Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Freddie Mac is a privately-owned, publicly-chartered financial services corporation, 12 U.S.C. 1452, created to provide stability in the secondary residential mortgage market. Piszel began working as the CFO of Freddie Mac in 2006. Piszel with a signing bonus of $5 million in Freddie Mac restricted stock units that would vest over four years, an annual salary of $650,000, and performance-based incentive compensation of $3 million a year in restricted stock. If terminated without cause, Piszel would receive a lump-sum cash payment of double his annual salary and certain restricted stock units would continue to vest. In 2008, facing Freddie Mac's potential collapse, Congress passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act,12 U.S.C. 4511, establishing the FHFA as Freddie Mac's new primary regulator, with authority to disaffirm any contract, after which damages for the breach would be limited to “actual direct compensatory damages.” The Act contained a limit on “golden parachutes.” Piszel alleges that he was terminated without cause and Freddie Mac “refused to provide him with any of the benefits to which he was contractually entitled.” The Claims Court dismissed his allegations of an unconstitutional taking. The Federal Circuit affirmed, noting that Piszel’s breach of contract claim remains intact despite the legislation, particularly in light of Piszel’s assertion that his contract called for “deferred compensation,” rather than a golden parachute. View "Piszel v. United States" on Justia Law

Illumina’s 794 patent, covering DNA assay optimization techniques, issued in 2011. In 2010-2011, Ariosa provided Illumina, as a prospective investor, with information on its efforts to develop a noninvasive prenatal diagnostic test. Seven months after the 794 patent issued, Illumina agreed to supply consumables, hardware, and software to Ariosa for three years, providing Ariosa with a non-exclusive license to Illumina’s “Core IP Rights in Goods,” specifically excluding “Secondary IP Rights … that pertain to the Goods (and use thereof) only with regard to particular field(s) or application(s), and are not common to the Goods in all applications and fields.” The agreement’s arbitration clause excluded “disputes relating to issues of scope, infringement, validity and/or enforceability of any Intellectual Property Rights.” Illumina never indicated that Ariosa needed to license the 794 patent . Ariosa launched the Harmony Prenatal Test, using materials supplied by Illumina. Verinata and Stanford sued, alleging that the Test infringed other patents. Illumina later acquired Verinata and accused Ariosa of breaching the supply agreement by failing to license Secondary Rights. Ariosa filed counterclaims, asserting invalidity and non-infringement; breach of contract; and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court concluded that the counterclaims were not subject to compulsory arbitration. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The counterclaims depend on the scope determination of licensed intellectual property rights, which is expressly exempt from arbitration. View "Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2003, the government awarded Laguna a contract for Worldwide Environmental Remediation and Construction (WERC). Under the contract, Laguna received 16 cost-reimbursable task orders to perform work in Iraq, and awarded subcontracts to several subcontractors. The physical work under the contract was completed by 2010. Laguna sought reimbursement of past costs, a portion of which the government refused to pay after an audit by the Defense Contract Audit Agency. Before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, the government alleged that it was not liable because Laguna had committed a prior material breach by accepting subcontractor kickbacks (18 U.S.C. 371, 41 U.S.C. 53), excusing the government’s nonperformance. Three of Laguna’s officers were ultimately indicted for kickbacks. The Board granted the government summary judgment on that ground, The Federal Circuit affirmed. Laguna committed the first material breach by violating the contract’s Allowable Cost and Payment clause because its vouchers were improperly inflated to include the payment, Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.216-7. View "Laguna Constr. Co. v. Carter" on Justia Law

In 2001, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) awarded Northrop an order for network monitoring software produced by Oakley for one base year and three option years. A subsequent modification required ICE to use best efforts to secure funding for the option years. Without notifying ICE, Northrop entered into a private agreement with ESCgov, an IT services company, assigning all payments under the order to ESCgov. ESCgov paid more than $3,000,000. The agreement absolved Northrop from liability for failure of ICE to exercise a renewal option if Northrop “use[d] its best efforts to obtain the maximum recovery.” ESCgov assigned its rights to Citizens, a financial institution. None of the parties provided notice, as required by the Anti-Assignment Act, 31 U.S.C. 3727(a)(2). ICE paid Northrop $900,000 for the base year, which it delivered to ESCgov. ICE did not use the software in any investigations, and sent Northrop notification of its decision not to exercise the first option year. ICE did not exercise any option year. A contracting officer declined a claim that ICE breached the contract by failing to use its best efforts. The Claims Court dismissed a lawsuit on grounds that it lacked jurisdiction because Northrop failed to provide “adequate notice” of its claim by failing to disclose the assignments. The Federal Circuit affirmed a second dismissal, following remand, agreeing that Northrop “is unable to identify any way that it, as opposed to ESCgov or Citizens, was harmed.” View "Northrop Grumman Computing Sys., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Navy's Diego Garcia facility, a 10.5-square-acre Indian Ocean atoll, 1,800 miles east of Africa and 1,200 miles south of India, had no commercial or civilian infrastructure. In 2005, the Navy sought bids on a firm fixed-price contract for Diego Garcia support services, ranging from information technology to refuse collection. For contractor vehicles and equipment, “contractor-furnished fuel,” was to be provided by the Navy at the prevailing Department of Defense rate. DG21 submitted a bid and, for contractor-furnished fuel, arrived at “a significantly lower number of gallons than” reflected in the solicitation. DG21 indicated that if fuel rates varied from historical rates by 10% or more, it would request an equitable adjustment. The Navy clarified that the solicitation was fixed-price, “DG21 assumes the full risk of consumption and/or rate changes. Please price ... accordingly.” The Navy questioned the lack of an escalation clause. DG21 did not change its estimate or pricing, but removed the equitable adjustment reference. DG21’s $455,292,490 proposal was accepted. During the contract term, fuel prices rose dramatically, reaching a maximum of more than double the historical rate indicated in the solicitation. In 2011, DG21 requested an equitable adjustment, characterizing the fuel cost as a $1,171,475.90 contract “change” under FAR 52.243-4. The contracting officer and the Board of Contract Appeals rejected the request. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The cost increase was not a change to the contract triggering FAR 52.243-4; the contract allocated that risk to DG21. View "DG21, LLC v. Mabus" on Justia Law

