Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Vincent Curtis Conyers, an army veteran, sought employment benefits under the Veteran Readiness and Employment program, which is administered by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs. His application was denied by the VA, and this denial was subsequently upheld by the Board of Veterans' Appeals and the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. During his appeal, Mr. Conyers requested that certain documents be added to the administrative record under the doctrine of constructive possession. The Veterans Court denied his request, reasoning that the documents did not have a "direct relationship" to his claim, a standard of review that the court derived from a previous decision in Euzebio v. Wilkie.However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the Veterans Court applied an erroneous legal standard in its review of the doctrine of constructive possession. The Federal Circuit stated that the correct standard for constructive possession is one of "relevance and reasonableness," not the "direct relationship" standard applied by the Veterans Court. The Federal Circuit noted that its standard aligns with the VA's statutory duty to assist veterans in substantiating their claims and ensures that all record documents reasonably expected to be part of a veteran’s claim are included in the administrative record. Therefore, the court vacated the decision of the Veterans Court and remanded it for further proceedings, with the instruction to apply the correct standard of "relevance and reasonableness" in its review of the doctrine of constructive possession. View "CONYERS v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Jason Lambro, worked as a studio technician for the Voice of America (VOA), a federal agency, under a series of contracts. Lambro alleged that he should have been classified as an employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and thus entitled to benefits such as overtime pay. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the FLSA itself, through its definitional provisions, provides the applicable standard for recognizing an employment relationship for FLSA purposes. Therefore, the court had to evaluate whether Lambro was employed by VOA under the FLSA's own standard for being employed. The court rejected the lower court's conclusion that the FLSA does not cover a person asserting coverage as a federal government employee unless a congressional authorization outside the FLSA creates the asserted employment relationship with the federal government. The court vacated the lower court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lambro v. United States" on Justia Law

Crispin Torres, a former employee of the Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), appealed an arbitration decision which upheld his removal from the agency for unauthorized travel and falsification of certified records. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the arbitrator did not provide substantial evidence for concluding that two key factors, consistency of penalty with similar offenses (Douglas factor 6) and potential for rehabilitation (Douglas factor 10), weighed in favor of Mr. Torres' removal. The court found that the arbitrator failed to fully consider comparator cases where similar misconduct by other ICE law enforcement officers resulted in suspension rather than removal, and did not adequately explain why Mr. Torres had no potential for rehabilitation. The court vacated the arbitrator's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "TORRES v. DHS " on Justia Law

The case involves ParkerVision, Inc. appealing a decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) that invalidated one of its patents, U.S. Patent No. 7,110,444 ('444 patent), owned by ParkerVision, Inc., which relates to wireless local area networks (WLANs) that use frequency translation technology. The Board determined that claim 3 of the patent is unpatentable as obvious in light of prior art. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's decision. The court found that the Board correctly construed the term “storage element” and did not procedurally err in how it treated certain arguments raised by the parties. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the Board's finding that the patent claim was obvious in light of prior art. The court found no violation of ParkerVision's procedural rights under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and no abuse of the Board's discretion in excluding parts of ParkerVision’s sur-reply. View "PARKERVISION, INC. v. VIDAL " on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was asked to review a decision by the United States Court of International Trade. The dispute arose from an anti-dumping investigation conducted by the Department of Commerce into the sale of certain welded carbon steel pipes from Thailand, specifically those sold by Saha Thai Steel Pipe Public Company Limited and Thai Premium Pipe Company Ltd.The Department of Commerce initially found that the costs of producing these pipes were distorted by a "particular market situation" (PMS) in Thailand that affected the cost of hot rolled steel coil, a crucial component in the production of these pipes. As a result, the Department made upward adjustments to the production costs of these companies when calculating the anti-dumping margins, which impacted the duty rates assigned to each company. This decision was challenged in the Court of International Trade, which found that the Department had overstepped its statutory authority.The Court of International Trade ruled, based on the precedent set in Hyundai Steel Co. v. United States, that the Department of Commerce was not allowed to make a PMS adjustment to the cost of production when determining anti-dumping margins. The court remanded the case to the Department to recalculate the dumping margins without the PMS adjustment.The case was subsequently appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The appellant, Wheatland Tube Company, argued that this case could be distinguished from Hyundai Steel because the Department had relied on a subsection of the statute to adjust the cost of production upward to account for a PMS by framing it as a constructed value calculation. The Court of Appeals disagreed, affirming the lower court's decision and holding that the statute does not authorize PMS adjustments to cost of production calculations, regardless of how the Department attempted to frame it. View "SAHA THAI STEEL PIPE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED v. US " on Justia Law

In 2018, Presidential Proclamation 9693 imposed duties on imports of solar panels, starting at 30% and scheduled to decrease each year to 25%, 20%, and in the final year, 15%. Importers of bifacial solar modules, consisting of cells that convert sunlight into electricity on both the front and back of the cells, petitioned the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), asking that bifacial solar panels not be subjected to the duties. Ultimately, bifacial solar panels were excluded from the duties. In October 2020, Presidential Proclamation 10101, “modified” Proclamation 9693 to withdraw the exclusion of bifacial solar panels from the scheduled duties, and to increase the fourth-year duty rate to 18%. IImporters of bifacial solar panels sued, alleging that the statute authorizing the President to “modify” Proclamation 9693 only allowed him to make previously adopted safeguard measures more trade-liberalizing while eliminating the exclusion of bifacial panels and raising the fourth-year duty were trade-restrictive. They further argued that even if the President had the authority to “modify” safeguards in a trade-restrictive direction, he failed to follow appropriate procedures.The Trade Court agreed that the authority to “modify” a safeguard is limited to trade-liberalizing changes but rejected the procedural challenges under the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. 2251. The Federal Circuit reversed. The President’s interpretation of the statute, which allows him to “modify” an existing safeguard in a trade-restricting direction, is not unreasonable. In adopting Proclamation 10101, the President committed no significant procedural violation. View "Solar Energy Industries Association v. United States" on Justia Law

