Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Browns, U.S. citizens, lived in Australia while Mr. Brown worked for Raytheon. The IRS received the Browns' amended returns for 2015 and 2017, claiming the Foreign Earned Income Exclusion, signed by attorney Castro, but not accompanied by powers of attorney. The Browns' second amended return for 2015, again signed by Castro, also did not append any powers of attorney. The IRS disallowed the refund claims, indicating that "as an employee of Raytheon . . . [Brown] may have entered into a closing agreement . . . irrevocably waiving” Browns’ rights to claim the Exclusion under section 911(a).The Browns filed a refund suit under 26 U.S.C. 6532 and 7422(a). The government argued that the Browns had not “duly filed” their administrative refund claims in accordance with section 7422(a) because they had not personally signed and verified their amended returns or properly authorized an agent to execute them. The Browns responded that the IRS had waived those requirements by processing their claims despite the defects and that the requirements were waivable regulatory conditions. The Claims Court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Claims Court had jurisdiction; the “duly filed” requirement is more akin to a claims-processing rule than a jurisdictional requirement. However, the Browns did not meet that requirement, which derives from statute and cannot be waived by the IRS, nor did the IRS waive the requirement. View "Brown v. United Statesx" on Justia Law

B.W., a two-year-old in good health, experienced immune thrombocytopenic purpura after receiving his measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine. Later blood tests showed his condition had resolved. More than six months after he was first diagnosed, B.W. presented with bruising, a possible symptom of immune thrombocytopenic purpura, but blood tests showed the condition had not recurred. In a suit under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, the Claims Court ruled in favor of B.W., holding that those blood tests, occurring more than six months after his initial diagnosis, were “residual effects” of B.W.’s vaccine injury that satisfied the severity requirement of 42 U.S.C. 300aa-11(c)(1)(D).The Federal Circuit reversed. A residual effect must be a change within the patient that is caused by the vaccine injury. B.W.’s later bruising was not caused by his vaccine injury, and his tests did not reveal, constitute, or cause any somatic change. Tests revealed B.W. had no lingering symptoms or recurrence of thrombocytopenic purpura. There was no argument that the testing itself was detrimental to B.W.’s health such that it might qualify under section 300aa-11(c)(1)(D)(i) as a “residual effect” or a “complication” of thrombocytopenic purpura. View "Wright v. Secretary of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

The Army requested bids for helicopter flight training and awarded the contract to L3. In a bid-protest action filed by disappointed bidder S3, the Claims Court set aside the award. After reevaluation of the bids, the Army awarded the contract to CAE. S3 filed another bid protest.The Claims Court rejected most of S3’s arguments but agreed that the assignment by the Army’s source selection authority (SSA) of a certain “strength” to CAE was irrational because that strength, which purported to provide a “significant cost savings benefit,” would result in only small and unpredictable savings, if any. Nevertheless, the Claims Court upheld the award, finding no prejudice to S3 from the identified error. The Claims Court observed that the erroneously found strength had been treated as falling within a non-price-factor category for which CAE’s proposal had been “clearly superior,” an assessment that would not be altered by the loss of a strength for which the only possible benefit could be monetary; when explicitly comparing the added benefits of the CAE proposal with its higher price in the best-value tradeoff analysis, the SSA had not made any adjustment to CAE’s price based on a cost-saving from the strength.The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that there is a presumption of prejudice whenever the Claims Court determines that the agency acted irrationally in making an award decision and finding no clear error in the determination that there was no prejudice. View "System Studies & Simulation, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Dr. Metzinger brought an Equal Pay Act (EPA) suit against her employer, the VA, in the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging that the government violated 29 U.S.C. 206(d), by paying her less than her male subordinates. She sought over $10,000 in damages. The government argued that the Court of Federal Claims had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over EPA claims against the government for over $10,000. In the alternative to dismissal, the government requested that the district court transfer Metzinger’s EPA claim to the Claims Court under 28 U.S.C. 1631. Metzinger opposed dismissal but allowed that if the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction, it should transfer the EPA claim. The district court agreed that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and transferred Metzinger’s EPA claim to the Claims Court under 28 U.S.C. 1631.Metzinger appealed to both the Fifth and Federal Circuits. The Fifth Circuit summarily dismissed. In a joint filing, the government reversed course, agreeing with Metzinger that the district court possessed jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit affirmed the transfer to the Claims Court. Precedent dictates that district courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over EPA claims against the government for over $10,000. View "Metzinger v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Former and current Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) employees were relocated to Puerto Rico or the U.S. Virgin Islands at the DEA’s request for two to five years. Each received a one-time relocation incentive bonus under 5 U.S.C. 5753(b), which provides that “[t]he Office of Personnel Management may authorize the head of an agency to pay a [relocation incentive] bonus” to an individual who relocates to accept a position. Each bonus was equivalent to 25% of each employee’s yearly salary. The employees allege they are entitled to a relocation incentive bonus for each year of their relocation, rather than the one-time bonus they received.The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s dismissal of that claim, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The claim was not based on a statute or regulations that are money mandating, as required for jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1). The statute and implementing regulations use discretionary language. View "Bell v. United States" on Justia Law

