Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves an appeal by Marmen Inc., Marmen Énergie Inc., Marmen Energy Co., the Government of Québec, and the Government of Canada against a decision by the U.S. Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce had imposed countervailing duties on imports of certain utility scale wind towers from Canada, arguing that the Canadian government had provided illegal subsidies to the producers and exporters of these towers.The case was initially reviewed by the United States Court of International Trade, which upheld the Department of Commerce's decision. The appellants then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The appellants argued that the Department of Commerce had erred in its assessment of three government programs and its computation of the sales denominator used to calculate the subsidy rate. They contended that the subsidy rate should have been de minimis, meaning it was too trivial or minor to merit consideration.The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the U.S. Court of International Trade, ruling that the Department of Commerce's determination was supported by substantial evidence and was in accordance with the law. The court rejected the appellants' arguments, finding that the Department of Commerce had reasonably determined that the auditor's adjustment was unreliable, and that the three subsidy programs at issue did provide countervailable subsidies. View "GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US " on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. Deborah A. Perlick, who was employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) as a Research Health Science Specialist. During her tenure, she discovered approximately $78,000 missing from a study's funding and reported this to VA officials. Subsequently, she was terminated from her position. Perlick filed a complaint under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), and the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board) granted her request for corrective action, awarding her back pay through March 31, 2020. However, Perlick also sought consequential and compensatory damages, including future lost earnings, which the Board denied.The Board found that Perlick had established her claim of protected whistleblowing disclosures. However, it denied her request for consequential damages, stating that such damages are limited to out-of-pocket costs and do not include non-pecuniary damages. The Board also denied Perlick's request for future lost earnings, arguing that she had no guarantees of future employment beyond the completion date of her final project with the VA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the Board's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that future lost earnings are recoverable as compensatory damages under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012. The court found that the Board erred by improperly raising the burden for Perlick to establish these damages, requiring her to "guarantee" future employment to recover future lost earnings. The court instructed the Board to determine under the preponderance of the evidence standard whether Perlick met her burden to prove entitlement to pecuniary compensatory damages in the form of future lost earnings. View "PERLICK v. DVA " on Justia Law

Percipient.ai, Inc., a company that offers a commercial computer vision (CV) platform, appealed a decision by the United States Court of Federal Claims that dismissed its case against the United States and CACI, Inc.-Federal. The case centered on the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's (NGA) procurement process for its SAFFIRE project, which aimed to improve its processes for obtaining and storing visual intelligence data. Percipient alleged that NGA and its contractor, CACI, violated the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA) and other procurement-related statutes by not considering its commercial CV platform, Mirage, for the project.The Court of Federal Claims had dismissed Percipient's case, ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the FASA task order bar, which limits protests related to the issuance of task orders. The court also rejected Percipient's arguments related to the Tucker Act, standing, and timeliness.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. It held that the FASA task order bar did not apply because Percipient's protest was not connected to the issuance of a task order. The court also found that Percipient's protest fell within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act, as it alleged a violation of procurement-related statutes. The court further held that Percipient had standing to bring the case and that its claims were timely. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "PERCIPIENT.AI, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

Louis Frantzis, a U.S. Army veteran, appealed a decision by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) that denied his claim for an increased disability rating for his service-connected headaches. The Board's decision was made by a member who did not conduct the hearing, which Frantzis argued was a violation of 38 U.S.C. § 7102. He contended that the same Board member who conducts a hearing should also issue the resulting decision. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) affirmed the Board's decision, concluding that the Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017 (AMA) does not require the Board member conducting the hearing to also decide the appeal.The Veterans Court's decision was based on the removal of pre-AMA language in 38 U.S.C. § 7107(c) that required the same judge conducting the hearing to issue a final determination. The court also rejected the argument that 38 U.S.C. § 7102 supports the same judge requirement because its language did not change with the enactment of the AMA. The court declined to consider the fair process doctrine because Mr. Frantzis did not raise the argument himself.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court's decision. The court agreed with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs that the AMA eliminated the same judge requirement because it removed the language expressly requiring the same judge for the hearing and final determination. The court also disagreed with Mr. Frantzis' argument that 38 U.S.C. § 7102 supplies a same Board member requirement, stating that the unchanged language of § 7102 cannot be the basis for the same member requirement in the AMA system. The court concluded that the statutory scheme and its history are clear—the same judge is not required to both conduct the hearing and author the final determination under the AMA. View "FRANTZIS v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Ulrich Speck and Bruno Scheller (collectively, “Speck”) and Brian L. Bates, Anthony O. Ragheb, Joseph M. Stewart IV, William J. Bourdeau, Brian D. Choules, James D. Purdy, and Neal E. Fearnot (collectively, “Bates”) over the priority of a patent related to a drug-coated balloon catheter. The Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) Patent Trial and Appeals Board (“Board”) had previously awarded priority to Bates. Speck had argued that the claims of Bates' patent application were time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 135(b)(1) and invalid for lack of written description. The Board denied these motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the Board erred in finding that Bates' patent application was not time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 135(b)(1). The court applied a two-way test to determine if pre-critical date claims and post-critical date claims were materially different. The court found that the post-critical date claims were materially different from the pre-critical date claims, making the patent application time-barred. The court reversed the Board's decision, vacated its order canceling the claims of Speck's patent and entering judgment on priority against Speck, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "SPECK v. BATES " on Justia Law

