Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in International Trade
J.D. IRVING, LTD. v. US
A Canadian company, J.D. Irving (JDI), challenged the U.S. Department of Commerce's assignment of an antidumping duty cash deposit rate of 11.59% on its softwood lumber products from Canada. This rate was determined in the final results of the second administrative review (AR 2) of an antidumping duty order. JDI argued that its cash deposit rate should remain at 1.57%, the rate assigned in the first administrative review (AR 1). JDI filed a complaint with the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), asserting that the CIT had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the court's residual jurisdiction.The CIT dismissed JDI's case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that jurisdiction under § 1581(i) was not appropriate because jurisdiction could have been available under § 1581(c). The CIT noted that JDI's action was essentially a challenge to the final results of AR 2, which is reviewable under § 1581(c). Additionally, the CIT found that JDI had not demonstrated that the remedy provided by administrative review and binational panel review under the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) would be manifestly inadequate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT's dismissal. The court held that the true nature of JDI's suit was a challenge to the AR 2 final results, making § 1581(c) the proper jurisdiction. The court also determined that JDI had not met its burden to show that the alternative remedies of administrative review and binational panel review would be manifestly inadequate. The court emphasized that binational panels have the authority to review and remand final antidumping determinations, and Commerce must take action consistent with the panel's decision. Therefore, the CIT's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1581(i) was affirmed. View "J.D. IRVING, LTD. v. US " on Justia Law
WORLDWIDE DOOR COMPONENTS, INC. v. US
The case involves the importation of door thresholds by Worldwide Door Components, Inc. and Columbia Aluminum Products, LLC. These companies sought a determination from the Department of Commerce that their imported door thresholds were not subject to existing antidumping and countervailing duty orders on aluminum extrusions from China. The door thresholds in question are assemblies containing both extruded aluminum and non-aluminum components, which the companies argued should be excluded from the orders under the finished merchandise exception.The United States Court of International Trade initially reviewed the case and remanded it to the Department of Commerce for further consideration. The court found that the Department had misinterpreted the scope of the orders and failed to properly consider whether the door thresholds qualified for the finished merchandise exception. On remand, the Department again found the thresholds to be within the scope of the orders, categorizing them as subassemblies. The Court of International Trade disagreed, remanding the case multiple times for further analysis and clarification.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that the Department of Commerce's determination that the door thresholds were subassemblies was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the Department had provided a thorough analysis of the scope language and relevant record evidence, including statements from the companies themselves. The court also clarified that subassemblies and finished merchandise are mutually exclusive categories under the orders, meaning that the Department was not required to consider the finished merchandise exception once it determined the thresholds were subassemblies.The Federal Circuit reversed the Court of International Trade's second remand order and reinstated the Department of Commerce's first remand redetermination, which found the door thresholds to be subassemblies and therefore within the scope of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders. The court vacated all subsequent opinions and orders by the Court of International Trade. View "WORLDWIDE DOOR COMPONENTS, INC. v. US " on Justia Law
Posted in:
International Law, International Trade
CELANESE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION v. ITC
Celanese International Corporation, Celanese (Malta) Company 2 Limited, and Celanese Sales U.S. Ltd. (collectively, “Celanese”) filed a petition with the United States International Trade Commission (the “Commission”), alleging that Anhui Jinhe Industrial Co., Ltd., Jinhe USA LLC (collectively, “Jinhe”), and other entities violated 19 U.S.C. § 337 by importing Ace-K (an artificial sweetener) made using a process that infringed Celanese’s patents. The patents in question had an effective filing date of September 21, 2016. It was undisputed that Celanese had sold Ace-K made using the patented process in the United States before the critical date of September 21, 2015.The presiding Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted Jinhe’s motion for a summary determination of no violation of 19 U.S.C. § 337, concluding that Celanese’s prior sales triggered the on-sale bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). The ALJ found that the America Invents Act (AIA) did not overturn settled pre-AIA precedent, which held that sales of products made using a secret process could trigger the on-sale bar, precluding the patentability of that process. The Commission denied Celanese’s petition for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commission.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission’s decision. The court held that the AIA did not alter the pre-AIA rule that a patentee’s sale of an unpatented product made according to a secret method triggers the on-sale bar to patentability. The court concluded that Celanese’s pre-2015 sales of Ace-K made using its secret process triggered the on-sale bar, rendering the later-sought patent claims on that process invalid. View "CELANESE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION v. ITC " on Justia Law
PRIMESOURCE BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC. v. US
