Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ash challenged the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) denial of his application for disability retirement benefits. Ash asserted disparate treatment based on race and prior protected activity. The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) affirmed. Ash appealed.The Federal Circuit transferred the case to the District of Maryland. Because this case involves an action that is appealable to the MSPB and a discrimination allegation, it is a mixed case. Under 5 U.S.C. 7703(b)(1)(A), an appellant generally must appeal a final MSPB decision to the Federal Circuit but if the appellant has been affected by an action that the appellant may appeal to the MSPB and alleges that a basis for the action was discrimination prohibited by enumerated federal statutes, then the appellant has a “mixed case” and must seek judicial review in federal district court. One of those enumerated federal statutes is 42 U.S.C, 2000e16, which prohibits racial discrimination with respect to “personnel actions.” An appeal arising from a benefits decision can be a “personnel action” giving rise to a mixed case. An OPM decision that adversely affects retirement “rights or benefits,” like the Ash decision, is a “personnel action,” 5 U.S.C. 8461(e), that is appealable to the MSPB and alleges discrimination. View "Ash v. Office of Personnel Management" on Justia Law

Dr. Smolinski is a Supervisory Physician in the Traumatic Brain Injury Clinic of the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC), an Army hospital in Germany. He was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army and occasionally saw patients at LRMC as a visiting provider. The Army purportedly changed the salary Smolinski was offered and delayed his move to a new position. Smolinski’s subsequent complaint under the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 1221, alleged those actions were retaliation for his wife’s 2017 patient complaint, his 2018 testimony in an investigation into an officer, and his 2019 Office of Special Counsel (OSC) complaints.The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed his complaint, citing lack of jurisdiction because Smolinski failed to establish that those activities were protected disclosures. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. Smolinski failed to allege sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim that his wife’s patient complaint was a protected disclosure, and did not exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his claim of retaliation for his OSC complaints. With respect to Smolinski’s claims alleging retaliation for his 2018 testimony, however, the court reversed the dismissal and remanded for the Board to consider those claims on the merits. View "Smolinski v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

Dr. Metzinger brought an Equal Pay Act (EPA) suit against her employer, the VA, in the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging that the government violated 29 U.S.C. 206(d), by paying her less than her male subordinates. She sought over $10,000 in damages. The government argued that the Court of Federal Claims had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over EPA claims against the government for over $10,000. In the alternative to dismissal, the government requested that the district court transfer Metzinger’s EPA claim to the Claims Court under 28 U.S.C. 1631. Metzinger opposed dismissal but allowed that if the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction, it should transfer the EPA claim. The district court agreed that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and transferred Metzinger’s EPA claim to the Claims Court under 28 U.S.C. 1631.Metzinger appealed to both the Fifth and Federal Circuits. The Fifth Circuit summarily dismissed. In a joint filing, the government reversed course, agreeing with Metzinger that the district court possessed jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit affirmed the transfer to the Claims Court. Precedent dictates that district courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over EPA claims against the government for over $10,000. View "Metzinger v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Former and current Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) employees were relocated to Puerto Rico or the U.S. Virgin Islands at the DEA’s request for two to five years. Each received a one-time relocation incentive bonus under 5 U.S.C. 5753(b), which provides that “[t]he Office of Personnel Management may authorize the head of an agency to pay a [relocation incentive] bonus” to an individual who relocates to accept a position. Each bonus was equivalent to 25% of each employee’s yearly salary. The employees allege they are entitled to a relocation incentive bonus for each year of their relocation, rather than the one-time bonus they received.The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s dismissal of that claim, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The claim was not based on a statute or regulations that are money mandating, as required for jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1). The statute and implementing regulations use discretionary language. View "Bell v. United States" on Justia Law

Valles began working for the State Department as a passport specialist in 2011. In 2016, Valles served a three-day suspension for charges concerning inappropriate sexual and political comments made to co-workers and customers. In 2018, Valles served a five-day suspension for failure to follow instructions and failure to protect personally identifiable information. In 2019, Valles received a performance appraisal of “Fully Successful” for 2018.The agency nonetheless proposed Valles’ removal based on four charges from 18 specifications dating between July 2018 and February 2019. Some of the alleged conduct occurred during the 2018 evaluation period. The charges included failure to follow instructions, failure to properly move along applications and provide updates, leaving a passport application on a photocopier, failure to follow policies concerning the handling of fees, not maintaining control over applications, leaving his adjudication stamp unsecured, and drinking from a wine glass at his workstation in the public counter.An administrative judge upheld the termination. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The agency proved all the charges and established a nexus between the proven misconduct and the agency’s ability to carry out its mission. The penalty was reasonable, considering all the relevant “Douglas” factors, including the repeated nature and seriousness of the misconduct, Valles’ prior discipline, his seven years of federal service and job performance, the consistency of the penalty with similar cases, and the lack of rehabilitation potential on Valles’ part. View "Valles v. Department of State" on Justia Law

