Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The International Trade Commission investigated DeLorme for violating the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. 1337, by importing, selling for importation, or selling after importation “two-way global satellite communication devices, system and components thereof” that allegedly infringed BriarTek’s patent, directed to emergency monitoring and reporting systems comprising a user unit and a monitoring system that communicate through a satellite network. The accused products included DeLorme’s InReach satellite-communication devices and software used with the devices. The Commission terminated the investigation based on entry of a consent order, in which DeLorme agreed not to import, sell for importation, or sell or offer for sale within the U.S. after importation any two-way global satellite communication devices, system, and components thereof, that infringe the Patent until the expiration, invalidation, or unenforceability of the Patent. In 2013, the Commission instituted an enforcement proceeding based on BriarTek’s allegations that DeLorme sold InReach devices containing imported components. DeLorme sought declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity of the patent. While DeLorme’s action was pending, the Commission found that DeLorme violated the Order and imposed a civil penalty of $6,242,500. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Consent Order instead prohibited DeLorme from using imported components only if the components themselves infringed the patent. View "DeLorme Publ'g Co., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Tariff Act of 1930 gives the International Trade Commission authority to remedy only those unfair acts that involve the importation of “articles” as described in 19 U.S.C. 1337(a). The Commission instituted an investigation based on a complaint filed by Align, concerning violation of 19 U.S.C. 1337 by reason of infringement of various claims of seven different patents concerning orthodontic devices. The accused “articles” were the transmission of the “digital models, digital data and treatment plans, expressed as digital data sets, which are virtual three-dimensional models of the desired positions of the patients’ teeth at various stages of orthodontic treatment” from Pakistan to the United States. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the Commission lacked jurisdiction. The Commission’s decision to expand the scope of its jurisdiction to include electronic transmissions of digital data runs counter to the “unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” View "ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

These appeals involve the Fourth and Fifth Administrative Reviews of an anti-dumping duty order covering frozen warm-water shrimp from China. Hilltop, an exporter of subject merchandise from China, was a mandatory respondent in both the Fourth and Fifth Reviews. At the beginning of the review, Hilltop filed a separate rate certification, representing that neither the company nor its affiliates were controlled by the Chinese government, and requested separate rate status, which means it would receive a company-specific anti-dumping duty rate instead of the country-wide rate calculated for the China-wide entity. After receiving information indicating Hilltop might have provided false or incomplete information regarding its affiliates and multiple remands, the Department of Commerce rejected that argument. The Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit upheld the determination that Hilltop is ineligible for an anti-dumping duty rate separate from the country-wide entity and Commerce’s selection of the country-wide rate. View "Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm. v. United States" on Justia Law

Cross Match claimed that defendants violated 19 U.S.C. 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) by importing articles that infringe or are used to infringe its patents. The International Trade Commission entered a limited exclusion order barring importation of certain optical scanning devices. In 2013, the Federal Circuit first vacated and remanded for revision of the order to bar only a subset of the scanners, reasoning that an exclusion order may not be predicated on a theory of induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. 271(b) where direct infringement does not occur until after importation of the articles the exclusion order would bar. In doing so, the panel effectively eliminated trade relief under Section 337 for induced infringement and potentially for all types of infringement of method claims. The Federal Circuit later granted en banc rehearing and upheld the Commission’s position. Because Section 337 does not answer the question, the Commission’s interpretation of Section 337 is entitled to Chevron deference. The Commission’s interpretation is reasonable because it is consistent with Section 337 and Congress’ mandate to the Commission to safeguard United States commercial interests at the border. View "Suprema, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

After receiving antidumping and countervailing duty petitions from an association of U.S. manufacturers of multilayered wood flooring, the International Trade Commission initiated investigations of imports of multilayered wood flooring from China. U.S. importers of multilayered wood flooring from China, participated in the investigations under 19 U.S.C. 1671d(b) and 1673d(b). The Commission found that the domestic multilayered wood flooring industry was materially injured by reason of less-than-fair-value and subsidized subject imports from China. Following remand by the Court of International Trade, the Commission found that “the statutory ‘by reason of’ standard clearly applies to the overall causation analysis to be performed by the Commission,” reopened the record, and continued to find the domestic industry was materially injured by reason of subject imports, stating that “but for the unfairly traded subject . . . imports from China in the U.S. market during the [period of investigation], the domestic industry would have been materially better off both during the housing market collapse and during the developing recovery that followed.” The Trade Court and Federal Circuit affirmed the determination as supported by substantial evidence. View "Swiff-Train Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

Celgard is a developer and manufacturer of battery membranes, used to separate chemical cell components in lithium-ion batteries, preventing contact between the positive and negative electrodes. The patents concerns a separator technology that uses a ceramic composite coating that helps prevent electrical shorting. This technology is used in rechargeable batteries in electronic vehicles and consumer electronic devices such as laptops and cellular phones. Celgard is headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina. SKI is a manufacturer of separators for use in lithium-ion batteries. SKI mainly supplies the separators to third-party manufacturers, but also manufactures batteries that include the separators it produces. SKI’s principal place of business is in Seoul, Korea. All of SKI’s design, manufacturing, and sales operations are based in Korea. Celgard sued SKI for infringement. Celgard sought to establish the district court’s jurisdiction based on allegations that SKI purposefully directed activities at the forum state through sales and offers for sale of its accused separators to residents of North Carolina. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, under either a purposeful-direction theory or a stream-of-commerce theory, noting an absence of evidence that SKI ever sold or offered for sale the accused products in North Carolina. View "Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

