Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a physician, sought compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. 300aa-1 to -34, alleging that Hepatitis B vaccination caused her multiple sclerosis. The Special Master dismissed her petition as untimely. The Court of Federal Claims affirmed. The Federal Circuit held that, contrary to precedent, the Act's statute of limitations is not jurisdictional, and that some claims brought under the Act are subject to equitable tolling. The court rejected a discovery rule and concluded that plaintiff's claim did not meet equitable tolling criteria. The Sixth Circuit subsequently remanded for a determination of whether plaintiff should be awarded reason-able attorneys’ fees and costs. Although she did not ultimately prevail on the merits, her appeal prompted a change of law in a limited way that potentially opens the door to certain Vaccine Act petitioners who otherwise would have been precluded from seeking redress. View "Cloer v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Norris was an SEC trial attorney from 1992, until he was removed in 2009. He had twice previously been disciplined for exercising poor judgment and misuse of government email. The firing was based on emails expressing political views, demeaning support staff, and sending a confidential suspicious activity report to an appointed receiver in violation of SEC policies. Norris claimed that the 2008 emails were influenced by his wife becoming fully disabled, his daughter suffering from Asperger's Disorder, and his own adult AD/HD. The union submitted the removal to arbitration. During the hearing, the arbitrator received testimony that Norris had a confrontation with agency commissioners in 2007 and that he was barred from presenting cases to commissioners in the future; Norris denied the allegation. Norris testified that his personal circumstances had improved. The arbitrator affirmed the firing. The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that the arbitrator should have considered evidence of post-removal change in circumstances to determine whether the penalty was reasonable. The court cautioned the arbitrator not to consider information not included in the notice of removal the 2007 incident). View "Norris v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into a "Stipulation Agreement Regarding Damages," approved by the EEOC, to resolve her Title VII pregnancy discrimination claim against the U.S. Postal Service. She later filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging breached of that Agreement. The court held that it did not have jurisdiction because the Agreement was a consent decree, not a contract. In the federal system, when the United States is the defendant, whether the issue is enforcement of a court decree by the issuing forum or enforcement of a settlement contract in a separate suit determines which court can hear the case. The Federal Circuit reversed, stating that the "dispute is yet another example of the wastefulness of litigation over where to litigate." Consent decrees and settlement agreements are not necessarily mutually exclusive; a settlement agreement, even one embodied in a decree, is a contract within the meaning of the Tucker Act. View "VanDesande v. United States" on Justia Law

A civilian employee of the Department of Defense retired in 2007 then served as a re-employed annuitant for a two-year term ending January 3, 2009. Like many Department employees, he was subject to the National Security Personnel System, and eligible for performance-based bonuses and salary increases until the system was repealed in 2009. He qualified in 2008, but was ineligible for a salary increase because of his two-year contract; by regulation, the effective date of any salary increase would be the first day of the first pay period on or after January 1. The Department denied a bonus, arguing that the effective date was the same as the effective of a salary increase. The employee argued that the effective date should be either the end of the appraisal period (September 30, 2008) or the first day of the following year. In his class action under the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, the district court ruled in favor of the Department. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the court had jurisdiction under the Act and deferring to the agency's interpretation of its own regulation. View "Price v. Panetta" on Justia Law

From 2000 to 2008, plaintiff worked in a permanent position as an attorney in the Department of Homeland Security. She then spent about eight months in an excepted temporary appointment as an Immigration Judge. Upon the completion of a background investigation, she started a permanent excepted appointment as an Immigration Judge. About 17 months later, the DOJ terminated her appointment based on alleged misconduct. An ALJ dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. 7511(a)(1)(C)(ii). The Board denied review. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff did not meet the statutory definition of employee as one "who has completed 2 years of current continuous service in the same or similar positions in an Executive agency under other than a temporary appointment limited to 2 years or less." View "Roy v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd." on Justia Law

