Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The 109 patent, entitled “Gelatinous Elastomer Compositions and Articles,” is directed to composite articles of a thermoplastic gel and a substrate, such as foam or fabric, used as a protective liner between an amputated limb and a prosthetic limb. According to the patent, prosthetic liners that incorporate the claimed composite articles are comfortable and skin-friendly, and more durable than previous liners. Alps licensed several AEI patents, including the 109 patent. Shortly thereafter, Alps, without naming AEI as a co-plaintiff, filed a patent infringement suit against OWW. Alps declined to join as co-plaintiff. OWW moved to dismiss for lack of standing. Alps and AEI executed an amended license agreement 16 months after Alps commenced the action, listing the effective date of the original agreement. The court denied the motion, finding that the terms of the original agreement was sufficed to provide Alps with standing and that, under the nunc pro tunc amended agreement, Alps “clearly possesses the substantial rights to proceed without [AEI].” A jury found the patent valid and infringed. The Federal Circuit reversed the denial of OWW’s motion to dismiss and vacated the judgment. Alps possessed neither legal title nor all substantial rights at the outset of the litigation, and was required to join AEI, as a co-plaintiff. View "Alps South, LLC v. Ohio Willow Wood Co." on Justia Law

RI purchased 320 acres in Washington State for use as a landfill and, in 1989, applied for state permits. Because the proposed landfill involved filling wetland areas, it sought a Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1344) permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. State permits issued in 1996. In 1994, the Corps required an Environmental Impact Statement; its draft EIS preliminarily concluded that RI had not demonstrated that there were no practicable alternatives to the proposed landfill (40 C.F.R. 230.10(a)). RI terminated the process. The Corps denied the application. In 1996, RI sued, alleging that the process and denial violated the CWA and was arbitrary. The district court upheld the decision, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, citing the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. 6941, under which regulation of municipal solid waste in landfills constructed on wetlands lies solely with the EPA or states with EPA-approved programs. The landfill became operational in 1999. In 1998, while the Ninth Circuit appeal was pending, RI filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging unconstitutional taking. The court dismissed, citing 28 U.S.C. 1500: the Claims Court “shall not have jurisdiction of any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff or his assignee has pending in any other court any suit or process against the United States.” The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Res. Inv., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Beginning in 1983, interferences were declared between Fiers and Sugano generally relating to claims to DNA sequences that encode the precursor and/or mature forms of human fibroblast interferon proteins, which promote viral resistance in human tissue, and in the case of the most recent interference, to claims for the proteins themselves. All of Fiers’ applications claimed priority to a United Kingdom Patent Application filed in April 1980, while Sugano’s applications and patents claimed priority to a Japanese Patent Application, filed in March 1980. In the first and second interferences, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences awarded priority to Sugano. In 2013, in response to a third interference the Board declared that Fiers was estopped from proceeding, given that Fiers lost the prior interferences and the subject matter was the same as in the prior interferences. The district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 125 Stat. 284, eliminated district court jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. 146 with respect to interferences commenced after September 15, 2012. The district court transferred the case to the Federal Circuit, which concluded that the district court correctly decided that it lacked jurisdiction and that the Board’s decision was not erroneous. View "Biogen Ma, Inc. v. Japanese Found. for Cancer Research" on Justia Law

Toomer served in the Army, 1971 to 1974. He sought benefits for degenerative disc disease, claiming connection to a 1972 in-service back strain from lifting heavy objects. In 2004, a VA Regional Office denied the claim. In 2009, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed, relying on a 2007 VA examination. Although Toomer was treated for a back strain in 1972, there was no evidence from subsequent clinical visits that his current pain was connected to that injury: a 1972 x-ray was normal; after January 1973, there were no complaints of back pain during service; and there were potential post-service injuries, considering his occupation as a construction worker. The Decision was mailed on June 2, 2009. On July 27, Toomer informed the VA that he had not received it. On August 4, the VA mailed another copy, noting that the veteran has “120 days from the date this decision was mailed to you (as shown on the first page of this decision) to file a Notice of Appeal,” On October 28, more than 120 days from the decision date, but within 120 days of the August letter, Toomer appealed to the Veterans Court, which dismissed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that even if it disagreed with that court’s finding that dates on the correspondence were not misleading, and did not constitute “extraordinary circumstances,” revisiting this finding was beyond its jurisdiction. View "Toomer v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Oplus filed a patent infringement suit in Illinois that was transferred to California. Oplus moved the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer the case back and consolidate it with other cases. The Panel denied the motion. Ultimately, the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement. Defendant sought attorneys’ and expert witness fees under 35 U.S.C. 285 and 28 U.S.C. 1927. The court made numerous findings regarding misconduct, found the case exceptional under section 285, and held that Oplus and its counsel were vexatious litigants. The court nonetheless denied the request, stating that “[a]though Oplus’s behavior has been inappropriate, unprofessional, and vexatious, an award of attorney fees must take the particular misconduct into account,” the “case has been fraught with delays and avoidance tactics to some degree on both sides,” and “[t]here is little reason to believe that significantly more attorney fees or expert fees have been incurred than would have been in the absence of Oplus’s vexatious behavior.” Concerning section 1927, the court stated that “there is no evidence suggesting that Oplus’s behavior stemmed from bad faith or a sufficient intent to harass,” although there was “ample evidence of Oplus’s litigation misconduct.” The Federal Circuit vacated, finding the denial an abuse of discretion. View "Oplus Techs., Ltd. v. Vizio, Inc." on Justia Law

