Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Higbie, a Criminal Investigator for the U.S. State Department, contacted equal employment opportunity (EEO) counsel to complain of alleged reprisal by the Department for his activities, which he claimed were protected under the Civil Rights Act. Higbie successfully requested that his complaint be processed through the Department’s alternative dispute resolution program. Higbie repeatedly inquired whether the mediation proceedings would be confidential. State Department representatives confirmed that they would be. Higbie’s supervisors, including Cotter and Thomas, signed the mediation agreement, which included a confidentiality provision. The parties did not resolve their dispute through mediation. Cotter and Thomas provided affidavits to the EEO investigator that discussed Higbie’s statements in the mediation and cast his participation in a negative light. Higbie filed suit, claiming retaliation, discrimination, and violation of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act. The district court dismissed the ADRA claim. Amending his complaint, Higbie alleged a claim sounding in contract for breach of the confidentiality provision. The Court of Federal Claims concluded that Higbie had not established that the agreement could be fairly read to contemplate money damages, and dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Higbie v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1997, Memorylink’s founders approached Motorola about jointly developing a handheld camera that could wirelessly transmit and receive video signals. After a successful demonstration, they sent Motorola a letter, agreeing “that any patents would be jointly owned by Motorola and Memorylink,” agreeing that Motorola should “head up the patent investigation,” and providing a “Wireless Multimedia Core Technology Overview for Patent Review” Motorola’s attorney sent a letter concerning the patent applications, stating an understanding that the inventors were Memorylink’s founders and Motorola employees Schulz and Wyckoff. A proposed patent filing agreement was enclosed. The named inventors signed an invention disclosure and an Assignment of rights to Motorola and Memorylink. Memorylink sued Motorola in 2008, alleging patent infringement and torts sounding in fraud, and seeking a declaration that the Assignment was void for lack of consideration. The district court rejected Memorylink’s argument that its claims did not accrue until an inventorship problem was discovered and dismissed most claims, reasoning that Memorylink should have known that the Motorola employees were not co-inventors in 1998, so that its claims were untimely. The court found that the consideration issue was a contract claim, not time-barred, but granted Motorola summary judgment. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Memorylink Corp. v. Motorola Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1987, Krauser, a periodontist, designed a dental implant system. He paid BHI’s predecessor to produce drawings and prototypes. In1991, the parties entered into a written agreement that specified that Krauser would develop new products for the company to produce and sell and that the drawings were “property of [BHI].” Krauser was entitled to royalties. Krauser obtained a patent covering one component of the system and listing Krauser as the inventor. The company subsequently secured patents covering dental implant systems, naming Shaw as the sole inventor. Krauser sued the company and Shaw for a declaration of ownership rights and for copyright and patent infringement. While the suits were pending, the company filed for bankruptcy, and Krauser filed claims in bankruptcy court. In a settlement agreement, Krauser granted the company a 10-year patent license and “all rights . . . [to] the dental implant system currently being manufactured.” The bankruptcy court approved the agreement. Later, several patents on dental implant systems issued to BHI. None listed Krauser as an inventor. Krauser alleged that BHI failed to pay the full amount of royalties or submit to required audits and claimed default. The district court granted BHI summary judgment, construing the settlement to apply only to implants being manufactured in 1996, not implants manufactured at the time of litigation, and finding that Krauser had no ownership rights. The Eleventh Circuit transferred the case “[b]ecause the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction … relating to patents.” The Federal Circuit transferred the case back, noting that Krauser had dropped his claim of inventorship. View "Krauser v. Biohorizons, Inc." on Justia Law

