Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, employed by the federal government for almost 30 years, appealed from termination of her position with the VA. During her last months on the job she suffered depression and high blood pressure. The parties entered into a settlement in which plaintiff agreed to withdraw her appeal and forego all claims against the VA. An ALJ dismissed the appeal as settled. The March 2009 decision became final in April 2009. In November 2009, plaintiff filed a new appeal, seeking reinstatement. The appeal was docketed as a petition to enforce the agreement, but without allegation of noncompliance. The ALJ dismissed. The Board, unable to determine whether plaintiff's filing was an untimely appeal of the March decision or any basis for appeal, affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff failed to show good cause for her untimely filing of the November 2009 appeal and the March 2009 decision implementing the agreement operated as a res judicata bar. View "Ford-Clifton v. Dep't of Veterans' Affairs" on Justia Law

The Information Security Management Act, 44 U.S.C. 3541–49, requires that federal agencies meet information security standards. Compliance is monitored by the Office of Management and Budget. The Department of Justice purchased a license for plaintiff’s compliance product. Plaintiff participated with DOJ in seeking designation as a "Center of Excellence." Without notifying plaintiff, DOJ developed an alternative product, accessing plaintiff's database to learn the system’s architecture. OMB selected DOJ as a Center of Excellence and required agencies to purchase from COEs. DOJ’s product substituted its alternative for plaintiff's software. Plaintiff filed, in district court, a Lanham Act claim; a common law unfair competition claim; and a breach of fiduciary duty claim. Months later, plaintiff filed, in the Court of Federal Claims, claims of: breach of oral or implied contract, breach of license agreement, and breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing. The district court dismissed all but the Lanham Act claim. The Claims Court dismissed all claims, applying 28 U.S.C. 1500, which precludes it from exercising jurisdiction over "any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff … has pending in any other court any suit … against the United States." The Federal Circuit reversed, in part, reasoning that the license agreement claim does not arise from substantially the same facts as the district court claim.

In 1996 petitioner, who had served in the Marine Corps from 1965 to 1968, filed a claim for compensation for post-traumatic stress disorder. The VA Regional Office granted the claim and assigned a disability rating of 30%, effective October 1996. Petitioner requested an increase in the percentage and made multiple submissions before 2000, when the Office increased the rating to 70%, effective July 1999. The Veterans Court affirmed as to the rating, but remanded with instructions for assigning an effective date. On remand, the Board found that a February 1998 submission met the requirements for an informal claim for TDIU and assigned an effective date of February 11, 1998 that was affirmed by the Veterans Court. The Federal Circuit vacated. To comply with the directive of 38 C.F.R. 3.156(b) that new and material evidence be treated as having been filed in connection with the pending claim, the VA must evaluate submissions received during the relevant period and determine whether they contain new evidence relevant to a pending claim, whether or not the relevant submission might otherwise support a new claim; the VA failed to make such a determination.

Plaintiff, a mail processing clerk, was injured on-duty in 2005 and received workers' compensation. She partially recovered and, in 2008, the Postal Service provided a modified light duty assignment. In June 2010, pursuant to the National Reassessment Process, the Postal Service informed plaintiff that work within her medical restrictions was no longer available in her commuting area. The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed her claim under 5 C.F.R. 353.304(c)) of wrongful denial of restoration following partial recovery from a compensable injury. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Board applied the correct standard in determining its jurisdiction, and its factual determinations were supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff did not identify any vacant position available within her commuting area that she was able to perform. Plaintiff did not make a non-frivolous allegation that the Service acted arbitrarily in not restoring her, even after the Board ordered her make such a showing and afforded her time to do so.

In 2006, plaintiff, employed as an auditor at the Department of Defense was removed from his position for failing to maintain his Secret level security clearance. His loss of security clearance was based on his wife's status as a diplomat for Honduras. The Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The DoD complied with its internal procedures in revoking plaintiff's security clearance and the decision was supported by substantial evidence.

