Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1983, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act established a plan for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) generated by nuclear power plants, 42 U.S.C. 10101–10270. The Act made utilities responsible for SNF storage until the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) accepts the material. The Secretary of Energy entered into contracts with nuclear utilities to accept SNF in return for payment of fees. The Act provided that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission “shall not issue or renew a license” to any nuclear utility unless the utility has entered into a contract with DOE or DOE certifies ongoing negotiations. Nuclear utilities, including the owner of the Entergy nuclear power stations, entered into contracts and began making payments, which have continued. By 1994, DOE knew it would be unable to accept SNF by the Act’s January 31, 1998 deadline. In 1995, DOE issued a “Final Interpretation” that took the position that it did not have an unconditional obligation to begin performance on that date. Entergy sued, asserting that DOE’s partial breach caused it to incur additional costs for SNF storage. The claims court struck an unavoidable delay defense, based on a prior decision rejecting DOE’s argument that its failure was “unavoidable” under the contract. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Entergy Nuclear Fitzpatrick, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1996, CP sued the United States, claiming that CP owned minerals underlying Louisiana property (Groups A, B, and C mineral servitudes), and that between 1943 and 1978, the government imposed a drilling and operations moratorium while the surface was used for bombing and artillery practice. It alleged that starting in 1992, the government, claiming ownership, has granted oil and gas leases covering the property. The district court granted the government summary judgment with regard to Groups A and B because the prescription period was not suspended by the moratoriums. Concerning Group C, the court granted CP summary judgment, finding that servitude imprescriptible. The Fifth Circuit affirmed; certiorari was denied. In1998, CP filed another complaint in the Claims Court, alleging taking without just compensation, as an alternative to its district court action. In 2004, the Claims Court dismissed the Groups A and B claims and limited the C claim to post-1992 action. The court found that the government’s issuance of leases after 1997 constituted a compensable temporary taking, but subsequently dismissed, finding that the facts alleged in the district court complaint were nearly identical. The complaints were “for or in respect to” the same claim and 28 U.S.C. 1500 precluded jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Cent. Pines Land Co., LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

Shell imported petroleum products, 1993-1994, upon which custom duties, taxes, and other fees were paid. During the same period, Shell exported drawback-eligible substitute finished petroleum derivatives. In 1995-1996, substitution drawback claims were filed with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection on Shell’s behalf. Generally, Customs provides a drawback of 99% of any duty, tax, or fee imposed under federal law upon entry or importation if the merchandise (or a commercially interchangeable substitute) is subsequently exported or destroyed under Customs supervision and not used within the U.S. before exportation or destruction, 19 U.S.C. 1313(j),(p). Drawback claims must be filed within three years of exportation. During the time of Shell’s imports, drawback eligibility of Harbor Maintenance Tax and Environmental Tax payments, which Shell now seeks, were heavily disputed. Shell was found not to have included an express request for HMT and ET in the “net claim” figure. In 1997, after the three-year period for the filing of drawback claims had expired Shell filed protests with Customs, seeking drawback as to HMT and ET payments. Customs denied Shell’s protests. The Court of International Trade found the claims time-barred. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that 1999 and 2004 statutory amendments did not change Shell’s position. View "Shell Oil Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

Kansas power companies suffered damages due to the government’s partial breach of the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel And/Or High-Level Radioactive Waste, authorized by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. 10101–10270. The Court of Federal Claims conducted a nine-day trial and awarded $10,632,454.83. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. In determining the amount of damages, thel court correctly did not award damages for cost of capital and for the costs associated with researching alternative storage options for spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste. The court also appropriately reduced the companies’ damages by the value of the benefit they received as a result of their mitigation activities. However, the court erred by not accepting the companies’ reasonable method for calculating overhead costs. View "KS Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

A subsidiary of Marathon hired Preston as a relief pumper in Marathon’s coal bed methane well operation. After beginning work, Preston signed an Employee Agreement containing the assignment at issue. Later, Preston worked with Marathon Engineer Smith on a baffle system to improve machinery used to extract methane gas from water-saturated coal in a coal bed methane gas well. Marathon installed the system on wells. After Preston’s employment ended, both Marathon and Preston pursued patents. The district court declared that Preston is the sole inventor of one patent and that Smith was misjoined as an inventor; ordered the PTO to issue a new certificate reflecting Preston as the sole inventor; declared Marathon the owner of other patents pursuant to the employment agreement and that Preston breached the agreement for failing to assign his rights. The court entered summary judgment in favor of Marathon on its shop right claim, finding that, even if Marathon did not own the patents, it had a shop right to practice the inventions. The Federal Circuit affirmed that Preston assigned his rights in two inventions to Marathon pursuant to his employment agreement. Because that assignment was automatic, there was no breach of that agreement. View "Preston v. Marathon Oil Co." on Justia Law

