Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves an appeal by Marmen Inc., Marmen Énergie Inc., Marmen Energy Co., the Government of Québec, and the Government of Canada against a decision by the U.S. Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce had imposed countervailing duties on imports of certain utility scale wind towers from Canada, arguing that the Canadian government had provided illegal subsidies to the producers and exporters of these towers.The case was initially reviewed by the United States Court of International Trade, which upheld the Department of Commerce's decision. The appellants then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The appellants argued that the Department of Commerce had erred in its assessment of three government programs and its computation of the sales denominator used to calculate the subsidy rate. They contended that the subsidy rate should have been de minimis, meaning it was too trivial or minor to merit consideration.The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the U.S. Court of International Trade, ruling that the Department of Commerce's determination was supported by substantial evidence and was in accordance with the law. The court rejected the appellants' arguments, finding that the Department of Commerce had reasonably determined that the auditor's adjustment was unreliable, and that the three subsidy programs at issue did provide countervailable subsidies. View "GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US " on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Great Northern Properties, L.P. ("GNP"), filed a lawsuit against the United States, alleging a Fifth Amendment taking of its coal leases on the Otter Creek property in Montana. GNP claimed that the federal government, through the Montana state regulatory authority, denied the necessary permits for coal mining. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Court of Federal Claims, which dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that GNP could not establish that Montana's actions were coerced by the federal government or that Montana acted as an agent of the federal government. The court also noted that the federal government did not dictate the outcome in individual permitting cases and that state law governed the permitting process. Therefore, the federal government was not responsible for the permit denial, as Montana was not coerced to enact its own regulatory program following the passage of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. Furthermore, the court rejected GNP's claim that the existence of federal standards created an agency relationship between the federal government and Montana. View "GREAT NORTHERN PROPERTIES, L.P. v. US " on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled against Philadelphia Energy Solutions Refining and Marketing, LLC ("Philadelphia Energy"). Philadelphia Energy, a fuel producer, had appealed a decision by the United States Court of Federal Claims denying their claim for tax refunds for excise taxes they had paid on fuel mixtures of butane and gasoline. Philadelphia Energy argued that these fuel mixtures should be considered "alternative fuel mixtures" under 26 U.S.C. § 6426(e), making them eligible for a tax credit. However, the Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's decision, finding that butane, despite being considered a liquefied petroleum gas, is not considered an "alternative fuel" under this statute. This is because butane is also a "taxable fuel," and the statutory language creates a dichotomy between "taxable fuels" and "special motor fuels", with the two being mutually exclusive. Consequently, Philadelphia Energy's mixture of butane and gasoline does not qualify for the alternative fuel mixture credit, and they are not entitled to the claimed tax refunds. View "PHILADELPHIA ENERGY SOLUTIONS REFINING v. US " on Justia Law

In 2018, Presidential Proclamation 9693 imposed duties on imports of solar panels, starting at 30% and scheduled to decrease each year to 25%, 20%, and in the final year, 15%. Importers of bifacial solar modules, consisting of cells that convert sunlight into electricity on both the front and back of the cells, petitioned the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), asking that bifacial solar panels not be subjected to the duties. Ultimately, bifacial solar panels were excluded from the duties. In October 2020, Presidential Proclamation 10101, “modified” Proclamation 9693 to withdraw the exclusion of bifacial solar panels from the scheduled duties, and to increase the fourth-year duty rate to 18%. IImporters of bifacial solar panels sued, alleging that the statute authorizing the President to “modify” Proclamation 9693 only allowed him to make previously adopted safeguard measures more trade-liberalizing while eliminating the exclusion of bifacial panels and raising the fourth-year duty were trade-restrictive. They further argued that even if the President had the authority to “modify” safeguards in a trade-restrictive direction, he failed to follow appropriate procedures.The Trade Court agreed that the authority to “modify” a safeguard is limited to trade-liberalizing changes but rejected the procedural challenges under the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. 2251. The Federal Circuit reversed. The President’s interpretation of the statute, which allows him to “modify” an existing safeguard in a trade-restricting direction, is not unreasonable. In adopting Proclamation 10101, the President committed no significant procedural violation. View "Solar Energy Industries Association v. United States" on Justia Law

