Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2009, following a petition and a related investigation, the Department of Commerce issued anti-dumping orders concerning citric acid and certain citrate salts from Canada and the People's Republic of China: In the Final Scope Determination, Commerce found the portion of GCG’s merchandise consisting of citric acid from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), approximately 35 percent, within the scope of the anti-dumping duty and countervailing duty orders. The Court of International Trade sustained the determination. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Commerce’s application of the Order, assessing a duty on GCG’s product “according to the rates applicable to citric acid from both the PRC and any other country represented in the blend, based upon the quantity and value of citric acid from each country included in the blend,” evidences that Commerce’s interpretation appropriately accounts for both the physical scope of the product as well as the country of origin.View "Global Commodity Grp., LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

In its tax return for the year 1997, ConEd claimed multiple deductions pertaining to a lease-in/lease-out (LILO) tax shelter transaction under which a Dutch utility, EZH, a tax-indifferent entity because it is not subject to U.S. taxation, conveyed to ConEd a gas-fired cogeneration plant that delivers power to customers in the Netherlands, then leased it back, followed by a reconveyance to EZH and a sublease. The stated purpose of the arrangement was tax avoidance. LILO transactions accelerate losses to the taxpayer and defer gains. The transaction provided several upfront deductions that allowed ConEd to pay lower taxes in 1997 (and in later years) than it otherwise would have. The IRS disallowed these claimed deductions and assessed a deficiency of $328,066. ConEd paid the deficiency and filed a refund claim; when this claim was denied, ConEd filed suit. The Claims Court awarded ConEd a full refund. The Federal Circuit reversed, applying the substance-over-form doctrine to conclude that ConEd’s claimed deductions must be disallowed. There was a reasonable likelihood that EZH would exercise its purchase option at the conclusion of the ConEd sublease, thus rendering the master lease illusory. View "Consol. Edison Co. of NY v. United States" on Justia Law

When merchandise is sold in the U.S. at less than fair value, the Commerce Department may impose antidumping duties, 19 U.S.C. 1673e(a)(1), 1677b(a)(1), 1677a(a). Commerce generally determines individual margins for each exporter or producer, but if that is not practicable, may investigate a reasonable number of respondents. Others are assigned a separate “all-others” rate. In proceedings involving non-market economy countries, including China, Commerce presumes that exporters and producers are state-controlled, and assigns them a state-wide rate. This presumption is rebuttable; a company that demonstrates sufficient independence from state control may apply for a separate rate. Commerce concluded that the Jiangsu Jianghai Chemical was entitled to a separate rate. The company subsequently challenged the rate calculation. The Court of International Trade held that Commerce did not exceed the scope of a remand order when it recalculated the U.S. price and that the explanation given for calculation of the separate rate was not unreasonable. The Federal Circuit reversed in part and remanded to Commerce to again reconsider its approach to calculating the separate rate. “Commerce must act non-arbitrarily and must explain why its approach is a ‘reasonable method,’” in light alternatives available and with recognition that the calculation will affect only cooperating respondents. View "Changzhou Wujin Fine Chem. Factory Co., Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

The 392 patent discloses a “four-sided, generally rectangular clamp” for connecting fluid flow elements, especially those used in compressed air systems—filters, regulators, and lubricators. The only independent claim is for a four-sided, generally rectangular clamp having a hinged side that can be opened to receive flanges of the elements and closed to hold the flanges. Norgren complained to the International Trade Commission that importation or sale of SMC devices alleged to infringe the patent violated the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. 1337. The ALJ found no violation, construing the claim to require four projecting rims on the flange of the element whereas SMC flanges have two rims and found the claims nonobvious. The Federal Circuit reversed because the generally rectangular ported flange of the asserted claims was not limited to a flange having four projecting rims. On remand, the ALJ found the asserted claims not invalid under 35 U.S.C. 103. The Commission reversed, finding the asserted claims obvious, and, thus, no section 337 violation. A prior art SMC clamp is four-sided and generally rectangular; addition of a hinge to that connector would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Norgren, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Department of Commerce issued an antidumping duty order on certain stainless steel plate in coils (SSPC). The order states that the products subject to the order are those which are “4.75 mm or more in thickness.” ASB, a Belgian producer of SSPC, requested a scope ruling to determine whether its products, which have nominal thicknesses of 4.75 mm or more but are imported into the U.S. with actual thicknesses less than 4.75 mm, are included within the scope of the order. Commerce determined that the scope of its antidumping order encompasses SSPC having a nominal thickness of 4.75 mm but an actual thickness of less than 4.75 mm. The Court of International Trade affirmed. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the ruling was contrary to the plain language of the order. View "Arcelormittal Stainless Belgium, N.V. v. United States" on Justia Law