ICP imports products sold to food manufacturers, including “white sauce.” In 1998, Customs issued a Ruling Letter, classifying “white sauce” under Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the U.S. (HTSUS) 2103.90.9060 as “sauces and preparations therefor.” In 2005 Customs issued a Notice, without providing statutory notice and comment, reclassifying “white sauce” under HTSUS 0405.20.3000 as “[d]airy spreads,” effecting a tariff increase of almost 2400%. Waves of litigation followed. In 2007, Customs liquidated entries from 2003-2004 under the Notice, imposing a liability of $28 million. After Customs denied a protest, ICP unsuccessfully asked Customs for relief under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c). ICP did not ask Customs to voluntarily reliquidate under 19 U.S.C. 1501, nor seek administrative review of the protest denial, which became final and could not be suspended pending the Federal Circuit decision concerning the Notice. ICP sued without paying the $28 million owed. The Trade Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based on ICP’s failure to pay and for failure to state a claim. In 2014 the Federal Circuit held that the 2005 Notice was subject to the requirements in 19 U.S.C. 1625(c) and was void because Customs failed to comply. The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to the 2003-2004 entries. To invoke Trade Court jurisdiction, an aggrieved importer must file protest under 19 U.S.C. 1514. Once Customs denies that protest, the importer must pay “all liquidated duties, charges, or exactions” owed before commencing suit,28 U.S.C. 2637. The pre-payment requirement is a valid condition attached to the government’s waiver of immunity, and ICP lacked a constitutionally protected property interest. View "Int'l Custom Prods., Inc v. United States" on Justia Law

Carbon imported three entries from China in June-July, 2007, which were subject to an antidumping duty order from the Department of Commerce covering activated carbon from China. Carbon deposited estimated antidumping duties at a rate of 67.14%. An administrative review of the order for the period from October 2006, to March 2008, began in June 2008. Commerce instructed Customs to suspend liquidation of entries imported during the review period. Nonetheless, Customs liquidated Carbon’s entries in 2008 at the rate of 67.14%. Carbon allegedly was unaware of the liquidation and did not then protest under 19 U.S.C. 1514. In November 2009, Commerce published the results of the administrative review. Several parties, including the exporter of Carbon’s entries, Hebei, challenged the results and obtained a preliminary injunction suspending liquidation. Ultimately, the Trade Court sustained a final liquidation rate of 16.35% for entries exported by Hebei, which would have applied to the three Carbon entries, had they not already been liquidated. In June 2012, Carbon first became aware that the entries had been erroneously liquidated. In September 2012, Carbon filed a protest. In October 2013, Carbon sought a refund under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i). The Trade Court found the protest untimely under the 180- day statutory deadline, that filing a timely protest in 2008 would not have been a manifestly inadequate remedy, and that section 1581(i) was not available. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Carbon Activated Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Department of Commerce issued an antidumping duty order covering polyethylene terephthalate (PET) Film from United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2008. JBF manufactures and exports PET Film from UAE, and, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(1), in 2011, requested administrative review of the order. Commerce initiated review in December 2011, but before Commerce published its preliminary results, domestic producers filed an allegation of targeted dumping against JBF and argued Commerce should not use the average-to-average comparison method typically used in administrative reviews because that method would not account for the price differences of JBF’s merchandise, but should use an average-to-transaction method of comparison. In December 2012, Commerce published preliminary results, assigning JBF a dumping margin of 5.31% using its average-to-average comparison methodology. Commerce indicated it “did not have sufficient time to fully analyze [the targeted dumping issue] for purposes of these preliminary results” and that it would “address [the domestic producers’] targeted dumping allegation at a later date.” In March 2013, Commerce published a post-preliminary determination addressing the domestic producers’ allegation of targeted dumping. Using an average-to-transaction comparison methodology, Commerce determined JBF had engaged in targeted dumping and assigned a revised dumping margin of 9.80%. The Court of International Trade and Federal Circuit affirmed. View "JBF RAK LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

Following a 1996 investigation, the Department of Commerce declared that freshwater crawfish tail meat imported from China was subject to antidumping duties. In 2001, JCOF imported that product from Yangzhou, which qualified as a “new exporter” under 19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(2)(B). JCOF obtained, from AHAC , a one-year, continuous $600,000 bond, 19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(2)(B)(iii), made two entries from Yangzhou, and declared a 0% duty rate, the deposit rate then in effect for shipments by Yangzhou. Commerce conducted administrative review of 2001-2002 entries; the final results assigned Yangzhou a 223.01% rate. Customs liquidated the entries and billed JCOF, which failed to pay. Customs sought payment from AHAC, which filed protest. Another exporter challenged Commerce’s 2004 administrative review. Following dissolution of a resultant injunction, which had not applied to Yangzhou, Customs nonetheless reliquidated JCOF’s entries, issued new bills, and denied AHAC’s protest. AHAC did not appeal, but filed another protest, which was denied. Customs demanded $1,157,898.22. AHAC asserted that the collection action was moot because the erroneous reliquidations voided the previous liquidations, so that no valid liquidation occurred and the entries should be deemed liquidated under 19 U.S.C. 1504(d) at the initially-declared 0% rate. The Court of International Trade and Federal Circuit held that AHAC was obligated to pay. The reliquidations voided the original liquidations, but AHAC failed to preserve its rights by timely litigation; the reliquidations became final, “whether legal or not.” The court remanded the issues of equitable and statutory prejudgment interest. View "United States v. Am. Home Assurance Co." on Justia Law