Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The 1989 Ethics Reform Act, 103 Stat. 1716, limited a federal judge’s ability to earn outside income, but provided for automatic, non-discretionary cost of living adjustments (COLA); whenever a COLA for General Schedule federal employees takes effect under 5 U.S.C. 5303, the salary of judges “shall be adjusted.” The only limitation on General Schedule COLAs is a presidential declaration of a “national emergency or serious economic conditions” 5 U.S.C. 5303(b). Nonetheless, in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1999, General Schedule employees received adjustments, but Congress blocked adjustments for judges. Judges alleged violation of Article III, which provides that “Compensation” for federal judges “shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.” The district court agreed, but the Federal Circuit reversed, based on United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980). In 2001, Congress enacted legislation blocking COLAs in certain years. Judges sought back pay. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed; the Federal Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated. On remand, the Federal Circuit held that the claim was not precluded, but affirmed dismissal. On rehearing en banc, the Federal Circuit overruled its earlier decision, holding that the 1989 Act triggered the Compensation Clause’s basic protections. In this unique context, the Constitution prevents Congress from abrogating that precise commitment to COLAs. The 1989 Act controls over the 2001 enactments. View "Beer v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2007 the Postal Service awarded Tip Top a contract under which the Postal Service would assign individual projects by issuing work orders. In 2009, the Postal Service issued a work order to replace the air conditioning system at the Main Post Office in Christiansted, Virgin Islands, for the price of $229,736.92. As a result of that work Tip Top submitted a claim and request for an equitable adjustment under the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 7101-7109, in the amount of $34,553.77, consisting of a subcontractor’s price for a change, plus 10% profit, 4% insurance, and 4% gross receipts tax, plus $9,655 for “Preparation Costs & Extended Overhead” and $2,745 for “Legal Fees.” The Postal Service Board of Contract Appeals ruled that Tip Top was entitled to recover $2,565. The Board ruled that Tip Top was not entitled to recover the balance of the amount claimed because it had failed to demonstrate that the costs at issue were incurred as a result of the change order. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, with directions to grant the appeal in its entirety. The ruling was based upon an error of law and not supported by substantial evidence. View "Tip Top Constr., Inc.v. Donahoe" on Justia Law

Landowners along a trail in Missouri and Kansas sought to join an existing “takings” suit against the United States, concerning the Rails-to-Trails program, filed under the Tucker Act. The initial plaintiff characterized her suit as a class action on behalf of herself and similarly situated persons; the owners qualified as such persons. The class action had been filed before the running of the six-year statute of limitations for the Tucker Act; however, the plaintiffs who sought to join as named parties did not do so until after the limitations period had run. The Court of Federal Claims refused to permit the original plaintiff to amend her complaint for joinder of additional plaintiffs; their suits were dismissed as time barred. The Federal Circuit reversed; the merits are before the Court of Federal Claims. In the meantime, the owners filed “protective suits” under 28 U.S.C. 1346, the “Little Tucker Act” which authorizes suits against the government in federal district courts, if damages sought do not exceed $10,000. The district courts declined to stay those suits pending the appeal and dismissed them as time barred. The Federal Circuit vacated and instructed the district courts to dismiss those suits without prejudice. View "Evans v. United States" on Justia Law

Semper worked as a probation officer for the District Court of the Virgin Islands until he was removed from his position on August 6, 2010. The reason given for his termination was that he was negligent in supervision of a convicted defendant who was killed while on release pending sentencing. . Semper filed a complaint in the Claims Court against the United States, the Chief Judge, and the court’s Chief Probation Officer. The Claims Court dismissed, holding that it lacked jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit affirmed, first holding that the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. 7501-7543, applied to Semper, regardless of which governmental branch employed him. He was classified as a member of the “excepted service,” not the “competitive service,” and was not among those excepted service employees whom the statute makes eligible for judicial or administrative review of adverse agency action. View "Semper v. United States" on Justia Law

Hillyard suffered a head injury and was hospitalized for two weeks while serving in the U.S. Army. Hillyard filed a single claim for service connection for a mental condition, which he attributed to his in-service head injury. The Veterans Administration denied his claim and the Board affirmed and subsequently denied Hillyard’s request for revision. The Veterans Court affirmed. Hillyard later filed a second request for revision alleging clear and unmistakable error (CUE) by the Board in failing to consider and apply 38 U.S.C. 105(a) and 1111, a different CUE allegation from the one he made in his first request. The Board dismissed the second request for revision with prejudice, concluding 38 C.F.R. 20.1409(c) permitted only one request for revision to be filed. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The interpretation of Rule 1409(c) proffered by the VA is consistent with the language of the regulation and is in harmony with the VA’s description of the regulation in its notice of rule-making. View "Hillyard v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Conyers and Northover were indefinitely suspended and demoted, respectively, from their positions with the Department of Defense after they were found ineligible to occupy “noncritical sensitive” positions. The Department argued that, because the positions were designated “noncritical sensitive,” the Merit Systems Protection Board could not review the merits of the Department’s determinations under the precedent set forth in Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988). The Board held that Egan limits review of an otherwise appealable adverse action only if that action is based upon eligibility for or a denial, revocation, or suspension of access to classified information. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. Egan prohibits Board review of agency determinations concerning eligibility of an employee to occupy a “sensitive” position, regardless of whether the position requires access to classified information. View "Berry v. Conyers" on Justia Law

