Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Miller served on active duty, 2003-2007, and has a VA disability rating of 60 percent. Since 2008, Miller has been employed as an FDIC Economic Analyst. He was hired at the GS-9 level and has risen to the GS-12 level. In 2012 the FDIC posted vacancy announcements for a CG-13 Financial Economist position: one open to all citizens and another for status candidates. Miller applied under both procedures and was one of three finalists. Three FDIC employees participated in the interviews, rating each candidate’s answers to questions on bank failure prediction models as Outstanding, Good, or Inadequate. All of the candidates received some "inadequate" ratings. No candidate was selected; the vacancy was cancelled. Miller filed a Department of Labor complaint, stating that the cancellation was in bad faith to avoid hiring a veteran or having to request a “pass over” from the Office of Personnel Management. The Merit Systems Protection Board denied his petition under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act, finding that the allegation of non-selection in violation of veterans’ rights was sufficient to confer jurisdiction, but that Miller had not established a violation because the FDIC “conducted a thorough, structured interview of each of the candidates” and “none of the interviewees possessed the requisite skills and knowledge for the position.” The Federal Circuit affirmed; substantial evidence indicated that cancellation was predicated on a lack of appropriately qualified candidates. View "Miller v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 authorized the Department of Energy (DOE) to contract with power utilities for a planned national nuclear waste disposal system, 42 U.S.C. 10222. Utilities were to pay into a Nuclear Waste Fund; the government was to dispose of their spent nuclear fuel beginning by January 31, 1998.. Under the Standard Contract, utilities must provide “preparation, packaging, required inspections, and loading activities necessary for the transportation … to the DOE facility.” DOE is responsible for “arrang[ing] for, and provid[ing], a cask(s) and all necessary transportation … to the DOE facility.” In 1983, System Fuels entered Standard Contracts concerning the Grand Gulf and Arkansas Nuclear One power stations. The government has yet to begin accepting spent nuclear fuel. System Fuels obtained damages for costs incurred through August 31, 2005 (Grand) and June 30, 2006 (Arkansas), including costs to construct Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs) and later successfully sought damages for continued breach. The Claims Court denied costs incurred to load spent fuel into storage casks at the ISFSIs by first loading it into canisters, then loading those canisters into dry fuel storage casks and welding the casks closed. The Federal Circuit reversed, noting that under the Standard Contracts, DOE cannot accept any of the canistered fuel as is, so System Fuels will incur costs to unload the casks and canisters and to reload fuel into transportation casks if and when DOE performs. View "System Fuels, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

SUFI invested money to build and operate telephone systems at Air Force bases and was to earn returns for 15 years from per-call charges, to be shared with the Air Force. The Air Force breached the contract by allowing contractually prohibited diversions of calls from the SUFI phones. SUFI brought claims to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), which awarded $2.8 million (plus interest) on one group of claims and $4.6 million (plus interest) on another. SUFI appealed the award on the second group of claims, invoking the standards of review set by the Wunderlich Act 41 U.S.C. 321 (repealed 2011). The Claims Court granted SUFI relief. The Federal Circuit remanded, holding that the Claims Court had not properly applied that standard. ASBCA conducted remand proceedings and awarded roughly $113 million (plus interest). SUFI promptly accepted the decision. The Claims Court declined the government’s request for review, stating, “[u]nder the Wunderlich Act, only the contractor has the right to appeal from a Board decision.” The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating: “The new decision is no less the position of the United States just because it is not the initial decision.” View "SUFI Network Servs., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Agent Parkinson, of the FBI’s Sacramento field office, was the leader of a special operations group, tasked with relocating a previously compromised undercover facility. In 2006, the FBI leased a facility from Rodda, who agreed to contribute $70,000 to “construction, construction documents, permits and fees. Parkinson negotiated the lease on behalf of the FBI, and managed the tenant improvement funds. In 2008, during the work, Parkinson made whistleblower-eligible disclosures, implicating two pilots involved with the group in misconduct. Parkinson’s supervisor issued Parkinson a low-performance rating, removed him as group leader, and reassigned him. Believing this to be retaliation, Parkinson sent a letter to Senator Grassley, who forwarded Parkinson’s allegations to the Department of Justice’s Office of the Investigator General (OIG) for investigation. The OIG sent the FBI its report. Ultimately, the Merit Systems Protection Board upheld Parkinson’s termination for lack of candor under oath and obstruction of process of the Office of Professional Responsibility. The Federal Circuit reversed in part and remanded. The court sustained the obstruction charge and dismissal of Parkinson’s affirmative defense of violations of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, but found the lack of candor charge unsupported by substantial evidence and that the Board improperly precluded Parkinson from raising an affirmative defense of whistleblower retaliation. View "Parkinson v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

