Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Defense Contract Management Agency within the Department of Defense (DOD) employed Vassallo as a computer engineer in 2012. That summer, it announced a vacancy for the position of Lead Interdisciplinary Engineer, stating that only certain individuals could apply: “[c]urrent [DCMA]” employees or “[c]urrent [DOD] [e]mployee[s] with the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics . . . [w]orkforce who are outside of the Military Components.” Vassallo, a veteran, applied, but DCMA rejected his application. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) determined that DOD was not required to afford him veterans employment preferences under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA), 112 Stat. 3182. OPM defines the word “agency” in 5 U.S.C. 3304(f)(1) to mean “Executive agency” as defined in 5 U.S.C. 105 and concluded that DCMA was not required to give Vassallo an opportunity to compete under 5 U.S.C. 3304(f)(1) because the DOD— the agency making the announcement—did not accept applications from outside its own workforce. Vassallo sought corrective action from the Merit Systems Protection Board, which concluded that OPM’s regulation permissibly fills a gap in the governing statute. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the OPM regulation contradicts the plain terms of the statute and unreasonably undermines the purpose of the VEOA. View "Vassallo v. Dept. of Defense" on Justia Law

Bay County Utilities provides water and sewer services. The County Commissioners establish rates. In 1966, the U.S. Air Force contracted with the County for water services at Tyndall Air Force Base. The parties entered into a sewer services contract in 1985. Both required the parties to renegotiate any new rates. In 1994, Federal Acquisition Regulations were amended to require standardized clauses in utility service contracts. When the government is contracting with an unregulated utility or the utility is subject to non-independent oversight, the parties must negotiate new rates. If the utility is overseen by an independent regulatory body, no further negotiations are required. In 2007 and 2009, Bay County increased water rates. The Air Force ignored those increases, but, in 2009 and 2010, unilaterally modified the water contract, with new rates, lower than the rates set by Bay County. In 2009 Bay County increased sewer rates. The Air Force refused to pay those higher rates, and instituted a unilateral contract modification to moderately increase sewer rates. Bay County submitted unsuccessful Contract Disputes Act claims to recover the unpaid balance of approximately $850,000. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims, holding that Bay County is an independent regulatory body and may revise rates in utility contracts without resorting to negotiations with the Air Force. View "Bay Cnty., Fla. v. United States" on Justia Law

Ryan was employed by FEMA (Department of Homeland Security). Her position required top secret security clearance. The agency suspended Ryan’s access to classified information after learning she had been indicted on federal charges of conflict of interest, soliciting a gratuity, and making a false statement. FEMA indefinitely suspended her without pay pending final determination by FEMA's Chief Security Officer concernng future eligibility for access to classified information. Ryan appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Although Ryan was acquitted, the MSPB found she was not entitled to immediate termination of the suspension because it “was based upon the suspension of her clearance and not the underlying reasons … (the indictment)” and MRPB cannot order reinstatement to a position requiring access to classified information while Ryan is without the required clearance. Ryan filed another appeal asserting unreasonable delay in adjudication of her security clearance. The MSPB affirmed dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In a third decision, the MSPB found the basis for her suspension was not constructively amended. The Federal Circuit affirmed, noting that “denial of a security clearance . . . is not subject to [MSPB] review.” It was Ryan’s inability to access classified information, not the underlying reasons for the inability, that caused her suspension. View "Ryan v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

In the “NOVA” decision, the Federal Circuit approved a plan requiring the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to identify and rectify harms caused by wrongful application of former 38 C.F.R. 3.103. The Plan required that the VA notify every claimant who received a final Board decision during the specified period and did not receive full relief. If a claimant had a case outside of the Board’s jurisdiction, but mandate had not issued and the appellate court’s judgment was not final, the VA was obligated to offer to submit a joint motion for remand. If the mandate had issued, the VA was required to offer to submit a joint motion to recall mandate and a joint motion for remand. Smith served in the Army, 1963-1965. In 2000, Smith filed an unsuccessful claim for compensation for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In 2008, Smith was awarded service connection for PTSD with a 100% disability rating and a 2006 effective date. Smith appealed to the Board, which, in 2011, denied entitlement to an earlier effective date. The Board did not apply the invalid Rule interpretation. The Veterans Court affirmed and, days before the NOVA decision, entered judgment. In 2013, the parties filed a joint motion to recall that judgment. The decision fit the search terms profile under the Plan and triggered the VA’s obligation to offer to submit a joint motion. Smith did not claim that VA failed to comply with 38 C.F.R. 3.103(c)(2) or any prejudice in the conduct of the Board hearing. The Federal Circuit affirmed denial of the motion, stating that neither its decisions nor the Plan preclude appropriate denial. View "Smith v. McDonald" on Justia Law

The Forest Service removed Bernard, a firefighter, from his position as supervisor. Bernard appealed. The agency and Bernard settled: the agency reinstated him in a non-supervisory role and provided back pay, promising that Bernard would not be restricted from applying for supervisory positions and would be given future fire assignments “the same as any other employee.” To receive assignments, an employee must have an Incident Qualification Card (red card), listing specific firefighting positions the employee is qualified to fill. A renewal card requires completion of annual training. Five months after his reinstatement, Bernard successfully completed the course. Other participants received renewal cards, but the agency did not issue a card to Bernard, indicating that an audit of his records found too few hard-copy documents supporting the entries. Bernard provided a copy of his 2010 card, signed by a certifying official, listing Bernard as qualified, until 2014, for 11 firefighting positions. After the agency requested additional documentation, Bernard notified it of a potential breach of the settlement, and received a card certifying him for seven positions. Bernard petitioned the Merit Systems Protection Board. An administrative judge found that Bernard had not established a breach, and— without acknowledging repeated requests for discovery—that Bernard “did not support his bare allegations with any evidence illustrating bad faith” and retaliation. The Federal Circuit vacated. The Board improperly denied discovery of potentially relevant evidence. View "Bernard v. Dep't of Agric." on Justia Law

