Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
by
The Missouri River, in its natural state, experienced annual flooding that constantly morphed its path and the topography of its floodplain, rendering it unproductive for development. The 1944 Flood Control Act (FCA) authorized the construction of dams to create a reservoir storage system. The FCA required the Army Corps of Engineers to promote navigation and flood control and, secondarily, fish and wildlife conservation. Under the 1945 Bank Stabilization and Navigation Project, the Corps altered the River’s water flow (location, volume, and rate); the floodplain was no longer dynamic by 1980. The Corps' 1979 Master Manual prioritized flood control over recreation and wildlife By 2005, 95 percent of the floodplain was developed for agricultural, urban, and industrial uses. The programs had significant environmental side effects, eliminating fish and bird habitats and interrupting wildlife breeding cycles. In 1986, Congress authorized the Corps to purchase River-adjacent land to recreate lost habitats. The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) placed several species on the endangered species list. The Corps did not make changes recommended by FWS, concerned about exacerbating flooding. Lawsuits followed. The district court ordered the Corps to revise its Master Manual,.The 2004 Master Manual was intended to restore the River to a more natural state.About 372 plaintiffs who operate River-adjacent farms in six states sued, alleging the 2004 Changes caused frequent and severe flooding on their farms and amounted to permanent, physical takings under the Fifth Amendment. The Claims Court determined there was a taking and awarded compensation for the diminished value of the land but dened damages for lost crops. The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to the takings claims but vacated the denial of crop damages and a finding that the Government did not causally contribute to 2011 flooding. View "Ideker Farms, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

by
Property owners sought compensation for an alleged taking pursuant to the National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. 1241–51. When a railroad wishes to relinquish responsibility over a railroad corridor, it must seek permission to abandon the corridor. Under the Trails Act, before abandonment is consummated, other entities can intervene to railbank the corridor and preserve it for future railroad use. The railbanking intervention process allows a railroad to negotiate with the intervening entity to assume financial and managerial responsibility for the corridor by operating it as a recreational trail. The issuance of a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) allowing interim trail use and railbanking constitutes a Fifth Amendment taking if the railroad was granted an easement, interim trail use and railbanking were beyond the scope of that easement, and the NITU caused a delay in termination of the easement.The Claims Court found that the property interests at issue were easements, but that interim trail use was within the scope of the easements. The Federal Circuit reversed. The Claims Court erred in interpreting Missouri law and in concluding that interim trail use was within the scope of the easements; railbanking is not within the scope of the easements. With no causation dispute, the NITU issuance constituted a taking. View "Behrens v. United States" on Justia Law

by
The 1976 Magnuson–Stevens Act contemplated “[a] national program for the conservation and management of the fishery resources of the United States,” 16 U.S.C. 1801(a)(6), and established the United States 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). A 2007 amendment established national criteria for quota-based fishing programs, (limited access privilege programs) and authorized the quota-based fishing permits and licenses at issue in this Fifth Amendment takings claim, in which fishing businesses challenged four different permitting, licensing, and endorsement requirementsThe Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit for lack of a cognizable property interest in the fishing endorsements, licenses, and permits, separate from or appurtenant to their fishing vessels. Precedent establishes that fishing permits and licenses issued under the Act are revocable privileges, not compensable property interests. The Magnuson–Stevens Act refers to “congressional intent not to confer any right, title, or interest, and to preserve the government’s authority to revoke privileges enjoyed in” fishing licenses and permits. The National Marine Fisheries Service’s regulations did not create compensable property rights in permits or licenses. licenses; permits did not have the essential characteristics of compensable property—transferability and the right to exclude others. There is no inherent right in vessel ownership to fish within the EEZ. View "Fishermen's Finest, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