Olivia, born in 2000, apparently healthy, became ill after her first vaccinations. Her condition required extensive hospitalization; she still requires a ventilator and a wheelchair. Her parents filed a petition with the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. 300aa-1 to34. Olivia's injuries are not covered by a table of injuries presumed to be caused by vaccines, so the parents were required to show that one of the administered vaccines caused or significantly aggravated her condition. They submitted two reports by experts. The special master identified unanswered questions, but the parents took the position that it was unreasonable to require such detail at the pre-hearing stage. Based on failure to submit a supplemental report and failure to identify a clear theory of causation, the special master dismissed. The claims court affirmed. The Federal Circuit reversed. The special master did not appropriately review the evidence of causation under the summary judgment standard. View "Simanski v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned land in the Chaparral railroad corridor, converted for trail use by the ICC under the National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d) and filed a class action compensation claim against the government. After the government stipulated to takings liability on certain claims, the parties cooperated to determine compensation. The district court approved a settlement of $1,241,385.36, including pre-judgment interest. Plaintiffs sought attorneys' fees of $832,674 under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, 42 U.S.C. 4654(c) for 2,119.69 hours of work at market rates for the District of Columbia, where counsel practiced, rather than rates for the Texas forum where the case was filed. The district court determined that 18.2 hours were unreasonable, that the relevant market was the District of Columbia and calculated a lodestar figure of $826,044.19, but considering the results obtained, reduced by 50% and awarded $413,022.10. The Federal Circuit vacated. While a court may reduce the lodestar figure to account for the amount involved and results obtained, those factors should be considered in calculating the lodestar figure, rather after that calculation. The district court should have used forum rates in determining the reasonable hourly rate. View "Bywaters v. United States" on Justia Law

DIRECTV sold business segments. In 1997 it sold defense units to Raytheon, transferring $5,774,655,148 in pension assets and $3,310,028,559 in pension liabilities, a net transfer of $2,464,626,589 in surplus pension assets. In a 2000 sale of satellite business units to Boeing, DIRECTV transferred $1,843,930,981 in pension assets and $1,037,344,156 in liabilities, a net transfer of $806,586,825 in surplus assets. In both transactions, DIRECTV retained a small portion of surplus pension assets. The Government asserted noncompliance with Cost Accounting Standard 413.50(c)(12) (41 U.S.C. 422(f)(1)), which regulates assignment of actuarial gains and losses, valuation of assets of a pension fund, and allocation of pension costs to a contractor’s business segments, and demanded payments of $68,695,891 and of $12,197,704. The Court of Federal Claims granted DIRECTV summary judgment. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The claims court correctly determined that DIRECTV's segment closing obligations could be satisfied by cost savings realized by the Government in successor contracts. The court rejected arguments that the trial court erred by calculating segment closing adjustments based on assets and liabilities of the entire segment, rather than only assets and liabilities that DIRECTV retained and that the Federal Acquisition Regulation required DIRECTV itself to pay any amount due as a segment closing adjustment.View "DIRECTV Group, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2010, the court of claims awarded owners $3,043,051, plus interest, for the temporary taking of a blanket easement over five parcels in the Otay Mesa area of San Diego County, California, limiting the government's liability to the period April, 1999 to October, 2008. The taking was the result of Border Patrol activities outside the boundaries of an easement that had been purchased by the government for those purposes, and included creating new roads, constructing a permanent tented structure, and installing under-ground motion-detecting sensors. The Federal Circuit affirmed the limitation of liability to five parcels and the stated time period, but reversed the calculation of damages. The claims court erred in concluding that the taking was temporary rather than a permanent physical taking. The government stipulated that its easement was "perpetual" and has not removed its equipment. View "Otay Mesa Prop. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1983, Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 10101–10270, to provide for government collection and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The NWPA authorized the Department of Energy to contract for disposal. In return for payment of fees into the Nuclear Waste Fund, the Standard Contract provided that the DOE would begin to dispose of SNF and HLW not later than January 31, 1998. Because collection and disposal did not begin, courts held that the DOE had breached the Standard Contract with the nuclear energy industry. The trial court found breach of plaintiff's contract, but granted summary judgment in favor of the government regarding the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and set damages for the breach at $10,014,114 plus the cost of borrowed funds for financing construction of a dry fuel storage project. On reconsideration, the trial court reduced damages to $9,735,634 and denied the cost of borrowed funds. The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to borrowed fund, but and reversed denial of overhead costs. View "System Fuels, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law