Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two advocacy organizations submitted a petition to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) seeking a rule that would limit the PTO’s discretion to institute inter partes review (IPR) and post-grant review (PGR) proceedings under the America Invents Act. Their proposed rule would have prevented institution of such proceedings in certain circumstances when the patent owner objected and met specific criteria, such as being the original applicant and having small entity status. The PTO denied the petition, stating that the issues overlapped with topics already under consideration in a separate request for public comment and that the suggestions would be considered in any future rulemaking.After the denial, the organizations filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the PTO’s denial violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the America Invents Act. They argued that the PTO failed to act within a reasonable time, did not provide adequate reasons for denial, and was required to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking. The PTO moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing. The district court granted the motion, finding that the organizations lacked both organizational and associational standing because they failed to show that any member faced a concrete, non-speculative injury as a result of the PTO’s denial.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the organizations lacked associational standing because they did not demonstrate that any member suffered an actual or imminent injury traceable to the PTO’s denial of the petition. The court found the alleged injury too speculative, relying on a chain of uncertain future events involving third-party actions. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of standing. View "US INVENTOR, INC. v. PTO " on Justia Law

Rex Medical, L.P. and Intuitive Surgical, Inc. are competitors in the medical device industry, specifically in the market for surgical stapling products. Rex accused Intuitive of infringing U.S. Patent No. 9,439,650, which covers a system for stapling tissue during surgery. The accused products included several models of Intuitive’s SureForm staplers. Rex initially asserted two patents, but after Intuitive challenged one in an inter partes review, Rex withdrew it, leaving only the ’650 patent at issue. The dispute centered on claim 6 of the ’650 patent, which describes a stapling apparatus with specific structural features.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware presided over the case. Before trial, the court excluded Rex’s damages expert from testifying about a prior license agreement, finding the expert failed to apportion the value of the asserted patent from other patents in the agreement. At trial, neither party’s damages expert testified, and Rex relied on lay testimony regarding damages. The jury found Intuitive infringed claim 6 and that the claim was not invalid, awarding Rex $10 million in damages. After post-trial motions, the district court entered judgment for Rex on infringement and validity but reduced the damages award to $1, finding insufficient evidence to support the jury’s damages calculation and denying Rex’s request for a new trial on damages.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Federal Circuit held that the exclusion of Rex’s damages expert was proper because the expert did not adequately apportion the value of the asserted patent. The court also affirmed the reduction of damages to $1, finding the record lacked sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably determine damages for the ’650 patent alone. The Federal Circuit further affirmed the district court’s findings on infringement and validity, rejecting Intuitive’s arguments regarding claim construction and written description. View "REX MEDICAL, L.P. v. INTUITIVE SURGICAL, INC. " on Justia Law

The dispute centers on allegations of intellectual property infringement involving shower curtains designed with embedded rings, eliminating the need for traditional hooks. The plaintiffs, a group of related companies, own several patents covering these “hookless” shower curtains, as well as registered and unregistered trademark and trade dress rights. The defendants, two companies that manufactured and sold similar shower curtains, were accused of infringing these patents, trademarks, and trade dress. The accused products featured rings with a flat upper edge and a slit, allowing the curtain to be attached to a rod without hooks.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the defendants’ motion to transfer venue was denied as untimely. The district court granted summary judgment of patent infringement in favor of the plaintiffs, based on its claim constructions, and precluded the defendants’ unclean hands defense for being raised too late. After a bench trial, the court found that the defendants infringed the asserted patents, the HOOKLESS® and EZ ON trademarks, and the claimed trade dress, and that some infringement was willful. The court awarded lost profits, reasonable royalties, attorneys’ fees, and costs.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of the venue transfer and the exclusion of the unclean hands defense. However, it reversed the findings of infringement for the ’248 and ’609 patents as to one defendant, vacated the ’088 patent infringement finding as to that defendant, and affirmed the patent infringement findings as to the other. The court also vacated the trade dress infringement and willfulness findings, reversed the EZ ON trademark infringement finding, and vacated the HOOKLESS® trademark infringement finding. The award of attorneys’ fees was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. The court clarified the standards for claim construction, trade dress functionality, and standing to assert trademark rights. View "Focus Products Group International, LLC v. Kartri Sales Co." on Justia Law

