Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Browns, U.S. citizens, lived in Australia while Mr. Brown worked for Raytheon. The IRS received the Browns' amended returns for 2015 and 2017, claiming the Foreign Earned Income Exclusion, signed by attorney Castro, but not accompanied by powers of attorney. The Browns' second amended return for 2015, again signed by Castro, also did not append any powers of attorney. The IRS disallowed the refund claims, indicating that "as an employee of Raytheon . . . [Brown] may have entered into a closing agreement . . . irrevocably waiving” Browns’ rights to claim the Exclusion under section 911(a).The Browns filed a refund suit under 26 U.S.C. 6532 and 7422(a). The government argued that the Browns had not “duly filed” their administrative refund claims in accordance with section 7422(a) because they had not personally signed and verified their amended returns or properly authorized an agent to execute them. The Browns responded that the IRS had waived those requirements by processing their claims despite the defects and that the requirements were waivable regulatory conditions. The Claims Court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Claims Court had jurisdiction; the “duly filed” requirement is more akin to a claims-processing rule than a jurisdictional requirement. However, the Browns did not meet that requirement, which derives from statute and cannot be waived by the IRS, nor did the IRS waive the requirement. View "Brown v. United Statesx" on Justia Law

The Army requested bids for helicopter flight training and awarded the contract to L3. In a bid-protest action filed by disappointed bidder S3, the Claims Court set aside the award. After reevaluation of the bids, the Army awarded the contract to CAE. S3 filed another bid protest.The Claims Court rejected most of S3’s arguments but agreed that the assignment by the Army’s source selection authority (SSA) of a certain “strength” to CAE was irrational because that strength, which purported to provide a “significant cost savings benefit,” would result in only small and unpredictable savings, if any. Nevertheless, the Claims Court upheld the award, finding no prejudice to S3 from the identified error. The Claims Court observed that the erroneously found strength had been treated as falling within a non-price-factor category for which CAE’s proposal had been “clearly superior,” an assessment that would not be altered by the loss of a strength for which the only possible benefit could be monetary; when explicitly comparing the added benefits of the CAE proposal with its higher price in the best-value tradeoff analysis, the SSA had not made any adjustment to CAE’s price based on a cost-saving from the strength.The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that there is a presumption of prejudice whenever the Claims Court determines that the agency acted irrationally in making an award decision and finding no clear error in the determination that there was no prejudice. View "System Studies & Simulation, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Dr. Metzinger brought an Equal Pay Act (EPA) suit against her employer, the VA, in the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging that the government violated 29 U.S.C. 206(d), by paying her less than her male subordinates. She sought over $10,000 in damages. The government argued that the Court of Federal Claims had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over EPA claims against the government for over $10,000. In the alternative to dismissal, the government requested that the district court transfer Metzinger’s EPA claim to the Claims Court under 28 U.S.C. 1631. Metzinger opposed dismissal but allowed that if the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction, it should transfer the EPA claim. The district court agreed that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and transferred Metzinger’s EPA claim to the Claims Court under 28 U.S.C. 1631.Metzinger appealed to both the Fifth and Federal Circuits. The Fifth Circuit summarily dismissed. In a joint filing, the government reversed course, agreeing with Metzinger that the district court possessed jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit affirmed the transfer to the Claims Court. Precedent dictates that district courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over EPA claims against the government for over $10,000. View "Metzinger v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Tolliver had a contract with the United States under which Tolliver was obliged to write technical manuals for government-used equipment. The government was obliged to supply Tolliver information relevant to that task. When the government failed to obtain and therefore failed to supply that information, the parties modified the contract. Tolliver ultimately produced the manuals. After the modification, however, a third party sued Tolliver in the name of the government under the False Claims Act, alleging that Tolliver had made a false certification of compliance with the original contract. The government, rather than intervening in the qui tam case and then dismissing it, allowed it to proceed. With evidentiary help from the government, Tolliver prevailed after incurring substantial legal fees.The contracting officer denied Tolliver's claim under the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 7101, for an “equitable adjustment” for reimbursement of “allowable legal fees.” The Claims Court entered judgment for Tolliver, concluding that the United States had breached an implied warranty of performance. The Federal Circuit vacated. Because Tolliver never submitted a claim of breach of that warranty to the contracting officer, the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate such a claim. The claim that Tolliver presented to the contracting officer was, on its face, based on legal fees, not on a breach of the implied warranty of performance. View "Tolliver Group, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Former and current Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) employees were relocated to Puerto Rico or the U.S. Virgin Islands at the DEA’s request for two to five years. Each received a one-time relocation incentive bonus under 5 U.S.C. 5753(b), which provides that “[t]he Office of Personnel Management may authorize the head of an agency to pay a [relocation incentive] bonus” to an individual who relocates to accept a position. Each bonus was equivalent to 25% of each employee’s yearly salary. The employees allege they are entitled to a relocation incentive bonus for each year of their relocation, rather than the one-time bonus they received.The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s dismissal of that claim, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The claim was not based on a statute or regulations that are money mandating, as required for jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1). The statute and implementing regulations use discretionary language. View "Bell v. United States" on Justia Law

