Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Andrew J. Winterbottom, a veteran, was awarded a 30% disability rating for his service-connected post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which was later increased to 50%. He appealed to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals seeking a higher rating. During a Board hearing in June 2021, the judge questioned Winterbottom about specific violent episodes, which he later claimed demonstrated judicial bias. In May 2022, the Board denied a higher rating, concluding that his violent behavior was not unprovoked.Winterbottom appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision and exhibited bias. The Veterans Court partially agreed, remanding the case because the Board did not adequately explain why it gave less weight to a private counselor's opinion. However, the court found no bias warranting reassignment, stating the judge's questions aimed to determine if the violent conduct was provoked.Winterbottom then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal, stating it lacked jurisdiction to review non-final orders from the Veterans Court. The court noted that exceptions to the finality requirement, as outlined in Williams v. Principi, did not apply to Winterbottom's case. The court also declined to create a new exception for judicial bias claims, suggesting that such claims should be raised through a mandamus petition or after a final judgment. Thus, the appeal was dismissed. View "WINTERBOTTOM v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

CKY, Inc. entered into a fixed-price construction contract with the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) in October 2012. CKY encountered unexpected conditions, including heavy rainfall and undisclosed culverts, which led to additional expenses. CKY sought compensation for these expenses, but the Corps denied the requests. CKY then filed a claim under the Contract Disputes Act, seeking $1,146,226 for the additional costs incurred. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (Board) ruled in favor of CKY regarding the undisclosed culverts but denied compensation for other claims.The Board awarded CKY $185,000 plus interest for the expenses related to the undisclosed culverts. CKY then applied for attorney’s fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The Board granted the application, concluding that the government’s position regarding the undisclosed culverts was not substantially justified. The Board limited its substantial-justification inquiry to the government’s litigation position on the specific claim where CKY prevailed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Board erred by categorically narrowing its substantial-justification inquiry to the government’s litigation position and to the specific claim on which CKY prevailed. The court emphasized that the substantial-justification inquiry should consider both the agency’s pre-litigation conduct and its litigation position, and should treat the case as an inclusive whole rather than focusing on individual claims. The court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration without the categorical limitations previously applied. View "In Re SECRETARY OF THE ARMY " on Justia Law

The United States Department of the Navy issued a solicitation requesting technical support for its electromagnetic spectrum resources, requiring proposals to be submitted via email by a specified deadline. eSimplicity, Inc. submitted its proposal before the deadline, but it was not received by the Contracting Officer due to the email exceeding the maximum file size and being bounced back. The Navy deemed eSimplicity's proposal untimely and did not consider it.eSimplicity filed a pre-award bid protest with the United States Court of Federal Claims. The Claims Court ruled in favor of eSimplicity, concluding that the file size was an unstated evaluation criterion and that the government control exception could apply to electronically submitted proposals. The court remanded the case for the Navy to reconsider its decision or to take other actions consistent with the court's opinion. Subsequently, the Navy issued an amended solicitation and awarded the contract to eSimplicity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that the appeal was moot because the original solicitation had expired, and the contract had been awarded under a new solicitation. The court found that there was no longer a live controversy, as the issues presented on appeal concerned the now-expired solicitation. The court also rejected the government's argument that the case fell under the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception to mootness, noting that the government had other opportunities to appeal similar issues in the past but chose not to do so. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "ESIMPLICITY, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

