Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Cubatabaco, a Cuban entity, and General, a Delaware company, manufacture and distribute cigars using the COHIBA mark. General owns trademark registrations issued in 1981 and 1995. Cubatabaco owns the mark in Cuba and uses it worldwide. Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), prohibit Cubatabaco from selling cigars in the U.S.; 31 C.F.R. 515.201(b) prohibits “transfer of property rights . . . to a Cuban entity,” but a general or specific license allows Cuban entities to engage in otherwise prohibited transactions. General licenses are available for transactions “related to the registration and renewal” of U.S. trademark. Specific licenses issue from the Office of Foreign Assets Control. Cubatabaco used a general license to attempt to register the COHIBA mark in 1997, relying on 15 U.S.C. 1126(e), which allows reliance on a foreign registration if the applicant has a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce. Cubatabaco also sought to cancel General’s registrations, which the PTO cited as a basis for likelihood of confusion. Cubatabaco obtained a special license to sue General. The district court held that General had abandoned its registration by non-use and enjoined General’s use of the COHIBA mark, finding that Cubatabaco had acquired ownership under the famous marks doctrine. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that injunctive relief would involve a prohibited transfer under CACR because Cubatabaco would acquire ownership of the mark and later affirmed denial of General’s motion concerning cancellation of its registrations. The Board then dismissed Cubatabaco’s petition, stating that it need not address preclusion because Cubatabaco lacked standing. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that Cubatabaco has a statutory cause of action to petition to cancel the registrations and that issue and claim preclusion do not bar that petitionView "Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. General Cigar Co., Inc." on Justia Law

In 1987, Krauser, a periodontist, designed a dental implant system. He paid BHI’s predecessor to produce drawings and prototypes. In1991, the parties entered into a written agreement that specified that Krauser would develop new products for the company to produce and sell and that the drawings were “property of [BHI].” Krauser was entitled to royalties. Krauser obtained a patent covering one component of the system and listing Krauser as the inventor. The company subsequently secured patents covering dental implant systems, naming Shaw as the sole inventor. Krauser sued the company and Shaw for a declaration of ownership rights and for copyright and patent infringement. While the suits were pending, the company filed for bankruptcy, and Krauser filed claims in bankruptcy court. In a settlement agreement, Krauser granted the company a 10-year patent license and “all rights . . . [to] the dental implant system currently being manufactured.” The bankruptcy court approved the agreement. Later, several patents on dental implant systems issued to BHI. None listed Krauser as an inventor. Krauser alleged that BHI failed to pay the full amount of royalties or submit to required audits and claimed default. The district court granted BHI summary judgment, construing the settlement to apply only to implants being manufactured in 1996, not implants manufactured at the time of litigation, and finding that Krauser had no ownership rights. The Eleventh Circuit transferred the case “[b]ecause the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction … relating to patents.” The Federal Circuit transferred the case back, noting that Krauser had dropped his claim of inventorship. View "Krauser v. Biohorizons, Inc." on Justia Law

Suffolk owns a patent directed to methods and systems for controlling a server that supplies files to computers rendering web pages. The patent discloses using the address of the referring web page to determine whether to serve a file, and if so, which file. The district court entered summary judgment of invalidity, holding that claims 1, 7, and 9 were anticipated by a Usenet newsgroup post. Suffolk then stipulated that, in light of the district court’s prior art, claim construction, and expert testimony rulings, claim 6 was also anticipated. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Suffolk Techs., LLC v. AOL Inc." on Justia Law

