earlier effective date. The Board did not apply the invalid Rule interpretation. The Veterans Court affirmed and, days before the NOVA decision, entered judgment. In 2013, the parties filed a joint motion to recall that judgment. The decision fit the search terms profile under the Plan and triggered the VA’s obligation to offer to submit a joint motion. Smith did not claim that VA failed to comply with 38 C.F.R. 3.103(c)(2) or any prejudice in the conduct of the Board hearing. The Federal Circuit affirmed denial of the motion, stating that neither its decisions nor the Plan preclude appropriate denial. View "Smith v. McDonald" on Justia Law

INTTRA owns patents relating to online methods for coordinating containerized shipping. GT sought a declaratory judgment that INTTRA’s shipping methods patents were invalid. While the case was pending, GT petitioned the PTO to review the patents as covered-business-method patents. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted review, but granted INTTRA leave to file a motion to dismiss on the ground that section 325(a)(1) barred the reviews because of the civil action. GT argued that INTTRA had waived that objection by not presenting it within the 14 days allowed by the rule giving a right to seek reconsideration. The Board granted INTTRA’s motion and “terminated” proceedings, without addressing patentability, reasoning that section 325(a)(1) is a statutory limit on Board “jurisdiction.” The Federal Circuit dismissed and denied mandamus relief. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. 325 declares that “review may not be instituted . . . if, before the date on which the petition for such a review is filed, the petitioner … filed a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent.” GT identified nothing that precludes the Board from reconsidering an initial institution decision or invoking the 325(a)(1) bar on its own, or inviting the patentee to file a motion after more than 14 days. View "GTNX, Inc.. v. INTTRA, Inc." on Justia Law

The 109 patent, entitled “Gelatinous Elastomer Compositions and Articles,” is directed to composite articles of a thermoplastic gel and a substrate, such as foam or fabric, used as a protective liner between an amputated limb and a prosthetic limb. According to the patent, prosthetic liners that incorporate the claimed composite articles are comfortable and skin-friendly, and more durable than previous liners. Alps licensed several AEI patents, including the 109 patent. Shortly thereafter, Alps, without naming AEI as a co-plaintiff, filed a patent infringement suit against OWW. Alps declined to join as co-plaintiff. OWW moved to dismiss for lack of standing. Alps and AEI executed an amended license agreement 16 months after Alps commenced the action, listing the effective date of the original agreement. The court denied the motion, finding that the terms of the original agreement was sufficed to provide Alps with standing and that, under the nunc pro tunc amended agreement, Alps “clearly possesses the substantial rights to proceed without [AEI].” A jury found the patent valid and infringed. The Federal Circuit reversed the denial of OWW’s motion to dismiss and vacated the judgment. Alps possessed neither legal title nor all substantial rights at the outset of the litigation, and was required to join AEI, as a co-plaintiff. View "Alps South, LLC v. Ohio Willow Wood Co." on Justia Law

RI purchased 320 acres in Washington State for use as a landfill and, in 1989, applied for state permits. Because the proposed landfill involved filling wetland areas, it sought a Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1344) permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. State permits issued in 1996. In 1994, the Corps required an Environmental Impact Statement; its draft EIS preliminarily concluded that RI had not demonstrated that there were no practicable alternatives to the proposed landfill (40 C.F.R. 230.10(a)). RI terminated the process. The Corps denied the application. In 1996, RI sued, alleging that the process and denial violated the CWA and was arbitrary. The district court upheld the decision, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, citing the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. 6941, under which regulation of municipal solid waste in landfills constructed on wetlands lies solely with the EPA or states with EPA-approved programs. The landfill became operational in 1999. In 1998, while the Ninth Circuit appeal was pending, RI filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging unconstitutional taking. The court dismissed, citing 28 U.S.C. 1500: the Claims Court “shall not have jurisdiction of any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff or his assignee has pending in any other court any suit or process against the United States.” The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Res. Inv., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Beginning in 1983, interferences were declared between Fiers and Sugano generally relating to claims to DNA sequences that encode the precursor and/or mature forms of human fibroblast interferon proteins, which promote viral resistance in human tissue, and in the case of the most recent interference, to claims for the proteins themselves. All of Fiers’ applications claimed priority to a United Kingdom Patent Application filed in April 1980, while Sugano’s applications and patents claimed priority to a Japanese Patent Application, filed in March 1980. In the first and second interferences, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences awarded priority to Sugano. In 2013, in response to a third interference the Board declared that Fiers was estopped from proceeding, given that Fiers lost the prior interferences and the subject matter was the same as in the prior interferences. The district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 125 Stat. 284, eliminated district court jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. 146 with respect to interferences commenced after September 15, 2012. The district court transferred the case to the Federal Circuit, which concluded that the district court correctly decided that it lacked jurisdiction and that the Board’s decision was not erroneous. View "Biogen Ma, Inc. v. Japanese Found. for Cancer Research" on Justia Law