Malcolm Pipes, a former reservist in the United States Air Force, sought disability-retirement pay and benefits after suffering a stroke while participating in the Air Force’s Self-paced Fitness Improvement Program (SFIP). Pipes argued that he was in inactive-duty training (IDT) status at the time of his injury, which would entitle him to the benefits under 10 U.S.C. § 1204. The Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR) and the United States Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court) previously denied his claim, leading to this appeal.In the first appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court's decision, holding that Pipes was in a duty status when ordered to participate in the SFIP. However, the court did not address whether Pipes was in IDT status when performing the SFIP. On remand, the AFBCMR and the Claims Court again denied relief, concluding that Pipes did not have the necessary advance authorization for IDT status as required by Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 36-8001.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the Claims Court's decision. The court found that the AFMAN applies to all IDT and requires advance authorization for such status. Pipes failed to provide evidence of receiving this authorization. The court also rejected Pipes's argument that the lawful order to participate in the SFIP automatically placed him in IDT status. The court noted that the Department of Veterans Affairs' grant of service connection for Pipes's stroke did not impact the determination of his duty status under the AFMAN.The court affirmed the Claims Court's judgment, concluding that the AFBCMR's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, or unsupported by substantial evidence. View "PIPES v. US " on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the municipality of Anchorage and the United States regarding two agreements related to the improvement of the Port of Alaska. In 2003, Anchorage and the United States, through the Maritime Administration (MARAD), signed a Memorandum of Understanding (2003 Memorandum) to upgrade and expand the port. In 2011, they signed a Memorandum of Agreement (2011 Memorandum) to address issues that arose during the project, including large-scale damage discovered in 2010.The United States Court of Federal Claims held that the United States breached the 2003 Memorandum by failing to deliver a defect-free port and the 2011 Memorandum by settling subcontractor claims without consulting Anchorage. The court awarded Anchorage $367,446,809 in damages, including $11,279,059 related to the settlement of subcontractor claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the 2003 Memorandum did not require the United States to deliver a defect-free port, as it lacked specific terms such as what was to be built, where, dimensions, deadlines, and costs. The court vacated the Court of Federal Claims' decision regarding the 2003 Memorandum and remanded for further proceedings.However, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims' decision that the United States breached the 2011 Memorandum by settling subcontractor claims without conferring with Anchorage. The court upheld the award of $11,279,059 in damages to Anchorage for this breach. The case was vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further consideration consistent with the Federal Circuit's opinion. View "ANCHORAGE v. US " on Justia Law

Risen Energy Co., Ltd. (Risen), a Chinese exporter of solar cells, was subject to an antidumping order by the Department of Commerce (Commerce). In the Sixth Administrative Review, Commerce used surrogate values from Malaysia to calculate normal values for Risen's products. Risen challenged Commerce's surrogate value calculations for its backsheet and ethyl vinyl acetate (EVA) inputs, as well as the overhead ratio calculation.The United States Court of International Trade (Trade Court) initially found Commerce's surrogate value calculations for Risen's backsheet and EVA inputs unsupported by substantial evidence and remanded the matter for further explanation. Commerce then provided additional evidence from ASTM standards to support its choice of HTS categories for these inputs, which the Trade Court sustained. However, the Trade Court upheld Commerce's surrogate financial ratio calculation for overhead despite some reservations about Commerce's rationale.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Commerce's use of the HTS categories for "sheet" to value Risen's backsheet and EVA inputs, finding the decision supported by substantial evidence. However, the court found Commerce's surrogate overhead ratio calculation unsupported by substantial evidence. The court noted that Commerce's reliance on the Hanwha financial statement and the IFRS standard was unclear and speculative.The Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court's decision regarding the surrogate value calculations for backsheet and EVA inputs but vacated the decision on the surrogate overhead ratio calculation. The case was remanded to Commerce for further proceedings to provide substantial evidence for its overhead calculation. View "Risen Energy Co., LTD. v. United States" on Justia Law