PrimeSource Building Products, Inc. and other appellants challenged the United States Department of Commerce's calculation of an all-others antidumping duty rate for non-selected respondents in the fourth administrative review of an antidumping duty order on certain steel nails from Taiwan. Commerce had assigned an adverse facts available (AFA) rate of 78.17% to the mandatory respondents, who failed to cooperate, and used this rate to calculate the all-others rate for non-selected respondents, including Liang Chyuan.The United States Court of International Trade (Trade Court) upheld Commerce's decision, finding that the use of the expected method to calculate the all-others rate was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law. The Trade Court determined that the burden of proof lay with the non-selected respondents to show that the expected method was not reasonable, which they failed to do. The court also rejected PrimeSource's argument that Liang Chyuan should receive an individual rate, noting that Liang Chyuan did not meet the statutory requirements to be considered a voluntary respondent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court's decision. The court held that Commerce's use of the expected method was appropriate and that the burden was on the appellants to demonstrate that the method was not feasible or did not reasonably reflect the potential dumping margins of the non-selected respondents. The court found that the appellants failed to provide substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of representativeness of the mandatory respondents. Additionally, the court agreed that Liang Chyuan was not entitled to an individual rate as it did not submit the necessary information in a timely manner to be considered a voluntary respondent. View "PRIMESOURCE BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC. v. US " on Justia Law
Posted in:
International Law, International Trade
ADEE HONEY FARMS v. US
The case involves a dispute over the distribution of interest associated with antidumping and countervailing duties under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (CDSOA). Plaintiffs, who are affected domestic producers, argued that the United States Customs and Border Protection (Customs) unlawfully excluded delinquency interest from the distributions they were entitled to receive under the CDSOA. Customs had been distributing only interest charged on antidumping and countervailing duties at liquidation, as specified by 19 U.S.C. § 1677g, and not delinquency interest assessed under 19 U.S.C. § 1505(d).The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) initially dismissed claims related to distributions made more than two years before the complaints were filed, citing the statute of limitations. The CIT found that the Final Rule published by Customs in 2001 provided adequate notice of its decision to exclude delinquency interest. The CIT also denied plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration, maintaining that the Final Rule sufficiently informed the public of Customs' decision. Finally, the CIT denied plaintiffs' motions for judgment on the agency record, holding that the CDSOA did not require Customs to distribute delinquency interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the CIT's decisions. The Federal Circuit held that the Final Rule provided adequate notice of Customs' decision to exclude delinquency interest, thus supporting the CIT's dismissal of claims outside the two-year statutory period. The court also concluded that the CDSOA unambiguously excludes delinquency interest from distributions to affected producers. Therefore, the court affirmed the CIT's judgment in favor of the government, upholding Customs' practice of excluding delinquency interest from CDSOA distributions. View "ADEE HONEY FARMS v. US " on Justia Law
GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US
The case involves an appeal by Marmen Inc., Marmen Énergie Inc., Marmen Energy Co., the Government of Québec, and the Government of Canada against a decision by the U.S. Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce had imposed countervailing duties on imports of certain utility scale wind towers from Canada, arguing that the Canadian government had provided illegal subsidies to the producers and exporters of these towers.The case was initially reviewed by the United States Court of International Trade, which upheld the Department of Commerce's decision. The appellants then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The appellants argued that the Department of Commerce had erred in its assessment of three government programs and its computation of the sales denominator used to calculate the subsidy rate. They contended that the subsidy rate should have been de minimis, meaning it was too trivial or minor to merit consideration.The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the U.S. Court of International Trade, ruling that the Department of Commerce's determination was supported by substantial evidence and was in accordance with the law. The court rejected the appellants' arguments, finding that the Department of Commerce had reasonably determined that the auditor's adjustment was unreliable, and that the three subsidy programs at issue did provide countervailable subsidies. View "GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US " on Justia Law
ASOCIACION DE EXPORTADORES E INDUSTRIALES v. US
The case involves three organizations of Spanish olive producers (collectively “Asemesa”) who appealed a decision by the Court of International Trade (“the Trade Court”) regarding a countervailing duty imposed on olives imported from Spain. Asemesa argued that an order from the Department of Commerce imposing a countervailing duty on imported olives was contrary to law and that the Trade Court should have overturned the order. The United States and the Coalition for Fair Trade in Ripe Olives argued that Commerce’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence and that the Trade Court’s decision should be upheld.The Trade Court had previously reversed a decision by Commerce, concluding that the evidence that table olives accounted for 8 percent of the demand for raw olives did not show that the demand for raw olives was “substantially dependent” on the demand for table olives. The case was remanded to Commerce for further analysis. On remand, Commerce redefined the market for the prior stage product as the raw olives that the olive industry considers principally suitable for use in the production of table olives. The Trade Court rejected Commerce’s analysis, reasoning that Commerce’s market definition would “render the requirements of Section 1677–2 largely self-fulfilling.” The case was remanded to Commerce for a second time to correctly define the relevant market for the prior stage product and analyze whether the demand for the prior stage product was substantially dependent on the demand for table olives.On the second remand, Commerce again redefined the relevant market for the prior stage product, this time defining that market as consisting of the olives from varietals that the Spanish