Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Former and current Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) employees were relocated to Puerto Rico or the U.S. Virgin Islands at the DEA’s request for two to five years. Each received a one-time relocation incentive bonus under 5 U.S.C. 5753(b), which provides that “[t]he Office of Personnel Management may authorize the head of an agency to pay a [relocation incentive] bonus” to an individual who relocates to accept a position. Each bonus was equivalent to 25% of each employee’s yearly salary. The employees allege they are entitled to a relocation incentive bonus for each year of their relocation, rather than the one-time bonus they received.The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s dismissal of that claim, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The claim was not based on a statute or regulations that are money mandating, as required for jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1). The statute and implementing regulations use discretionary language. View "Bell v. United States" on Justia Law

Valles began working for the State Department as a passport specialist in 2011. In 2016, Valles served a three-day suspension for charges concerning inappropriate sexual and political comments made to co-workers and customers. In 2018, Valles served a five-day suspension for failure to follow instructions and failure to protect personally identifiable information. In 2019, Valles received a performance appraisal of “Fully Successful” for 2018.The agency nonetheless proposed Valles’ removal based on four charges from 18 specifications dating between July 2018 and February 2019. Some of the alleged conduct occurred during the 2018 evaluation period. The charges included failure to follow instructions, failure to properly move along applications and provide updates, leaving a passport application on a photocopier, failure to follow policies concerning the handling of fees, not maintaining control over applications, leaving his adjudication stamp unsecured, and drinking from a wine glass at his workstation in the public counter.An administrative judge upheld the termination. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The agency proved all the charges and established a nexus between the proven misconduct and the agency’s ability to carry out its mission. The penalty was reasonable, considering all the relevant “Douglas” factors, including the repeated nature and seriousness of the misconduct, Valles’ prior discipline, his seven years of federal service and job performance, the consistency of the penalty with similar cases, and the lack of rehabilitation potential on Valles’ part. View "Valles v. Department of State" on Justia Law

Courtney, an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Investigator, was removed from her federal employment effective December 7, 2019, based on a charge of being absent without leave. Her removal was affirmed by the Merit Systems Protection Board and Federal Circuit. Courtney applied to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for disability retirement benefits, asserting that she suffered from vision-related ailments, asthma, and diabetes. As a result of the vision problems, she said, she was unable to perform her duties, which were all computer-based, and she had difficulty commuting. Courtney alleged that she had requested reasonable accommodations that were not granted. The EEOC indicated that requested reasonable accommodations had been provided and that Courtney’s performance even with her alleged disability “was not less than fully successful” (even if her conduct was unsatisfactory).OPM denied her application, concluding that Courtney had failed to establish that her medical condition was incompatible with useful service or that the agency-provided reasonable accommodations were ineffective. The Merit Systems Protection Board and Federal Circuit affirmed, agreeing with an administrative judge that although Courtney met some of the requirements for disability retirement, she had not established that she was unable “to render useful and efficient service” in light of her disability—a requirement of 5 U.S.C. 8451(a)(1)(B). View "Courtney v. Office of Personnel Management" on Justia Law

Courtney, an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Investigator. was removed from her federal employment effective December 7, 2019, premised on a charge of being absent without leave (AWOL) for several months. An administrative judge first determined that the EEOC had proven its AWOL charge by a preponderance of the evidence then determined that Courtney had failed to establish her affirmative defenses—allegations of retaliation for EEO activity, discrimination based on disability, and harmful procedural errors. The administrative judge determined that there was a nexus between the AWOL charge and the efficiency of the federal service because an “essential element of employment is to be on the job when one is expected to be there” and agreed that removal was appropriate given the agency’s thorough analysis, which relied on the seriousness of Courtney’s misconduct, the length of her absence, and her supervisor’s statement regarding a loss in confidence in her based on her failures to communicate.The Merit Systems Protection Board and the Federal Circuit affirmed, noting evidence that Courtney was AWOL from March 25 to December 7, 2019, that she provided no medical excuse for her absence, and that the EEOC had granted every requested accommodation. View "Courtney v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission" on Justia Law

