Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Moore is a male Examination Manager at the SEC's Washington, D.C. headquarters. Two women Examination Managers in that office perform the same work as Moore under similar working conditions. In 2014, the SEC initiated a Pay Transition Program to recalibrate its employees’ pay so that they could receive credit for years of relevant work experience regardless of their SEC hire date. The Program was open to all SEC employees from September 14-October 14, 2014. The women applied for the Program during this open period. Moore did not, due to family-related issues occupying his attention. The SEC permitted 10 other employees with extenuating circumstances to apply for the Program in November-December 2014. Program pay adjustments began taking effect around June 2015; the women’s salaries were increased. In August-September 2016, Moore unsuccessfully tried to apply for the Program.Moore's Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d), lawsuit argues that the SEC lacks justification for any Program-related pay differential between him and the women because the application process was unnecessary, given that the SEC always had the necessary information in its records and the SEC had no valid basis for creating, or not extending, an application deadline. The Federal Circuit vacated the dismissal of Moore’s complaint, first overruling its own 2009 decision, Yant, which added an element to the prima facie case–a showing that the pay differential “is either historically or presently based on sex.” The court remanded for consideration on non-Yant grounds. View "Moore v. United States" on Justia Law

The Department of Commerce initiated a countervailing duty investigation concerning imports of softwood lumber products from Canada and individually investigated five groups of companies that produced and/or exported covered products. Commerce issued a final determination, imposing duties on the products of those companies at company-specific rates ranging from 3.34% to 18.19%, with an “all-others” rate, 14.19%. Within days of publication of the countervailing duty (CVD) order in January 2018, about 36 Canadian companies that alleged they were subject to the all-others rate requested “expedited review” to give them individually determined rates. Commerce initiated that review and ultimately awarded the individual requesters reduced or de minimis CVD rates.A domestic trade group filed suit, arguing that Commerce lacked statutory authority to create the expedited-review process. Canadian parties intervened and, with the United States, asserted that Commerce had the authority to adopt the expedited-review procedures of 19 C.F.R. 351.214(k) to give exporters a chance to secure individual rates shortly after the publication of a CVD order, arguing for the existence of such authority chiefly in provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). The Trade Court ruled against Commerce. The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that the Secretary had statutory authority to adopt the expedited-review process as a procedure for implementing statutory provisions that authorize individualized determinations in CVD proceedings, 19 U.S.C. 1667f1(e), 1677m, 3513(a)(2). View "Committee Overseeing Action for Lumber International Trade Investigations or Negotiations v. United States" on Justia Law

Rueter worked for NOAA under his supervisor, Dr. Bolden. In November 2014, two female employees of agency contractors informed Bolden of incidents that had occurred at a Halloween costume party and the following morning, when Rueter engaged in inappropriate conduct directed at them. In June 2015, Rueter loudly yelled disrespectful accusations at Bolden in her office. In November 2016, Rueter’s second-level supervisor issued a letter to Rueter proposing that he be removed from his position for misconduct. Rueter filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). The agency stayed the removal action for several months at OSC’s request. In September 2017, Rueter’s third-level supervisor rescinded the first proposed removal letter and issued a second notice of proposed removal, which charged conduct unbecoming a federal employee and disrespectful conduct toward a supervisor, explaining in detail the specifications supporting each charge.Rueter, claiming that his removal was retaliation for his complaints against Bolden, unsuccessfully appealed his subsequent removal to the Merit Systems Protection Board. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting Rueter’s claims that three internal, ex parte emails deprived him of due process, that the Board improperly denied his request to have certain testimony at the removal hearing, and that he was improperly denied in camera inspection of certain documents. The emails did not provide new and material evidence nor apply undue pressure on the deciding official to remove Rueter. View "Rueter v. United States Department of Commerce" on Justia Law