Toomer served in the Army, 1971 to 1974. He sought benefits for degenerative disc disease, claiming connection to a 1972 in-service back strain from lifting heavy objects. In 2004, a VA Regional Office denied the claim. In 2009, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed, relying on a 2007 VA examination. Although Toomer was treated for a back strain in 1972, there was no evidence from subsequent clinical visits that his current pain was connected to that injury: a 1972 x-ray was normal; after January 1973, there were no complaints of back pain during service; and there were potential post-service injuries, considering his occupation as a construction worker. The Decision was mailed on June 2, 2009. On July 27, Toomer informed the VA that he had not received it. On August 4, the VA mailed another copy, noting that the veteran has “120 days from the date this decision was mailed to you (as shown on the first page of this decision) to file a Notice of Appeal,” On October 28, more than 120 days from the decision date, but within 120 days of the August letter, Toomer appealed to the Veterans Court, which dismissed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that even if it disagreed with that court’s finding that dates on the correspondence were not misleading, and did not constitute “extraordinary circumstances,” revisiting this finding was beyond its jurisdiction. View "Toomer v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Oplus filed a patent infringement suit in Illinois that was transferred to California. Oplus moved the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer the case back and consolidate it with other cases. The Panel denied the motion. Ultimately, the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement. Defendant sought attorneys’ and expert witness fees under 35 U.S.C. 285 and 28 U.S.C. 1927. The court made numerous findings regarding misconduct, found the case exceptional under section 285, and held that Oplus and its counsel were vexatious litigants. The court nonetheless denied the request, stating that “[a]though Oplus’s behavior has been inappropriate, unprofessional, and vexatious, an award of attorney fees must take the particular misconduct into account,” the “case has been fraught with delays and avoidance tactics to some degree on both sides,” and “[t]here is little reason to believe that significantly more attorney fees or expert fees have been incurred than would have been in the absence of Oplus’s vexatious behavior.” Concerning section 1927, the court stated that “there is no evidence suggesting that Oplus’s behavior stemmed from bad faith or a sufficient intent to harass,” although there was “ample evidence of Oplus’s litigation misconduct.” The Federal Circuit vacated, finding the denial an abuse of discretion. View "Oplus Techs., Ltd. v. Vizio, Inc." on Justia Law

AMS sued Crane for infringement of four patents. In 2011, Crane requested an inter partes reexamination of each patent under 35 U.S.C. 311–318. Finding that Crane raised substantial new questions of patentability, the PTO initiated four inter partes reexaminations. While they were underway, AMS and Crane settled their suit. The court issued a consent judgment stating that “[t]he parties stipulate that [the patents] are valid,” that “[a]ll claims . . . are dismissed with prejudice,” and that “[t]his judgment is final.” AMS argued that the reexaminations must stop because, under 35 U.S.C. 317(b), the judgment was a “final decision . . . entered against a party in a civil action . . . that the party has not sustained its burden of proving the invalidity of any patent claim in suit.” The PTO denied AMS’s petition. The district court reasoned that the consent judgment, though final, was not a decision that Crane failed to prove invalidity of the patents, but only that the parties stipulated to validity. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the PTO’s refusal to terminate pending reexaminations is not subject to judicial review because it is not a “final agency action” under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 704. View "Automated Merch. Sys., Inc. v. Lee" on Justia Law