Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2010, while Kerner was an Evidence Custodian, GS-05, with the Department’s Fish and Wildlife Service, he applied for two vacancies: Wildlife Inspector, GS-09/11, and Wildlife Inspector, GS-11/11. Both positions were merit-promotion vacancies. Each required federal employee applicants to meet a time-in-grade requirement. A federal civil service applicant must have completed at least 52 weeks of experience equivalent to GS-07 to be qualified for the GS- 09 position, and at least 52 weeks of experience equivalent to GS-09 to be qualified for the GS-11 position. The vacancies also required one year of specialized experience in the federal civil service equivalent to GS-07 or GS-09, respectively. Kerner had no federal civil service experience at the GS-07 or GS-09 level and, therefore, did not meet the time-in-grade requirements. The Department determined that he did not qualify for either vacancy. Kerner then filed a Veterans Employment Opportunity Act claim with the Department of Labor, alleging that the Department violated his VEOA rights. The Department of Labor and Merit Systems Protection Board rejected the claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The provisions cited by Kerner only apply to preference-eligible veterans not already employed in federal civil service, not to current federal employees seeking merit promotions. View "Kerner v. Dep't of the Interior" on Justia Law

The Forest Service awarded EM Logging a timber sale contract for the Kootenai National Forest in Montana. The contract’s load limit clause states that “[a]ll vehicles shall comply with statutory load limits unless a permit from the Forest Service and any necessary State permits are obtained,” the haul route clause states that “[a]ll products removed from Sale Area shall be transported over the designated routes of haul” and a notification clause requires that “Purchaser shall notify Forest Service when a load of products … will be delayed for more than 12 hours in reaching weighing location.” The provision under which the Forest Service terminated the contract refers to: “a pattern of activity that demonstrates flagrant disregard for the terms of this contract.” The Forest Service issued multiple notifications of breach with respect to the clauses, suspended operations, and terminated the contract. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that one instance of route deviation necessitated by illness, one load limit violation, and two instances of delayed notifications. None of the alleged violations independently substantiated the finding of flagrant disregard. Even together, the violations were not substantial evidence of a pattern of activity demonstrating that EM’s actions were in flagrant disregard of the contract. View "EM Logging v. Dep't of Agric." on Justia Law

In March 2010, Herring was removed from her position as a cytotechnologist with the Department of the Navy. The Office of Personnel Management denied her application for disability retirement benefits. Herring received the relevant OPM denial letter on July 14, 2012. The deadline to file an appeal of the denial was August 13, 2012. However, because her attorney’s law office negligently failed to transmit to her attorney the documents submitted by Herring (while confirming to Herring that the necessary documents and payment had been received), Herring did not file the appeal until August 23. An administrative judge dismissed the appeal as untimely filed without good cause, and the Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed. The Federal Circuit reversed. The Board’s failure to consider a factor it has previously treated as significant to “good cause” indicates that the MSPB abused its discretion in its disposition of Herring’s petition. View "Herring v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd." on Justia Law

Best, a Hong Kong manufacturer, produces Metalized Yarn from polyester chips melted with metal nanopowders to form monofilament yarns. Best sought a pre-importation ruling concerning proper tariff classification in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTSUS), attaching a laboratory report describing the yarn as having a fiber content of 100% polyester, with 0.7%- 0.74% metal by weight. Customs classified the yarn as metalized yarn, HTSUS 5605.00.90, dutiable at 13.2%, stating “yarn combined with metal in the form of powder is considered a metalized yarn.” Best then sought a ruing regarding a “Johnny Collar” garment made of its yarn, asserting the garment was classifiable under HTSUS 6105.90.8030 as a shirt of other textile materials (duty rate 5.6%), not HTSUS 6110.30.3053 for polyester shirts (duty rate 32%). Based on trace amounts of metal and a label that stated “100% polyester,” Customs classified the sample as man-made non-metalized fibers under HTSUS 6110.30.3053. Customs subsequently revoked the Yarn Ruling, reclassifying the yarn as a polyester yarn under HTSUS 5402.47.90 (duty rate 8%). Customs also revoked the Johnny Collar Ruling as conflicting with the Yarn Ruling, but continued to classify the garment under 6110.30.30. Best challenged the Yarn Ruling Revocation, but not the Johnny Collar revocation. The Trade Court sustained the Revocation. The Federal Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Best sought reversal of a Revocation, the effect of which would be to increase Best ’s own duty rate while benefiting manufacturers of products made from its yarn. The statute does not provide jurisdiction over such requests View "Best Key Textiles Co., Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

Higbie, a Criminal Investigator for the U.S. State Department, contacted equal employment opportunity (EEO) counsel to complain of alleged reprisal by the Department for his activities, which he claimed were protected under the Civil Rights Act. Higbie successfully requested that his complaint be processed through the Department’s alternative dispute resolution program. Higbie repeatedly inquired whether the mediation proceedings would be confidential. State Department representatives confirmed that they would be. Higbie’s supervisors, including Cotter and Thomas, signed the mediation agreement, which included a confidentiality provision. The parties did not resolve their dispute through mediation. Cotter and Thomas provided affidavits to the EEO investigator that discussed Higbie’s statements in the mediation and cast his participation in a negative light. Higbie filed suit, claiming retaliation, discrimination, and violation of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act. The district court dismissed the ADRA claim. Amending his complaint, Higbie alleged a claim sounding in contract for breach of the confidentiality provision. The Court of Federal Claims concluded that Higbie had not established that the agreement could be fairly read to contemplate money damages, and dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Higbie v. United States" on Justia Law