Plaintiff, which owned a nuclear power plant, entered into the standard U.S. Department of Energy contract, under which DOE agreed to collect spent nuclear fuel (SNF) no later than 1998. DOE never began collecting SNF and has breached contracts nationwide. Massachusetts restructured the electric utility industry and, in 1999, the plant sold for $80 million; buyer agreed to accept decommissioning responsibilities for $428 million. The district court awarded $40 million for the portion of the decommissioning fund corresponding to projected post-decommissioning SNF-related costs attributable to DOE’s continuing breach. The court awarded the buyer $4 million in mitigation damages, including direct and overhead costs for new spent fuel racks and fees paid to the NRC. The Federal Circuit reversed in part and remanded. Plaintiff cannot recover damages under a diminution-of-value theory in a partial breach setting. The sale of assets does not alter the principle that when the breaching party has not repudiated and is still expected to perform, anticipated damages are not recoverable until incurred. A non-breaching party may recover from the government indirect overhead costs associated with mitigation and the costs of financing those activities.

The Court of Federal Claims dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, the most recent claims brought by the Samish Indian Nation in its continuing quest for federal recognition and benefits. The claims court reasoned that some of the allegations were not premised upon any statute that was money-mandating, and that allegations reliant on money-mandating statutes were limited by other statutes, so that they fell outside the scope of the Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. 1491(a)) and the Indian Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. 1505). The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to some of the allegations because the Tribal Priority Allocation system (25 CFR 46.2) is not money-mandating. The court reversed dismissal of claims under the Revenue Sharing Act, reasoning that the court's ability to provide a monetary remedy under that law is not limited by operation of the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. 1341.

Petitioner married in 2001. Her husband had retired unmarried under the Civil Service Retirement System and elected to receive an annuity payable during his lifetime with no survivor benefits. He died in 2003, and petitioner's application for survivor annuity benefits was denied. After considering evidence about a conversation that husband purportedly had with one of its employees, the Office of Personnel Management affirmed, stating that husband could have elected to receive a reduced lifetime annuity with survivor benefits for a new wife only by notifying OPM of his intentions in a signed writing within two years of his marriage, 5 U.S.C. 8339(k)(2)(A). An administrative judge upheld the decision, stating that the decision would become final on June 21, 2004, unless a petition for review was filed. Petitioner did not file until 2010, claiming disability made her unable to attend to the matter. The Board denied her petition for review as untimely filed, finding no credible medical evidence regarding her condition. The Federal Circuit affirmed.

The class action alleged that National Guard members were required to take correspondence courses to keep positions or advance in rank and sought compensation for time spent on the courses. At the time, 37 U.S.C. 206 provided for compensation for: "equivalent training, instruction, duty, or appropriate duties, as the Secretary may prescribe . . . . This section does not authorize compensation for work or study performed by a member of a reserve component in connection with correspondence courses of an armed force." The Federal Circuit reversed dismissal. Meanwhile, Congress amended 37 U.S.C. 206(d), retroactively clarifying that National Guard members would not be compensated for correspondence courses. Plaintiffs amended their complaint to add a claim that retroactive application of these amendments amounted to taking of vested rights. The district court granted the government summary judgment. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The earlier remand was not a holding that plaintiffs were entitled to compensation. The trial court had authority to consider and acted within its discretion in finding that none of the plaintiffs received written orders or authorizations from state commanders in connection with correspondence courses, so none were placed in a duty status necessary for federal payment.

Plaintiffs, California grape growers who purchased grapevines covered by the USDA's patents, brought this action to challenge the validity and enforceability of the USDA's patents on three varieties of grapes, as well as the conduct of the California Table Grape Commission (Commission) and the USDA in licensing and enforcing the patents. The court held that the district court correctly held that the USDA was a necessary party to plaintiffs' declaratory judgement claims based on the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. 1 et seq. The court also held that the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., was broad enough to allow plaintiffs to pursue equitable relief against the USDA on its patent law claims. The court further held that plaintiffs' claims were sufficient to overcome any presumption of regularity that could apply to a certain USDA employee who was one of the co-inventors of each of the three varieties of grapes. The court finally held that because plaintiffs failed to point to anything other than the issuance of a patent for the Sweet Scarlet grapes that would provide a plausible basis for finding that Sweet Scarlet grapes form a relevant antitrust market, the court upheld the district court's decision dismissing plaintiffs' antitrust claim.