In July 2009, veteran John H. Casey filed a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) with the VA challenging the denial of service connection for disabilities. In June 2010, Robert Goss entered into a contingent fee agreement with Casey, agreeing to represent him in his pursuit of benefits from the VA and receive twenty percent of any past-due benefits awarded. Goss filed the necessary forms with the VA, and in January 2011, Casey terminated their attorney-client relationship. Despite this, the VA awarded past-due benefits to Casey in September 2011 and February 2012, and paid Goss twenty percent of these benefits. Casey challenged the payment of fees to Goss, arguing that Goss did not perform any work on his case.The VA issued a Statement of the Case (SOC) denying Casey’s challenge, and Casey appealed to the Board of Veterans Appeals (Board). The Board remanded the case to the VA Regional Office (RO) three times, instructing the RO to request an itemized account of Goss’s work to determine the reasonableness of the fees. Goss refused to provide this information, and the RO repeatedly denied Casey’s claim without providing full reasons and bases. In November 2020, the Board found the twenty percent fee unreasonable, as Goss had not contributed significantly to the case, and Casey’s NOD was filed before Goss’s appointment.Goss appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the reasonableness of the fee award. The VA initially opposed but later conceded this point. The Veterans Court accepted the VA’s concession, vacated the Board’s decision on reasonableness, and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Goss then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The Federal Circuit reversed the Veterans Court’s decision, holding that the Board did have jurisdiction to review the reasonableness of the fee award. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this determination. View "Goss v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a group of ambulance service providers, challenged the validity of a final rule promulgated by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The rule, titled "Change in Rates VA Pays for Special Modes of Transportation," amended how the VA pays for noncontract ground and air ambulance transports for eligible beneficiaries. The rule stipulated that the VA would pay the lesser of the actual charge or the Medicare fee schedule amount for these services, rather than the actual costs. Petitioners argued that this rule exceeded the VA's statutory authority under 38 U.S.C. § 111(b)(3)(C).The case was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The court examined whether the VA had the authority to implement the rule under the cited statute. The court noted that while 38 U.S.C. § 111(a) allows the VA to pay for travel expenses to or from a "Department facility or other place," § 111(b)(3)(C) specifically limits the VA's payment discretion to ambulance transports to or from a "Department facility" only. The court found that the VA's rule improperly extended this payment methodology to transports to or from places other than Department facilities, which was not authorized by the statute.The Federal Circuit held that the VA's final rule exceeded the statutory authority granted by Congress under 38 U.S.C. § 111(b)(3)(C). Consequently, the court granted the petition and set aside the final rule. The court did not address other arguments raised by the petitioners, as the decision on the statutory authority was sufficient to resolve the case. The petitioners' motion to stay the rule pending judicial review was denied as moot, given the court's decision on the merits. View "Metropolitan Area EMS Authority v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Julien P. Champagne, a veteran who served from December 1953 to December 1956, filed a claim in September 1987 for benefits related to his cerebellar degenerative disorder (CDD) using VA Form 21-526. The VA regional office (RO) interpreted this as a pension claim and awarded a disability pension in December 1987. In 1999, Champagne sought service connection compensation for malaria and any residual illnesses, including CDD. The RO granted service connection for malaria at 0% in 2002 but did not grant compensation for CDD. Champagne filed a notice of disagreement in 2003, and after multiple proceedings, he was granted compensation for CDD at 100%, effective February 3, 2005. This effective date was later changed to July 14, 2003, but Champagne sought an earlier date, arguing it should be from 1987.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied an earlier effective date in October 2020, finding no indication in the 1987 application that Champagne intended to claim service connection compensation. Champagne appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board’s decision in July 2022. The Veterans Court held that under 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a), the VA may consider a pension claim as a compensation claim but is not required to do so.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the plain language of 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a) is permissive, allowing but not requiring the VA to consider a pension claim as a compensation claim. The court also found no merit in Champagne’s argument that the Veterans Court engaged in impermissible fact-finding, as the court had merely determined that any findings by the RO would not bind the Board. View "Champagne v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Herbert McCoy, Jr. applied for a Program Analyst position with the General Services Administration (GSA) but was not selected. He appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board), claiming his veteran's preference and 30% or more Disabled Veteran status were not considered. McCoy had not filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor before appealing to the Board.The Board's Administrative Judge (AJ) ordered McCoy to provide proof of filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, as required under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA). McCoy failed to provide such proof. Consequently, the AJ dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. McCoy petitioned the Board for review, but the Board affirmed the AJ's decision, stating McCoy had not exhausted his Department of Labor (DOL) remedies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that McCoy had not demonstrated he exhausted his DOL remedies, a prerequisite for the Board's jurisdiction under the VEOA. McCoy's arguments did not address this failure. The court affirmed the Board's decision, concluding it lacked jurisdiction over McCoy's petition. View "MCCOY v. MSPB " on Justia Law