Congress established the Osage reservation in Oklahoma Territory in 1872. Years later, “mammoth reserves of oil and gas” were found. Congress severed the subsurface mineral estate, reserved it to the tribe, and placed it into trust with the federal government as trustee. Royalties are distributed to tribal members listed on an approved membership roll (a headright).In previous litigation, the Claims Court found the tribe had standing and found the government liable for breaching its fiduciary duties by failing to collect the full amount of royalties and failing to invest the royalty revenue. Individual headright owners (not the present plaintiffs) attempted to intervene. The Claims Court found that the individuals had no legal interest in the dispute because they were not a party to the trust relationship. The $380 million settlement agreement stated that the tribe, “on behalf of itself and the [h]eadright [h]olders,” waived any claims relating to the tribe’s trust assets or resources that were based on violations occurring before September 30, 2011. In a federal suit, filed by individual headright owners, the Tenth Circuit held that headright owners had a trust relationship with the federal government, which was ordered to provide an accounting.In 2019, based on allegations that the accounting revealed mismanagement of the trust fund, headright owners filed the present suit under the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act, citing breach of statutorily imposed trust obligations. The Federal Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. A trust relationship exists between the headright owners and the government and the 1906 Act imposes an obligation on the federal government to distribute funds to headright owners in a timely and proper manner. View "Fletcher v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2007, CalBio acquired two facilities and began upgrading them to biomass facilities. CalBio secured Authority to Construct permits that allowed construction and allowed the facilities to generate and sell electricity. The permits could be converted into Permits to Operate after the facilities met conditions, including emissions tests. CalBio labeled the facilities “in operation” in 2008. The facilities passed pre-parallel testing under PG&E interconnection agreements and began selling electricity on the spot market and later to PG&E. The facilities operated fairly continuously throughout 2009, occasionally noncompliant with emissions regulations.The 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 123 Stat. 115, allowed entities to receive federal grants if they “placed in service” a renewable energy facility during 2009-2010 or began constructing property in 2009-2010. CalBio was experiencing financial difficulties but did not seek grants because its facilities had been placed in service in 2008. CalBio suspended operations in 2010 and sold the facilities. Akeida spent $15 million improving the facilities, which passed emissions tests in 2011. Akeida applied for grants, claiming that the facilities were placed in service when Akeida’s emissions improvements were certified.The Treasury Department largely rejected Akeida’s claims, reasoning that most of the property had been placed in service in 2008. The Claims Court and Federal Circuit agreed, applying Treasury’s regulatory definition of “placed in service,” which required it to determine the “taxable year in which the property is . . . availabil[e] for a specifically assigned function.” View "Ampersand Chowchilla Biomass, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1942-1943, the government contracted with the Oil Companies to rapidly expand aviation gas (avgas) production facilities and sell vast quantities of avgas to the government with an artificially low profit margin. The government assumed certain risks, agreeing to reimburse “any new or additional taxes, fees, or charges” which the Companies “may be required by any municipal, state, or federal law ... to collect or pay by reason of the production, manufacture, sale or delivery of the [avgas].” The increased production led to increased amounts of acid waste that overwhelmed existing reprocessing facilities. The Companies contracted to dispose of the acid waste at the McColl site in Fullerton, California.In 1991, the United States and California sued under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601, seeking to require the Companies to pay cleanup costs. The Ninth Circuit held that the government was 100% liable for the cost of cleaning up the benzol waste (about 5.5% of the waste) at the McColl site. The Companies have borne nearly all of the clean-up costs incurred since 1994; they submitted a contract termination claim, seeking reimbursement. The Claims Court ultimately found the government liable for all cleanup costs at the McColl site and awarded the Companies $99,509,847.32 for costs incurred through November 2015. The government paid. Remediation at McColl remains ongoing. The Companies sought damages incurred after November 2015. The Federal Circuit affirmed that the government is liable for those costs plus interest, rejecting arguments that res judicata bars the claims and that the Claims Court did not have jurisdiction under the Contract Settlement Act of 1944. View "Shell Oil Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