Following nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate, Brigadier General Schwalier was scheduled to be appointed to major general in 1997. His appointment was delayed and the President later chose not to appoint him, 10 U.S.C. 624(c). Schwalier argued that he was appointed by operation of law after the delay of his appointment expired and before the President’s decision. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court finding that the appointment process for senior military officers does not allow for automatic appointments, and a President’s decision not to appoint an officer is unreviewable. The Air Force and the Department of Defense did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by not retroactively appointing Schwalier. View "Schwalier v. Hagel" on Justia Law

Hopper was hired by the Social Security Administration, which requested that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conduct a background investigation. Fifteen months later, OPM challenged his application. Asked whether, during the past five years, he had been fired from any job, Hopper responded “no.” OPM alleged that Hopper had been fired from two positions with different companies and that, in response to a question requesting a list of all employment for the past five years, Hopper failed to report one of those positions. Hopper responded with supporting documents, claiming that he was not fired from either position and, if he failed to report a position, “it was an honest mistake.” OPM rejected Hopper’s assertions. SSA removed Hopper. While appeal was pending, the Merit System Protection Board issued decisions that questioned whether an individual who meets the definition of “employee” and is separated under an OPM suitability action retains a right to appeal as an “adverse action.” At a hearing, OPM refused to participate. The ALJ mitigated OPM’s action to a reprimand. The Board upheld the decision. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Board erred in approaching the case as an adverse action appeal, rather than as a suitability action under OPM’s regulations. The Civil Service Reform Act does not exempt suitability removals from Board jurisdiction. View "Archuleta v. Hopper" on Justia Law

Under 5 U.S.C. 7521, an agency may furlough an administrative law judge (ALJ) for 30 days or less “only for good cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board” in a formal adjudication. The Board determined that the Department of Labor had good cause to furlough its ALJs for a particular length of time in 2013. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The challenged furlough, part of a program of furloughs throughout the Department and throughout the federal government, was the result of a neutral, reasonable, statute-based determination about how to implement a government-wide budget sequester. The spending limits were imposed under the Budget Control Act of 2011, 125 Stat. 240, 241–46, and the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, 126 Stat. 2313, 2370, which amended the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 2 U.S.C. 901. View "Berlin v. Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

IRIS owns the 506 patent, titled “Method of Making an Improved Security Identification Document Including Contactless Communication Insert Unit.” The patent discloses methods for making a secure identification document containing an embedded computer chip that stores biographical or biometric data. Japan Airlines Corporation (JAL) examines passports according to the Enhanced Border Security Act, 8 U.S.C. 1221, the Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, 19 C.F.R. 122.75a(d), and international treaties. According to IRIS, some of these passports are made using the methods claimed in the 506 patent. IRIS sued, alleging that JAL infringed the patent under 35 U.S.C. 271(g) by “using . . . electronic passports in the processing and/or boarding of passengers . . . at . . . JAL services passenger check-in facilities throughout the United States.” JAL argued that federal laws requiring the examination of passports conflict with the patent laws and therefore exempt JAL from infringement liability and that IRIS’s exclusive remedy was an action against the United States under 28 U.S.C. 1498(a). The district court agreed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, concluding that JAL’s allegedly infringing acts are carried out “for the United States” under 28 U.S.C. 1498(a). View "IRIS Corp. v. Japan Airlines Corp." on Justia Law

Wrocklage was a Customs and Border Patrol Officer for 12 years. While screening travelers at Sault Sainte Marie, Wrocklage was the first to screen the Millers, who declared that they were carrying “fruits and vegetables.” At a secondary inspection point, Officer Hendricks issued a $300 fine to the Millers for failing to declare lemons and seeds. Wrocklage and LaLonde, contacted their supervisor, Price, challenging the propriety of the fine. Wrocklage took home a copy of the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) report, which included Miller’s social security number, birth date, address, and license plate number. In an email to the Joint Intake Center, Wrocklage reported that he believed the Millers had been wrongly charged. Wrocklage attached the TECS report and copied Berglund, an employee in Senator Levin’s office. Within hours, Wrocklage realized that the TECS report had been attached, contacted Berglund, and, in response to his request, Berglund deleted the emails before opening the report. Wrocklage immediately self-reported to DHS, which determined that the report had been printed by LaLonde. Wrocklage stated that he “d[id] not recall” where he obtained the report. Wrocklage and LaLonde explained that they both printed copies and jointly presented copies to Price, so it was possible that the copies were switched. DHS removed Wrocklage from his position for improper possession of TECS information, unauthorized disclosures of TECS information, and lack of candor during the investigation. The Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding the charges of unauthorized disclosure and lack of candor not supported by substantial evidence. View "Wrocklage v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law