Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a bid protest action initiated by Oak Grove Technologies, LLC against the United States Department of the Army's award of a contract to F3EA, Inc. The contract, known as SOF RAPTOR IV, was for procuring training services for special forces. Oak Grove, a competing bidder, alleged that the bidding process was flawed and that F3EA had an unfair advantage due to an organizational conflict of interest involving the chairperson of the Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB), RM.The Court of Federal Claims reviewed the case and agreed with Oak Grove, finding that the Army's evaluation process was flawed. The court enjoined the Army from proceeding with the contract award to F3EA and ordered the Army to either restart the procurement process or reopen it to accept revised proposals. The court also sanctioned the government for failing to include material evidence in the administrative record, which delayed the proceedings and increased costs for Oak Grove.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the judgment and injunction issued by the Court of Federal Claims. The appellate court held that Oak Grove had waived its argument that the Army was required to hold discussions with bidders, that F3EA was not required to include teaming agreements in its proposal, and that the Army's investigation into RM's alleged misconduct was adequate. The court also found that the Court of Federal Claims erred in determining that Lukos, another bidder, was financially irresponsible and ineligible for the contract. However, the appellate court affirmed the sanctions imposed on the government for failing to compile a complete administrative record. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "OAK GROVE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

Thomas Smith, a veteran, sought specially adapted housing (SAH) benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to build a home spa for his service-connected low back disability. Before receiving a response, he constructed the spa. His initial request was denied, and he did not appeal. Later, he sought reimbursement for the spa's construction costs, which was also denied by the VA and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. Smith appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims but died before the case was decided. His daughter, Karen Hicks, sought to substitute herself in the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims denied Hicks's motion for substitution, stating she was not entitled to pursue her father's claim. The court found that Hicks had not obtained a determination from the VA that she was an eligible accrued-benefits claimant, a prerequisite for substitution under the court's precedent in Breedlove v. Shinseki.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. Hicks argued that the Veterans Court should have made the determination of her eligibility for substitution without requiring a VA determination. She also contended that she should be allowed to pursue the claim under 38 C.F.R. § 36.4406, which governs SAH benefits, and under the equitable doctrine of nunc pro tunc. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court's decision, holding that the court did not err in requiring a VA determination for substitution eligibility and that Hicks did not meet the regulatory requirements for reimbursement. The court also upheld the application of the nunc pro tunc doctrine, which did not apply as Smith died before the case was submitted for decision. View "SMITH v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

Kenneth Dojaquez, an attorney, appealed a decision regarding his entitlement to additional attorney's fees under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(3). Dojaquez represented a veteran, Billy Wayne Slaughter, who was awarded an increased disability rating by the Board of Veterans' Appeals. The agency assigned an effective date of August 1, 2012, for the increased rating in a decision dated March 2, 2019, but did not notify Slaughter of this decision until April 26, 2019. Dojaquez argued that his attorney's fees should be calculated up to the notification date, not the decision date.The Board of Veterans' Appeals concluded that Dojaquez was only entitled to attorney's fees through March 2, 2019, the date of the agency's decision. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed this decision, relying on the interpretation of 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(1) and established case law, specifically Snyder v. Nicholson, which defined the end date for calculating past-due benefits as the date of the award decision, not the notification date.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the "date of the final decision" under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(3) refers to the date of the agency's decision assigning an effective date, not the date the veteran was notified of the decision. This interpretation ensures that attorney's fees are calculated based on past-due benefits up to the date of the award decision, consistent with the statutory language and previous case law. The court rejected Dojaquez's argument that the notification date should be used, as it would conflict with the statutory scheme and potentially allow attorneys to receive more than 20% of the claimant's past-due benefits. View "DOJAQUEZ v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

