Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of International Trade held that Sunpreme’s solar modules are covered by the scope of antidumping and countervailing duty orders on U.S. imports of certain solar cells from China and that the Department of Commerce could not instruct U.S. Customs and Border Protection to continue suspending liquidation of Sunpreme’s solar modules entered or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption before the scope inquiry was initiated. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting Sunpreme’s arguments that the orders did not cover its solar modules because they do not contain crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells, do not have an additional semiconductor substrate (p/n junction), and are thin film products. Commerce cannot order the suspension of liquidation pre-scope inquiry for merchandise possibly subject to an unclear or ambiguous duty order; neither can Customs because allowing it to do so would permit Customs in the first instance to clarify or interpret the ambiguity in the duty order so as to place merchandise within its scope. Customs lacks authority to suspend liquidation under those narrow circumstances and Commerce cannot continue an ultra vires suspension of that kind. View "Sunpreme Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Segway filed a complaint (19 U.S.C. 337) with the International Trade Commission based on infringement of six patents and two trademarks--stylized and non-stylized SEGWAY marks, which cover “motorized, self-propelled, wheeled personal mobility devices, namely, wheelchairs, scooters, utility carts, and chariots.” The complaint alleged that Swagway’s self-balancing hoverboard products, marketed under the names SWAGWAY and SWAGTRON infringed Segway’s marks. Swagway proposed a consent order stipulating that Swagway would not sell or import “SWAGWAY-branded personal transporter products ... all components thereof, packaging and manuals.” Segway opposed the proposal as addressing only a subset of the claims and products at issue. After a hearing, the ALJ found that the accused products did not infringe certain patents and that use of the SWAGWAY designation, but not the SWAGTRON designation, infringed the trademarks. The Commission determined not to review the ALJ’s denial of Swagway’s consent order motion. The Federal Circuit upheld that determination and the trademark infringement determination based on the evidence supporting factors other than likelihood of confusion, including the degree of similarity between the two marks in appearance, the pronunciation of the words, and the strength of the SEGWAY marks. View "Swagway, LLC v. International Trade Commission" on Justia Law

The Department of Commerce imposed an antidumping duty on crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells, whether or not assembled into modules, from China. Commerce assigned Sumec Hardware a separate rate, 24.48%, assigning Sumec’s China-wide entity a margin of 249.96%. In 2015, Hardware's margin was amended to 13.18% pursuant to the U.S. Trade Representative’s decision to implement a related World Trade Organization determination. Commerce later reconsidered and assigned Hardware the China-wide rate. The Trade Court affirmed. Commerce then published a Timken notice, suspended liquidation of entries in accordance with the decision, and later instructed Customs to collect cash deposits on subject merchandise exported by Hardware at the China-wide rate of 238.95% for any entries made after October 15, 2015. In March 2016, Commerce issued liquidation instructions, ordering Customs to liquidate all Hardware entries “at the cash deposit . . . rate in effect.” Sumec sought an injunction, alleging that Commerce should have set the “date for the change in liquidation rate as the date of publication of the Timken [n]otice,” (November 23, 2015) rather than October 15, and that Hardware made entries during this 39-day period, which should have been subject to the 13.18% separate rate. The Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of Sumec’s Motion; Sumec failed to demonstrate irreparable harm. View "Sumecht NA, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Kalle's sausage casings, imported from Germany, are comprised of a woven textile sheet that is coated with a layer of plastic on one side. The plastic coating is thin and “only fills the interstitial spaces between the textile fibers” to ensure that the casing’s “textile character remains recognizable.” The textile gives the casing its strength and shape and allows the casing to “absorb dyes and aroma substances.” The plastic coating helps prevent moisture transmission. After the textile sheet is coated in plastic, it is trimmed, folded to form a tube, and fixed with a seam for importation as flattened tubes wound around a cardboard core. The casings were liquidated by U.S. Customs and Border Protection under Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) subheading 6307.90.98, as “[o]ther made up articles, including dress patterns,” subject to a duty of 7%. Kalle argued that the casings should be classified under subheading 3917.39.0050, which covers “[t]ubes, pipes and hoses and fittings therefor (for example, joints, elbows, flanges), of plastics,” subject to a duty of 3.1%, emphasizing that Note 8 includes “sausage casings and other lay-flat tubing.” The Trade Court granted the government summary judgment. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The casings are not “completely embedded,” or entirely fixed in a surrounding mass of plastic. The court distinguished “impregnated” fabrics. View "Kalle USA, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Amarin markets Vascepa®, a prescription drug consisting of eicosapentaenoic acid in ethyl ester form, synthetically produced from fish oil, intended to reduce triglyceride levels in adult patients with severe hypertriglyceridemia. Vascepa® is the only FDA-approved purified ethyl ester E-EPA product sold in the U.S. Amarin filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission (ITC) under 19 U.S.C. 1337 (Tariff Act), alleging that certain companies were falsely labeling and deceptively advertising their imported synthetically produced omega-3 products as “dietary supplements,” where the products are actually “new drugs” under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) that have not been approved for use in the U.S. Amarin claimed that their importation and sale was an unfair act or unfair method of competition because it violates the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), and the Tariff Act “based upon" FDCA standards. The FDA urged the Commission not to institute an investigation and to dismiss Amarin’s complaint, arguing that the FDCA prohibits private enforcement actions and precludes any claim that would “require[] the Commission to directly apply, enforce, or interpret the FDCA.” The ITC and Federal Circuit agreed.Amarin’s allegations are based entirely on FDCA violations; such claims are precluded by the FDCA, where the FDA has not yet provided guidance as to whether violations have occurred. Although Amarin claimed violations of the Tariff Act, its claims constituted an attempt to enforce the FDCA. View "Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. International Trade Commission" on Justia Law

