Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Government Printing Office (GPO) received nine bids for a printing order. Colonial was the lowest bidder ($2,418,443.54); Fry was the second lowest ($2,502,545.05). Colonial was a small business. Under its Printing Procurement Regulation, GPO can award contracts only to “responsible” bidders. The contracting officer found Colonial non-responsible, considering previous late deliveries, and recommended an award to Fry. A purchase order issued to Fry. Colonial filed a protest with the Government Accountability Office, arguing that the responsibility determination should have been referred to the Small Business Administration (SBA) Certificate of Competency Program, 15 U.S.C. 637(b)(7), under which a “Government procurement officer” may not preclude a small business from being awarded a government contract due to non-responsibility without referring the matter to the SBA, which responded that “requirements of the COC program could, arguably, apply to GPO and other nonexecutive agencies.” The GAO found that GPO was not subject to the program and that the contracting officer had a reasonable basis for her determination of non-responsibility. The Claims Court held that GPO did not violate the referral requirements and that the GPO’s responsibility determination was not arbitrary. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that GPO is not required to refer responsibility determinations to the SBA. View "Colonial Press Int'l, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Nurses employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs claimed entitlement to overtime pay under 38 U.S.C. 7453(e)(1), which requires the agency to compensate “officially ordered or approved” overtime work. The Claims Court dismissed because the nurses did not allege that the agency “expressly directed” their overtime. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. The statute does not require the official order or approval to be in any particular form, and the agency has not enacted any regulation interpreting the statute as mandating any particular procedure that must be followed to qualify for overtime pay. The words “officially ordered or approved” in section 453(e)(1) should have the same meaning as the same words which appear in the Federal Employee Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. 5542(a), which authorizes overtime pay generally for federal employees not covered by other specific statutes, The nurses allege the agency has “knowledge” that they work overtime “on a recurring and involuntary basis,” and that the agency ordered or approved such work through “expectation, requirement, and inducement.” Those allegations state a claim upon which relief may be granted under previous interpretation of the phrase “officially ordered or approved.” View "Mercier v. United States" on Justia Law

The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), 25 U.S.C. 450, authorizes self-determination (Title I) contracts. The Bureau of Indian Affairs reviews proposals for the Secretary of the Interior. A proposal not declined within 90 days is deemed approved. In October 2011, the Tribe wrote to the Bureau’s Office of Self Governance (OSG) requesting several million dollars for public safety, attaching a Resolution authorizing submission of a “Title I Compact Request.” OSG replied that it did not have authority to manage a Title I agreement, copying the Bureau’s Office of Justice Services (OJS), as the appropriate contact. OJS asked the Tribe to clarify whether it was seeking a Title I contract or funding under Title IV. The Tribe emailed OJS, regarding availability to meet "regarding the Title 1 request" and sent two follow-up emails, referencing its “Title 1 request.” On February 1, 2012 the Tribe wrote to OJS, stating that “the contract is deemed approved.” OJS responded that the intent of the October letter was unclear and did not meet self-determination contract proposal requirements. The Tribe again asserted deemed approval. A year later, OJS received a letter titled “Claim for performance of Title I justice services contract pursuant to Contract Disputes Act.” OJS again denied receiving a complete proposal. The Civilian Board of Contracting Appeals dismissed a claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the Tribe has not been awarded a contract, noting a parallel appeal with the Interior Board of Indian Appeals. View "Yurok Tribe v. Dep't of the Interior" on Justia Law

The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) within the National Institutes of Health issued Request for Proposal for the “NIH Pain Consortium Centers of Excellence in Pain Education Coordination Center.” NIDA initially issued the solicitation as a small business set-aside under North American Industry Classification System code 541712, “Research and Development in the Physical, Engineering, and Life Sciences (except Biotechnology),” which limits offerors to small businesses with 500 employees or fewer. A prospective offeror appealed the NAICS code designation to the U.S. Small Business Administration Office of Hearings and Appeals, which ordered NIDA’s contracting officer to amend the solicitation to change the NAICS code designation to 541611, “Administrative Management and General Management Consulting Services.” Palladian sought to enjoin NIDA from accepting and evaluating proposals under the new code, which rendered Palladian ineligible to compete. The Court of Federal Claims granted Palladian’s motion for judgment on the administrative record, finding that the contracting officer’s NAICS code amendment was arbitrary and capricious because NAICS code 541611 did not best describe the statement of work for the solicitation. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that Palladian failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. View "Palladian Partners, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2005, the Shinnecock Indian Nation filed suit to vindicate its rights to land in the Town of Southampton, claiming that 1859 New York legislation allowed thousands of acres of the Nation’s land to be wrongfully conveyed to the town. The district court dismissed, holding that laches barred the claims. An appeal to the Second Circuit remains pending. In 2012, the Nation filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, seeking $1,105,000,000, alleging that the United States, “acting through the federal court system . . . denied any and all judicial means of effective redress for the unlawful taking of lands” in violation of trust obligations arising under the Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. 177, and the “federal common law.” The Claims Court dismissed on alternative grounds: that the claims were not ripe because they were predicated upon the district court’s judgment in the prior suit, which was on appeal, or that, even if the claims were ripe, it had no jurisdiction because they did not fall within the Indian Tucker Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity. The court refused to allow amendment to allege a judicial takings claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed that the breach of trust claims are not ripe for review, vacated the jurisdiction ruling, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the breach of trust claims without prejudice. View "Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States" on Justia Law

