Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The National Federation of Federal Employees Local 1442 filed a group grievance on behalf of 138 NFFE bargaining unit employees at Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD); Local 2109 filed two grievances on behalf of all of bargaining unit employees at Watervliet Arsenal (WVA). In both grievances, the Union challenged the furloughing of bargaining unit employees for six discontinuous days between July and September in Fiscal Year 2013. The furloughs were the result of an automatic process of federal agency spending reductions called “sequestration.” Arbitrator Kaplan ruled that the furloughs of the employees at LEAD were in accordance with law. Months later, Arbitrator Gross ruled that the furloughs of WVA security employees were not in accordance with law, but that the furloughs of non-security bargaining unit employees at WVA were in accordance with law. The Federal Circuit upheld both decisions. Arbitrators Kaplan and Gross had substantial evidence before them demonstrating that the furlough decisions were reasonable management solutions to the financial restrictions placed on DOD by the sequester, thus promoting the efficiency of the service. View "Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Dep't of the Army" on Justia Law

In 1997 Seagate recruited Dr. Shukh, a native of Belarus, to move to the U.S. Shukh executed Seagate’s standard Employment Agreement, assigning to Seagate all “right, title, and interest in and to any inventions” made while at Seagate. Seagate prohibited employees from filing patent applications for their inventions. During his employment, Shukh was named as an inventor on 17 patents. Shukh’s time at Seagate was tumultuous. His performance evaluations indicated that he did not work well with others due to his confrontational style. In 2009, Seagate terminated Shukh and 178 others. Shukh has not yet secured employment and claims that he was told that he would never find employment at certain companies with his reputation. Shukh alleges that Seagate wrongfully omitted him as an inventor from several patents relating to semiconductor technologies; that Seagate discriminated against and terminated him based national origin and in retaliation for complaining about discrimination. He sought correction of inventorship of the disputed patents under 35 U.S.C. 256. The district court held that Shukh had no interest in the patents based on the assignment; dismissed claims for rescission of his Employment Agreement, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment; and rejected claims of reputational harm, retaliation, fraud, and discrimination on summary judgment. The Federal Circuit vacated with respect to correction of inventorship, but otherwise affirmed. There is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Shukh’s negative reputation is traceable to Seagate’s omission of Shukh as an inventor from disputed patents. View "Shukh v. Seagate Tech., LLC" on Justia Law

The Department of the Navy furloughed Einboden, a civilian employee for six days in 2013 as part of budget cuts made pursuant to sequestration legislation, 2 U.S.C. 901a. Einboden argued that his position was not subject to the cuts because money saved by the furlough could have been transferred from the Navy working capital fund to other activities with appropriate notice to the congressional defense committees. An AJ and the Merit Systems Protection Board upheld the decision, finding that the furlough was a “reasonable management solution to the financial issues facing the agency,” that notice of proposed furlough was not procedurally deficient, and that “although [Einboden’s work group] may have had adequate funding to avoid a furlough . . . , it was reasonable for DOD to consider its budget holistically, rather than isolating the situation of each individual Navy.” The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting Einboden’s contention that the Navy should be required to show actual re-programming of the funds saved by his furlough. View "Einboden v. Dep't of the Navy" on Justia Law

In 2008 Miller was appointed by the Department of the Interior, National Park Service, as Park Superintendent, GS-13, for Sitka National Historical Park (SNHP). In 2010, Miller was removed from her position after she refused a management-directed reassignment to a different position at the same grade and pay in Anchorage, Alaska. The Merit Systems Protection Board sustained the removal action, but later vacated the Initial Decision, reversed Miller’s removal, and ordered Miller’s reinstatement to her position as Park Superintendent. The Office of Personnel Management sought review. The Federal Circuit reversed. Substantial evidence supported the Initial Decision that the agency established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it had legitimate management reasons for Miller’s reassignment; and that Miller failed to rebut the agency’s prima facie case. View "Cobert v. Miller" on Justia Law

Shapiro began working for the Social Security Administration as an administrative law judge in 1997. As early as 1998, the Agency informed Shapiro that his performance was lacking. Shapiro’s poor performance continued and, in early 2000, “a tremendous backlog” of cases in his docket became apparent. The Agency began to take an active role in assisting Shapiro, including reviewing cases, drafting decisions, and returning them for signature. Shapiro’s performance, however, did not improve. The Agency continued to provide assistance and issue warnings until Shapiro’s supervisor concluded that “despite the extraordinary efforts to assist him, to mentor him, [and] to train him,” Shapiro could not manage his docket to meet expectations. The Agency filed a complaint under 5 U.S.C. 7521, with the Merit System Protection Board seeking a finding of good cause to remove Shapiro based on “unacceptable performance” and “neglect of duty.” The Federal Circuit affirmed the finding of good cause, noting that Shapiro’s production was dramatically lower than similarly situated ALJs, and that this failure to manage his caseload constituted good cause for removal. View "Shapiro v. Soc. Sec. Admin." on Justia Law