Military-Veterans Advocacy (MVA) filed suit under 38 U.S.C. 502, seeking review and revision of certain instructions and practices set forth in the Veterans Affairs Adjudication Procedures Manual (M21-1 Manual), which provides guidance and instructions to the administrators of veterans’ benefits and claims, by interpreting and coordinating the application of statutes, regulations, policies, and judicial decisions. The M21-1 Manual “limits VA staff discretion, and, as a practical matter, impacts veteran benefits eligibility for an entire class of veterans.”The Federal Circuit dismissed challenges to presumptions and procedures concerning Vietnam-era exposure to the Agent Orange defoliant. MVA waived its challenge to the “Thailand Rules.” The VA’s interpretation of the “Blue Water Navy Rule” of 2019 did not unduly narrow the presumption of exposure and service connection as applied to shipboard service. MVA’s challenge to the “Airspace Rule” is barred by the six-year limit provided in section 2401(a) because the rule has been in full force and effect since 1993. Even if the time bar did not apply, Congress has consistently preserved the high-altitude exception to the presumption of exposure since its adoption in 1993. View "Military-Veterans Advocacy Inc. v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Apple and four other companies, have repeatedly been sued for patent infringement and thereafter petitioned the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to institute inter partes reviews (IPRs), under 35 U.S.C. 311–319, with unpatentability challenges to patent claims that were asserted against them in court. They sued the PTO under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701– 706, challenging instructions issued to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board concerning how to exercise, under delegation by the Director, the Director’s discretion whether to institute a requested IPR. Plaintiffs assert that the instructions are likely to produce too many denials.The district court dismissed the APA action, finding that the Director’s instructions were made unreviewable by 35 U.S.C. 314(d): “The determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under [section 314] shall be final and nonappealable.” The Federal Circuit affirmed the unreviewability dismissal of plaintiffs’ challenges to the instructions as being contrary to the statute and arbitrary and capricious. No constitutional challenges are presented. The court reversed the unreviewability dismissal of the challenge to the instructions as having been improperly issued because they had to be, but were not, promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. 553. Apple had standing to present that challenge. View "Apple Inc. v. Vidal" on Justia Law

Kluge, an Army Reserve commissioned officer and a civilian employee of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), was ordered under 10 U.S.C. 12301(d) to report to active duty in support of a contingency operation, Operation Enduring Freedom. He was absent from his DHS job from January 15 to July 30, 2011. For the first few weeks, Kluge was on paid military leave; from February 27 until July 30, DHS did not pay him except for the July 4 holiday. Kluge sought to recover differential pay under 5 U.S.C. 5538 for himself and similarly situated service members employed by the federal government, naming the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) as the respondent.An administrative judge denied class certification and substituted DHS for OPM. DHS and Kluge stipulated that he was eligible for differential pay. The AJ determined that DHS owed Kluge $274.37 plus interest. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The court upheld a finding that putative class members lack commonality or that identifying class members and adjudicating their claims as a class would not be fairer or more efficient. There was no legal error or abuse of discretion in the substitution of DHS for OPM. Kluge failed to show any error in calculating the differential pay. View "Kluge v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ARRA) to stabilize the U.S. economy following the 2008 financial crisis, 123 Stat. 115, creating two types of government-subsidized Build America Bonds (BABs). “Direct Payment BABs,” entitled bond issuers to a tax refund from the Treasury Department equal to 35 percent of the interest paid on their BABs. Treasury pays issuers of BABs annually. The payments are funded by the permanent, indefinite appropriation for refunds of internal revenue collections. 31 U.S.C. 1324. Local power agencies (Appellants) collectively issued over four billion dollars in qualifying Direct Payment BABs before 2011. Through 2012, Treasury paid the full 35 percent.In 2011 and 2013, Congress passed legislation reviving sequestration: “[T]he cancellation of budgetary resources provided by discretionary appropriations or direct spending law,” 2 U.S.C. 900(c)(2), 901(a). Treasury stopped making payments to Appellants at 35 percent. Since 2013, Appellants have been paid reduced rates as determined by the Office of Management and Budget’s calculations; for example, 2013 payments were reduced to 8.7 percent.Appellants sued, arguing a statutory theory that the government violates ARRA section 1531 by not making the full 35 percent payments and that the government breached a contract that arises out of section 1531. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s dismissal of the suit. No statutory claim existed because sequestration applied to these payments. No contractual claim existed because the ARRA did not create a contract between the government and Appellants. View "Indiana Municipal Power Agency v. United States" on Justia Law

