Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gallo served as an FAA air traffic control specialist from 1982 until 1995 when she experienced a job-related injury for which she received OWCP benefits. Gallo recovered enough to return to light duty. In 1996 she lost her medical certification to continue as an operational ATCS. Until 2000 she was assigned to a “non-operational” automation specialist position, which did not provide the same retirement credit or weekend pay. She received OWCP benefits for the differential. Gallo fully recovered in 2000 and received medical clearance; the Agency terminated OWCP benefit. She applied for restoration under 5 U.S.C. 8151(b)(2), which provides the right to priority consideration for restoration to federal employees who have overcome a compensable injury. The Agency assigned Gallo to a supervisory ATCS position. In setting her salary, the Agency did not take into account pay increases granted to operational ATCS employees during while Gallo was working as an automation specialist. The Merit Systems Protection Board denied her claim. The Federal Circuit reversed. The Board erred in interpreting “resumes employment with the Federal Government” under section 8151(a), and any pay increases that Gallo would have received based on her creditable service time with the federal government are “benefits based on length of service.” View "Gallo v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

In 2008, Rocha was appointed to an excepted service position at the State Department. By letter (July, 2010), the Department informed Rocha that his appointment would soon expire and that the agency would not convert his appointment into a career or career-conditional position. An administrative judge concluded that the board had no jurisdiction over Rocha’s appeal because he was serving under an excepted service appointment in the Federal Career Intern Program. Rocha was informed by the administrative judge that the decision would become final on December 15, 2010. The initial decision was served upon Rocha by email; he had consented to electronic filing. On June 3, 2011, Rocha filed a petition with the board, which informed Rocha that his petition was untimely and that it would consider the merits only if he established good cause for untimely filing. In response, Rocha asserted that he never received notification that his case had been dismissed. On December 22, the board dismissed, noting that its regulations require an e-filer to monitor case activity at e-Appeal Online to ensure receipt of all documents. Rocha presented no evidence of circumstances beyond his control that affected his ability to comply with time limits. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Rocha v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd." on Justia Law

A subsidiary of Marathon hired Preston as a relief pumper in Marathon’s coal bed methane well operation. After beginning work, Preston signed an Employee Agreement containing the assignment at issue. Later, Preston worked with Marathon Engineer Smith on a baffle system to improve machinery used to extract methane gas from water-saturated coal in a coal bed methane gas well. Marathon installed the system on wells. After Preston’s employment ended, both Marathon and Preston pursued patents. The district court declared that Preston is the sole inventor of one patent and that Smith was misjoined as an inventor; ordered the PTO to issue a new certificate reflecting Preston as the sole inventor; declared Marathon the owner of other patents pursuant to the employment agreement and that Preston breached the agreement for failing to assign his rights. The court entered summary judgment in favor of Marathon on its shop right claim, finding that, even if Marathon did not own the patents, it had a shop right to practice the inventions. The Federal Circuit affirmed that Preston assigned his rights in two inventions to Marathon pursuant to his employment agreement. Because that assignment was automatic, there was no breach of that agreement. View "Preston v. Marathon Oil Co." on Justia Law

Whitmore began his federal government career in 1972. In 1990 his group transferred to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Prior to 2005, Whitmore regularly received better than satisfactory performance reviews, bonuses, and awards, and was never subject to discipline. In 2005, Whitmore began making public disclosures that OSHA was failing to enforce its recordkeeping requirements and acquiescing in industry reports of impossibly low numbers of injuries and illnesses. He provided comments to newspapers. Also in 2005, Whitmore provided an affidavit supporting a co-worker in her Equal Employment Opportunity complaint for alleged discrimination and retaliation by her managers at OSHA. Due to various medical and personal matters, Whitmore took significant leave from work. Following a number of additional incidents, he was removed from his position. The Merit Systems Protection Board upheld the termination. The Federal Circuit reversed. In analyzing whether the DOL had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Whitmore would have been removed regard-less of his whistleblowing disclosures (5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)), the MSPB excluded or ignored evidence offered by Whitmore necessary to adjudicate Whitmore’s retaliation claim, and otherwise applied the law incorrectly. View "Whitmore v. Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Naval Criminal Investigative Service engineer since 1984, agreed to a transfer in 2002. The transfer was delayed because of her mother’s poor health. Shortly before the transfer was to occur, she voluntarily responded to a summons to act as a grand juror. The Navy paid her while she served as a grand juror (5 U.S.C. 6322(a)), but ordered her to report to Washington year later and directed her not to seek or accept extension of her grand jury duties. She nonetheless was sworn in for a second term. The Navy declared her to be AWOL, the Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed an appeal, and she was terminated from her employment. The claims court granted summary judgment in favor of the government on pre-removal back pay claim and dismissed, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, her post- removal claims for back pay, reinstatement, and other forms of compensation. The Federal Circuit reversed in part, holding that the claims court erred in interpreting 5 U.S.C. 6322(a), which entitles a grand juror to court leave when "summoned," regardless of whether the grand juror volunteered to be summoned. View "Hall v. United States" on Justia Law

