Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Erickson was a U.S. Postal Service employee from 1988 to 2000, and also a member of the Army National Guard Reserve. He was absent from the Postal Service for lengthy periods while on active duty with the National Guard. Between 1991 and 1995 he was absent for more than 22 months, and between 1996 and 2000, he worked at the Postal Service for only four days. The Postal Service inquired whether he intended to return. Erickson replied that he would not return until he completed his tour of duty in September 2001. The Postal Service removed him for excessive use of military leave. Erickson re-enlisted with the Guard and remained on active duty through 2005. In 2006, he appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board alleging violation of his rights under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). The Board rejected his claim under 38 U.S.C. 4312, holding that he had not made a timely request for reemployment and that military service was not a motivating factor in the termination. The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to his reemployment claim, but reversed with respect to his discrimination claim. On remand, the Board found that Erickson had waived his USERRA rights by abandoning his civilian career, but on a second remand, ruled in favor of Erickson and granted him reinstatement with back wages and benefits. The Federal Circuit denied his application for recovery of attorney fees and expenses for the two appeals.View "Erickson v. U.S. Postal Serv." on Justia Law

Matthews enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1990. In 2006, while on active duty, he pled guilty to computer pornography and solicitation of a child. He was sentenced to 21 years plus 10 months in prison. In 2007, an administrative separation board imposed an “other than honorable” discharge on Matthews. In 2010, Matthews sought back pay from the date of his arrest and “retainer” pay, based on a total of 20 years of active duty, reached while incarcerated. He claimed he was not properly discharged, citing the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. 552b; the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552; the Military Whistleblower Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. 1034; and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706. The Claims Court of held that it lacked jurisdiction over claims founded on the four statutes because they are not money-mandating and held that Matthews failed to state claims for back pay under 37 U.S.C. 204(a) and retainer pay under 10 U.S.C. 6330(b). The statute prohibits service members from receiving pay for absences without leave that are not unavoidable; an absence due to civilian incarceration is not unavoidable. When he was arrested Matthews had not reached the 20 years of active duty service required to receive retainer pay. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Matthews v. United States" on Justia Law

Following the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, each of the Oil Companies entered into contracts with the government to provide high-octane aviation gas (avgas) to fuel military aircraft. The production of avgas resulted in waste products such as spent alkylation acid and “acid sludge.” The Oil Companies contracted to have McColl, a former Shell engineer, dump the waste at property in Fullerton, California. More than 50 years later, California and the federal government obtained compensation from the Oil Companies under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601, for the cost of cleaning up the McColl site. The Oil Companies sued, arguing the avgas contracts require the government to indemnify them for the CERCLA costs. The Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The Federal Circuit reversed with respect to breach of contract liability and remanded. As a concession to the Oil Companies, the avgas contracts required the government to reimburse the Oil Companies for their “charges.” The court particularly noted the immense regulatory power the government had over natural resources during the war and the low profit margin on the avgas contracts. View "Shell Oil Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

Cunningham worked for the U.S. Office of Personnel Management in 2004-2005. He appealed his termination to the Merit Systems Protection Board, alleging discrimination based on marital status. Cunningham agreed to withdraw his appeal; OPM agreed to pay him $50,000. The agreement designated the OPM’s director of human resources as the contact for reference inquiries and permitted disclosure of dates of service only. The termination letter was to be removed from the personnel file and both parties were prohibited from disclosing the agreement or the grievance. In 2006, Cunningham accepted a position with USIS, a private company that contracts with federal agencies to perform background investigations. A week after Cunningham began training USIS suspended him without pay at the direction of OPM's security office. OPM employees (not the Director of Human Resources) had discussed Cunningham’s termination. An administrative judge found that OPM had breached the agreement, but that MSPB could not award damages. Cunningham was only entitled to rescind the agreement, reinstate his appeal, and return the $50,000 payment. MSPB adopted the findings. Cunningham did not want his appeal reinstated and sought breach-of-contract damages. The Claims Court found that it had subject matter jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, but dismissed based on res judicata. The Federal Circuit vacated, agreeing that the court had jurisdiction, but holding that res judicata did not apply because jurisdictional limits on the MSPB did not permit him to seek damages in the prior matter.View "Cunningham v. United States" on Justia Law

