Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A federal employee serving as a Presidential Innovation Fellow at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) was assigned to work on an artificial intelligence tool intended to reduce the processing time for veterans’ disability benefits claims. After reviewing the performance of the tool (CAAPI), the employee determined and communicated to agency leadership that, contrary to the agency’s public claims, the tool was producing inaccurate predictions and actually increasing the average processing time for claims. These findings were shared internally in March 2021, discussed in a blog post in April 2021 (approved and published by the VA), and elevated to higher-level management in May 2021. Despite the disclosures, the agency continued to use the tool with minor modifications, and eventually, the employee’s contract was not renewed, and he was terminated from his position.After filing a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel, the employee brought an individual right of action appeal before the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board), alleging that his removal was in retaliation for whistleblowing. The VA moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Board’s administrative judge, and later the full Board, concluded that the employee had not made nonfrivolous allegations that his disclosures were protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act, finding he lacked a reasonable belief that his disclosures evidenced gross mismanagement or waste.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the employee had sufficiently raised nonfrivolous allegations that his communications constituted protected disclosures of gross mismanagement under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). The court found the employee’s allegations plausible and sufficiently specific to establish jurisdiction for his claim before the Board. The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. Costs were awarded to the petitioner. View "OGUNTADE v. MSPB " on Justia Law

A group of domestic producers and a union petitioned the Department of Commerce to investigate whether steel pipes imported from Argentina were being sold in the United States at less than fair value. The petitioners supplied production data and estimates to demonstrate that their petition met statutory thresholds for industry support, using 2020 shipment figures as a proxy for domestic production. Tenaris Bay City, Inc., a major domestic producer with ties to foreign producers, opposed the petition, arguing that the industry support calculations were unreliable, particularly due to potential double counting of pipes both produced and finished domestically.After receiving comments from Tenaris, Commerce determined that the petition met the statutory requirements for industry support and initiated an antidumping investigation. Tenaris challenged this determination in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT), which remanded the issue to Commerce for further explanation specifically regarding potential double counting in the industry support calculations. On remand, Commerce found no evidence of double counting and addressed concerns about particular companies flagged by Tenaris. The CIT subsequently affirmed Commerce’s remand results, concluding the agency’s calculations were reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, and found that Tenaris’s new arguments concerning undercounting and overcounting were unexhausted because they were not timely raised during the administrative process.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s decision de novo and applied a deferential standard to Commerce’s findings, overturning only if unsupported by substantial evidence or not in accordance with law. The court affirmed the CIT, holding that Commerce’s determination of industry support was reasonable and supported by the record, that Tenaris’s concerns about double counting were unsubstantiated, and that the CIT did not abuse its discretion in finding Tenaris’s additional arguments unexhausted. The CIT’s decision was affirmed. View "TENARIS BAY CITY, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

After serving twenty years in the United States Air Force, the claimant sought educational assistance benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to pay for a flight training course at MidCoast Aviation Services, LLC. He needed this pilot certification to qualify for a job as a sensor operator with General Atomics. Although he supported his application with a certificate from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) confirming MidCoast’s status as an approved pilot school, his application was denied.The VA initially denied the benefits, and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed the denial. The Board found that while the claimant had basic entitlement to educational assistance, the law did not permit benefits for the MidCoast course because the school was not an educational institution of higher learning (IHL), and the course was not part of a college degree program. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims also affirmed the Board’s decision. The majority held that the claimant was ineligible for benefits because MidCoast was not affiliated with an IHL, relying on 38 U.S.C. § 3680A(b). A dissenting judge argued that FAA-approved flight training courses should be eligible regardless of IHL affiliation, based on 38 U.S.C. § 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed how to reconcile the two statutes. It held that while FAA-approved courses at certified pilot schools are “deemed approved,” veterans are only eligible for benefits if the flight training course is provided by an IHL and counts toward a college degree, per 38 U.S.C. § 3680A(b). Since the claimant’s course did not meet this requirement, the court affirmed his ineligibility for benefits. The court further concluded that any challenge to related VA regulations was moot, as statutory ineligibility foreclosed relief. View "LOOMIS v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