Celgene markets pomalidomide as a multiple-myeloma drug under the brand name Pomalyst. Many drug companies questioned the validity or applicability of Celgene's patents and sought to bring generic pomalidomide to market. The defendants submitted an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) to the FDA. Celgene filed suit in New Jersey. Celgene is headquartered there, but no defendant is. MPI is based in West Virginia, Mylan Inc. in Pennsylvania, and Mylan N.V. in Pennsylvania and the Netherlands. The district court dismissed the case for improper venue (MPI; Mylan Inc.) and for failure to state a claim (as to Mylan N.V.).The Federal Circuit affirmed. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 21 U.S.C. 355(j)(5)(B)(iii), venue was improper in New Jersey for the domestic corporation defendants, MPI and Mylan Inc. Celgene did not show that those defendants committed acts of infringement in New Jersey and have a regular and established place of business there. The court rejected Celgene’s argument that receipt of the ANDA notice letter is an infringing act in New Jersey. Under section 271(e)(2), submitting an ANDA is the act of infringement; although the ANDA applicant must later send a notice letter that happens after the infringing submission. As to the foreign-corporation defendant, Mylan N.V., Celgene’s pleadings failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "Celgene Corp. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc." on Justia Law

Ravgen filed suit in the federal district court in Waco, Texas, accusing Quest’s QNatal Advanced test of infringing patents relating to non-invasive tests for prenatal genetic disorders. Quest moved to transfer the case (28 U.S.C. 1404(a)), arguing that the Central District of California was a more convenient forum; its knowledgeable employees work in that district and third-party witnesses reside in the district. Although Quest maintains patient service centers across the country—including in the Western District of Texas—Quest designed, developed, and continues to perform QNatal Advanced testing only in the Central District of California. Quest argued that Ravgen, headquartered in Maryland, has no meaningful connections to the Western District of Texas. Ravgen noted that it had filed three related complaints in the Western District of Texas, alleging infringement of the same patents. After analyzing the public and private interest factors that govern transfer determinations, the district court denied Quest’s motion.The Federal Circuit directed the district court to transfer the case. When there are numerous witnesses in the transferee venue and the only other witnesses are far outside the plaintiff’s chosen forum, the witness-convenience factor favors transfer. The court erroneously discounted documents located in California that relate to the development, validation, testing, and performance of the accused product and in weighing court congestion as strongly against transfer. View "In Re Quest Diagnostics, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007, ROHM Japan and MaxPower entered into a technology license agreement (TLA). ROHM Japan was permitted “to use certain power [metal oxide semiconductor field-effect transistors (MOSFET)]-related technologies of” MaxPower (Licensor) developed under a Development and Stock Purchase Agreement in exchange for royalties paid to MaxPower. The TLA, as amended in 2011, includes an agreement to arbitrate “[a]ny dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of or in relation to this Agreement or at law, or the breach, termination, or validity thereof.” Arbitration is to be conducted “in accordance with the provisions of the California Code of Civil Procedure.”In 2019, a dispute arose between ROHM Japan and MaxPower concerning whether the TLA covers ROHM’s silicon carbide MOSFET products. MaxPower notified ROHM Japan of its intent to initiate arbitration. Shortly thereafter, ROHM's subsidiary, ROHM USA, sought a declaratory judgment of noninfringement of four MaxPower patents in the Northern District of California and four inter partes review petitions. The district court granted MaxPower’s motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the case without prejudice, reasoning that the TLA “unmistakably delegate[s] the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator.” The Federal Circuit affirmed. In contracts between sophisticated parties, incorporation of rules with a provision on the subject is normally sufficient “clear and unmistakable” evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate arbitrability to an arbitrator. View "ROHM Semiconductor USA, LLC v. MaxPower Semiconductor, Inc." on Justia Law

Brazos filed lawsuits in the Western District of Texas charging Juniper, a Delaware corporation headquartered in California, with infringing patents that had been assigned to Brazos. Juniper moved to transfer the case to the Northern District of California, 28 U.S.C. 1404(a). Juniper argued that Brazos “describes itself as a patent assertion entity” that “does not seem to conduct any business” from its recently-opened office in Waco other than filing patent lawsuits. The assignment agreement by which Brazos received much of its patent portfolio lists a California address for Brazos; only one of the officers listed on its website resides in Texas. Brazos’s CEO and its president reside in California. The accused products were primarily designed, developed, marketed, and sold from Juniper’s headquarters within the Northern District of California; potential witnesses who would be expected to testify as to the structure, function, marketing, and sales of the accused products are located in California. Juniper had a small office in Austin, Texas.The Federal Circuit vacated the denial of the motion to transfer and granted the petition. The “center of gravity of the action” was clearly in California: several of the most important factors strongly favor the transferee court. No factor favors retaining the case in Texas. View "In Re Juniper Networks, Inc." on Justia Law

Wanxiang is a U.S. importer for Wanxiang Group, an automotive parts manufacturing company headquartered in China. In 1994-2001, Group and Wanxiang IE participated in Department of Commerce administrative reviews that covered entries of wheel hub assemblies that were subject to a 1987 antidumping duty order. Group and IE were assigned company-specific antidumping duty rates of zero percent. Wanxiang Q did not receive a company-specific antidumping duty rate because it did not participate in the reviews. Following a 2012 audit of Wangxiang, Customs found that some of the audited entries were imports from Q, subject to the China country-wide rate of 92.84%, and that, based on the sampling results, Wanxiang had underpaid dumping duties. In 2019, Customs issued a Penalty Notice.Wanxiang did not protest under 19 U.S.C. 1514 and has not made any payment but filed a complaint before the Trade Court, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i)(2) and (4). The court dismissed, concluding that it lacked “residual” jurisdiction because relief could have been available under a section 1581(c) action. Wangxiang has not shown that such relief would have been manifestly inadequate. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Wanxiang could have challenged the assessments by a protest under 19 U.S.C. 1514 and, if unsuccessful, by appealing to the Trade Court under 1581(a). Alternatively, Wanxiang could have initiated a test shipment and sought, as a new shipper, an administrative review, during which it could have argued the issues it raised in its complaint; the results of that review could have been challenged under 19 U.S.C. 1516a, invoking Trade Court jurisdiction under 1581(c). View "Wanxiang America Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law