In 1983, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 10101-10270, authorized the Department of Energy to contract with nuclear facilities for disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste. The Standard Contract provided that rights and duties may be assignable with transfer of SNF title. Plaintiff entered into the Standard Contract in 1983 and sold its operation and SNF to ENVY in 2002, including assignment of the Standard Contract, except one payment obligation. Plaintiff transferred claims related to DOE defaults. As a result of DOE’s breach, ENVY built on-site dry-storage facilities. The Claims Court consolidated ENVY’s suit with plaintiff’s suit. The government admitted breach; the Claims Court awarded ENVY $34,895,467 (undisputed damages) and certain disputed damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. Plaintiff validly assigned pre-existing claims; while partial assignment of rights and duties under the contract was not valid, the government waived objection. The assignment encompassed claims against the government. Legal and lobbying fees to secure Vermont approval for mitigation were foreseeable, but other expenses were not recoverable. ENVY failed to prove costs of disposing of contaminated material discovered due to the breach and its characterization of spent fuel moved to dry storage. ENVY is not entitled to recover cost of capital for funding mitigation, or Resource Code 19 payroll loader overhead costs, but may recover capital suspense loader overhead costs,.View "VT Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Power companies sought damages for the cost of storing spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste beyond when the government promised by contract to begin storing that waste in a permanent repository. In 2004, the claims court held a seven-week trial on damages. The Federal Circuit accepted its findings on foreseeability, reasonable certainty and the use of the substantial causal factor standard for causation purposes, and the determination that an award of Nuclear Waste Fund fees should be denied as premature, but remanded for application of the 1987 annual capacity report rate to damages claimed by the parties. On remand, the claims court accepted the fuel exchange model presented by plaintiffs’ expert and concluded that plaintiffs would not have built dry storage; two of the companies would not have reracked their storage pools under the 1987 ACR rate. The court found that, using fuel exchanges, plaintiffs would have emptied their wet storage facilities in the non-breach world within the first 10 years of DOE’s performance. The Federal Circuit reversed with respect to denial of claims for wet storage pool costs and NRC fees, which were within the mandate on remand, but otherwise affirmed. View "Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1983, Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 10101-10270, authorizing the Department of Energy to enter into contracts with nuclear facilities for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW). Congress mandated that, under the Standard Contract, DOE dispose of SNF and HLW beginning not later than January 31, 1998. In 1983, DOE entered into a Standard Contract with Consolidated Edison under which DOE agreed to accept SNF stored at the Indian Point facility. Following DOE’s breach, the Claims Court awarded two categories of damages: wet storage costs for continued operation of its Unit 1 spent fuel pool and regulatory fees paid to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Federal Circuit reversed the awards, affirmed denial of damages for the cost of financing mitigation activities, but reversed denial of damages for indirect overhead costs associated with mitigation. The company had chosen to prioritize removal of Unit 2 SNF and Unit 1 material would not have been removed by the time at issue; the company did not establish that the breach caused an increase in fees to the NRC. View "Consol. Edison Co. of NY, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

During World War II, the U.S. contracted with oil companies for the production of aviation fuel, which resulted in production of hazardous waste. The waste was dumped at the California McColl site. Several decades later, the oil companies were held liable for cleanup costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601, and sought reimbursement from the government based on the contracts. The district court entered summary judgment on liability, finding that the contracts contained open ended indemnification agreements and encompassed costs for CERLCA cleanup, and awarded $87,344,345.70. The trial judge subsequently discovered that his wife had inherited 97.59 shares of stock in a parent to two of the oil companies. The judge ultimately vacated his summary judgment rulings; severed two companies from the suit and directed the clerk to reassign their claims to a different judge; reinstated his prior decisions with respect to two remaining companies; and entered judgment against the government ($68,849,505). The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for reassignment to another judge. The judge was required to recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. 455(b)(4) and the error was not harmless.View "Shell Oil Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

On GE’s complaint, the International Trade Commission conducted an investigation and, rejecting the findings of an ALJ determined that GE's 039 patent was not invalid by reason of obviousness or written description, that variable speed wind turbines imported by Mitsubishi do not infringe any of GE's patents, and that the domestic industry requirement is not met as to any of the patents. The Commission concluded that the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. 1337, was not violated. The 039 patent subsequently expired. The Federal Circuit affirmed that the 221 patent is not infringed, but reversed the determination of no domestic industry as to the 985 patent, and remanded. View "Gen. Elec. Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law