In the 1970s, the Department of the Interior’s Fish and WildlifeService began entering into cooperative farming agreements with farmers to manage public lands in the National Wildlife Refuge System for the conservation of migratory birds and wildlife, including at the Umatilla and McNary Refuges in the Pacific Northwest. Most CFAs share identical terms; the Service permits a “cooperator” to farm public land with specific crops that benefit wildlife. There is no payment. Cooperators typically retain 75 percent of the crop yield for their efforts. Hymas sought a cooperator contract. The Service selected other cooperators, but did not use formal procurement procedures or solicit full and open competition. It relied upon its system that gave preference to previous cooperators with a successful record of farming designated areas within the refuge. Hymas did not live adjacent to the refuges and had not previously farmed refuge lands. The Claims Court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491(b)(1), to resolve his bid protest and held that the Service violated various federal procurement laws and the Administrative Procedure Act. The Federal Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss, holding that the CFAs are not subject to Tucker Act review. View "Hymas v. United States" on Justia Law

GA entered into a blanket purchase agreement (BPA 218), with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in June 2011, to furnish trained service dogs for disabled veterans. A year later, the contracting officer sent an email questioning GA's performance. On August 31, 2012, the officer sent notice terminating BPA 218 for default and suspending open orders, informing GA that it had the right to appeal under the disputes clause of the contract. On December 21, 2012, GA sent a letter to the VA’s Rehabilitation Research & Development Service, arguing that it had fulfilled its duties and that the default termination should be converted to a termination for the convenience of the government. On February 28, 2013, GA sent the contracting officer a “formal demand.” On March 21, the officer sent a letter stating that she had received the claim but needed supporting documentation. GA began compiling documentation, but on May 3, the officer sent another letter, stating that she would not reconsider her decision, but that GA could appeal under 41 U.S.C. 7104(b). On January 7, 2014, GA filed suit. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed, finding the claim time-barred because, while the February 2013 letter qualified as a request for reconsideration, the officer did not reconsider, so the statute of limitations never tolled. The Federal Circuit reversed. The 12-month statutory appeal period did not begin to run until the officer rejected the request for reconsideration on May 3. View "Guardian Angels Med. Serv. Dogs, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Reddick was employed as an FDIC “Investigation Specialist” by an initial two-year term appointment, set to expire in September 2012. In April 2012, the FDIC offered him an extension of the initial term for an additional two years. The offer stated that the “extended employment” would be “effective [September], 2012” and that the “extended appointment is subject to the conditions of employment [included in the initial appointment offer] and subject to your continued successful performance.” Reddick accepted the offer days after receipt. The FDIC revoked the extension offer in August 2012. Reddick filed a grievance on the theory that the revocation of the offer was an adverse action under 5 U.S.C. 7512 and that he was entitled to procedural protections that the FDIC did not provide him. The matter was referred to arbitration under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator found the extension offer to be conditioned on Reddick’s “satisfactory work performance” and that the revocation was supported by sufficient justification. The Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal. The extension offer was still revocable by the FDIC even after acceptance by Reddick; it never matured into an effective extension, so Reddick was not “removed.” View "Reddick v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

USF&G filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1), seeking reimbursement from the government for legal expenses and settlement costs it allegedly incurred in its capacity as general liability insurer for Gibbs Construction, a government contractor. USF&G alleged that, in a contract for renovation work at the New Orleans main post office, the U.S. Postal Service agreed to indemnify Gibbs and its agents against any liability incurred as a result of asbestos removal work under the contract. USF&G alleged that the Postal Service failed to indemnify Gibbs in connection with a lawsuit filed against Gibbs by a former Postal Service police officer, in which the officer claimed that he contracted mesothelioma as a result of asbestos removal during performance of the contract, and that, as Gibbs’s general liability insurer, it was required to litigate and settle the officer’s claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal. The Claims Court lacked jurisdiction under a theory of equitable subrogation. View "Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The U.S. Air Force solicited bids from private companies to supply equipment and services to build a new radar system. Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin cleared early hurdles; each received a solicitation for proposals for Engineering and Manufacturing Development. The Air Force subsequently sent Evaluation Notices to Raytheon and Northrop that “contractors would not be permitted to use IR & D costs to reduce their costs of performing . . . if those costs were implicitly or explicitly required for contract performance.” Raytheon objected; Northrop did not.. The Air Force then changed its view and accepted Raytheon’s treatment of certain costs as IR & D costs, but never communicated its new view to Northrop. In final proposals, Raytheon proposed IR & D cost reductions, whereas Northrop did not. The Air Force awarded the contract to Raytheon. Northrop and Lockheed filed protests with the Government Accountability Office (31 U.S.C. 3551). In response, the Air Force “decided to take corrective action” and to reopen discussions. Raytheon filed a protest under 28 U.S.C. 1491(b) to challenge the decision to take corrective action. The Federal Circuit affirmed denial of the protest, concluding that the reopening decision was proper based on the disparate-information violation. View "Raytheon Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

Trona is a sodium carbonate compound that is processed into soda ash or baking soda. Because oil and gas development posed a risk to the extraction of trona and trona worker safety, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which manages the leasing of federal public land for mineral development, indefinitely suspended all oil and gas leases in the mechanically mineable trona area (MMTA) of Wyoming. The area includes 26 pre-existing oil and gas leases owned by Barlow. Barlow filed suit, alleging that the BLM’s suspension of oil and gas leases constituted a taking of Barlow’s interests without just compensation and constituted a breach of both the express provisions of the leases and their implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s dismissal of the contract claims on the merits and of the takings claim as unripe. BLM has not repudiated the contracts and Barlow did not establish that seeking a permit to drill would be futile. View "Barlow & Haun, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law