Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Over three hundred restaurants and businesses applied for grants from the Restaurant Revitalization Fund (RRF), a program established by Congress in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and administered by the Small Business Administration (SBA). The plaintiffs submitted their applications on the first day the portal opened, but did not receive grants before the RRF funds were exhausted. They alleged that the SBA improperly awarded grants to later applicants instead of following the statutory requirement to award grants in the order applications were received.The United States Court of Federal Claims considered the plaintiffs’ complaint seeking damages equivalent to the unpaid grants. The Government moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction under the Tucker Act and for failure to state a claim, arguing that the RRF statute did not mandate payment and that Congress imposed a cap on liability. The Court of Federal Claims denied the motion, holding that the RRF statute’s language was money-mandating, thus conferring jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, and that there was no clear statutory cap limiting the Government’s liability for the grants. The court certified its decision for interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that the RRF statute was money-mandating due to its mandatory “shall award” language and the retrospective nature of the grant calculation. The court further determined that the statutory appropriation language was ambiguous and did not impose a clear cap limiting the Government’s liability. As a result, the plaintiffs’ claims fell within Tucker Act jurisdiction, and they had sufficiently stated a claim for relief. The decision of the Court of Federal Claims was affirmed. View "112 GENESEE STREET, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

In this case, the central issue arose during a countervailing duty investigation into phosphate fertilizers imported from Morocco and Russia. The International Trade Commission (Commission) collected information through questionnaires sent to various parties, including domestic and foreign producers. The Commission’s longstanding practice was to automatically designate all questionnaire responses as confidential, regardless of whether the submitting party requested confidentiality or whether the information would qualify for such treatment under the relevant statute. This led to heavy redactions in the administrative record when the investigation was challenged in court.A Moroccan producer, OCP S.A., sought review of the Commission’s injury determination in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT). The CIT initially remanded the injury determination due to insufficient evidentiary support. When the remand record again included substantial redactions, the CIT held a hearing to scrutinize the Commission’s confidentiality designations. After reviewing arguments from the Commission and affected parties, the CIT concluded that the Commission’s practice of automatically treating all questionnaire responses as confidential was unauthorized by law. The CIT found that much of the redacted information was either publicly available, generalized, or outdated, and thus not entitled to confidential treatment, with only a small portion warranting protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s Confidentiality Opinion and Order. The Federal Circuit held that the governing statute does not abrogate the common law right of public access to judicial records and that the Commission’s blanket confidentiality rule conflicts with statutory requirements, which demand public disclosure of non-confidential information and proper justification for confidentiality. The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s order that required the Commission to comply with statutory standards for confidentiality and to cease automatic confidential designation of questionnaire responses. View "In re United States" on Justia Law

In a dispute concerning antidumping and countervailing duties on mattresses imported from several countries, the U.S. International Trade Commission determined that domestic industry suffered material injury from imports sold at less than fair value and from subsidized imports. The Commission treated certain information submitted in response to its questionnaires as confidential. After the Court of International Trade issued a public opinion sustaining the Commission’s injury determination, it did not redact information the Commission had deemed confidential. The Commission requested retraction of the public opinion and sought redactions for specific company names and numerical data, arguing these deserved confidential treatment.The parties jointly moved for redaction, relying on the Commission’s practice of treating questionnaire data as confidential and citing statutory provisions. The Court of International Trade denied the motion, reasoning that the information was either publicly available or not linked to specific entities, and that some claims of confidentiality had been waived due to procedural oversight. The court also emphasized the common law right of access and transparency, but did not specifically address the statutory authority for disclosure.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the denial of the joint motion. The court found the case moot because the allegedly confidential information had already been publicly disclosed more than two years earlier, rendering any relief unavailable. The Federal Circuit held that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness did not apply, as the companion case decided that day resolved the same confidentiality issues. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded. View "In re United States" on Justia Law