A veteran who served in the U.S. Army from 1969 to 1972 and deployed to Vietnam sought disability benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) through four claims. His first claim in 1987 was denied due to his failure to attend a required examination. He filed a second claim in 1990, providing additional details, but it was denied for lack of evidence of a stressor or diagnosis. A third claim in 2000 was also denied for similar reasons. In 2007, he filed a fourth claim to reopen, providing further information about his service. During the appeal of the 2007 denial, he obtained and submitted new service department records in 2008 that supported his PTSD claim. Ultimately, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) awarded him benefits with an effective date corresponding to his 2007 claim to reopen.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals concluded in 2022 that reconsideration of his claim was warranted based on the new records and granted an effective date of 1990, finding he had provided sufficient information in his 1990 claim but not in his 1987 claim. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed, holding that the version of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) in effect when the new records were associated with the file (the 2006 amended version) applied, rather than the prior version.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed whether applying the 2006 regulation to the veteran’s claims was impermissibly retroactive. The court held that the regulation’s application is triggered by the VA’s receipt or association of new and relevant service department records, and since this occurred after the 2006 amendment, applying the new regulation was proper. The court affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. View "MILLER v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

An employee of the Internal Revenue Service, who also served as trustee for her goddaughter’s trust, was terminated from her position following an investigation into her tax returns and health insurance claims. The investigation revealed that she had improperly claimed her goddaughter and goddaughter’s son as dependents for several tax years and placed them on her federal health insurance plan, despite not meeting eligibility criteria. The employee acknowledged to investigators that she knew her actions were technically illegal. Additional incidents involving misuse of her government travel card were also considered as prior discipline. The employee challenged the resulting tax liabilities in the U.S. Tax Court, ultimately settling for a reduced amount based on a stipulation between her and the IRS.An Administrative Judge of the Merit Systems Protection Board initially reversed her removal, finding in her favor. However, following a petition for review by the IRS, the full Merit Systems Protection Board reversed the judge’s decision, sustaining her removal. The Board concluded that the IRS had proven its primary reason for removal by a preponderance of the evidence, and merged another reason into it, without reaching a third reason. The Board gave evidentiary weight to the Tax Court settlement and associated documents, which had been discounted by the Administrative Judge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed whether the Board’s consideration of the Tax Court settlement documents violated evidentiary principles, specifically Federal Rule of Evidence 408. The court held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in considering those materials to establish the fact of the admitted liability, and that even if there had been an evidentiary error, the petitioner failed to show harm or prejudice. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s final decision sustaining the removal. View "HARRIS-CAMPBELL v. TREASURY " on Justia Law

During a review of antidumping duties on multilayered wood flooring imported from China, the U.S. Department of Commerce determined company-specific dumping margins for two mandatory respondents: one received a 0% margin for cooperating, while the other received an 85.13% margin based on adverse facts available due to non-cooperation. Commerce initially calculated a "separate rate" for other eligible companies by averaging these two margins, resulting in a rate of 42.57%. Various plaintiffs, including the appellants, challenged this method, objecting to both the inclusion of the adverse facts available rate and the use of a simple average.The United States Court of International Trade reviewed the case and remanded certain issues to Commerce, including the calculation method for the separate rate. After reconsideration, Commerce adopted a weighted average approach, which reduced the separate rate to 31.63%. This change was more favorable to the appellants. After Commerce filed its final remand results, the appellants submitted comments agreeing that the new calculation method and the resulting rate were lawful and in line with the court’s instructions. They specifically requested the Trade Court to uphold Commerce’s decision. The Trade Court then sustained Commerce’s redetermination, finding it consistent with the statute and administrative guidance, and noted that no parties objected. The court also ruled that issues previously reserved for decision had become moot.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the appellants attempted to challenge the use of the adverse facts available rate and the reasonableness of the 31.63% separate rate. The Federal Circuit held that the appellants forfeited these arguments by not raising them after the new rate was determined and by expressly supporting Commerce’s revised calculation before the Trade Court. The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Trade Court. View "FUSONG JINLONG WOODEN GROUP CO., LTD. v. US " on Justia Law