by
The Indiana Southwestern Railway Company sought to abandon railway easements, in which the owners had reversionary interests. The Surface Transportation Board (49 U.S.C. 10903) issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use and Abandonment (NITU). Negotiations with potential railbanking sponsors failed. Eventually, the NITU expired, Railway abandoned its easements without entering into a trail use agreement, and the landowners’ fee simple interests became unencumbered by any easements.The landowners sought compensation for an alleged taking arising under the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d), claiming that the government had permanently taken their property in April 2001, when the NITU became effective. The Claims Court found that the government had taken the property but that the taking lasted only from the date the NITU went into effect until it expired. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. The landowner’s property was temporarily taken under the Trails Act. The NITU delayed the reversion of the owners’ interests. The Railway would have otherwise relinquished its rights to its right-of-way during the NITU period. The court remanded for a determination as to the compensation and interest to which the owners are entitled. View "Memmer v. United States" on Justia Law

by
Johnson was a Dyess Air Force Base firefighter from 2017-2019. In 2018, Johnson’s mother came to live with Johnson's family. She took around 13 pills to treat health issues; Johnson was taking “seven or eight” pills. The Air Force subsequently selected Johnson for a mandatory random drug test. He tested positive for oxycodone and oxymorphone. Johnson told his supervisor, Ranard, that he had accidentally taken his mother’s pills instead of his own prescribed medication. Ranard proposed that Johnson be fired. The deciding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher, fired Johnson, explaining that he could not “risk the possibility of Johnson] coming to work again under the influence of illicit drugs.” At an arbitration hearing, Fletcher testified that he “just [didn’t] believe” that Johnson accidentally took his mother’s pill, having consulted his wife, a registered nurse, and his brother-in-law, a nurse practitioner, who “confirmed that the likelihood of that happening is slim to none.” The arbitrator denied Johnson’s grievance, affirming his termination.The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. Fletcher’s ex parte communications violated Johnson’s right to due process. When Fletcher’s relatives allegedly “confirmed” that the chances of Johnson taking his mother’s pill were “slim to none,” they were not confirming information in the record; they were providing new opinions on the evidence. View "Johnson v. Department of the Air Force" on Justia Law

by
Centripetal filed an infringement complaint against PAN, which then filed an inter partes review (IPR) petition for one patent and a post-grant review (PGR) petition for another. While the petitions were pending, the Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) updated its interim guidance, noting that the agency “does not accept requests for Director review of decisions on institution.” The Patent Trial and Appeal Board denied institution. PAN filed Requests for Director Rehearing. The agency responded that USPTO "does not accept requests for Director review of decisions on institution ... parties may only request Director review of final written decisions" issued in IPR and PGR and that PAN’s “rehearing requests will not revert to the Board panel and there will be no further review of the Board’s decision.”PAN sought mandamus relief. A newly-appointed Director updated the interim guidance to state that “the Office does not accept requests for Director review of institution decisions” but that “the Director has always retained and continues to retain the authority to review such decisions sua sponte.” The Director has since exercised that authority. PAN argues that the Director’s current policy was contrary to the Appointments Clause, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in “Arthrex,” (2021). The Federal Circuit denied the petition. That the Appointments Clause requires that a Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed officer have review authority does not mean that a principal officer, once bestowed with such authority, cannot delegate it to other agency officers. View "In Re Palo Alto Networks, Inc." on Justia Law