The case involves Mark W. Smith, a U.S. Navy veteran, who appealed a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. Smith had initially filed a claim for service connection for deep vein thrombosis (DVT) after his discharge from the Navy in 1991. However, his request was denied by the Regional Office of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in 1992, and this denial was affirmed by the Board of Veterans Appeals in 1996. Smith did not appeal this decision, and it became final.In 2012, Smith filed a new claim for service connection for DVT, which was granted by the VA in 2013. In 2016, Smith filed a motion to revise the 1996 Board Decision, alleging that it was tainted by clear and unmistakable error (CUE). He argued that there was sufficient evidence in 1996 to show he had DVT, and thus his claim should have been allowed to proceed with the VA's duty to assist. However, the Board denied his motion, and this denial was affirmed by the Veterans Court.The case was then brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Smith argued that the Veterans Court had erred in its interpretation of the CUE standard in 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403, claiming that the court had incorrectly limited CUE-eligible errors to those that would have led to a grant of service connection. However, the Federal Circuit Court disagreed with Smith's interpretation and affirmed the decision of the Veterans Court. The court held that a revision or reversal based on CUE requires an error that, once corrected, alters the merits outcome of a veteran’s claim with absolute clarity. View "SMITH v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

The case revolves around a group of Texans who were receiving Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) until the Texas governor informed the Department of Labor that Texas would withdraw from its agreement with the Secretary of Labor to participate in the PUA program. The plaintiffs argued that the Federal Government violated the mandate in PUA that the Secretary of Labor “shall provide . . . assistance” to “any covered individual.”The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed the case, agreeing with the magistrate judge's recommendation. The judge reasoned that the CARES Act, which established the PUA, required the existence of an agreement with a state for the payment of benefits. The judge also noted that the Act did not provide a mechanism for the Secretary to pay out benefits in the absence of an agreement with the relevant state. The judge concluded that Congress intended for the funds to be administered solely by the states.The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, stating that the PUA does not require the Secretary to pay PUA benefits to individual citizens; rather, the Secretary must provide assistance through agreements with the states. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Little Tucker Act. View "CREAGER IRELAND v. US " on Justia Law

The case involves Daniel D. Barry, a veteran who appealed a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. Barry had argued that the Board of Veterans’ Appeals should have considered his entitlement to multiple special monthly compensation (SMC) increases, rather than just one, under 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(f)(3). The Veterans Court disagreed, interpreting § 3.350(f)(3) to permit only one SMC increase, regardless of how many qualifying disabilities Barry could demonstrate.The Veterans Court had previously remanded the case for further explanation and consideration of potential additional SMC entitlement. The Board then concluded that Barry could not show entitlement to an additional SMC increase under 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(f)(4). Barry appealed this decision to the Veterans Court, arguing that the Board erred by not considering whether he would be entitled to an additional SMC increase under 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(f)(3).The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the Veterans Court. The court held that § 3.350(f)(3) does not limit how many SMC increases can be provided; instead, it is a mandatory entitlement that can apply multiple times, subject to a statutory cap. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, including the calculation of the number of intermediate-rate SMC increases Barry should receive. View "BARRY v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal by Wheatland Tube Company against a decision by the U.S. Court of International Trade, which affirmed the U.S. Department of Commerce’s remand determination concerning the scope of an antidumping duty order on certain steel pipes imported from Thailand. The dispute centers on whether certain imports of steel pipes, specifically those that are "dual-stenciled" as both standard pipes and line pipes, fall within the scope of the existing antidumping duty order.The U.S. Court of International Trade initially found that the Department of Commerce unlawfully expanded the scope of the antidumping duty order by determining that it covered dual-stenciled pipes. On remand, the Department of Commerce, under protest, concluded that the antidumping duty order did not cover dual-stenciled pipes. The U.S. Court of International Trade sustained this determination.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of International Trade. The Court of Appeals held that the Department of Commerce’s initial determination that dual-stenciled pipes fall within the scope of the antidumping duty order was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeals found that the lower court's interpretation lacked support in the record and failed to give sufficient deference to the Department of Commerce under the substantial evidence standard of review. View "SAHA THAI STEEL PIPE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED v. US " on Justia Law

The case revolves around Jay Anthony Dobyns, a former agent with the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), who sued the United States for failing to adequately protect him and his family from threats related to his undercover work. The government counterclaimed, alleging that Dobyns violated his employment contract and several federal regulations by publishing a book based on his experience as an agent and by contracting his story to create a motion picture. The Court of Federal Claims found that the government had not breached the settlement agreement but had breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, awarding Dobyns emotional distress damages. The court also found that the government was not entitled to relief on its counterclaim.The government appealed the Claims Court’s judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reversed the finding that the government breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Dobyns, having prevailed on the government’s counterclaim, sought attorneys’ fees and costs. However, the Claims Court denied his application for attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) as untimely. Dobyns appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the Claims Court had abused its discretion and applied the incorrect legal standard. The Appeals Court held that the filing deadline for fee applications under EAJA is subject to equitable tolling. It found that Dobyns had justifiably relied on the government's representations about the procedure for Claims Court judgments, and thus his motion for attorneys’ fees under EAJA should be accepted as timely. The court reversed the Claims Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Dobyns v. United States" on Justia Law