Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

During Mayberry’s tenure as a civilian employee with the FBI, he elected Becker to receive survivor benefits under the Federal Employees Retirement System upon his death. They were married for less than nine months and had no children together when Mayberry died. Becker applied for survivor benefits with the Office of Personnel Management, which denied her application, citing 5 U.S.C. 8441(1), which identifies a widow as a “surviving wife” who: “was married to [the covered decedent] for at least [nine] months immediately before his death” or “is the mother of issue by that marriage.” An administrative judge for the Merit Systems Protection denied her request to seek information regarding whether OPM had ever waived the nine-month requirement for prior applicants, and whether OPM had ever sufficiently explained the nine-month requirement to Mayberry. The denial became the final decision of the Board. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that 5 U.S.C. 8441(1) is unconstitutional and that the Board improperly denied her discovery requests. The court applied the rational basis test and cited Supreme Court precedent. View "Becker v. Office of Personnel Management" on Justia Law

Before October 2012, Army emergency medical technicians and paramedics serving at Fort Stewart, Liberty, Georgia (EMTs) were generally scheduled for a compressed schedule consisting of 24 hours on-duty followed by 48 hours off-duty. After October 2012, the EMTs switched to a schedule consisting of two 48-hour workweeks. Because the EMTs remain at their work stations more than 40 hours in one week, they were entitled to Fair Labor Standards Act overtime pay. For a typical biweekly pay period, the government compensated the EMTs with basic pay under the Federal Employees Pay Act (Title 5); standby duty premium pay under Title 5; and FLSA overtime pay for regularly scheduled overtime. Current and former EMTs filed suit, alleging that the government underpaid them by using an incorrect formula to calculate FLSA overtime. The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government. The EMTs receive “the straight time rate of pay times all overtime hours worked” when the government pays them annual premium standby pay in addition to basic pay. The EMTs are not entitled to a windfall, particularly where the very nature of standby work means that the employees are not actively working all hours for which they receive pay. View "Alamo v. United States" on Justia Law

Fedora began working for the Postal Service in 1980 and retired in 2012, then filed an appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board alleging that his retirement was involuntary and amounted to constructive discharge. He claimed that he was forced to perform work in violation of his medical restrictions, was harassed, and was threatened with loss of his pension. An administrative judge found that Fedora had failed to make a non-frivolous allegation and dismissed. The Board issued a final order affirming the AJ’s decision, stating that the Federal Circuit “must receive [his] request for review no later than 60 calendar days after the date of [the Board’s] order.” . He filed a petition for review on October 20, 2014, within 60 days of his receipt of the order (August 19), but not within 60 days of issuance of the notice (August 15). Fedora argued that the Board’s final order directed him to the court's “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which incorrectly instructed that a petitioner “may file a petition for review in this court within 60 days of receipt of the Board’s decision.” The Federal Circuit dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction, 5 U.S.C. 7703(b)(1)(A), stating that it lacks authority to equitably toll the filing requirements. View "Fedora v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

The Budget Control Act of 2011 established spending limits for federal agencies and required automatic spending cuts (sequestration) if certain deficit reduction legislation was not enacted. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 required the President to issue a sequestration order near the middle of fiscal year 2013. Under President Obama’s sequestration the Department of Defense (DOD) 2013 budget was cut by approximately 37 billion dollars, to be absorbed over six months. The DOD reprogrammed funds, reduced facility maintenance, eliminated some military training exercises, and furloughed civilian workers. Calhoun is a non-excepted civilian Doctrine Defense Specialist for the Army Cyber Command (ACC). ACC Commander Lt. Gen. Hernandez, the deciding official, delegated that authority to his Chief of Staff, Col. Sanborn. Calhoun received a Notice of Proposed Furlough. Calhoun replied, including budget proposals she asserted would prevent furloughs. In responses to Calhoun, Col. Sanborn stated that he had read her submissions and that “[t]he furlough guidance … is clear.” Calhoun was furloughed for six nonconsecutive days. An administrative judge found that delegation to Col. Sanborn did not violate DOD policy; that Col. Sanborn appropriately considered Calhoun’s reply; and that evaluation of the merits of her proposals was beyond the scope of his review. The Merit Systems Protection Board and the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding no due process violation because Col. Sanborn considered Calhoun’s written reply and because a summary of her oral reply would not have altered the furlough decision. View "Calhoun v. Department of the Army" on Justia Law

Gallegos worked for the FDA, 1980-2000. He was removed for refusal to accept a reassignment that required relocation. Gallegos appealed to the Merit System Protection Board. In 2001, the parties entered into a settlement, providing that the Agency would expunge from Gallegos’s file and Standard Form 50 any indication that he was removed. A revised SF50 would indicate “voluntary resignation.” Gallegos was to “be provided with a copy of the revised SF50 … notify the Agency of any concerns within 15-days.” The Board approved the settlement, noting that any petition for enforcement must be filed within a reasonable period after discovery of noncompliance, consistent with 5 C.F.R. 1201.182(a). Almost 14 years later, Gallegos alleged that he discovered that his revised SF-50 indicated resignation “in lieu of involuntary action.” Gallegos alleged that he had misplaced the agreement and was only able to confirm the breach by obtaining a copy in response to a FOIA request. In 2015, Gallegos filed a petition for enforcement with the Board. An administrative judge concluded that Gallegos had received the revised SF-50 14 years earlier, and that Gallegos did not establish good cause for the delay. The Board and Federal Circuit affirmed, noting Gallegos’s failure to maintain a copy of the agreement and his apparent failure to compare the SF-50 with the settlement agreement. Gallegos did not establish good cause for untimely filing. View "Gallegos v. Merit System Protection Board" on Justia Law