The Federal Circuit affirmed the U.S. Court of International Trade's decision sustaining the U.S. Department of Commerce's final results in the fifth administrative review of the antidumping duty order on large power transformers from the Republic of Korea. This case involves two categories of information that Commerce requested from Hyundai, namely product-specific cost information and cost-reconciliation information.The court held that Commerce's determinations to rely on facts otherwise available, to cancel verification, and to draw an adverse inference in selecting from among the facts otherwise available are supported by substantial evidence and otherwise not contrary to law. In this case, Hyundai's repeated disclosure of partial, aggregate, or sample information rather than complete and itemized information establishes that Commerce's decision to rely on facts otherwise available was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, Commerce articulated sound reasons for seeking more detailed information regarding Hyundai's cost-shifting in this administrative review than in prior reviews, including its observation that cost shifting had a larger impact on this administrative review. The court explained that such concerns support the reasonableness of Commerce's requests for a greater amount of detail in this administrative review. Finally, to the extent that the shortcomings of Hyundai's responses are attributable to its record keeping, that alone does not avoid an adverse inference. Here, Commerce clearly and repeatedly requested the information and identified the defects in Hyundai’s responses, and the information that was ultimately missing from the record was foundational to Commerce's ability to perform the antidumping duty calculations in a sound manner. The court considered Hyundai's remaining arguments and found them unpersuasive. View "Hyundai Electric & Energy Systems Co., Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2013, Bullock, a civilian employed by the Army, received a formal letter of reprimand from her supervisor. Bullock filed an EEO claim alleging sex discrimination and retaliation. In proceedings before the EEOC’s mediation program, Bullock was represented by her attorney, Elliott; the Army was represented by its management official Shipley, and attorney Lynch. According to Bullock, the parties reached agreement as to seven non-monetary demands on July 29 and reached an oral agreement regarding her monetary demands on August 27, 2015. The mediating administrative judge sent an email to the parties asking for the “agency’s understanding of the provisions of the settlement agreement” and noting that, “[o]nce we confirm that the parties are in complete agreement, the agency can begin work on the written settlement agreement.”. No written settlement agreement was executed. In September, the Army “rescinded its settlement offer.” Bullock continued to press her claims before the EEOC for a year, then filed a breach of contract claim regarding an oral settlement agreement.The Federal Circuit reversed the dismissal of the complaint, rejecting an argument that EEOC and Army regulations, requiring that settlement agreements be in writing, preclude enforcement of oral settlement agreements. The court remanded for a determination of whether the representative of the Army had the authority to enter a settlement agreement and whether the parties actually reached an agreement. View "Bullock v. United States" on Justia Law

Imported goods are generally subject to tariffs, duties, fees, and taxes, such as an excise tax. A “drawback” is a customs transaction involving the refund of payments made upon the importation of a good. The most common drawback occurs when duties that are paid when a good is imported are refunded when the same good is exported. A “substitution drawback,” involves the refund of duties, taxes, or fees that were paid upon importation and refunded when similar goods, normally merchandise classified under the same tariff schedule subheading, are exported. Since 2008, substitution drawback has been allowed for wine where the imported wine and exported wine are of the same color and the price variation does not exceed 50 percent. Substitution drawbacks could result in a near-total refund of both tariffs and excise taxes paid on imported wine where the substituted exported wine was either not subject to excise tax (having been exported from a bonded facility) or had received a complete refund of previously paid excise taxes, a “double drawback.”Treasury and Customs promulgated Rule.1, an interpretation of 19 U.S.C. 1313(v), intended to prevent “double recovery,” limits drawbacks to the amount of taxes paid and not previously refunded. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court in finding the Rule invalid. The Rule is contrary to the clear intent and structure of the statute. View "National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of the Treasury" on Justia Law