A veteran who suffered a traumatic brain injury from an improvised explosive device while deployed sought financial assistance under the Traumatic Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance (TSGLI) program after experiencing a stroke within two years of the injury. The Army denied his claim, determining the stroke was a physical illness or disease, not a qualifying traumatic injury as defined by the relevant statute and regulations. The veteran then petitioned the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to amend its rules to include coverage for illnesses or diseases caused by explosive ordnance, arguing these conditions are analogous to those already covered under existing exceptions for injuries resulting from chemical, biological, or radiological weapons.The VA initially denied the rulemaking petition but agreed to further review as part of a program-wide assessment. After several years, extensive consultation with medical experts, and consideration of the petition and supporting materials, the VA issued a final denial. It concluded that expanding coverage to delayed illnesses or diseases linked to explosive ordnance would be inconsistent with TSGLI’s purpose, which focuses on immediate injuries, would deviate from the insurance model underlying the program, and could threaten its financial stability. The VA also found insufficient evidence of a direct causal relationship between explosive ordnance, traumatic brain injury, and downstream illnesses like stroke.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the VA’s denial under the highly deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that the VA provided a reasoned explanation addressing the petitioner’s arguments and the record, and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. The petition for review was therefore denied. View "MCKINNEY v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS " on Justia Law

Mr. Palmeri began his employment with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1997 and was promoted to the Senior Executive Service (SES) in 2020. He was not informed that joining the DEA SES would affect his appeal rights. In January 2022, the DEA proposed his removal based on alleged misconduct, but before the removal was finalized, Mr. Palmeri retired. The agency stated that, had he not retired, he would have been removed. He then appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board), claiming his retirement was involuntary and constituted a constructive removal.The DEA moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that SES employees in the DEA do not have the right to appeal adverse actions to the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 3151. After allowing for discovery and briefing, an Administrative Judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The full Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed and adopted this initial decision, explaining that DEA SES employees can only appeal adverse actions through procedures established by the Attorney General, but no such procedures or regulations have been promulgated.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered whether the Board had jurisdiction over Mr. Palmeri’s appeal. The court held that the governing statutes clearly exclude DEA SES employees from Board appeal rights and require any hearing or appeal to be decided pursuant to regulations issued by the Attorney General, which do not exist. The court rejected arguments that lack of notice or absence of regulations should confer jurisdiction on the Board, and clarified that any constitutional claims must be pursued in a different forum. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. View "PALMERI v. MSPB " on Justia Law

James Young, a veteran who served in the military during the mid-1980s, initially filed a claim for service-connected disability benefits in 1988, alleging head injuries from an in-service car accident. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regional office denied his claim in 1991, and after several years of proceedings, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the claim in 1999, citing Young’s failure to appear for scheduled medical examinations. Young did not appeal the Board’s 1999 denial. Years later, in 2017, following a new claim and medical examinations, the VA granted service connection for his head injuries effective August 17, 2012.Seeking an earlier effective date linked to his original 1988 claim, Young filed a motion in 2022 with the Board to vacate its 1999 denial, alleging due process violations because the Board had failed to ensure the regional office complied with orders to search for certain records. The Board denied the motion, characterizing the alleged error as a “duty to assist error” rather than a due process error. Young appealed this denial to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which dismissed the appeal. The Veterans Court found that while the appeal was timely regarding the denial of the motion to vacate, such a denial was not an appealable decision under its jurisdictional statute.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court’s dismissal. The Federal Circuit held that the Board’s denial of a motion to vacate under 38 C.F.R. § 20.1000(a), when based solely on alleged material error known at the time of the original decision, does not constitute an appealable “decision” under 38 U.S.C. § 7252. The court determined that allowing appeals from such procedural denials would undermine the statutory time bar and permit indefinite judicial review of Board decisions. View "YOUNG v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

David S. Brimer, a disabled veteran with preference eligibility, was employed as a GS-13 Supervisory Human Resources Specialist for the Naval Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. He applied for a merit promotion to a GS-14 Assistant Human Resources Officer position with the Naval Education and Training Command. Although the position was open to current permanent employees, VEOA eligibles, and DoD Military Spouse Preference eligibles, his application was not initially referred to the hiring official due to an erroneous belief by the agency that he had not met the time-in-grade requirement. After Brimer filed a complaint with the Department of Labor, the agency acknowledged the error but determined, upon review, that Brimer was not among the most highly qualified candidates for the position.Brimer subsequently appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, alleging that the agency obstructed his right to compete for employment and violated his veterans’ preference rights under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1). The administrative judge denied his request for corrective action, stating that the initial error had been remedied through a proper merit review. The Board affirmed, relying on Kerner v. Department of the Interior, 778 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and concluded that § 3304(f) does not apply to veterans already employed by the federal government, thus denying Brimer corrective action as a matter of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision. Applying the standard set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c), the court held that the Board correctly interpreted precedent and the statute, affirming that 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) does not entitle currently employed federal veterans to corrective action under VEOA for merit promotion vacancies. The Board’s decision denying Brimer's claims was affirmed. View "BRIMER v. NAVY " on Justia Law