The case involves veterans' benefits appeals that were erroneously deactivated by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) due to a computer program error. The VA operates two adjudicatory systems for benefits claims, and the legacy system is relevant here. Under this system, a claimant must file a Notice of Disagreement and, if unresolved, a Substantive Appeal. The VA's electronic database, VACOLS, automatically closed appeals if no timely Substantive Appeal was noted, leading to approximately 3,000 erroneously closed appeals. This affected U.S. Army veterans J. Roni Freund and Marvin Mathewson, whose successors are the named petitioners in this class action.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims dismissed the petitions and denied class certification. The court found the case moot as to the individual petitioners after the VA reactivated their appeals. It also held that the petitioners failed to meet the commonality and adequacy requirements for class certification under Rule 23. The court did not address whether the case was moot as to the class or the superiority of class resolution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that the Veterans Court abused its discretion in its commonality and adequacy findings. The Federal Circuit held that the inherently transitory exception to mootness applied, as the VA's practice of reactivating appeals quickly made it likely that individual claims would become moot before class certification could be ruled upon. The court also rejected the Secretary's argument that the class was not ascertainable due to the difficulty in identifying class members.The Federal Circuit vacated the Veterans Court's order denying class certification and remanded the case for further consideration of class certification and appropriate relief. View "FREUND v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

Nevada Health CO-OP, a health insurance provider, received two loans from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) under the Affordable Care Act’s CO-OP program. These loans included a start-up loan and a solvency loan. In 2015, Nevada Health faced financial difficulties and was placed into receivership by the Nevada Commissioner of Insurance. CMS subsequently terminated the loan agreement and began offsetting payments owed to Nevada Health against the start-up loan debt.The United States Court of Federal Claims reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the Nevada Commissioner of Insurance, acting as the receiver for Nevada Health. The court found that the government improperly withheld statutory payments owed to Nevada Health under the ACA. The court also held that the government could not invoke 31 U.S.C. § 3728 to withhold these payments in the future.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s judgment that the government improperly withheld payments owed to Nevada Health. The court held that the loan agreement subordinated the government’s claim to those of policyholders and basic operating expenses, thus precluding the government from asserting offset rights to jump ahead of these senior creditors. However, the appellate court vacated the portion of the lower court’s order that addressed the government’s ability to invoke 31 U.S.C. § 3728, ruling that the lower court exceeded its jurisdiction by addressing this issue, which was not raised by the parties. View "Richardson v. United States" on Justia Law

Eric Mote, a former Captain in the United States Air Force, sought the removal of a Letter of Admonishment (LOA) and a Non-Judicial Punishment (NJP) from his military records, along with back pay for the fine associated with the NJP. The LOA and NJP were issued following Mote's repeated requests for a "White Heritage Month" at Hill Air Force Base, which were denied by his superiors. Mote's subsequent communications, which were deemed disrespectful, led to the LOA and NJP.The United States Court of Federal Claims reviewed Mote's case and granted judgment on the administrative record in favor of the government, upholding the decision of the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR). The Claims Court found that the AFBCMR's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. The court also held that the LOA and NJP were not illegal reprisals.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Claims Court's decision regarding the NJP, finding that the AFBCMR's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence. However, the appellate court vacated the portion of the Claims Court's decision that reviewed the LOA and remanded the case for a determination of whether the Claims Court had jurisdiction over the LOA claim under the Tucker Act. The appellate court emphasized that the Claims Court's jurisdiction to grant non-monetary relief is limited to cases where such relief is incident to a money judgment. View "MOTE v. US " on Justia Law

Norah R. Lewis, Sr., a U.S. Army veteran, had his disability rating for PTSD increased from 30 percent to 70 percent in 2009. However, in 2016, the VA Regional Office (RO) reduced his rating back to 30 percent, citing evidence from a 2015 VA examination and outpatient treatment records. Mr. Lewis appealed this decision, arguing that the reduction was improper.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals initially sustained the RO's decision in 2018, but the Veterans Court vacated and remanded the case, requiring the Board to address favorable evidence. The Board issued a second decision in 2019, which was again vacated and remanded by the Veterans Court for failing to comply with the prior remand order. On the second remand, Mr. Lewis argued that the 2016 rating decision was void ab initio because the RO did not make a required finding under 38 C.F.R. § 3.344(a) that the improvement in his condition would be maintained under ordinary conditions of life.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board's March 2021 decision, which had found that Mr. Lewis’s PTSD had materially improved and that the improvement was likely to be maintained under ordinary conditions of life. The Veterans Court held that the RO was not required to make specific findings in its initial decision, as long as the Board made the necessary findings on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court's decision. The Federal Circuit held that while the RO failed to make the required findings under 38 C.F.R. § 3.344(a) in its initial decision, the Board's subsequent findings cured this deficiency. The Board's de novo review and ultimate decision on Mr. Lewis’s disability rating were consistent with its role in the statutory scheme, satisfying the VA’s duty to follow procedural protections for rating reductions. View "LEWIS v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

