Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner served 26 years in the U.S. Army. Following his discharge, he began working in a civil service position as a maintenance management specialist for the Department of the Navy. His appointment was subject to completion of a one-year probationary period. Petitioner had no previous federal civilian service. Before expiration of the probationary period, the agency notified petitioner that he would be terminated from his position for unacceptable performance. He sought to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board. The administrative judge found that petitioner had no statutory right of appeal to the Board and that, as a probationary employee, petitioner's rights before the Board were limited to those defined by OPM regulations allowing appeal only if the termination was based on partisan political reasons or was the result of discrimination based on marital status, 5 C.F.R. 315.806(b). The Board rejected petitioner's claim that his military service should count toward completion of the one-year period of continuous service needed to qualify for Board review. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that petitioner did not qualify as an employee within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 7511(a)(1)(A). View "Wilder v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into a "Stipulation Agreement Regarding Damages," approved by the EEOC, to resolve her Title VII pregnancy discrimination claim against the U.S. Postal Service. She later filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging breached of that Agreement. The court held that it did not have jurisdiction because the Agreement was a consent decree, not a contract. In the federal system, when the United States is the defendant, whether the issue is enforcement of a court decree by the issuing forum or enforcement of a settlement contract in a separate suit determines which court can hear the case. The Federal Circuit reversed, stating that the "dispute is yet another example of the wastefulness of litigation over where to litigate." Consent decrees and settlement agreements are not necessarily mutually exclusive; a settlement agreement, even one embodied in a decree, is a contract within the meaning of the Tucker Act. View "VanDesande v. United States" on Justia Law

A civilian employee of the Department of Defense retired in 2007 then served as a re-employed annuitant for a two-year term ending January 3, 2009. Like many Department employees, he was subject to the National Security Personnel System, and eligible for performance-based bonuses and salary increases until the system was repealed in 2009. He qualified in 2008, but was ineligible for a salary increase because of his two-year contract; by regulation, the effective date of any salary increase would be the first day of the first pay period on or after January 1. The Department denied a bonus, arguing that the effective date was the same as the effective of a salary increase. The employee argued that the effective date should be either the end of the appraisal period (September 30, 2008) or the first day of the following year. In his class action under the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, the district court ruled in favor of the Department. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the court had jurisdiction under the Act and deferring to the agency's interpretation of its own regulation. View "Price v. Panetta" on Justia Law

From 2000 to 2008, plaintiff worked in a permanent position as an attorney in the Department of Homeland Security. She then spent about eight months in an excepted temporary appointment as an Immigration Judge. Upon the completion of a background investigation, she started a permanent excepted appointment as an Immigration Judge. About 17 months later, the DOJ terminated her appointment based on alleged misconduct. An ALJ dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. 7511(a)(1)(C)(ii). The Board denied review. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff did not meet the statutory definition of employee as one "who has completed 2 years of current continuous service in the same or similar positions in an Executive agency under other than a temporary appointment limited to 2 years or less." View "Roy v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd." on Justia Law

In 2009, plaintiff applied for an IT specialist position with the Miami VA Healthcare System. He did not get the job and, after exhausting rights before the Department of Labor, filed an appeal, asserting that the VA violated his rights relating to veteran's preference. The AJ concluded that the Merit Systems Protection Board had no authority to review the merits of the VA’s non-selection of plaintiff. The Board agreed. The Federal Circuit vacated. There is no way to determine whether the Veterans' Preference Act (58 Stat. 390) has been violated without examining the grounds for non-selection. The Board has jurisdiction to determine whether the VA properly afforded plaintiff the right to compete for the job and properly determined, in accordance with 5 C.F.R. § 302.302(d), that he was not qualified for the position View "Lazaro v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged infringement of patents covering systems and devices for testing blood samples against a competitor in the diagnostic field. The patents at issue name defendant as the assignee. Plaintiff claimed ownership based on confidentiality and non-competition clauses in employment and consulting contracts between its predecessor and an employee, the inventor. The district court dismissed, finding that plaintiff lacked standing because the 1999 Consulting Agreement did not continue the 1984 Agreement’s Disclosure and Assignment Covenant. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the company lacked standing with respect to rights assigned long after the inventor resigned from the company. View "Abbott Point of Care, Inc. v. Epocal, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a veteran with a service-connected disability rated at 80 percent, which makes him a "preference eligible" veteran, 5 U.S.C. 2108(3)(C). He applied for attorney positions at the Social Security Administration and at the U.S. Attorney's Office, informing both that he was a preference eligible veteran. Both agencies selected other applicants, at least one of whom was not preference eligible. He filed complaints with the Department of Labor. The agencies concluded that 5 U.S.C. 3320 did not apply to require that agencies "file written reasons" and receive permission from the Office of Personnel Management if they pass over a preference eligible who is among the highest three eligibles available for appointment on a certificate furnished by OPM. The Board agreed that attorneys are exempt from any examination or rating requirements. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Board properly concluding that the agencies were exempt from the procedures and were not required to file written reasons with OPM and seek permission before selecting other candidates. View "Jarrard v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

After several notifications about deficiencies, plaintiff, a former service representative with the Social Security Administration, was terminated from her position. The Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Performance and Communications System (PACS) used in her termination was subjective. She received detailed feedback about her performance and was allowed adequate participation under 5 U.S.C. 4302(a). SSA was not required to submit PACS to the Office of Personnel Management for approval. View "Salmon v. Soc. Sec. Admin." on Justia Law

Plaintiff applied for a position with the Department of Labor and responded "no" to whether he had been convicted or put on probation during the preceding 10 years. After he was hired, he signed the form, certifying the answers as true. It came out that plaintiff had been on probation for disturbing the peace He insisted that he had been arrested and placed on "informal probation," but not convicted. His attorney explained that plaintiff had pled guilty; the order stated that the plea was vacated and that "a plea of not guilty be entered, and that the accusatory filing is dismissed. ... does NOT relieve the defendant of the obligation to disclose the conviction" in application for public office. The Department terminated plaintiff during his probationary period. An ALJ dismissed his appeal, finding that the firing was based on conduct during the probationary period. The Merit System Protection Board and Federal Circuit denied appeals. To invoke 5 C.F.R. 315.806(c) for MSPB jurisdiction, plaintiff would have to identify facts in the record amounting to a non-frivolous assertion that the Department actually relied on a pre-employment condition in terminating his employment. Plaintiff failed to do so; the termination letter expressly referenced his signature on the application after he was hired. View "Younies v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd." on Justia Law

The agency removed plaintiff from her position based on charges of rude, disruptive, aggressive, or intimidating behavior and misrepresentation. Plaintiff denied the charges and alleged retaliation for prior Equal Employment Opportunity claims of sex discrimination. The Administrative Judge and Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed the removal. Plaintiff petitioned the EEOC for review; that agency found that the evidence supported the conclusion that her removal was not motivated by retaliatory animus. The Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Board's decision on the "mixed case." The case involved both a specific type of action against an agency which may be appealed to the Board and an allegation in the nature of an affirmative defense that a basis for the action was discrimination within one of the categories” listed in 5 U.S.C. 7702(a)(1)(B). Affirmative defenses of retaliation for prior EEO activity are assertions of discrimination under Title VII and within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 7702. View "Diggs. v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev." on Justia Law