Prairie County, Montana, and Greenlee County, Arizona sought additional payments under the Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act (PILT), 31 U.S.C. 6901–6907. PILT was enacted to “compensate[ ] local governments for the loss of tax revenues resulting from the tax-immune status of federal lands located in their jurisdictions, and for the cost of providing services related to these lands” and directs the Department of the Interior to “make a payment for each fiscal year to each unit of general local government in which entitlement land is located.” PILT provides two alternative formulas for calculating the amount of payment, but provides that “[n]ecessary amounts may be appropriated to the Secretary of the Interior to carry out this chapter. Amounts are available only as provided in appropriation laws.” During the years at issue, Congress did not appropriate sufficient funds to provide for full payments to all eligible local governments according to PILT formulas. Interior followed the relevant regulation and proportionally reduced PILT payments to each local government. The Claims Court dismissed. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The statute limits the government’s liability under PILT to the amount appropriated by Congress. View "Prairie Cnty, v. United States" on Justia Law

The Tribe filed suit against the government seeking damages to cover the cost of providing safe drinking water on the northeastern Arizona Hopi Reservation. The reservation’s public water systems rely on groundwater drawn from subsurface layers of water-bearing rock. The Tribe alleges that the systems serving five communities on the eastern portion of the reservation contain unsafe levels of arsenic that exceed the federally allowed maximum. The Tribe alleges the United States funded and provided technical assistance for the construction of many of those wells. The Tribe owns and operates the public water systems serving four of the communities; the Bureau of Indian Affairs owns and operates the system serving the fifth. To invoke the court’s jurisdiction under the Indian Tucker Act, the Tribe must identify a statute or regulation imposing a specific obligation on the government to provide adequate drinking water that would give rise to a claim for money damages. The Court of Federal Claims concluded that the Tribe failed to do so. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The sources of law relied on by the Tribe do not establish a specific fiduciary obligation on the United States to ensure adequate water quality on the Reservation. View "Hopi Tribe v. United States" on Justia Law

Exela petitioned the Patent and Trademark Office to “reconsider and withdraw” its revival of the national stage application and to cancel the 218 patent, assigned to SCR Pharmatop. The PTO declined to consider Exela’s petition, stating that no law or regulation authorizes non-party challenge to a PTO ruling to accept a tardy filing. Exela then brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, arguing that the PTO’s action was ultra vires and that Exela’s petition should have been considered and favorably decided. The district court, on reconsideration and in view of new Fourth Circuit precedent, dismissed Exela’s complaint for failing to meet the statute of limitations for claims filed against the United States, including APA claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal, on the ground that PTO revival rulings are not subject to third party collateral challenge, thereby precluding review regardless of whether Exela’s claims were time-barred. View "Exela Pharma Sciences, LLC v. Lee" on Justia Law

Wingard, a 20-year veteran, died in 2005, from causes unrelated to his military service. His daughter sought a burial-plot or interment allowance (38 U.S.C. 2303) and burial benefits (38 U.S.C. 2302(a)(1)), which provides for burial benefits only in the case of a deceased veteran “who at the time of death was in receipt of compensation . . . or was in receipt of pension.”. The Board of Veterans Appeals granted an interment allowance, but denied burial benefits. In 1989, the Department had assigned Wingard a 0% disability rating for a service-connected hernia that had been treated and showed no sign of recurrence. Wingard’s disability rating remained at 0%l. He never received disability compensation, had no claims pending, and never received a Veterans-related pension. The Veterans Court held that 8 U.S.C. 7252(b) did not preclude review and that sections 1110 and 1155 allowed the Department to find some disabilities noncompensable and assign a 0% rating. The court did not address whether “in receipt of compensation,” included “entitled to receive compensation.” The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that Congress has barred the Veterans Court and Federal Circuit from conducting such review, which must be conducted through a direct review of rulemaking determinations under 38 U.S.C. 502. View "Wingard v. McDonald" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Federal Circuit ruled that the U.S. Border Patrol’s placement of motion sensors on five separate parcels of land owned by Otay Mesa adjacent to the Mexican border in Southern California constituted the taking of permanent easements over the parcels. On remand, the Court of Federal Claims held that Otay was entitled to no damages for the taking of an easement over land that could be developed for industrial use; that it was entitled to damages of $455,520 for the taking of an easement over land that could be used for environmental mitigation purposes; and that interest on the $455,520 damages award should run from August 28, 2008, the date Otay became aware of the taking as a result of the filing of a stipulation of liability by the government. The Federal Circuit then affirmed the denial of damages with respect to the industrial development property and the award of $455,520 with respect to the mitigation property. The court vacated the computation of interest; Otay is entitled to interest computed from when sensors were first placed on its property. View "Otay Mesa Prop., L.P. v. United States" on Justia Law