Konig’s SRI Employment Agreement, stated: I agree ….To promptly disclose… all discoveries, improvements, and inventions, including software … during … my employment, and … to effect transfer of ownership … to SRI . . . . I understand that termination of this employment shall not release me from my obligations. While employed by SRI, Konig started generating documents relating to a personalized information services idea called “Personal Web” and formed a company, Utopy. Konig left SRI and filed a provisional patent application in 1999; the 040 patent issued in 2005. In 2001, Konig asked an SRI scientist to test the Utopy products. The 040 patent was eventually assigned to PUM. Konig filed another patent application in 2008. PUM was the assignee; the 276 patent issued in 2010. In 2009, PUM sued Google, asserting infringement. PUM provided interrogatory responses that asserted that the conception of the inventions was while Konig was still at SRI. Google had acquired “any rights” that SRI had and counterclaimed breach of contract. The court stated that no reasonable juror could have found that the injury was “inherently unknowable,” applied the three-year limitations period for contracts claims, and granted PUM judgment on the counterclaim. The court also entered judgment of invalidity and noninfringement. The Federal Circuit affirmed, noting that the claim construction had no effect on the outcome and declining to issue an advisory opinion. View "Personalized User Model, LLP v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law

The Defense Contract Management Agency within the Department of Defense (DOD) employed Vassallo as a computer engineer in 2012. That summer, it announced a vacancy for the position of Lead Interdisciplinary Engineer, stating that only certain individuals could apply: “[c]urrent [DCMA]” employees or “[c]urrent [DOD] [e]mployee[s] with the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics . . . [w]orkforce who are outside of the Military Components.” Vassallo, a veteran, applied, but DCMA rejected his application. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) determined that DOD was not required to afford him veterans employment preferences under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA), 112 Stat. 3182. OPM defines the word “agency” in 5 U.S.C. 3304(f)(1) to mean “Executive agency” as defined in 5 U.S.C. 105 and concluded that DCMA was not required to give Vassallo an opportunity to compete under 5 U.S.C. 3304(f)(1) because the DOD— the agency making the announcement—did not accept applications from outside its own workforce. Vassallo sought corrective action from the Merit Systems Protection Board, which concluded that OPM’s regulation permissibly fills a gap in the governing statute. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the OPM regulation contradicts the plain terms of the statute and unreasonably undermines the purpose of the VEOA. View "Vassallo v. Dept. of Defense" on Justia Law

Ryan was employed by FEMA (Department of Homeland Security). Her position required top secret security clearance. The agency suspended Ryan’s access to classified information after learning she had been indicted on federal charges of conflict of interest, soliciting a gratuity, and making a false statement. FEMA indefinitely suspended her without pay pending final determination by FEMA's Chief Security Officer concernng future eligibility for access to classified information. Ryan appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Although Ryan was acquitted, the MSPB found she was not entitled to immediate termination of the suspension because it “was based upon the suspension of her clearance and not the underlying reasons … (the indictment)” and MRPB cannot order reinstatement to a position requiring access to classified information while Ryan is without the required clearance. Ryan filed another appeal asserting unreasonable delay in adjudication of her security clearance. The MSPB affirmed dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In a third decision, the MSPB found the basis for her suspension was not constructively amended. The Federal Circuit affirmed, noting that “denial of a security clearance . . . is not subject to [MSPB] review.” It was Ryan’s inability to access classified information, not the underlying reasons for the inability, that caused her suspension. View "Ryan v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

Appleberry worked for the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, under a collective bargaining agreement. Deeming her performance unsatisfactory, the agency placed her on a “performance improvement plan” and then found that she failed to improve. Eventually, relying on that failure, the agency fired her. When Appleberry brought her removal to arbitration, as authorized (but not required) by the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator concluded that she could not challenge the key bases for the removal, i.e., the agency determinations that she should be placed on the performance-improvement plan and that she failed under the plan; that the collective bargaining agreement, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7121, prescribed the exclusive process, including time limits, for challenging those determinations; but that Appleberry had abandoned that process after initiating it through filing grievances, allowing the time for completing challenges to run. The arbitrator barred reconsideration of “issues that were raised in [her] earlier grievances, or that could have been raised but were not.” The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the arbitrator should not have barred consideration of the performance-improvement-plan issues raised in her earlier, uncompleted grievances; the arbitrator properly enforced the grievance process designated as “exclusive” in the collective bargaining agreement. View "Appleberry v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

The Forest Service removed Bernard, a firefighter, from his position as supervisor. Bernard appealed. The agency and Bernard settled: the agency reinstated him in a non-supervisory role and provided back pay, promising that Bernard would not be restricted from applying for supervisory positions and would be given future fire assignments “the same as any other employee.” To receive assignments, an employee must have an Incident Qualification Card (red card), listing specific firefighting positions the employee is qualified to fill. A renewal card requires completion of annual training. Five months after his reinstatement, Bernard successfully completed the course. Other participants received renewal cards, but the agency did not issue a card to Bernard, indicating that an audit of his records found too few hard-copy documents supporting the entries. Bernard provided a copy of his 2010 card, signed by a certifying official, listing Bernard as qualified, until 2014, for 11 firefighting positions. After the agency requested additional documentation, Bernard notified it of a potential breach of the settlement, and received a card certifying him for seven positions. Bernard petitioned the Merit Systems Protection Board. An administrative judge found that Bernard had not established a breach, and— without acknowledging repeated requests for discovery—that Bernard “did not support his bare allegations with any evidence illustrating bad faith” and retaliation. The Federal Circuit vacated. The Board improperly denied discovery of potentially relevant evidence. View "Bernard v. Dep't of Agric." on Justia Law