Kingdomware is a VA-certified service-disabled veteran-owned small business. The Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. ch. 14A, states that small businesses generally will receive “a fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts for property and services for the Government.” Veteran-Owned Small Businesses (VOSBs) and Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Businesses (SDVOSBs) are expressly recognized in the Small Business Act and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48 C.F.R. ch. 1, which implements the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, 41 U.S.C. ch. 7. Agency-specific contract regulations are stated in the Veterans Affairs Acquisition Regulation (VAAR), 48 C.F.R. ch. 8. In 2012, the VA decided to implement an Emergency Notification Service in medical centers. The VA contracting officer chose to use the General Services Administration (GSA) Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) to procure the needed services, and awarded the contract to a FSS vendor which was not a VOSB. Kingdomware filed a bid protest with the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which rejected the VA’s argument, and issued a recommendation that the VA cancel the award. The VA did not acquiesce. The Claims Court upheld the VA determination, interpreting 38 U.S.C. 8127(c), concerning use of restricted competition, as not creating a mandatory set-aside. The overarching policy of the FAR generally demands ‘full and open competition,” which is deemed satisfied by FSS contracts. The FAR specifies that an agency is encouraged to obtain goods and services from FSS contractors before purchasing from commercial sources, which include privately owned VOSBs and SDVOSBs. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Kingdomware Techs, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1996, the Air Force entered into a contract under which SUFI would install and operate telephone systems in guest lodgings on bases in Europe at no cost to the government; the Air Force agreed that SUFI network was to be the exclusive method available to a guest placing telephone calls at the lodging. The contract permitted SUFI to block other networks and required the Air Force to remove or disable preexisting Defense Switched Network (DSN) telephone lines in hallways and lobbies, but DSN phones remained in place. Call records showed that, with Air Force assistance, guests often placed multiple or lengthy individual calls. After the Air Force declined to implement controls to curb DSN and patched-call abuse, SUFI blocked guest-room access to the DSN operator numbers but permitted morale calls from lobby phones, monitored by sign-in logs. Air Force personnel failed to require guests to sign the logs and gave guests new DSN access numbers, to circumvent SUFI’s charges. After failed attempts to resolve the situation, including through the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, SUFI sold the telephone system to the Air Force for $2.275 million and submitted claims, totaling $130.3 million, to the contracting officer. The officer denied the claims, except for $132,922 on a claim involving use of calling-cards. The Board later awarded $7.4 million in damages, plus interest. In an action under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491, the Court of Federal Claims awarded $118.76 million in damages, plus interest. The Federal Circuit vacated in part and remanded for additional findings.View "SUFI Network Servs, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Monsanto developed a genetic modification in soybean seeds (Roundup Ready® (RR)), known as the 40-3-2 event (RR trait), which enables soybean plants to tolerate application of glyphosate herbicide to kill weeds. Monsanto owns the patent for the RR trait and granted Pioneer a license to produce and sell seeds containing the traits. After Pioneer became a subsidiary of DuPont, Monsanto and Pioneer entered into an amended license, under which DuPont produced and sold RR trait seed. In 2006, DuPont announced that it had developed a glyphosate-tolerant trait, OGAT, expected to confer tolerance to both glyphosate and acetolactate synthase inhibitor herbicide. Testing indicated that OGAT alone did not provide sufficient glyphosate-tolerance for commercial use. DuPont then combined OGAT with the RR trait; the OGAT/RR stack provided increased yields in field trials. DuPont did not sell any OGAT/RR product, however, and discontinued development. Monsanto sued DuPont for breach of the license and patent infringement. The district court granted partial judgment to Monsanto, holding that the license was unambiguous and did not grant the right to stack non-RR technologies with the licensed” trait, but allowed DuPont to amend its answer to assert reformation counterclaims and defenses. The court ultimately told DuPont to “either voluntarily dismiss these reformation claims or produce … all documents … previously withheld.” DuPont continued litigating its reformation counterclaims and produced previously withheld internal e-mails that showed its awareness that it did not have the right to commercialize the OGAT/RR stack. The court found that DuPont’s position was not rooted in fact, that DuPont made misrepresentations and had perpetrated a fraud on the court, struck DuPont’s reformation defense and counterclaims, and awarded limited attorney fees to Monsanto. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Monsanto Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co." on Justia Law