Norris was an SEC trial attorney from 1992, until he was removed in 2009. He had twice previously been disciplined for exercising poor judgment and misuse of government email. The firing was based on emails expressing political views, demeaning support staff, and sending a confidential suspicious activity report to an appointed receiver in violation of SEC policies. Norris claimed that the 2008 emails were influenced by his wife becoming fully disabled, his daughter suffering from Asperger's Disorder, and his own adult AD/HD. The union submitted the removal to arbitration. During the hearing, the arbitrator received testimony that Norris had a confrontation with agency commissioners in 2007 and that he was barred from presenting cases to commissioners in the future; Norris denied the allegation. Norris testified that his personal circumstances had improved. The arbitrator affirmed the firing. The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that the arbitrator should have considered evidence of post-removal change in circumstances to determine whether the penalty was reasonable. The court cautioned the arbitrator not to consider information not included in the notice of removal the 2007 incident). View "Norris v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioner served 26 years in the U.S. Army. Following his discharge, he began working in a civil service position as a maintenance management specialist for the Department of the Navy. His appointment was subject to completion of a one-year probationary period. Petitioner had no previous federal civilian service. Before expiration of the probationary period, the agency notified petitioner that he would be terminated from his position for unacceptable performance. He sought to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board. The administrative judge found that petitioner had no statutory right of appeal to the Board and that, as a probationary employee, petitioner's rights before the Board were limited to those defined by OPM regulations allowing appeal only if the termination was based on partisan political reasons or was the result of discrimination based on marital status, 5 C.F.R. 315.806(b). The Board rejected petitioner's claim that his military service should count toward completion of the one-year period of continuous service needed to qualify for Board review. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that petitioner did not qualify as an employee within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 7511(a)(1)(A). View "Wilder v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into a "Stipulation Agreement Regarding Damages," approved by the EEOC, to resolve her Title VII pregnancy discrimination claim against the U.S. Postal Service. She later filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging breached of that Agreement. The court held that it did not have jurisdiction because the Agreement was a consent decree, not a contract. In the federal system, when the United States is the defendant, whether the issue is enforcement of a court decree by the issuing forum or enforcement of a settlement contract in a separate suit determines which court can hear the case. The Federal Circuit reversed, stating that the "dispute is yet another example of the wastefulness of litigation over where to litigate." Consent decrees and settlement agreements are not necessarily mutually exclusive; a settlement agreement, even one embodied in a decree, is a contract within the meaning of the Tucker Act. View "VanDesande v. United States" on Justia Law

A civilian employee of the Department of Defense retired in 2007 then served as a re-employed annuitant for a two-year term ending January 3, 2009. Like many Department employees, he was subject to the National Security Personnel System, and eligible for performance-based bonuses and salary increases until the system was repealed in 2009. He qualified in 2008, but was ineligible for a salary increase because of his two-year contract; by regulation, the effective date of any salary increase would be the first day of the first pay period on or after January 1. The Department denied a bonus, arguing that the effective date was the same as the effective of a salary increase. The employee argued that the effective date should be either the end of the appraisal period (September 30, 2008) or the first day of the following year. In his class action under the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, the district court ruled in favor of the Department. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the court had jurisdiction under the Act and deferring to the agency's interpretation of its own regulation. View "Price v. Panetta" on Justia Law

From 2000 to 2008, plaintiff worked in a permanent position as an attorney in the Department of Homeland Security. She then spent about eight months in an excepted temporary appointment as an Immigration Judge. Upon the completion of a background investigation, she started a permanent excepted appointment as an Immigration Judge. About 17 months later, the DOJ terminated her appointment based on alleged misconduct. An ALJ dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. 7511(a)(1)(C)(ii). The Board denied review. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff did not meet the statutory definition of employee as one "who has completed 2 years of current continuous service in the same or similar positions in an Executive agency under other than a temporary appointment limited to 2 years or less." View "Roy v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd." on Justia Law