government considers suitable for processing into table olives, including dual-use varietals. Commerce calculated that 55.28 percent of all olives from varietals suitable for processing into table olives were indeed sold as table olives. Commerce adopted the Trade Court’s interpretation of the “substantially dependent” provision in section 1677–2 as requiring that more than half of the prior stage product be processed into the relevant finished good. Accordingly, Commerce determined that the demand for olive varietals suitable for processing into table olives was substantially dependent on the demand for table olives, and that a countervailing duty on table olives from Spain was warranted to offset the subsidies provided to Spanish olive growers. This time, the Trade Court sustained Commerce’s analysis.Asemesa now appeals the Trade Court’s determination. Asemesa argues that Commerce’s interpretation of the statute was contrary to law, and that Commerce’s factual analysis was not supported by substantial evidence. Although the court's interpretation of section 1677–2 and its analysis of the factual record in this case differ from the Trade Court’s, the court agrees with that court’s ultimate conclusion on both issues. The court affirms the Trade Court's decision. View "ASOCIACION DE EXPORTADORES E INDUSTRIALES v. US " on Justia Law
Posted in:
International Law, International Trade
SAHA THAI STEEL PIPE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED v. US
The case involves an appeal by Wheatland Tube Company against a decision by the U.S. Court of International Trade, which affirmed the U.S. Department of Commerce’s remand determination concerning the scope of an antidumping duty order on certain steel pipes imported from Thailand. The dispute centers on whether certain imports of steel pipes, specifically those that are "dual-stenciled" as both standard pipes and line pipes, fall within the scope of the existing antidumping duty order.The U.S. Court of International Trade initially found that the Department of Commerce unlawfully expanded the scope of the antidumping duty order by determining that it covered dual-stenciled pipes. On remand, the Department of Commerce, under protest, concluded that the antidumping duty order did not cover dual-stenciled pipes. The U.S. Court of International Trade sustained this determination.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of International Trade. The Court of Appeals held that the Department of Commerce’s initial determination that dual-stenciled pipes fall within the scope of the antidumping duty order was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeals found that the lower court's interpretation lacked support in the record and failed to give sufficient deference to the Department of Commerce under the substantial evidence standard of review. View "SAHA THAI STEEL PIPE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED v. US " on Justia Law
ZIRCON CORP. v. ITC
In 2020, Zircon Corp. filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission alleging that Stanley Black & Decker, Inc. and Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc. violated section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 by importing and selling electronic stud finders that infringed on Zircon's patents. The Commission instituted an investigation based on Zircon's complaint. A Commission Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found no violation of section 337. On review, the Commission affirmed the ALJ's finding of no violation.The Commission's decision was based on two independent reasons. First, it affirmed the ALJ's determination that Zircon had not satisfied the economic prong of the domestic industry requirement. Zircon had argued that it met this requirement based on its investment in plant and equipment, its employment of labor and capital, and its investment in the exploitation of the asserted patents. However, the Commission found that Zircon had not provided an adequate basis to evaluate the investments and the significance of those investments with respect to each asserted patent.Second, the Commission found each of the claims of the patents that were before the Commission were either invalid or not infringed. The Commission found that all the asserted claims of one patent would have been obvious in view of four prior art references; that several claims of two other patents were invalid as anticipated by or obvious in light of Zircon’s original stud finder; and that several of the claims of these two patents were not infringed.Zircon appealed the Commission's decision, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission's decision. The court agreed with the Commission's interpretation of section 337 and found that substantial evidence supported the Commission's finding that Zircon failed to meet its burden to prove the existence of a domestic industry relating to articles protected by each of its patents. View "ZIRCON CORP. v. ITC " on Justia Law
Rimco Inc. v. United States
The case involves Rimco Inc., an importer and reseller of wheels, who appealed against the United States Court of International Trade's dismissal of its action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Rimco sought judicial review of a denied protest against the assessment of countervailing and antidumping duties by Customs and Border Protection. Rimco argued that the Court of International Trade had exclusive jurisdiction to review the denial of protests under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), or alternatively, residual jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).Previously, the Court of International Trade had dismissed Rimco's action, stating that it lacked jurisdiction under § 1581(a) because Customs' application of antidumping and countervailing duties was not a protestable decision. The court also found that it lacked jurisdiction under § 1581(i) because jurisdiction under § 1581(c) would have been available if Rimco had sought administrative review of Commerce’s antidumping and countervailing duties determinations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of International Trade's dismissal. The court held that Customs' ministerial assessment of antidumping and countervailing duties was not a protestable decision. Furthermore, the court found that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) would have been available and not manifestly inadequate if Rimco had not failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Therefore, the Court of International Trade correctly dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Rimco Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law