Valles began working for the State Department as a passport specialist in 2011. In 2016, Valles served a three-day suspension for charges concerning inappropriate sexual and political comments made to co-workers and customers. In 2018, Valles served a five-day suspension for failure to follow instructions and failure to protect personally identifiable information. In 2019, Valles received a performance appraisal of “Fully Successful” for 2018.The agency nonetheless proposed Valles’ removal based on four charges from 18 specifications dating between July 2018 and February 2019. Some of the alleged conduct occurred during the 2018 evaluation period. The charges included failure to follow instructions, failure to properly move along applications and provide updates, leaving a passport application on a photocopier, failure to follow policies concerning the handling of fees, not maintaining control over applications, leaving his adjudication stamp unsecured, and drinking from a wine glass at his workstation in the public counter.An administrative judge upheld the termination. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The agency proved all the charges and established a nexus between the proven misconduct and the agency’s ability to carry out its mission. The penalty was reasonable, considering all the relevant “Douglas” factors, including the repeated nature and seriousness of the misconduct, Valles’ prior discipline, his seven years of federal service and job performance, the consistency of the penalty with similar cases, and the lack of rehabilitation potential on Valles’ part. View "Valles v. Department of State" on Justia Law

Courtney, an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Investigator, was removed from her federal employment effective December 7, 2019, based on a charge of being absent without leave. Her removal was affirmed by the Merit Systems Protection Board and Federal Circuit. Courtney applied to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for disability retirement benefits, asserting that she suffered from vision-related ailments, asthma, and diabetes. As a result of the vision problems, she said, she was unable to perform her duties, which were all computer-based, and she had difficulty commuting. Courtney alleged that she had requested reasonable accommodations that were not granted. The EEOC indicated that requested reasonable accommodations had been provided and that Courtney’s performance even with her alleged disability “was not less than fully successful” (even if her conduct was unsatisfactory).OPM denied her application, concluding that Courtney had failed to establish that her medical condition was incompatible with useful service or that the agency-provided reasonable accommodations were ineffective. The Merit Systems Protection Board and Federal Circuit affirmed, agreeing with an administrative judge that although Courtney met some of the requirements for disability retirement, she had not established that she was unable “to render useful and efficient service” in light of her disability—a requirement of 5 U.S.C. 8451(a)(1)(B). View "Courtney v. Office of Personnel Management" on Justia Law

Courtney, an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Investigator. was removed from her federal employment effective December 7, 2019, premised on a charge of being absent without leave (AWOL) for several months. An administrative judge first determined that the EEOC had proven its AWOL charge by a preponderance of the evidence then determined that Courtney had failed to establish her affirmative defenses—allegations of retaliation for EEO activity, discrimination based on disability, and harmful procedural errors. The administrative judge determined that there was a nexus between the AWOL charge and the efficiency of the federal service because an “essential element of employment is to be on the job when one is expected to be there” and agreed that removal was appropriate given the agency’s thorough analysis, which relied on the seriousness of Courtney’s misconduct, the length of her absence, and her supervisor’s statement regarding a loss in confidence in her based on her failures to communicate.The Merit Systems Protection Board and the Federal Circuit affirmed, noting evidence that Courtney was AWOL from March 25 to December 7, 2019, that she provided no medical excuse for her absence, and that the EEOC had granted every requested accommodation. View "Courtney v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission" on Justia Law

The Federal Circuit affirmed the U.S. Court of International Trade's decision sustaining the U.S. Department of Commerce's final results in the fifth administrative review of the antidumping duty order on large power transformers from the Republic of Korea. This case involves two categories of information that Commerce requested from Hyundai, namely product-specific cost information and cost-reconciliation information.The court held that Commerce's determinations to rely on facts otherwise available, to cancel verification, and to draw an adverse inference in selecting from among the facts otherwise available are supported by substantial evidence and otherwise not contrary to law. In this case, Hyundai's repeated disclosure of partial, aggregate, or sample information rather than complete and itemized information establishes that Commerce's decision to rely on facts otherwise available was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, Commerce articulated sound reasons for seeking more detailed information regarding Hyundai's cost-shifting in this administrative review than in prior reviews, including its observation that cost shifting had a larger impact on this administrative review. The court explained that such concerns support the reasonableness of Commerce's requests for a greater amount of detail in this administrative review. Finally, to the extent that the shortcomings of Hyundai's responses are attributable to its record keeping, that alone does not avoid an adverse inference. Here, Commerce clearly and repeatedly requested the information and identified the defects in Hyundai’s responses, and the information that was ultimately missing from the record was foundational to Commerce's ability to perform the antidumping duty calculations in a sound manner. The court considered Hyundai's remaining arguments and found them unpersuasive. View "Hyundai Electric & Energy Systems Co., Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2013, Bullock, a civilian employed by the Army, received a formal letter of reprimand from her supervisor. Bullock filed an EEO claim alleging sex discrimination and retaliation. In proceedings before the EEOC’s mediation program, Bullock was represented by her attorney, Elliott; the Army was represented by its management official Shipley, and attorney Lynch. According to Bullock, the parties reached agreement as to seven non-monetary demands on July 29 and reached an oral agreement regarding her monetary demands on August 27, 2015. The mediating administrative judge sent an email to the parties asking for the “agency’s understanding of the provisions of the settlement agreement” and noting that, “[o]nce we confirm that the parties are in complete agreement, the agency can begin work on the written settlement agreement.”. No written settlement agreement was executed. In September, the Army “rescinded its settlement offer.” Bullock continued to press her claims before the EEOC for a year, then filed a breach of contract claim regarding an oral settlement agreement.The Federal Circuit reversed the dismissal of the complaint, rejecting an argument that EEOC and Army regulations, requiring that settlement agreements be in writing, preclude enforcement of oral settlement agreements. The court remanded for a determination of whether the representative of the Army had the authority to enter a settlement agreement and whether the parties actually reached an agreement. View "Bullock v. United States" on Justia Law