Adams was employed as an Information Technology Specialist with the Missile Defense Agency of the Department of Defense, a position designated Special Sensitive and requiring the employee to maintain a Top Secret security clearance with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information. The Defense Intelligence Agency notified Adams that it had suspended his access to Sensitive Compartmented Information and had made a preliminary determination to revoke his security clearance for violations of agency security regulations. Weeks later, the Missile Defense Agency notified Adams that he would be suspended from his position indefinitely without pay. The Merit Systems Protection Board sustained the decision and the Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the agency had afforded Adams the required minimal procedural protections and that “an employee is not entitled to a transfer to a nonsensitive position absent a separate transfer right arising from some” other source. Adams remained on indefinite suspension without pay pending completion of the agency appeals process. The Department of Defense terminated his employment and denied his request for early retirement. The MSPB held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the termination and denial. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part, but reversed concerning MSPB authority to review denial of a retirement request. View "Adams v. Dep't of Def." on Justia Law

Jensen, a licensed customs broker, filed with Customs 308 protests on behalf of importers, seeking reliquidation of 1,529 entries of softwood lumber from Canada. More than two years later, Jensen inquired about the status of the protests. After nearly two months, Customs replied that the protests had been consolidated under a “lead protest” and that a draft decision letter had been prepared, but not finalized, and suggested that Jensen contact the Port of Detroit for a list of consolidated protests. Jensen expressed concern that Port of Detroit might not possess a complete list, as some protests had been filed in other ports. Receiving no response, Jensen filed suit in the Court of International Trade to preserve appeal rights. Customs subsequently stated, via email, that pursuant to 19 C.F.R. 177.7(b), it would not issue a ruling with respect to any issue pending before the Court of International Trade. Jensen then sought a writ of mandamus to compel Customs to rule on its protests. The Court of International Trade held that it lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i), reasoning that Jensen could seek accelerated disposition of its protests by Customs under 19 U.S.C. 1515(b) and contest any subsequent denial. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Norman G. Jensen, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Whiteman was employed by the FAA and reported violations of regulations, mismanagement, and abuses of authority. Whiteman alleged that colleagues and supervisors began to threaten and intimidate her. She filed EEO actions and reported one incident to police. She was excluded from the radar room and stripped of duties, then reassigned to the control tower instead of her previous job. In 2003, Whiteman settled with the FAA resolving all claims, “known or unknown” in exchange for guaranteed priority consideration for the next available supervisor position. December 9, 2003, Whiteman applied for a position. No other applicants were considered. December 18, 2003, the FAA adopted pay scale changes, which reduced the salary of the position. Whiteman accepted the position, but sued, alleging that the FAA’s delay in notifying her of the vacancy breached the settlement agreement and caused loss of earnings. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Whiteman appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board contending that the FAA had unlawfully retaliated against her for whistleblowing. The Board concluded that the claim was barred. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. The MSPB incorrectly concluded that Whiteman’s post-settlement retaliation claim was collaterally estopped, but its conclusion that the settlement agreement is enforceable is supported by substantial evidence. View "Whiteman v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Gallo served as an FAA air traffic control specialist from 1982 until 1995 when she experienced a job-related injury for which she received OWCP benefits. Gallo recovered enough to return to light duty. In 1996 she lost her medical certification to continue as an operational ATCS. Until 2000 she was assigned to a “non-operational” automation specialist position, which did not provide the same retirement credit or weekend pay. She received OWCP benefits for the differential. Gallo fully recovered in 2000 and received medical clearance; the Agency terminated OWCP benefit. She applied for restoration under 5 U.S.C. 8151(b)(2), which provides the right to priority consideration for restoration to federal employees who have overcome a compensable injury. The Agency assigned Gallo to a supervisory ATCS position. In setting her salary, the Agency did not take into account pay increases granted to operational ATCS employees during while Gallo was working as an automation specialist. The Merit Systems Protection Board denied her claim. The Federal Circuit reversed. The Board erred in interpreting “resumes employment with the Federal Government” under section 8151(a), and any pay increases that Gallo would have received based on her creditable service time with the federal government are “benefits based on length of service.” View "Gallo v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law