Former GM and Chrysler dealers, whose franchises were terminated in the 2009 bankruptcies of those companies, sued, alleging that the terminations constituted a taking because the government required them as a condition of its providing financial assistance to the companies. The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 363, 365, authorizes certain sales of a debtor’s assets and provides that a bankruptcy trustee “may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.” Debtors-in-possession in chapter 11 bankruptcies, like GM and Chrysler, generally have a trustee’s powers. The Claims Court denied motions to dismiss. In interlocutory appeals, the Federal Circuit remanded for consideration of the issues of the “regulatory” impact of the government’s “coercion” and of economic impact. While the allegations of economic loss are deficient in not sufficiently alleging that the economic value of the franchises was reduced or eliminated as a result of the government’s actions, the proper remedy is to grant to leave to amend the complaints to include the necessary allegations. View "A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In the early 2000s, Raytheon underwent a major reorganization, including the sale of several business segments, including AIS, Optical, and Aerospace (segments at issue). As part of each sale, Raytheon retained the assets and liabilities of defined-benefit pension plans associated with the segments. Raytheon also calculated segment closing adjustments as required by CFR Cost Accounting Standards (CAS). Raytheon determined that some of its segments had pension surpluses, but the segments at issue had deficits. Although Raytheon paid the government its share of the surpluses, the government refused to pay its share of the deficits. Raytheon submitted certified claims for recovery of the deficits under the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 7103 (2011). The contracting officer issued final decisions denying these claims, reasoning that the adjustments were subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation’s timely funding requirement, 48 CFR 31.205-6(j)(2)(i), and the deficits were therefore unallowable because Raytheon failed to fund the full amount of the pension deficits in the same year as the closings and that Raytheon’s segment closing calculations “do[] not comply with CAS 413[.]” The Claims Court awarded Raytheon $59.209,967 and rejected a claim for recovery with respect to one segment, finding that Raytheon applied the wrong asset allocation method in its adjustment calculation. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Raytheon Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act, 31 U.S.C. 6301, states that an executive agency must use: “a procurement contract . . . when . . . the principal purpose … is to acquire … property or services for the direct benefit or use” of the government and must adhere to the Competition in Contracting Act and the Federal Acquisition Regulation However, an “agency shall use a cooperative agreement . . . when . . . the principal purpose … is to transfer a thing of value … to carry out a public purpose of support or stimulation … instead of acquiring . . . property or service” and can avoid procurement laws. Under Section 8 of the Housing Act, HUD provides rental assistance, including entering Housing Assistance Program (HAP) contracts and paying subsidies directly to private landlords. A 1974 amendment gave HUD the option of entering an Annual Contributions Contract (ACC) with a Public Housing Agency (PHA), which would enter into HAP contracts with owners and pay subsidies with HUD funds. In 1983, HUD’s authority was amended. HUD could administer existing HAP contracts, and enter into new HAP contracts for existing Section 8 dwellings by engaging a PHA if possible, 42 U.S.C. 1437f(b)(1). Later, HUD began outsourcing services and initiated a competition to award a performance-based ACC to a PHA in each state, with the PHA to assume “all contractual rights and responsibilities of HUD.” After making an award, HUD chose to re-compete, seeking greater savings, expressly referring to “cooperative agreements,” outside the scope of procurement law. The Government Accountability Office agreed with protestors that the awards were procurement contracts. HUD disregarded that recommendation. The Claims Court denied a request to set aside the award. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the awards are procurement contracts, not cooperative agreements.View "CMS Contract Mgmt. Servs. v. United States" on Justia Law

Biggers had been employed by the Navy for 29 years and in 2007 was Security Manager for the Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center. The position required him to maintain a top secret security clearance. In 2008, a duty officer found that an outer vault door of the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network room was left open. Biggers notified the Commanding Officer of the potential violation. After an investigation, the Command Evaluator recommended that all security personnel (including Biggers) have their access to classified material suspended because “the investigation revealed numerous systemic problems, violations and deficiencies.” Biggers’ security clearance was suspended pending a final determination by the Department of Navy Central Adjudication Facility (DONCAF) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7513. Ultimately, DONCAF concluded that the information provided by Biggers and the Center “sufficiently explained, mitigated, or provided extenuating circumstances,” and Biggers was found eligible for a Top Secret clearance and assignment to a sensitive position and returned to duty status.. His suspension had lasted nine months. The Navy did not provide back pay or treat him as employed for calculation of retirement benefits. Biggers alleged that the suspension was motivated by retaliatory animus arising from his participation in an EEOC proceeding. An AJ determined that the Merit Systems Protection Board may not review the merits of a security clearance revocation or suspension. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that Biggers was not entitled to back pay. View "Biggers v. Dep't of the Navy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are or were air-traffic-control specialists or traffic-management coordinators with the Federal Aviation Administration and alleged that the FAA’s policies governing how to compensate them when they worked overtime did not comply with the time-and-a-half- payment requirement of the Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C. 207. They sought damages under 29 U.S.C. 216(b) and invoked jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.1491. The Claims Court ruled in their favor, holding that the agency’s personnel policies are contrary to the FLSA and are not authorized by any other provision of law. The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that the FAA has such authority under the federal personnel laws, 5 U.S.C. 5543 and 6120-6133. The court remanded for determination of whether the challenged FAA policies are fully, or only partly, within the authority of those title 5 exemptions from the FLSA. View "Abbey v. United States" on Justia Law

The companies obtained an oil and gas lease from the government for a 5760-acre tract on the Outer Continental Shelf. They made an initial bonus payment of $23,236,314 and have paid additional rental payments of $54,720 per year. The lease became effective on August 1, 2008, and had an initial term running through July 31, 2016. It provided that it issued pursuant to and was subject to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of August 7, 1953, (OCSLA) 43 U.S.C. 1331 and “all regulations issued pursuant to the statute in the future which provide for the prevention of waste and conservation of the natural resources of the Outer Continental Shelf and the protection of correlative rights therein; and all other applicable statutes and regulations.” In 2010, an explosion and fire on the Deepwater Horizon semi-submersible oil drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico killed 11 workers and caused an oil spill that lasted several months. As a result, the government imposed new regulatory requirements, Oil Pollution Act (OPA), 33 U.S.C. 2701. The companies sued for breach of contract. The Claims Court and Federal Circuit ruled in favor of the government, finding that the government made the changes pursuant to OCSLA, not OPA. View "Century Exploration New Orleans, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law