Williams was a Beaumont, Texas federal corrections officer beginning March 4, 2018. In 2016, Williams met Hayes. The two were engaged and had a child in September 2018. Hayes had been in Bureau of Prisons (BOP) custody from 2005-2013, including at FCC-Beaumont. He was on supervised release until July 15, 2018. Williams knew Hayes had been incarcerated but was unaware he had been in federal custody. In May 2019, after learning of the relationship, BOP placed Williams on administrative reassignment. Under the Standards of Employee Conduct, employees may not “become emotionally, physically, sexually, or financially involved with inmates, [or] former inmates.” If employees engage in improper contact, they must report the contact. A “former inmate” is an inmate for whom less than one year has elapsed since release from BOP custody or federal court supervision. Hayes met this definition until July 15, 2019. Williams learned, on June 3, 2019, that Hayes had been incarcerated in federal prison. She reported her relationship the next day. BOP issued a notice of proposed removal. The warden sustained the charges and removed Williams.An arbitrator sustained the charge of improper contact but did not sustain the charge of failure to report and upheld the removal, finding that the warden considered the relevant "Douglas" factors and exercised his discretion “within tolerable limits of reasonableness.” The Federal Circuit vacated. The arbitrator failed to independently analyze the appropriateness of alternative sanctions and accepted for sanctions purposes the warden’s fact findings which the arbitrator had rejected. View "Williams v. Bureau of Prisons" on Justia Law

The VA’s Schedule for Rating Disabilities includes diagnostic codes (DCs), each with a corresponding disability rating, 38 U.S.C. 1155. A particular veteran’s disability may not clearly fall under a delineated DC. VA regulations provide: When an unlisted condition is encountered it will be permissible to rate under a closely related disease or injury in which not only the functions affected but the anatomical localization and symptomatology are closely analogous. The VA considers the functions affected by ailments, the anatomical localization of the ailments, and the symptomatology of the ailments.Webb served in the Army, from 1968-1970, receiving an honorable discharge. Webb later developed service-connected prostate cancer, the treatment for which caused him to develop erectile dysfunction (ED). In 2015, Webb was assigned a non-compensable (zero percent) rating for his ED. The Schedule did not then include a diagnostic code for ED. The VA rated Webb’s disability by analogy to DC 7522, which provides a 20 percent disability rating for “[p]enis, deformity, with loss of erectile power.” The Board explained that DC 7522 required Webb to show “deformity of the penis with loss of erectile power.” Without such a deformity, he was not entitled to a compensable disability rating. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated. The listed disease or injury to which a veteran’s unlisted condition is being rated by analogy must be only “closely related,” not identical. View "Webb v. McDonough" on Justia Law

The Department of Transportation’s Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) contracted with Eagle for construction work in Yellowstone National Park, to be completed by October 2018. The contract required Eagle to submit a schedule detailing how it would complete the project on time. By late January 2017, FHWA had rejected Eagle’s eight formal schedule submissions as not complying with the contract. In February 2017, the contracting officer terminated the contract for default, concluding that Eagle was insufficiently likely to complete the project on time.Eagle challenged the termination for default under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA), 41 U.S.C. 7101–7109, before the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals, which ruled that the termination for default was improper. The Board converted the termination to one for the convenience of the government, relying heavily, though not exclusively, on its view of deficiencies in the contracting officer’s reasoning, rather than on de novo findings about whether the record developed before the Board showed that standard for termination for default was met. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for the Board to adjudicate the case de novo. The Board’s evaluation of the contracting officer’s reasoning exceeded the limited scope of the threshold inquiry. The Board also failed to separate that threshold analysis from its de novo evaluation of the evidence. View "Department of Transportation v. Eagle Peak Rock & Paving, Inc." on Justia Law

Wilmington charges its residential and non-residential property owners a stormwater management fee, based on an estimation of each property’s contribution to stormwater runoff. Because a precise measure of the actual amount of stormwater pollution from each property is impossible, the city devised a methodology for approximating the runoff attributable to each property based on recommendations from an engineering firm. For non-residential properties, the city assesses the fee based on a formula comprised of four variables. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) owns five properties in Wilmington, comprising 270 acres, classified as vacant, and used to store dredged material. USACE disputed whether the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1323, waived its sovereign immunity with respect to this fee.The Federal Circuit affirmed a Claims Court holding that the fees are not reasonable service charges, allowable under the CWA. Wilmington did not explain how the vacant land use code corresponded to the runoff coefficients nor whether its stormwater class fairly captured variability in vacant parcels, given that only one parcel contains any paved surface. Wilmington’s methodology, as applied, led to charges that are not a fair approximation of the properties’ proportionate contribution to stormwater pollution. View "City of Wilmington, Delaware v. United States" on Justia Law