The Government Printing Office (GPO) received nine bids for a printing order. Colonial was the lowest bidder ($2,418,443.54); Fry was the second lowest ($2,502,545.05). Colonial was a small business. Under its Printing Procurement Regulation, GPO can award contracts only to “responsible” bidders. The contracting officer found Colonial non-responsible, considering previous late deliveries, and recommended an award to Fry. A purchase order issued to Fry. Colonial filed a protest with the Government Accountability Office, arguing that the responsibility determination should have been referred to the Small Business Administration (SBA) Certificate of Competency Program, 15 U.S.C. 637(b)(7), under which a “Government procurement officer” may not preclude a small business from being awarded a government contract due to non-responsibility without referring the matter to the SBA, which responded that “requirements of the COC program could, arguably, apply to GPO and other nonexecutive agencies.” The GAO found that GPO was not subject to the program and that the contracting officer had a reasonable basis for her determination of non-responsibility. The Claims Court held that GPO did not violate the referral requirements and that the GPO’s responsibility determination was not arbitrary. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that GPO is not required to refer responsibility determinations to the SBA. View "Colonial Press Int'l, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Nurses employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs claimed entitlement to overtime pay under 38 U.S.C. 7453(e)(1), which requires the agency to compensate “officially ordered or approved” overtime work. The Claims Court dismissed because the nurses did not allege that the agency “expressly directed” their overtime. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. The statute does not require the official order or approval to be in any particular form, and the agency has not enacted any regulation interpreting the statute as mandating any particular procedure that must be followed to qualify for overtime pay. The words “officially ordered or approved” in section 453(e)(1) should have the same meaning as the same words which appear in the Federal Employee Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. 5542(a), which authorizes overtime pay generally for federal employees not covered by other specific statutes, The nurses allege the agency has “knowledge” that they work overtime “on a recurring and involuntary basis,” and that the agency ordered or approved such work through “expectation, requirement, and inducement.” Those allegations state a claim upon which relief may be granted under previous interpretation of the phrase “officially ordered or approved.” View "Mercier v. United States" on Justia Law

The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), 25 U.S.C. 450, authorizes self-determination (Title I) contracts. The Bureau of Indian Affairs reviews proposals for the Secretary of the Interior. A proposal not declined within 90 days is deemed approved. In October 2011, the Tribe wrote to the Bureau’s Office of Self Governance (OSG) requesting several million dollars for public safety, attaching a Resolution authorizing submission of a “Title I Compact Request.” OSG replied that it did not have authority to manage a Title I agreement, copying the Bureau’s Office of Justice Services (OJS), as the appropriate contact. OJS asked the Tribe to clarify whether it was seeking a Title I contract or funding under Title IV. The Tribe emailed OJS, regarding availability to meet "regarding the Title 1 request" and sent two follow-up emails, referencing its “Title 1 request.” On February 1, 2012 the Tribe wrote to OJS, stating that “the contract is deemed approved.” OJS responded that the intent of the October letter was unclear and did not meet self-determination contract proposal requirements. The Tribe again asserted deemed approval. A year later, OJS received a letter titled “Claim for performance of Title I justice services contract pursuant to Contract Disputes Act.” OJS again denied receiving a complete proposal. The Civilian Board of Contracting Appeals dismissed a claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the Tribe has not been awarded a contract, noting a parallel appeal with the Interior Board of Indian Appeals. View "Yurok Tribe v. Dep't of the Interior" on Justia Law

The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) within the National Institutes of Health issued Request for Proposal for the “NIH Pain Consortium Centers of Excellence in Pain Education Coordination Center.” NIDA initially issued the solicitation as a small business set-aside under North American Industry Classification System code 541712, “Research and Development in the Physical, Engineering, and Life Sciences (except Biotechnology),” which limits offerors to small businesses with 500 employees or fewer. A prospective offeror appealed the NAICS code designation to the U.S. Small Business Administration Office of Hearings and Appeals, which ordered NIDA’s contracting officer to amend the solicitation to change the NAICS code designation to 541611, “Administrative Management and General Management Consulting Services.” Palladian sought to enjoin NIDA from accepting and evaluating proposals under the new code, which rendered Palladian ineligible to compete. The Court of Federal Claims granted Palladian’s motion for judgment on the administrative record, finding that the contracting officer’s NAICS code amendment was arbitrary and capricious because NAICS code 541611 did not best describe the statement of work for the solicitation. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that Palladian failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. View "Palladian Partners, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2005, the Shinnecock Indian Nation filed suit to vindicate its rights to land in the Town of Southampton, claiming that 1859 New York legislation allowed thousands of acres of the Nation’s land to be wrongfully conveyed to the town. The district court dismissed, holding that laches barred the claims. An appeal to the Second Circuit remains pending. In 2012, the Nation filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, seeking $1,105,000,000, alleging that the United States, “acting through the federal court system . . . denied any and all judicial means of effective redress for the unlawful taking of lands” in violation of trust obligations arising under the Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. 177, and the “federal common law.” The Claims Court dismissed on alternative grounds: that the claims were not ripe because they were predicated upon the district court’s judgment in the prior suit, which was on appeal, or that, even if the claims were ripe, it had no jurisdiction because they did not fall within the Indian Tucker Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity. The court refused to allow amendment to allege a judicial takings claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed that the breach of trust claims are not ripe for review, vacated the jurisdiction ruling, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the breach of trust claims without prejudice. View "Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States" on Justia Law