A company that provides credit card services under the registered mark ASPIRE opposed the registration of two marks—ASPIRE BANK word and design marks—by a Tennessee retail bank, Apex Bank. Apex Bank, which does not offer credit cards but provides various banking services, filed intent-to-use applications for the ASPIRE BANK marks for “banking and financing services.” CC Serve, the credit card company, argued that Apex’s proposed marks were confusingly similar to its own ASPIRE mark, which has been used in connection with credit card services since 1996.The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) reviewed the opposition and sustained it under Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act, finding that there was a likelihood of consumer confusion between the marks. The Board analyzed several factors from the E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. case, including the similarity of the services and the marks themselves, and concluded that the services were highly similar and that confusion was likely. Apex Bank appealed the TTAB’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s finding that the parties’ services are highly similar, upholding the Board’s analysis of the second DuPont factor. However, the appellate court found that the Board erred in its analysis of the sixth DuPont factor by narrowly considering only marks used for credit card services, rather than similar marks used for broader banking and financing services. The court also vacated the Board’s analysis of the first DuPont factor, as reconsideration of the sixth factor could affect the assessment of the marks’ commercial impression. The case was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion. View "Apex Bank v. CC Serve Corp." on Justia Law

Finesse Wireless LLC owns two patents related to methods for mitigating interference in radios caused by intermodulation products (IMPs), which can arise when radio signals interact with passive obstacles. Finesse alleged that AT&T Mobility LLC, by using a particular feature in Nokia radios, infringed specific claims of both patents. Nokia intervened in the case. The dispute centered on whether the accused radios performed the patented methods for reducing IMP interference, specifically whether they sampled the required signals and performed certain signal multiplications as described in the patent claims.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas presided over a jury trial in which the jury found all asserted claims of both patents valid and infringed, awarding Finesse a lump-sum damages amount for the remaining life of the patents. After the verdict, AT&T and Nokia moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of noninfringement and for a new trial on damages, but the district court denied these motions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of JMOL de novo, applying Fifth Circuit law. The Federal Circuit found that Finesse’s evidence, particularly its expert’s testimony, was insufficient and self-contradictory regarding whether the accused radios sampled both the “signals of interest” and “interference generating signals” as required by the first patent. For the second patent, the court determined that no reasonable jury could have found the accused radios performed the seven specific signal multiplications required by the claims. As a result, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of JMOL of noninfringement for both patents and vacated the damages award. Costs were awarded to the defendants-appellants. View "FINESSE WIRELESS LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a patent owned by a pharmaceutical company, which describes methods for reducing the risk of cardiovascular events in patients with coronary artery disease or peripheral artery disease by administering specific doses of rivaroxaban and aspirin. The patent claims include both general methods of administering these drugs and a particular claim involving a “first product” that combines both drugs in a single dosage form. The patent is based on results from a clinical trial known as COMPASS, which evaluated the efficacy and safety of this drug combination.Three generic drug manufacturers challenged the patent’s validity by filing petitions for inter partes review with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), arguing that the claims were anticipated or obvious in light of prior art references, including published articles describing similar drug regimens and ongoing clinical trials. The PTAB joined the proceedings and ultimately held that claims 1–2 were unpatentable as anticipated and claims 1–8 were unpatentable as obvious, relying on the prior art and its interpretation of the patent’s claim language.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the PTAB’s decision. The court affirmed the PTAB’s finding that claims 1–4 were unpatentable, holding that the phrase “clinically proven effective” in the claims, even if considered limiting, did not create a patentable distinction because it was functionally unrelated to the method itself. However, the court found that the PTAB had incorrectly construed the “first product” limitation in claims 5–8, which should require a single dosage form containing both drugs. The court vacated the PTAB’s unpatentability finding for claims 5–8 and remanded for further proceedings under the correct claim construction. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case, with no costs awarded. View "BAYER PHARMA AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT v. MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC. " on Justia Law

A patent owner brought two infringement lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against a semiconductor company, alleging that certain integrated circuit products infringed three patents related to electronic circuitry and power-saving features. The accused products included specific chips that allegedly implemented a particular feature. After the lawsuits were filed, the defendant challenged the cases on grounds including improper service, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. During the litigation, the plaintiff produced a licensing agreement with a third party, and subsequently entered into another agreement covering the accused products. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed both cases without prejudice.Following the dismissals, the defendant moved for attorneys’ fees, costs, and sanctions, arguing that the lawsuits were baseless. The district court denied the defendant’s motions for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, costs under Rule 54(d)(1), and sanctions under Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, but converted the voluntary dismissals to dismissals with prejudice as a sanction. The court also denied the defendant’s discovery requests related to confidentiality and access to certain materials.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in denying fees under § 285 and costs under Rule 54(d)(1), because the defendant became a prevailing party when the dismissals were converted to dismissals with prejudice. The Federal Circuit vacated those portions of the district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of Rule 11 sanctions and fees under § 1927, finding no abuse of discretion. It also affirmed the denial of the remaining discovery request, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the protective order. The judgment was thus vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. View "FUTURE LINK SYSTEMS, LLC v. REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION " on Justia Law