Courtney, an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Investigator, was removed from her federal employment effective December 7, 2019, based on a charge of being absent without leave. Her removal was affirmed by the Merit Systems Protection Board and Federal Circuit. Courtney applied to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for disability retirement benefits, asserting that she suffered from vision-related ailments, asthma, and diabetes. As a result of the vision problems, she said, she was unable to perform her duties, which were all computer-based, and she had difficulty commuting. Courtney alleged that she had requested reasonable accommodations that were not granted. The EEOC indicated that requested reasonable accommodations had been provided and that Courtney’s performance even with her alleged disability “was not less than fully successful” (even if her conduct was unsatisfactory).OPM denied her application, concluding that Courtney had failed to establish that her medical condition was incompatible with useful service or that the agency-provided reasonable accommodations were ineffective. The Merit Systems Protection Board and Federal Circuit affirmed, agreeing with an administrative judge that although Courtney met some of the requirements for disability retirement, she had not established that she was unable “to render useful and efficient service” in light of her disability—a requirement of 5 U.S.C. 8451(a)(1)(B). View "Courtney v. Office of Personnel Management" on Justia Law

Courtney, an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Investigator. was removed from her federal employment effective December 7, 2019, premised on a charge of being absent without leave (AWOL) for several months. An administrative judge first determined that the EEOC had proven its AWOL charge by a preponderance of the evidence then determined that Courtney had failed to establish her affirmative defenses—allegations of retaliation for EEO activity, discrimination based on disability, and harmful procedural errors. The administrative judge determined that there was a nexus between the AWOL charge and the efficiency of the federal service because an “essential element of employment is to be on the job when one is expected to be there” and agreed that removal was appropriate given the agency’s thorough analysis, which relied on the seriousness of Courtney’s misconduct, the length of her absence, and her supervisor’s statement regarding a loss in confidence in her based on her failures to communicate.The Merit Systems Protection Board and the Federal Circuit affirmed, noting evidence that Courtney was AWOL from March 25 to December 7, 2019, that she provided no medical excuse for her absence, and that the EEOC had granted every requested accommodation. View "Courtney v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission" on Justia Law

In 2013, Bullock, a civilian employed by the Army, received a formal letter of reprimand from her supervisor. Bullock filed an EEO claim alleging sex discrimination and retaliation. In proceedings before the EEOC’s mediation program, Bullock was represented by her attorney, Elliott; the Army was represented by its management official Shipley, and attorney Lynch. According to Bullock, the parties reached agreement as to seven non-monetary demands on July 29 and reached an oral agreement regarding her monetary demands on August 27, 2015. The mediating administrative judge sent an email to the parties asking for the “agency’s understanding of the provisions of the settlement agreement” and noting that, “[o]nce we confirm that the parties are in complete agreement, the agency can begin work on the written settlement agreement.”. No written settlement agreement was executed. In September, the Army “rescinded its settlement offer.” Bullock continued to press her claims before the EEOC for a year, then filed a breach of contract claim regarding an oral settlement agreement.The Federal Circuit reversed the dismissal of the complaint, rejecting an argument that EEOC and Army regulations, requiring that settlement agreements be in writing, preclude enforcement of oral settlement agreements. The court remanded for a determination of whether the representative of the Army had the authority to enter a settlement agreement and whether the parties actually reached an agreement. View "Bullock v. United States" on Justia Law

Rodriguez, a Supervisory Consumer Affairs Specialist with the VA Patient Advocate’s Office, engaged in a confrontation with a patient, yelling at the patient and using profanity. VA Police officers had to escort him back to his office. Rodriguez returned to the reception area, where he again confronted the patient. During an investigation, Rodriguez was temporarily relieved of his supervisory responsibilities. Rodriguez contacted one of his subordinates and asked her to modify her witness statement. The investigator made findings of patient abuse, violation of the VA Code of Conduct, failure to follow the officer’s instruction, attempted coercion, and lack of candor in Rodriguez’s accounts of the incident, and concluded that the appropriate penalty was removal. Rodriguez had a previous disciplinary incident. After Rodriguez was given an opportunity to reply, the Director issued a removal decision.The Merit Systems Protection Board administrative judge, citing 38 U.S.C. 714, found the charges supported by substantial evidence. The Federal Circuit reversed the removal order. the administrative judge misinterpreted section 714 when he ruled that “substantial evidence” is the proper standard for determining whether an employee has engaged in misconduct that justifies discipline; preponderance of the evidence is the minimal appropriate burden of proof in administrative proceedings. Although section 714 provides that the Board may not mitigate penalties, the Board has the authority to review penalties for substantial evidence. View "Rodriguez v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

In 2007, Connor began working as the Chief of Police Services for the Fayetteville, North Carolina VA Medical Center. After it was discovered that Connor had stored ammunition in a manner inconsistent with VA policy, the VA investigated allegations of mismanagement at Fayetteville, including the failure to inventory ammunition, misuse of government vehicles, lack of training, unfair hiring and promotion practices, employee misconduct, and lack of leadership. In 2019, Fayetteville's Executive Director sustained 27 specifications against Connor and the penalty of removal under 38 U.S.C. 714. The Merit Systems Protection Board determined that the VA had failed to prove 26 specifications by substantial evidence, upholding specification 25, regarding the improper storage of ammunition. The Board held that the “Douglas factors” remained applicable and upheld the VA’s charge and the penalty of removal.The Federal Circuit affirmed. Section 714 of the 2017 Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act created an expedited procedure allowing the VA Secretary to remove, demote, or suspend VA employees for misconduct or substandard performance; it limits review of disciplinary actions by administrative judges and the Board. A disciplinary decision must be upheld if “supported by substantial evidence.” The administrative judge and the Board “shall not mitigate the penalty prescribed by the Secretary.” Section 714 does not alter the penalty review with respect to the Douglas factors. The court rejected Connor’s argument that the Board did not adequately consider those factors. View "Connor v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law