Wilson was a civilian Resource Analyst at the Nuclear Propulsion Directorate at the Naval Sea Systems Command, which required a Department of Energy security clearance. The DOE revoked Wilson’s security clearance, stating that Wilson: knowingly brought a personal firearm onto a Navy facility in violation of regulations; armed himself with a personal weapon while acting as a Metropolitan Police Department reserve officer, contrary to regulations; and made false statements and false time and attendance entries to his civilian employer, the Naval Reserve Unit and the MPD. Wilson maintains that he brought his firearm to the facility in response to the 2013 Washington Navy Yard shooting, in perceived compliance with his duty as a Navy Reservist, and requested reinstatement under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301. The Navy removed Wilson from federal service. A Merit Systems Protection Board administrative judge determined that the Board lacked authority to consider claims of discrimination or reprisal in the context of a removal based on security clearance revocation; that the Navy provided him the procedural protections of 5 U.S.C. 7513(b); and that the Navy did not have a policy to reassign employees to alternate positions that do not require a security clearance. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s finding that it lacked the authority to consider Wilson’s USERRA claim. View "Wilson v. Department of the Navy" on Justia Law

Miller worked as the Superintendent of Industries at the Beaumont, Texas Federal Correctional Complex, overseeing a prison factory that produced ballistic helmets primarily for military use. Miller occasionally served associate warden and was described by Warden Upton as “a fantastic employee.” In 2009, Miller disclosed to the government-owned corporation that ran the prison and to Upton what he perceived to be mismanagement of factory funds. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an inspection. Upton asked Miller to not report to the factory that day. The next day, Miller reported that there had been “sabotage” at the factory, and urged that it be closed pending investigation. Hours later, Upton informed Miller that he was being reassigned. Upton later testified that OIG was concerned that Miller might compromise its investigation. Over the next four and a half years, Miller was assigned to low-level positions. Upton attributed his reassignments to unidentified OIG staff. Eventually, Upton reassigned Miller to sit on a couch in the lobby for eight months. Miller appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, alleging violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8). The Administrative Judge found that the government had rebutted his case. The Federal Circuit reversed. The government did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have reassigned Miller absent his protected disclosures. View "Miller v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Graviss has worked in education since 1978. In 2008, she became a pre-school special needs teacher at Kingsolver Elementary, part of Fort Knox Schools. Kingsolver’s principal, McClain, issued Graviss a reprimand based on an “inappropriate interaction with a student” and “failure to follow directives,” asserting that Graviss and her aide had physically carried a misbehaving pre-school student and Graviss had emailed concerns to the director of special education, although McClain had directed Graviss to “bring all issues directly to [her].” The union filed a grievance. Subsequently, one of Graviss’s students had an episode, repeatedly flailing his arms, kicking, and screaming. While the other students were out at recess, Graviss employed physical restraint to subdue the child. After an investigation, McClain submitted a Family Advocacy Program Department of Defense Education Activity Serious Incident Report and Alleged Child Abuse Report to the Family Advocacy Program (child protective services for the military). McClain forwarded the Report to her direct supervisor, who was later the decision-maker in Graviss’s termination. An arbitrator concluded that that Graviss's termination promoted the efficiency of the service and was reasonable. The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that Graviss’s due process rights were violated by improper ex parte communication between a supervisor and the deciding official. That communication contained new information that the supervisor wanted Graviss terminated for insubordination. View "Federal Education Association v. Department of Defense" on Justia Law

In 2013, Cleaton, a Correctional Officer at the Federal Correctional Complex in Petersburg, Virginia, was indicted in Virginia state court on a felony charge for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. He pled no contest to the felony charge pursuant to a plea deal. The court deferred the imposition of the sentence “upon the condition that defendant cooperate fully with the requests for information made by the Probation Officer, who is directed to conduct a thorough investigation and to file a long-form presentence report with the Court.” Weeks later, the Bureau of Prisons proposed to remove Cleaton from his position pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7371(b). The Merit System Protection Board upheld the removal, rejecting Cleaton’s claim that he had not been convicted of a felony. After Cleaton was removed, he obtained new counsel and entered into a revised plea agreement. The court clarified that, upon successful completion of the probation period, the charges against Cleaton will be dismissed. The Federal Circuit affirmed. An individual can be “convicted” for purposes of section 7371(b) “once guilt has been established whether by plea or by verdict and nothing remains to be done except pass sentence.” View "Cleaton v. Dept. of Justice" on Justia Law

Purifoy missed two days of work as a housekeeping aid in a Milwaukee VA medical facility without authorization. That week, he sought treatment for substance abuse at the facility where he worked. He was admitted and transferred to Madison for treatment. Purifoy verbally informed his VA supervisor that he would miss work, but did not fill out leave paperwork. Nor did he inform his parole officer that he would miss upcoming supervision visits. His parole officer issued an arrest warrant. Purifoy agreed to report to the Milwaukee Secure Detention Facility of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections for treatment as an alternative to parole revocation. He entered the program, but was terminated after an altercation with another inmate; he remained as an inmate at MSDF for 38 more days. Following his release, Purifoy returned to work. The VA removed him from employment as a penalty for his unexcused absences, having first sent him a notice of proposed removal while he was at MSDF. A second notice cited two instances of extended unauthorized absence. Although an ALJ ordered Purifoy reinstated, the Merit Systems Protection Board upheld the termination. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that the Board’s analysist improperly omitted relevant mitigation factors and discarded the ALJ’s credibility determinations without adequate rationale. View "Purifoy v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law