Rubies imports and sells traditional Christmas Santa Claus costumes, including the “Premier Plush 9 Piece Santa Suit,” which consists of a jacket, pants, gloves, a toy sack, a beard, a wig, a hat, a belt, and shoe covers. Rubies requested a binding pre-importation ruling from U.S. Customs and Border Protection on the tariff classification of the Santa Suit. Customs issued a Ruling Letter HQ, classifying the Santa Suit under several tariff classifications of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS). Rubies contended that all nine pieces fell under HTSUS chapter 95 as “[f]estive . . . articles,” requiring duty-free entry. The Court of International Trade upheld the tariff classification. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The merchandise is excluded from classification as “festive articles” by the notes to HTSUS chapter 95, referring to “fancy dress of textile material.” View "Rubies Costume Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

Irwin imported several styles of hand tools, including straight jaw locking pliers, large jaw locking pliers, curved jaw locking pliers with and without wire cutters, and long nose locking pliers with wire cutters. U.S. Customs and Border Protection classified Irwin’s tools as “wrenches” under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) subheading 8204.12.00 and denied each of Irwin’s protests to classify them as “pliers” under 8203.20.6030. The Trade Court granted Irwin summary judgment that the tools are properly classified as pliers. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The term pliers is not defined by use; it refers to a versatile hand tool with two handles and two jaws that are flat or serrated and are on a pivot, which must be squeezed together to enable the tool to grasp an object. The Irwin tools “1) are versatile hand tools, 2) have two handles, and 3) have two jaws, that are flat or serrated and are on a pivot, which can be squeezed together to enable the tools to grasp an object.” View "Irwin Industrial Tool Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Court of International Trade sustained the remand determination of the Department of Commerce in the first administrative review of the antidumping duty order on large power transformers from Korea. The Federal Circuit affirmed, upholding Commerce’s determination to not make a circumstances of sale adjustment to normal value under 19 U.S.C. 1677b(a)(6)(C)(iii) in the form of a commission offset. Hyundai, the party seeking the adjustment, incurred no commission expenses on home market sales and no commission expenses outside the United States on U.S. sales but did incur commission expenses inside the United States on constructed export price sales in the United States. View "ABB, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Commerce Department issued antidumping and countervailing duty orders covering aluminum extrusions from China under 19 U.S.C. 1671,. In a previous case, the Federal Circuit upheld Commerce's ruling that the orders applied to certain imports of portions of “curtain wall”—the non-structural cladding of certain buildings such as office towers, composed of panels having aluminum frames and glass or other sheathing material, with the panels attached to steel, concrete, or other structural building elements. While that case was pending in the Court of International Trade, Yuanda sought a scope ruling that the orders do not cover curtain wall units when imported under a contract for an entire curtain wall. Commerce rejected that position. The Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit affirmed, first rejecting an argument that two parties lacked constitutional standing because the challenged decision pertains only to Yuanda’s merchandise. The orders exclude “subassemblies” only if they are “imported as part of the finished goods ‘kit," and “all of the necessary curtain wall units are imported at the same time.” That requirement focuses on the physical contents of the “packaged combination” at a particular time, not on contractual obligations that might link one packaged combination to another, later-entering one. Commerce properly found that the curtain wall units as entered were not ready for installation “as is.” View "Shenyang Yuanda Aluminum Industry Engineering Co., Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

The U.S. Department of Commerce, on remand, imposed countervailing and anti-dumping duties (19 U.S.C. 1671) on the importation of solar cells and modules, laminates, and/or panels, containing solar cells imported or sold for importation from China. In defining the class or kind of merchandise within the scope of the orders, Commerce used a new test, rather than the typically-used “substantial transformation” test, to determine the country of origin. If Commerce had used the substantial transformation test, it would have concluded that the country of cell production confers origin because the process of assembling the solar cells into solar panels does not substantially transform those solar cells. The Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit upheld that determination as supported by substantial evidence. The Tariff Act does not require Commerce to define the “class or kind of [foreign] merchandise” in any particular manner. It is reasonable to use the country where the merchandise was assembled to define the class or kind of merchandise within the scope of the orders—especially where, as here, the very imports found to cause injury due to unfair pricing and/or subsidies were panels assembled in China containing cells produced in other countries. View "Canadian Solar, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law