A company developed and patented a process for desulfurizing heavy marine fuel oil (HMFO) to comply with international sulfur content standards. The patented process involves taking a high-sulfur HMFO that meets certain physical property requirements and then hydroprocessing it to reduce its sulfur content. The company marketed its technology to various refineries, including the defendants, but no licensing agreement was reached. The defendants later modified their refineries to produce low-sulfur HMFO, prompting the plaintiff to sue for patent infringement, specifically alleging that the defendants’ processes at one refinery infringed two claims of the relevant patent.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the parties disputed the proper construction of certain claim terms and the appropriate method and location for testing the fuel’s compliance with the required standards. During discovery, the defendants argued that it was too dangerous to obtain certain test samples, and the court accepted their position, allowing the plaintiff to use an estimation formula instead. On the eve of trial, however, the defendants introduced a new noninfringement theory, arguing that only actual test data—not estimates—could prove compliance. The district court allowed this argument, and the jury returned a general verdict of noninfringement. The district court later found the defendants’ argument improper and prejudicial but deemed the error harmless and denied the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the error harmless because the jury’s general verdict made it impossible to determine whether the improper argument affected the outcome. The appellate court reversed the denial of a new trial and remanded for further proceedings, also affirming the district court’s construction of the disputed claim term. View "MAGEMA TECHNOLOGY LLC v. PHILLIPS 66 " on Justia Law

Global Health Solutions LLC and Marc Selner each filed patent applications in August 2017 for a method of preparing a wound treatment ointment containing nanodroplets of an aqueous biocide suspended in petrolatum jelly without emulsifiers. Selner filed his application four days before GHS, making him the first-filer under the America Invents Act (AIA) “first-inventor-to-file” system. GHS alleged that its founder, Bradley Burnam, conceived the invention and communicated it to Selner, who then derived the invention and filed first. Both parties agreed that their applications claimed the same invention, and the dispute centered on who conceived the invention and when.The United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the Board) instituted a derivation proceeding. After reviewing evidence, including contemporaneous emails, the Board found that Burnam communicated the invention to Selner by 4:04 p.m. on February 14, 2014, but also found that Selner had independently conceived the invention earlier that same day, by 12:55 p.m. The Board determined that Selner did not derive the invention from Burnam and ruled in favor of Selner. GHS appealed, arguing that the Board erred in its evidentiary rulings, burden of proof allocation, and failure to require reduction to practice for conception, and also requested that Burnam be named a co-inventor.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. The court held that the Board’s focus on “first-to-invent” was harmless error, as Selner’s independent conception was dispositive under the AIA. The court found no reversible error in the Board’s evidentiary rulings, burden allocation, or treatment of reduction to practice. The court also held that GHS failed to properly preserve its request for correction of inventorship. The Board’s judgment for Selner was affirmed. View "GLOBAL HEALTH SOLUTIONS LLC v. SELNER " on Justia Law

Erik Brunetti applied to register the word “FUCK” as a trademark for various goods and services, including sunglasses, jewelry, bags, and retail store services. After initial refusals based on the mark being “immoral or scandalous”—a ground later found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Iancu v. Brunetti—the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) reexamined the applications. The PTO’s examining attorney refused registration, finding that the term was a widely used, commonplace word that failed to function as a trademark because consumers would not perceive it as identifying the source of the goods or services.The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) affirmed the refusals, concluding that the mark did not serve as a source indicator. The Board reasoned that “FUCK” is an “all-purpose word” with many recognized meanings and is commonly used on similar goods by various sources, so it would not be seen by consumers as distinguishing Brunetti’s products from others. The Board also rejected Brunetti’s constitutional arguments and his reliance on other registered marks, stating that each application must be considered on its own merits.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court rejected most of Brunetti’s arguments but found that the Board failed to articulate a clear and rational standard for when an “all-purpose word” like “FUCK” can or cannot function as a trademark, especially given the existence of similar registered marks. The Federal Circuit vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the Board must provide a satisfactory explanation and coherent guidance for its actions. View "In Re BRUNETTI " on Justia Law