Sun developed the Java computer programming platform, released in 1996, to eliminate the need for different versions of computer programs for different operating systems or devices. With Java, a programmer could “write once, run anywhere.” The Java virtual machine (JVM) takes source code that has been converted to bytecode and converts it to binary machine code. Oracle wrote 37 packages of computer source code, “application programming interfaces” (API), in the Java language, and licenses them to others for writing “apps” for computers, tablets, smartphones, and other devices. Oracle alleged that Google’s Android mobile operating system infringed Oracle’s patents and copyrights. The jury found no patent infringement, but that Google infringed copyrights in the 37 Java packages and a specific routine, “rangeCheck.” It returned a noninfringement verdict as to eight decompiled security files. The jury deadlocked on Google’s fair use defense. The district court held that the replicated elements of the 37 API packages, including the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization, were not subject to copyright and entered final judgment in favor of Google on copyright infringement claims, except with respect to rangeCheck and the eight decompiled files. The Federal Circuit affirmed as to the eight decompiled files that Google copied into Android and rangeCheck. The court reversed in part, finding that the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization of the API packages are entitled to copyright protection, and remanded for consideration of fair use.View "Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc." on Justia Law

Calcar’s patents share a common specification, are derived from a priority application filed in 1997, and describe and claim a multimedia system to access vehicle information and control vehicle functions. Calcar accused Honda’s computerized navigation systems of infringement. Calcar claimed that the accused systems included additional infringing features beyond providing travel directions. Honda sought a finding of inequitable conduct, based on the actions of Calcar’s founder, Obradovich. Among coinventors, Obradovich was responsible for the patent application. Honda alleged that he deliberately withheld prior art that was material to patentability; Obradovich disclosed the existence of the 1996 Acura RL navigation system, but did not disclose additional information that would have led the PTO to deny the patent as anticipated or rendered obvious. When that system was introduced, Calcar Published “Quick Tips” booklets with condensed information from a car’s owner’s manual. In developing a guide for the 96RL, Obradovich drove the car and operated the navigation system. Calcar personnel took photographs of the system and owner’s manual. Obradovich acknowledged that the system was the basis of Calcar’s inventions. Honda argued that the operational details that he did not disclose were those that were the claimed in the patents at issue: the use of the system to display the status of vehicle functions and to search for information about the vehicle. The district court granted Honda’s inequitable conduct motion and found the patents unenforceable. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co." on Justia Law

uPI and Richtek design and sell DC-DC controllers that convert direct current from one voltage to another, and are embodied in chips for downstream devices such as computer motherboards. uPI was founded by former Richtek employees; its chips are imported into the U.S. either directly or as incorporated in downstream devices. Richtek complained to the International Trade Commission that uPI misappropriated Richtek’s trade secrets and infringed Richtek’s U.S. patents, in violation of the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. 1337. uPI offered to enter into a consent order and to cease importation of products produced using or containing Richtek’s trade secrets or infringing Richtek’s patents. Over Richtek’s objection, the ALJ entered the consent order substantially as drafted by uPI. The Commission terminated the investigation. A year later Richtek filed an Enforcement Complaint. An ALJ distinguished between products that were accused in the prior investigation and products allegedly developed and produced after entry of the Consent Order, finding violations as to the formerly accused products and that the post- Consent Order products infringed two patents, but were independently developed and not produced using Richtek’s trade secrets. The Commission affirmed with respect to the formerly accused products and reversed in part with respect to the post-Order products. The Federal Circuit affirmed concerning the formerly accused products, but reversed the ruling of no violation as to the post-Consent Order products.View "UPI Semiconductor Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

Align’s Invisalign System, an alternative to conventional braces, uses a series of clear dental aligners that are worn sequentially over time to adjust the position of a patient’s teeth. The aligners must be custom-designed for the patient’s unique teeth. Align’s asserted patents are directed to methods and treatment plans using digital data sets. In 2005, Align’s founder and former CEO founded OrthoClear and used former Align employees to manufacture dental aligners. Align filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission, alleging that OrthoClear violated 19 U.S.C. 1337 by importing, selling for importation, or selling within the U.S., aligners that infringe Align’s patents, and by misappropriating Align’s trade secrets. A 2006 settlement required OrthoClear to assign its entire intellectual property portfolio to Align. The Commission entered the Consent Order and terminated the investigation. Suspecting that OrthoClear and others were violating the Consent Order, Align sought an enforcement proceeding. Rather than issuing an “initial determination,” the ALJ issued an order, denied a motion to terminate and scheduled a trial. The Commission concluded that the order constituted an “initial determination,” subject to its review, reversed, and terminated the enforcement proceeding, finding that the accused digital data sets were not covered by the scope of the consent order. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that the Commission erred in reviewing the order. View "Align Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