A veteran who served in the Marine Corps, including a tour in Vietnam, began experiencing fatigue and underwent a medical evaluation at a Veterans Affairs Medical Center in 2010. His blood tests showed elevated lymphocyte counts. However, VA physicians in Florida diagnosed him with monoclonal B-cell lymphocytosis (MBL), not chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL), and did not inform him of a CLL diagnosis. Years later, after his condition worsened and he relocated to Tennessee, a VA oncologist diagnosed him with CLL and retroactively opined that his medical records met the diagnostic criteria for CLL since 2010. The veteran then applied for VA disability compensation. The VA assigned a 100% disability rating with an effective date of January 29, 2016, the date his claim was filed.The veteran appealed, arguing for an earlier effective date due to the alleged misdiagnosis and failure to inform him about his CLL. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals partially granted his request, assigning an effective date of January 29, 2015, but declined to go earlier, finding that the law did not allow equitable considerations to affect the effective date under 38 U.S.C. § 5110. The veteran then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, raising arguments that the VA should be equitably estopped from enforcing § 5110’s effective date restrictions, and that those restrictions were unconstitutional as applied to him. The Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s decision.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court. The Federal Circuit held that equitable estoppel cannot override the effective date limitations of 38 U.S.C. § 5110, and that § 7331 does not create a statutory precondition to enforcement of § 5110. It also held that the statute’s effective date limitations were not unconstitutional as applied to the veteran’s circumstances. View "LEY v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Elizabeth Jacobson, a former Wells Fargo mortgage loan officer, filed a whistleblower declaration with the U.S. Attorney General under the Financial Institutions Anti-Fraud Enforcement Act of 1990 (FIAFEA), alleging that Wells Fargo engaged in fraudulent origination of “stated income” loans between 2005 and 2007. The Department of Justice investigated and determined her declaration was deficient, citing the absence of new factual elements, her admitted participation in the alleged conduct, and that the allegations were already publicly disclosed. Subsequently, the government reached a substantial settlement with Wells Fargo over related allegations.Jacobson challenged the Attorney General’s determination in the United States Court of Federal Claims, arguing she was entitled to a share of the settlement under FIAFEA and asserting that the statutory bar on judicial review violated her due process rights. The government moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, invoking FIAFEA’s express provision precluding judicial review of the Attorney General’s actions except for failure to provide required notification. The Court of Federal Claims granted the motion, holding it lacked jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s determinations regarding Jacobson’s eligibility for a whistleblower award. The court also rejected her constitutional argument, finding no jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The court held that FIAFEA’s statutory language provided a clear and convincing indication that Congress intended to bar judicial review of the Attorney General’s determinations regarding whistleblower declarations, except for notification failures not at issue in this case. The Federal Circuit also held that the lower court was not required to determine whether FIAFEA is money-mandating before dismissing for lack of jurisdiction and found no Tucker Act jurisdiction over Jacobson’s due process claim. View "JACOBSON v. US " on Justia Law

A veteran who served during the Vietnam Era was awarded service connection for PTSD in 1993, effective from May 1991, with a 10% disability rating. In 2019, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals found clear and unmistakable error in the earlier decision and granted an earlier effective date of May 1983. The Board remanded the claim to the regional office to implement the earlier date and determine whether a higher rating was warranted. After the regional office denied a higher rating in a supplemental statement of the case, the Board preemptively issued its own denial before the veteran filed a required notice of disagreement.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims reviewed the Board’s action after the appellant argued the Board lacked jurisdiction, seeking vacatur and remand. The government conceded the Board lacked jurisdiction but argued for vacatur and dismissal, not remand. The Veterans Court vacated the Board’s decision and dismissed the appeal, concluding it lacked jurisdiction since no notice of disagreement had been filed. The court emphasized the veteran had a separate, properly noticed appeal pending regarding the merits of the regional office’s denial, and thus removed the ultra vires Board decision as an obstacle.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed whether the veteran qualified as a “prevailing party” under the Equal Access to Justice Act for purposes of seeking attorney’s fees. The Federal Circuit held that vacatur of the ultra vires Board decision materially altered the legal relationship between the parties and constituted success on the merits of the judicial review action, conferring prevailing party status. The court reversed the Veterans Court’s denial of fees and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "GREENIDGE v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

A legal advocacy organization petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to update its mailing addresses, alleging that the VA continued to send correspondence to incorrect addresses despite repeated notifications of changes. The petitioner requested court intervention to ensure the VA updated its address records, ceased sending correspondence to wrong addresses, and imposed financial penalties for future errors.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims dismissed the petition as moot after the VA voluntarily corrected the addresses and created a policy to guide attorneys on updating their addresses. The VA also provided affidavits and a fact sheet to confirm these corrections. The petitioner subsequently sought attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), asserting that the Veterans Court’s order requiring affidavits constituted the necessary “judicial imprimatur” for prevailing-party status. The Veterans Court denied the application, relying on Cavaciuti v. McDonough, and found there was no court-mandated decision on the merits and no material alteration to the parties’ legal relationship.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed whether the Veterans Court erred in denying attorney fees under EAJA. The Federal Circuit held that a court order requiring a party only to confirm voluntary corrective actions for the purpose of assessing mootness does not constitute sufficient judicial imprimatur to confer prevailing-party status under EAJA. The court found that the Veterans Court’s order did not address the merits of the petition or alter the legal relationship between the parties. The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the Veterans Court’s denial of the EAJA application. View "VETERANS LEGAL ADVOCACY GROUP v. COLLINS " on Justia Law