AMS sued Crane for infringement of four patents. In 2011, Crane requested an inter partes reexamination of each patent under 35 U.S.C. 311–318. Finding that Crane raised substantial new questions of patentability, the PTO initiated four inter partes reexaminations. While they were underway, AMS and Crane settled their suit. The court issued a consent judgment stating that “[t]he parties stipulate that [the patents] are valid,” that “[a]ll claims . . . are dismissed with prejudice,” and that “[t]his judgment is final.” AMS argued that the reexaminations must stop because, under 35 U.S.C. 317(b), the judgment was a “final decision . . . entered against a party in a civil action . . . that the party has not sustained its burden of proving the invalidity of any patent claim in suit.” The PTO denied AMS’s petition. The district court reasoned that the consent judgment, though final, was not a decision that Crane failed to prove invalidity of the patents, but only that the parties stipulated to validity. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the PTO’s refusal to terminate pending reexaminations is not subject to judicial review because it is not a “final agency action” under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 704. View "Automated Merch. Sys., Inc. v. Lee" on Justia Law

IV alleged infringement of five patents. A year later, JPMC moved to stay the case pending the result of four covered business method reviews (CBMR) JPMC planned to file with respect to the patents. JPMC filed CBMR petitions for two patents, but never filed the other two promised petitions. Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board acted on the petitions, the district court denied JPMC’s motion to stay, applying the four-factor test from the America Invents Act, 125 Stat. 284, 329–31. The court stated that, because there are multiple patents and claims in suit, it would be inappropriate to stay the entire litigation while waiting to see if the PTAB would initiate review of only two; that the litigation would likely be resolved more quickly than any extended CBM review; that it was largely speculative to argue that the PTAB’s resolutions of the CBMR petitions would reduce the court’s workload; and that any reduction was offset by IV’s right to a speedy trial. The Federal Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to consider an interlocutory appeal from a decision on a motion to stay until the PTAB institutes a CBMR proceeding. View "Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. JPMorgan Chase & Co." on Justia Law

Exela petitioned the Patent and Trademark Office to “reconsider and withdraw” its revival of the national stage application and to cancel the 218 patent, assigned to SCR Pharmatop. The PTO declined to consider Exela’s petition, stating that no law or regulation authorizes non-party challenge to a PTO ruling to accept a tardy filing. Exela then brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, arguing that the PTO’s action was ultra vires and that Exela’s petition should have been considered and favorably decided. The district court, on reconsideration and in view of new Fourth Circuit precedent, dismissed Exela’s complaint for failing to meet the statute of limitations for claims filed against the United States, including APA claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal, on the ground that PTO revival rulings are not subject to third party collateral challenge, thereby precluding review regardless of whether Exela’s claims were time-barred. View "Exela Pharma Sciences, LLC v. Lee" on Justia Law

TWM filed a patent infringement suit against AT&T. A jury awarded damages. The district court entered judgment consistent with the verdict and denied all of AT&T’s post-trial motions. AT&T failed to file timely notice of appeal. The Federal Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion or clearly err in refusing to extend or reopen the appeal period. With respect to F.R. App. P. 4(a)(5), the court found that the AT&T had failed to show good cause or excusable neglect for its failure to read the underlying orders and check the docket for more than a month after the court issued the final orders. Refusing to reopen the appeal period under Rule 4(a)(6), where a party actually received a final judgment, but failed to monitor the electronic docket for a compliant entry of the judgment, the court stated: “In this era of electronic filing … we find no abuse of discretion in a district court’s decision to impose an obligation to monitor an electronic docket for entry of an order which a party and its counsel already have in their possession and know that the clerk at least attempted to enter.” View "Two-Way Media, LLC v. AT&T, Inc." on Justia Law

Roca Solida, a non-profit religious organization, purchased a 40-acre Nevada parcel. A desert stream flowed across the property, the water rights to which Roca also purchased. The water supplied a recreational pond, used for baptisms. Roca’s property is situated within a national wildlife refuge, managed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. An FWS water restoration project completed in 2010 “restored [the] stream to its natural channel,” the effect of which was to divert the stream away from Roca Solida’s property, depriving it of water it would have otherwise enjoyed. In federal district court in Nevada, Roca sought declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief on the basis of alleged violations under the First and Fifth Amendment and “at least $86,639.00 in damage[s]” under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671–80. It also sued in the Claims Court, seeking declaratory relief and compensatory damages on the basis that the diversion project constituted an unlawful taking and asserting FWS negligently executed the water diversion project, causing $86,639 in damages to “land, structures, and animals.” The Claims Court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in light of the pending district court action under 28 U.S.C. 1500. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Ministerio Roca Solida v. United States" on Justia Law