AngioScore sells angioplasty balloon catheters (AngioSculpt), designed to open arterial blockages. Three AngioScore patents each list three inventors, but none lists Lotan as an inventor. TriReme is a competitor of AngioScore. Apparently concerned that AngioScore might charge TriReme with infringement, TriReme sought to acquire an interest in the AngioScore patents from Dr. Lotan, who performed consulting services for AngioScore. Lotan granted TriReme an exclusive license to “any and all legal and equitable rights” he held in the AngioScore patents. Lotan claimed that his inventive contribution arose from his work in connection with the development of the AngioSculpt catheters in 2003, which is reflected in the AngioScore patents. AngioScore’s defense was based on a 2003 consulting contract between AngioScore and Lotan. AngioScore asserts that it acquired rights to all inventive work completed by Lotan. TriReme brought suit for correction of inventorship, 35 U.S.C. 256. The district court dismissed, finding that TriReme lacked standing. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded for consideration of whether Lotan’s continued work on AngioSculpt after the contract’s effective date came within the contract’s language. View "TriReme Med., LLC v. Angioscore, Inc." on Justia Law

GA entered into a blanket purchase agreement (BPA 218), with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in June 2011, to furnish trained service dogs for disabled veterans. A year later, the contracting officer sent an email questioning GA's performance. On August 31, 2012, the officer sent notice terminating BPA 218 for default and suspending open orders, informing GA that it had the right to appeal under the disputes clause of the contract. On December 21, 2012, GA sent a letter to the VA’s Rehabilitation Research & Development Service, arguing that it had fulfilled its duties and that the default termination should be converted to a termination for the convenience of the government. On February 28, 2013, GA sent the contracting officer a “formal demand.” On March 21, the officer sent a letter stating that she had received the claim but needed supporting documentation. GA began compiling documentation, but on May 3, the officer sent another letter, stating that she would not reconsider her decision, but that GA could appeal under 41 U.S.C. 7104(b). On January 7, 2014, GA filed suit. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed, finding the claim time-barred because, while the February 2013 letter qualified as a request for reconsideration, the officer did not reconsider, so the statute of limitations never tolled. The Federal Circuit reversed. The 12-month statutory appeal period did not begin to run until the officer rejected the request for reconsideration on May 3. View "Guardian Angels Med. Serv. Dogs, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Reddick was employed as an FDIC “Investigation Specialist” by an initial two-year term appointment, set to expire in September 2012. In April 2012, the FDIC offered him an extension of the initial term for an additional two years. The offer stated that the “extended employment” would be “effective [September], 2012” and that the “extended appointment is subject to the conditions of employment [included in the initial appointment offer] and subject to your continued successful performance.” Reddick accepted the offer days after receipt. The FDIC revoked the extension offer in August 2012. Reddick filed a grievance on the theory that the revocation of the offer was an adverse action under 5 U.S.C. 7512 and that he was entitled to procedural protections that the FDIC did not provide him. The matter was referred to arbitration under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator found the extension offer to be conditioned on Reddick’s “satisfactory work performance” and that the revocation was supported by sufficient justification. The Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal. The extension offer was still revocable by the FDIC even after acceptance by Reddick; it never matured into an effective extension, so Reddick was not “removed.” View "Reddick v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Normandy Apartments, Ltd. owned and managed a low-income rental housing project where tenants’ rents were federally subsidized under the Section 8 project-based program. In 2004, Normandy and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) entered into a contract (the HAP contract) wherein HUD agreed to pay rental housing assistance to Normandy. Normandy and HUD renewed the contract annually until 2004. The named parties and signatories of the 2004 HAP contract were the Oklahoma Housing Finance Authority and Normandy. In 2007, HUD notified Normandy that its assistance payments would be terminated because Normandy defaulted on the HAP contract by repeatedly failing to maintain the apartments. In 2010, Normandy filed suit against the government in the United States Court of Federal Claims asserting a breach of the 2004 HAP Contract and requesting damages. The Claims Court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Normandy then filed an amended complaint asserting a takings claim against the government. The Claims Court granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the Claims Court correctly dismissed Normandy’s breach of contract claim for lack of jurisdiction because the United States was not a party to the 2004 HAP contract; and (2) HUD’s conduct did not constitute a regulatory taking. View "Normandy Apartments, Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

Trona is a sodium carbonate compound that is processed into soda ash or baking soda. Because oil and gas development posed a risk to the extraction of trona and trona worker safety, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which manages the leasing of federal public land for mineral development, indefinitely suspended all oil and gas leases in the mechanically mineable trona area (MMTA) of Wyoming. The area includes 26 pre-existing oil and gas leases owned by Barlow. Barlow filed suit, alleging that the BLM’s suspension of oil and gas leases constituted a taking of Barlow’s interests without just compensation and constituted a breach of both the express provisions of the leases and their implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s dismissal of the contract claims on the merits and of the takings claim as unripe. BLM has not repudiated the contracts and Barlow did not establish that seeking a permit to drill would be futile. View "Barlow & Haun, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law