Rapid-prototyping “additive technology” creates parts by building layer upon layer of plastics, metals, or ceramics. Subtractive technology starts with a block and cuts away layers. Additive technology include SL, fused deposition modeling, laser sintering, 3D printing, direct metal laser sintering, and digital light processing. 3DS is the sole U.S. supplier of SL machines, which use an ultraviolet laser to trace a cross section of an object on a vat of liquid polymer resin. The laser solidifies the resin it touches, while untouched, areas remain liquid. After one cross-section has solidified, the newly formed layer is lowered below the surface of the resin. The process is repeated until the object is completed. Users of SL machines often own many machines with varying sizes, speeds, and accuracy levels. 3DS began equipping some of its SL machines with wireless technology that allows a receiver to communicate with a transmitter on the cap of a resin bottle. A software-based lockout feature shuts the machine off upon detection of a resin not approved by 3DD. 3DS has approved two of Desotech’s resins and entered into negotiations for approval of additional resins. After negotiations broke down, Desotech sued, alleging tying, unreasonable restraint of trade, and attempted monopolization under the Sherman Act; tying under the Clayton Act; patent infringement; and violations of the Illinois Antitrust and Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Acts. The district court granted 3DS summary judgment on the antitrust claims and certain state-law claims. The parties stipulated to dismissal of the remaining claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "DSM Desotech Inc. v. 3D Sys. Corp." on Justia Law

Trebro’s patents involve sod harvesters: vehicles with knives that cut sod pieces from the ground, conveyor belts to transport the pieces, and mechanisms to stack them on a pallet. FireFly’s accused product is the ProSlab 150. Trebro also sells sod harvesters, including the SC2010 Slab. FireFly did not contest priority on the claims. While the preliminary injunction motion was pending, FireFly requested ex parte reexamination of thepatent, based primarily on two patents invented by the same individuals. After ordering reexamination, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office terminated the proceeding because neither of the patents qualified as prior art because they were not considered invented] by “others’ under 35 U.S.C. 102(a) or (e) and because each was published within the one year grace period. The district court denied a preliminary injunction. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, noting a record that strongly suggests a likelihood of success on the merits and a likelihood of irreparable harm. The court reasoned that the nature of the market is such that money damages would likely be inadequate and that the fact that Trebro does not presently practice the patent does not detract from its likely irreparable harm. View "Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. Firefly Equip., LLC" on Justia Law

ISE asserted infringement of its patent, “Automated Exchange for Trading Derivative Securities,” directed to an automated exchange for trading options contracts that allocates trades among market professionals and assures liquidity. It distinguishes an “automated” exchange from the traditional, floor-based “open outcry” system for trading options contracts. The Chicago Board Options Exchange’s accused product, the “Chicago Board Options Exchange,” uses the Hybrid Trading System, which includes a fully screen-based trading system called “CBOEdirect” integrated with traditional, open outcry trading. On appeal, the Federal Circuit construed the term “automated exchange” as “a system for executing trades of financial instruments that is fully computerized, such that it does not include matching or allocating through the use of open-outcry” and found that the patentee disavowed all manual or partially automated systems of trading. On remand, ISE stipulated to noninfringement because it concluded that the district court’s pretrial rulings, including a statement that “it will be a jury question whether CBOEdirect is a stand alone automated exchange alongside a floor-based system or whether it is a system that includes matching or allocating through open outcry,” prevented it from proving that the accused product met the “automated exchange” limitation. The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of noninfringement, but reversed a finding that one claim was indefinite. View "Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v. Int'l Secs., LLC" on Justia Law