by
Following floods at Houston’s Buffalo Bayou watershed, the federal government built the Barker and Addicks Dams. By 1963, each dam held a large reservoir with gated outflowing conduits. The Army Corps of Engineers’ 2012 Water Control Manual provides that if an inch of rain falls within a 24- hour period or if downstream flooding is expected, the Corps must close the floodgates. If “inflow and pool elevation conditions dictate,” the Corps releases water according to a schedule. The reservoirs were empty before Hurricane Harvey made landfall. On August 25, 2017, the Corps closed the floodgates; more than 30 inches of water poured onto the city in four days. The Corps released water. Some downstream properties were flooded for more than 11 days, some at more than eight feet above the first finished floor. Suits alleging that the flooding constituted an uncompensated, physical taking of property were split. In the Upstream Sub-Docket, the Claims Court found that plaintiffs were owners of land not subject to flowage easements and had valid property interests and that the government flooded plaintiffs’ properties and engaged in a taking. The court dismissed the Downstream Sub-Docket claims, finding that the owners did not articulate a cognizable property interest; “neither Texas law nor federal law creates a protected property interest in perfect flood control.” The court reasoned that the plaintiffs acquired their properties subject to the superior right of the Corps to engage in flood mitigation.The Federal Circuit reversed. The government is not immune from suit under the Flood Control Act of 1928, 33 U.S.C. 702c. There is no blanket rule under Texas law that property rights are held subject to owners’ expectations on acquisition. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that private property is subject to “unbridled, uncompensated qualification under the police power." View "Milton v. United States" on Justia Law

by
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed an examiner’s refusal to register the trademark “TRUMP TOO SMALL” for use on T-shirts. According to Elster’s registration request, the phrase he sought to trademark invokes a memorable exchange between then-candidate Trump and Senator Marco Rubio from a 2016 presidential primary debate, and aims to “convey[] that some features” of Trump’s “policies are diminutive.” The Board’s decision was based on the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(c), and the Board’s finding that the mark included the surname of a living individual without his consent.The Federal Circuit reversed. Applying section 2(c) to bar registration of Elster’s mark unconstitutionally restricts free speech in violation of the First Amendment. Section 2(c), prohibits registration of a trademark that [c]onsists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent, or the name, signature, or portrait of a deceased President of the United States during the life of his widow, if any, except by the written consent of the widow.” As applied in this case, section 2(c) involves content-based discrimination that is not justified by either a compelling or substantial government interest. View "In Re Elster" on Justia Law

by
The Landowners own parcels of land adjacent to a 2.45-mile strip of a Union Pacific railroad line in McLennan County, Texas. Union Pacific’s predecessor in interest, Texas Central originally acquired the Line in 1902 through multiple deeds executed by the Landowners’ predecessors in interest. The Landowners sued, seeking compensation based on a theory that their predecessors in interest had conferred only easements to Texas Central, and that the Surface Transportation Board (STB) enforcement of the National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. 1241, by “railbanking” amounted to a “taking” of their property. Railbanking involves the transition of unused railroad corridors into recreational hiking and biking trails, generally by a transfer of an interest in the use of a rail corridor to a third-party entity. The Claims Court interpreted the deeds as having conveyed fee simple estates, not easements.The Federal Circuit affirmed. No takings from the Landowners occurred when the government later authorized conversion of the railroad line to a recreation trail; the granting clauses of the subject deeds unambiguously conveyed fee simple interests in the land and not easements despite contradictory language elsewhere in the deeds. View "Anderson v. United States" on Justia Law

by
Mobility’s patent, titled “System, Apparatus, and Methods for Proactive Allocation of Wireless Communication Resources,” is “generally directed to the allocation of communication resources in a communications network.” The Patent Trial and Appeal Board determined that five claims of the patent were unpatentable as obvious.Mobility sought a remand under the Supreme Court's 2021 Arthrex decision, challenged the merits of the Board’s decision, and raised for the first time several constitutional challenges, including a challenge to the structure of the Board. Mobility argued that Board members have an interest in instituting AIA proceedings to generate fees to fund the agency and ensure future job stability and that individual administrative patent judges (APJs) have a personal financial interest in instituting AIA proceedings in order to earn better performance reviews and bonuses.Federal Circuit held that Mobility’s constitutional arguments are without merit. The President, not the agency, submits the budget, and Congress sets the USPTO budget and controls whether the USPTO has access to surplus funds. A remand of the “Appointments Clause” challenge is required under the Arthrex decision to allow the Acting Director to review the final written decision of the APJ panel pursuant to newly established USPTO procedures. View "Mobility Workx, LLC v. Unified Patents, LLC" on Justia Law