Taylor Energy leased and operated Gulf of Mexico oil and gas properties, on the Outer Continental Shelf, offshore Louisiana. In 2004, Hurricane Ivan destroyed those operations, causing oil leaks. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Oil Pollution Act required Taylor to decommission the site and stop the leaks. Taylor and the Department of the Interior developed a plan. Interior approved Taylor’s assignments of its leases to third parties with conditions requiring financial assurances. Three agreements addressed how Taylor would fund a trust account and how Interior would disburse payments. Taylor began decommissioning work. In 2009, Taylor proposed that Taylor “make the full final deposit into the trust account,” without any offsets, and retain all insurance proceeds. Interior rejected Taylor’s proposal. Taylor continued the work. In 2011, Taylor requested reimbursement from the trust account for rig downtime costs. Interior denied the request. In 2018, the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) affirmed Interior’s 2009 and 2011 Decisions.Taylor filed suit in the Claims Court, asserting contract claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, rejecting “Taylor’s attempt to disguise its regulatory obligations as contractual ones,” and stating an IBLA decision must be appealed to a district court.In 2018, Taylor filed suit in a Louisiana district court, seeking review of the IBLA’s 2018 decision and filed a second complaint in the Claims Court, alleging breach of contract. On Taylor's motion, the district court transferred the case, citing the Tucker Act. The Federal Circuit reversed. The Claims Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Taylor is challenging the IBLA Decision and must do so in district court under the APA. View "Taylor Energy Co., L.L.C. v. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

Taylor's leases for the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), set to expire in 2007, incorporated Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 1301, regulations. They required Taylor to leave the leased area “in a manner satisfactory to the [Regional] Director.” Taylor drilled 28 wells, each connected to an oil platform. In 2004, Hurricane Ivan toppled Taylor’s platform, rendering the wells inoperable. Taylor discovered leaking oil but took no action. In 2007, Taylor was ordered to decommission the wells within one year. Taylor sought extensions. The government required Taylor to set aside funds for its decommissioning obligations. For Taylor to receive reimbursement, the government must confirm the work was conducted “in material compliance with all applicable federal laws and . . . regulations" and with the Leases. The resulting Trust Agreement states that it “shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of" Louisiana. Taylor attempted to fulfill its obligations. The government approved a departure from certain standards but ultimately refused to relieve Taylor of its responsibilities.Taylor filed claims involving Louisiana state law: breach of the Trust Agreement; request for dissolution of the trust account based on impossibility of performance; request for reformation for mutual error; and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. OCSLA makes federal law exclusive in its regulation of the OCS. To the extent federal law applies to a particular issue, state law is inapplicable. OCSLA regulations address the arguments underlying Taylor’s contract claims, so Louisiana state law cannot be adopted as surrogate law. View "Taylor Energy Co. LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs each own a wind farm that was put into service in 2012. Each applied for a federal cash grant based on specified energy project costs, under section 1603 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009. The Treasury Department awarded each company less than requested, rejecting as unjustified the full amounts of certain development fees included in the submitted cost bases. Each company sued. The government counterclaimed, alleging that it had actually overpaid the companies.The Claims Court and Federal Circuit ruled in favor of the government. Section 1603 provides for government reimbursement to qualified applicants of a portion of the “expense” of putting certain energy-generating property into service as measured by the “basis” of such property; “basis” is defined as “the cost of such property,” 26 U.S.C. 1012(a). To support its claim, each company was required to prove that the dollar amounts of the development fees claimed reliably measured the actual development costs for the windfarms. Findings that the amounts stated in the development agreements did not reliably indicate the development costs were sufficiently supported by the absence in the agreements of any meaningful description of the development services to be provided and the fact that all, or nearly all, of the development services had been completed by the time the agreements were executed. View "California Ridge Wind Energy, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law