A registered nurse who worked for the Indian Health Service during the COVID-19 pandemic claimed that she and similarly situated nurses were required by supervisors to work overtime without compensation. After resigning, she filed a class action lawsuit in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging, among other things, that the government violated the federal overtime statute by failing to pay for overtime that was allegedly induced by supervisors. Specifically, she argued that the statutory requirement for overtime to be “officially ordered or approved” should cover such induced overtime, even in the absence of written authorization.The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed all counts of her complaint for failure to state a claim. With respect to the overtime claim (Count II), the court found that she did not allege that she or any potential class members had written authorization for their overtime, as required by the relevant Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, reviewed the validity of the OPM’s regulation that requires overtime orders or approvals to be in writing, in light of the statutory language and recent Supreme Court precedent on agency rulemaking authority. The court held that the statute delegates to OPM the authority to prescribe necessary regulations for administering the overtime pay statute, and that this includes the discretion to require written authorization as part of the “officially ordered or approved” process. The court concluded that the writing requirement is a valid exercise of OPM’s rulemaking authority and does not contradict the statute. The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of the overtime claim and remanded the remaining claims to the original panel for further consideration. View "Lesko v. United States" on Justia Law

Russian producers of phosphate fertilizers were investigated by the U.S. Department of Commerce after a domestic company alleged that the Russian government was providing subsidies, specifically through the provision of natural gas at prices below market value. Commerce’s investigation focused on whether these subsidies were both “specific” to an industry or enterprise and constituted a financial benefit through the sale of gas at less than adequate remuneration. During the investigation, Commerce requested and reviewed data from Russian authorities and Gazprom, Russia’s state-controlled gas supplier, about the volume and pricing of natural gas provided to various Russian industries. The evidence showed that the agrochemical industry, which includes fertilizer producers, was the largest industrial consumer of natural gas, though some non-industrial sectors consumed more in total.Commerce determined that the subsidy was “de facto specific” because the agrochemical industry was a predominant industrial user of natural gas. It also found that natural gas was provided at less than adequate remuneration, using a third-tier benchmark analysis that relied on international energy price data, after concluding that Russian market prices were distorted by government intervention and not set by market principles. Commerce’s final determination imposed countervailing duties on Russian phosphate fertilizer imports.The United States Court of International Trade reviewed Commerce’s decisions and upheld both the specificity and pricing determinations, remanding only on unrelated issues. Upon remand, Commerce reaffirmed its conclusions, and the Trade Court entered final judgment in support of the agency’s findings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court’s judgment. The court held that Commerce has reasonable flexibility in determining the appropriate comparator group for the “predominant user” analysis and that its approach in this case was reasonable. The court also upheld Commerce’s less-than-adequate-remuneration analysis and rejected arguments that further adjustments were required by statute. The judgment sustaining the countervailing duties was affirmed. View "MOSAIC COMPANY v. US " on Justia Law

Blue Sky The Color of Imagination, LLC imported a spiral-bound paper product that combines monthly calendars, weekly planning pages, note sections, and additional pages for goals and contacts. Blue Sky labeled this item a “weekly/monthly planning calendar,” while the government referred to it as a “planner.” The product was designed for users to schedule future appointments and events.Initially, Customs and Border Protection classified this product under subheading 4820.10.40.00 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), as “[o]ther” stationery items. Blue Sky protested, seeking classification under heading 4910 as a “calendar,” but Customs denied the protest. Blue Sky then filed suit in the United States Court of International Trade. The Trade Court granted summary judgment, rejecting both parties’ proposed classifications and instead classified the product as a “diary” under subheading 4820.10.20.10. The Trade Court reasoned that “diary” covers both retrospective journals and prospective scheduling devices, and found Blue Sky’s product fit this category.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Trade Court’s summary judgment de novo. The Federal Circuit found that the Trade Court’s definition of “diary” conflicted with the controlling precedent set in Mead Corp. v. United States, which held that a “diary” is retrospective, not prospective. Because Blue Sky’s product is used to note future appointments, the Federal Circuit concluded that it cannot be classified as a “diary.” The court reversed the Trade Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, directing the Trade Court to reconsider the proper classification under the HTSUS. View "BLUE SKY THE COLOR OF IMAGINATION, LLC v. US " on Justia Law