Jang assigned his patent rights to the companies in exchange for an upfront payment and a promise under defined circumstances to pay additional compensation if the companies sold stents covered by Jang’s patents. In 2005, Jang sued for breach of contract. In the first two appeals, the Federal Circuit addressed claim construction disputes relevant to whether the accused stents were covered by Jang’s patents. In the meantime, the companies sought ex parte reexamination with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, asserting invalidity. An examiner rejected the claims, which were canceled in issued reexamination certificates. In 2014, the district court denied the companies’ motion for summary judgment, finding that a patentee is not precluded from recovering royalties until the date the assignee first challenges the validity of the patent, so Jang could seek royalties prior to the challenge. The district court certified an interlocutory appeal. The Federal Circuit declined to transfer the petition to the Ninth Circuit despite the underlying contract claim and denied the petition for interlocutory review, stating that it is not clear that the identified legal issues will in fact be controlling, and each question depends on the resolution of factual issues not yet addressed by the district court. View "Jang v. Boston Scientific Corp." on Justia Law

In 1983, Central entered into a contract with the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation for an appropriation of water from the New Melones Reservoir in California’s San Joaquin Valley. Upon enactment of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA) in 1992, Reclamation made statements indicating that it would not be able to meet the quantity commitments in its contracts because of other demands for the water. In 1993, Central sued for breach of contract. After holding that breaches had occurred in certain years, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded for determination of damages. The district court, on remand, awarded Central $149,950.00 in cost of cover damages, but denied any expectancy damages. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. The trial court erred by not properly considering the effect of Reclamation’s announced breaches on the amount of water that Central may have expected to need to meet demand. This caused the trial court to discount Central’s arguments regarding what would have happened in the non-breach world. View "Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States" on Justia Law

Veridyne’s first contract to provide logistics services to the Maritime Administration (MARAD), was awarded pursuant to the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) 8(a) program for small, disadvantage businesses, 15 U.S.C. 637(a). To obtain extension of the contract without it being submitted to bidding, Veridyne estimated that the new contract would not exceed “$3,000,000 in the aggregate.” Veridyne and MARAD officials knew that the services to be provided under the extension would cost far more than $3,000,000. MARAD proposed that SBA approve the new contract without opening it to competition. MARAD, Veridyne, and the SBA executed the new contract. From 2001 to 2004, MARAD issued additional work orders to Veridyne and paid Veridyne $31,134,931.12. In part due to MARAD’s cost overruns, the Office of Inspector General investigated and concluded that Veridyne had obtained the extension through fraud. After a stop order issued, Veridyne continued to work for MARAD and submitted additional invoices. Veridyne sued to recover $2,267,163. The government entered a defense under the Fraudulent Claims statute, 28 U.S.C. 2514, and counterclaimed for penalties under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729, and the Contracts Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 7103. The Claims Court held that Veridyne’s contract claim was forfeited under the Fraudulent Claims Act, but awarded Veridyne partial recovery under a quantum meruit theory, while awarding penalties to the government under the False Claims Act and the Contract Disputes Act. The Federal Circuit reversed the quantum meruit award, but affirmed the award of penalties.View "Veridyne Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Following the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, each of the Oil Companies entered into contracts with the government to provide high-octane aviation gas (avgas) to fuel military aircraft. The production of avgas resulted in waste products such as spent alkylation acid and “acid sludge.” The Oil Companies contracted to have McColl, a former Shell engineer, dump the waste at property in Fullerton, California. More than 50 years later, California and the federal government obtained compensation from the Oil Companies under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601, for the cost of cleaning up the McColl site. The Oil Companies sued, arguing the avgas contracts require the government to indemnify them for the CERCLA costs. The Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The Federal Circuit reversed with respect to breach of contract liability and remanded. As a concession to the Oil Companies, the avgas contracts required the government to reimburse the Oil Companies for their “charges.” The court particularly noted the immense regulatory power the government had over natural resources during the war and the low profit margin on the avgas contracts. View "Shell Oil Co. v. United States" on Justia Law