Sean Ravin, an attorney, sought fees for representing Curtis D. Skogsbergh, a veteran claiming disability benefits. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) initially granted Skogsbergh a 10% disability rating, later increased to 20%. Skogsbergh, acting pro se, appealed for a higher rating and submitted a claim for total disability based on individual unemployability (TDIU). The VA denied TDIU, and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) did not address it in their decision. Skogsbergh retained Ravin, who represented him in an appeal to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court), which vacated the Board’s decision for not addressing TDIU.The Board later remanded the TDIU claim, and the VA granted TDIU with past-due benefits. However, the VA denied Ravin’s attorney fees, leading him to appeal to the Board, which found the fee agreement valid but denied fees, stating the Board’s decision was not final. Ravin appealed to the Veterans Court, which vacated the Board’s decision, finding the Board’s interpretation of finality incorrect but remanding for clarification on whether all fee award requirements were met.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the Veterans Court’s decision was non-final, as it remanded the case for further proceedings. The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that the remand did not meet the criteria for a final decision and that the Veterans Court was within its authority to remand for clarification. View "RAVIN v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the distribution of interest associated with antidumping and countervailing duties under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (CDSOA). Plaintiffs, who are affected domestic producers, argued that the United States Customs and Border Protection (Customs) unlawfully excluded delinquency interest from the distributions they were entitled to receive under the CDSOA. Customs had been distributing only interest charged on antidumping and countervailing duties at liquidation, as specified by 19 U.S.C. § 1677g, and not delinquency interest assessed under 19 U.S.C. § 1505(d).The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) initially dismissed claims related to distributions made more than two years before the complaints were filed, citing the statute of limitations. The CIT found that the Final Rule published by Customs in 2001 provided adequate notice of its decision to exclude delinquency interest. The CIT also denied plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration, maintaining that the Final Rule sufficiently informed the public of Customs' decision. Finally, the CIT denied plaintiffs' motions for judgment on the agency record, holding that the CDSOA did not require Customs to distribute delinquency interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the CIT's decisions. The Federal Circuit held that the Final Rule provided adequate notice of Customs' decision to exclude delinquency interest, thus supporting the CIT's dismissal of claims outside the two-year statutory period. The court also concluded that the CDSOA unambiguously excludes delinquency interest from distributions to affected producers. Therefore, the court affirmed the CIT's judgment in favor of the government, upholding Customs' practice of excluding delinquency interest from CDSOA distributions. View "ADEE HONEY FARMS v. US " on Justia Law

The case revolves around Ravi Teja, an Indian citizen, who paid thousands of dollars to enroll at the "University of Farmington," expecting to take classes. Unbeknownst to him, the University was a fictitious entity created by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as part of an undercover operation to target fraud involving student visas. When the operation came to light, the government neither provided the education Ravi had paid for nor refunded his money. Ravi filed a lawsuit against the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging a breach of contract and an accompanying breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed Ravi's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, without addressing other issues. The court reasoned that its jurisdiction under the Tucker Act does not extend to contracts entered into by the government when acting as a sovereign unless those contracts unmistakably subject the government to damages in the event of breach. The court concluded that the government was acting in its sovereign capacity as it entered into the alleged contract in furtherance of an undercover law-enforcement operation, and that the alleged contract did not unmistakably subject the government to damages in the event of breach.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Claims Court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Appeals Court concluded that the Claims Court had jurisdiction pursuant to the Tucker Act over the agreement alleged by Ravi. The court disagreed with the Claims Court's interpretation of the Tucker Act, stating that the contract in question did not concern what was promised to happen or not to happen in a different proceeding in another adjudicatory forum, and thus did not fall into the narrow exception carved out by precedent. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, noting that other grounds not reached by the Claims Court but raised by the government as alternative bases to affirm warranted further exploration. View "RAVI v. US " on Justia Law