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM), promulgated regulations (5 U.S.C. 5545(d) and 5343(c)(4)), to provide hazardous duty and environmental differential pay to federal employees. Current and former employees of the Federal Bureau of Prisons filed suit, alleging that they were entitled to hazardous duty and environmental differential pay due to their “work [with] or in close proximity to objects, surfaces, and/or individuals infected with COVID-19 without sufficient protective devices.”The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s dismissal of their claims for hazardous duty and environmental differential pay (plus related overtime, interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs). For the plaintiffs to prevail, it is not enough that COVID-19 can readily be characterized as “unusual”—one of the requirements of the statutory provisions; their case depends on whether their allegations come within OPM’s existing regulations, which are not challenged and which delimit particular situations in which federal employees are entitled to hazardous duty and environmental differential payments. OPM has not addressed contagious-disease transmission outside certain situations within laboratories and jungle-work situations. Although OPM might be able to provide for differential pay based on COVID-19 in various workplace settings, it has not to date adopted regulations that do so. View "Adams v. United States" on Justia Law

The 1976 Magnuson–Stevens Act contemplated “[a] national program for the conservation and management of the fishery resources of the United States,” 16 U.S.C. 1801(a)(6), and established the United States 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). A 2007 amendment established national criteria for quota-based fishing programs, (limited access privilege programs) and authorized the quota-based fishing permits and licenses at issue in this Fifth Amendment takings claim, in which fishing businesses challenged four different permitting, licensing, and endorsement requirementsThe Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit for lack of a cognizable property interest in the fishing endorsements, licenses, and permits, separate from or appurtenant to their fishing vessels. Precedent establishes that fishing permits and licenses issued under the Act are revocable privileges, not compensable property interests. The Magnuson–Stevens Act refers to “congressional intent not to confer any right, title, or interest, and to preserve the government’s authority to revoke privileges enjoyed in” fishing licenses and permits. The National Marine Fisheries Service’s regulations did not create compensable property rights in permits or licenses. licenses; permits did not have the essential characteristics of compensable property—transferability and the right to exclude others. There is no inherent right in vessel ownership to fish within the EEZ. View "Fishermen's Finest, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2018, under the Trade Expansion Act, 19 U.S.C. 1862, the Secretary of Commerce reported to the President that steel imports threatened national security by contributing to unsustainably low use of domestic steel-producing capacity. The President, agreeing with the finding, issued Proclamation 9705, imposing higher tariffs on steel imports from certain countries but providing for monitoring and future adjustments. In 2020, the President issued Proclamation 9980, which, based on the required monitoring, raised tariffs on imports of steel derivatives such as nails and fasteners. The Trade Court held Proclamation 9980 to be unauthorized by the statute because the new derivatives tariffs were imposed after the passing of certain deadlines; within 90 days of receiving the Secretary’s report, the President must determine whether to concur in the finding and, if so, within the same 90 days “the President shall” also “determine the nature and duration of the action.”In the meantime, in another case, the Federal Circuit upheld a presidential proclamation that increased tariffs on steel beyond Proclamation 9705’s rate, concluding that when the President, within the Act’s time limits, adopts a plan that contemplates future contingency-dependent modifications, those time limits do not preclude the President from adding to the initial import impositions to help achieve the originally stated national-security objective if the underlying findings and objective have not grown stale.The Federal Circuit then upheld Proclamation 9980, reversing the Trade Court. The proclamation’s new imposition reaches imports that are within section 232’s authorization of presidential action based on the Secretary’s finding and there is no staleness or other persuasive reason for overriding the President’s judgment. View "PrimeSource Building Products, Inc.v, United States" on Justia Law