Amkor initiated an International Trade Commission investigation, based on the importation, sale for importation, and sale within the U.S. after importation of certain encapsulated integrated circuit devices that allegedly infringed patent claims The Commission determined that the patent was invalid under 35 U.S.C. 102(g)(2). The Federal Circuit reversed. Evidence establishing that there might have been a prior conception is not sufficient to meet the clear and convincing burden needed to invalidate a patent. View "Amkor Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

Shell imported petroleum products, 1993-1994, upon which custom duties, taxes, and other fees were paid. During the same period, Shell exported drawback-eligible substitute finished petroleum derivatives. In 1995-1996, substitution drawback claims were filed with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection on Shell’s behalf. Generally, Customs provides a drawback of 99% of any duty, tax, or fee imposed under federal law upon entry or importation if the merchandise (or a commercially interchangeable substitute) is subsequently exported or destroyed under Customs supervision and not used within the U.S. before exportation or destruction, 19 U.S.C. 1313(j),(p). Drawback claims must be filed within three years of exportation. During the time of Shell’s imports, drawback eligibility of Harbor Maintenance Tax and Environmental Tax payments, which Shell now seeks, were heavily disputed. Shell was found not to have included an express request for HMT and ET in the “net claim” figure. In 1997, after the three-year period for the filing of drawback claims had expired Shell filed protests with Customs, seeking drawback as to HMT and ET payments. Customs denied Shell’s protests. The Court of International Trade found the claims time-barred. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that 1999 and 2004 statutory amendments did not change Shell’s position. View "Shell Oil Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2004 Ford owned the British car maker Jaguar. In 2004 and 2005, Ford imported Jaguar-brand cars. On the cars’ entry into the U. S., Ford deposited estimated duty payments with Customs. Ford subsequently concluded that its estimates were too high and filed reconciliation entries seeking a refund. The total refund claimed, across nine disputed entries at issue, was about $6.2 million. The general one-year time period imposed for liquidating such entries had long expired when Ford filed suit, 19 U.S.C. 1504(a). The Court of International Trade rejected the complaint’s assertion of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i), the Tariff Act’s grant of residual jurisdiction over matters concerning enforcement and administration of duty assessment. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding valid invocation of the court’s residual jurisdiction, as the importer could not have asserted jurisdiction under any of the other enumerated provisions of section 1581. Post-complaint efforts by Customs to clear the importer’s accounts did not undo such jurisdiction. View "Ford Motor Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

Jensen, a licensed customs broker, filed with Customs 308 protests on behalf of importers, seeking reliquidation of 1,529 entries of softwood lumber from Canada. More than two years later, Jensen inquired about the status of the protests. After nearly two months, Customs replied that the protests had been consolidated under a “lead protest” and that a draft decision letter had been prepared, but not finalized, and suggested that Jensen contact the Port of Detroit for a list of consolidated protests. Jensen expressed concern that Port of Detroit might not possess a complete list, as some protests had been filed in other ports. Receiving no response, Jensen filed suit in the Court of International Trade to preserve appeal rights. Customs subsequently stated, via email, that pursuant to 19 C.F.R. 177.7(b), it would not issue a ruling with respect to any issue pending before the Court of International Trade. Jensen then sought a writ of mandamus to compel Customs to rule on its protests. The Court of International Trade held that it lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i), reasoning that Jensen could seek accelerated disposition of its protests by Customs under 19 U.S.C. 1515(b) and contest any subsequent denial. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Norman G. Jensen, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Avisma produces magnesium and titanium sponge in Russia. The process starts with a dehydration step. Most of the resultant raw magnesium is then processed into pure and alloyed magnesium, the subject of an antidumping order issued by Commerce in response to a petition by domestic producers. A portion of the raw magnesium is used to produce titanium sponge. After Commerce imposed a 15.77 percent duty, the Trade Court remanded the case. On remand, Commerce declined to alter the determination. The Trade Court then held that, when determining Avisma’s magnesium production costs for purposes of calculating the constructed value of Avisma’s magnesium, Commerce was required to take into account Avisma’s entire production process, which includes titanium, as well as magnesium. In its second remand determination, Commerce determined the constructed value of Avisma’s magnesium by taking into account Avisma’s entire production process, resulting in an antidumping duty of 8.51 percent. The Trade Court issued final judgment accordingly. The Federal Circuit reversed and reinstated Commerce’s earlier decision. The Trade Court erred in requiring Commerce to consider an affidavit by Avisma’s accountant that Commerce had determined was untimely. View "PSC VSMPO-Avisma Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law