Rodriguez, a Supervisory Consumer Affairs Specialist with the VA Patient Advocate’s Office, engaged in a confrontation with a patient, yelling at the patient and using profanity. VA Police officers had to escort him back to his office. Rodriguez returned to the reception area, where he again confronted the patient. During an investigation, Rodriguez was temporarily relieved of his supervisory responsibilities. Rodriguez contacted one of his subordinates and asked her to modify her witness statement. The investigator made findings of patient abuse, violation of the VA Code of Conduct, failure to follow the officer’s instruction, attempted coercion, and lack of candor in Rodriguez’s accounts of the incident, and concluded that the appropriate penalty was removal. Rodriguez had a previous disciplinary incident. After Rodriguez was given an opportunity to reply, the Director issued a removal decision.The Merit Systems Protection Board administrative judge, citing 38 U.S.C. 714, found the charges supported by substantial evidence. The Federal Circuit reversed the removal order. the administrative judge misinterpreted section 714 when he ruled that “substantial evidence” is the proper standard for determining whether an employee has engaged in misconduct that justifies discipline; preponderance of the evidence is the minimal appropriate burden of proof in administrative proceedings. Although section 714 provides that the Board may not mitigate penalties, the Board has the authority to review penalties for substantial evidence. View "Rodriguez v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

In 2007, Connor began working as the Chief of Police Services for the Fayetteville, North Carolina VA Medical Center. After it was discovered that Connor had stored ammunition in a manner inconsistent with VA policy, the VA investigated allegations of mismanagement at Fayetteville, including the failure to inventory ammunition, misuse of government vehicles, lack of training, unfair hiring and promotion practices, employee misconduct, and lack of leadership. In 2019, Fayetteville's Executive Director sustained 27 specifications against Connor and the penalty of removal under 38 U.S.C. 714. The Merit Systems Protection Board determined that the VA had failed to prove 26 specifications by substantial evidence, upholding specification 25, regarding the improper storage of ammunition. The Board held that the “Douglas factors” remained applicable and upheld the VA’s charge and the penalty of removal.The Federal Circuit affirmed. Section 714 of the 2017 Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act created an expedited procedure allowing the VA Secretary to remove, demote, or suspend VA employees for misconduct or substandard performance; it limits review of disciplinary actions by administrative judges and the Board. A disciplinary decision must be upheld if “supported by substantial evidence.” The administrative judge and the Board “shall not mitigate the penalty prescribed by the Secretary.” Section 714 does not alter the penalty review with respect to the Douglas factors. The court rejected Connor’s argument that the Board did not adequately consider those factors. View "Connor v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

The 2017 Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act (AMA) reforms the VA's administrative appeals system, 131 Stat. 1105, replacing the existing system, which had shepherded all denials of veteran disability claims through a one-size-fits-all appeals process. Under the AMA, claimants may choose between three procedural options: filing a supplemental claim based on additional evidence, requesting higher-level review within the VA based on the same evidentiary record, and filing a notice of disagreement to directly appeal to the Board of Veterans Appeals. The VA promulgated regulations to implement the AMA. Veterans’ service organizations, a law firm, and an individual (Petitioners) filed separate petitions raising 13 rulemaking challenges to these regulations under 38 U.S.C. 502.1The Federal Circuit concluded that two veterans’ service organizations had associational standing based on claimed injuries to their members to collectively bring three of their challenges. No Petitioner demonstrated standing to raise any of the remaining challenges. The regulations the organizations have standing to challenge are invalid for contravening the unambiguous meaning of their governing statutory provisions: 38 C.F.R. 14.636(c)(1)(i), limiting when a veteran’s representative may charge fees for work on supplemental claims; 38 C.F.R. 3.2500(b) barring the filing of a supplemental claim when adjudication of that claim is pending before a federal court; and 38 C.F.R. 3.155 excluding supplemental claims from the intent-to-file framework. View "Military-Veterans Advocacy v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law