Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Robinson, a Marine Corps veteran, served in Vietnam from 1966-1969 and later had coronary problems. He sought treatment at a VA medical facility. In 2006, a VA cardiologist recommended that he undergo certain medical testing. The tests, performed 14 months later, revealed that Robinson suffered from left ventricular diastolic dysfunction. The VA granted Robinson a 60% disability rating effective April 2, 2007, the date he underwent cardiac testing. The Board denied Robinson entitlement to a higher rating. In the Veterans Court, Robinson argued for the first time—through the same counsel that represented him before the Board—that his rating should have been assigned an effective date in February 2006, when his doctor ordered tests. The court did not identify any error by the Board but “set aside” its decision and remanded for it to address Robinson’s argument in the first instance. Robinson sought attorney fees, arguing that, because he secured remand, he was a prevailing party under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The Federal Circuit affirmed denial of Robinson’s application. This particular remand did not confer prevailing party status on Robinson because it “was not predicated on administrative error by the Board,” did not materially alter the legal relationship of the parties, and was solely to allow the Board to consider an issue first raised on appeal. View "Robinson v. O'Rourke" on Justia Law

In 1995, Raniere assigned all rights in the five patents to GTI. Raniere is not listed on GTI’s incorporation documents as an officer, director, or shareholder. GTI dissolved in 1996. In 2014, Raniere executed a document on behalf of GTI, as its “sole owner,” purportedly transferring the patents to himself. Raniere subsequently sued Microsoft and AT&T for infringement, identifying himself as the patents’ owner. Microsoft moved to dismiss for lack of standing, noting that the PTO’s records indicated that Raniere did not own the patents. Raniere produced documents that, according to the court, failed to indicate that Raniere had an ownership interest in GTI at any time or had the right to assign the patents. Raniere obtained documents from an attorney, showing the GTI shareholders’ consent to a transfer of shares from Raniere’s ex-girlfriend (75% owner of GTI) to Raniere. The documents did not indicate that any transfer was completed and did not establish that Raniere owned the patents. The district court held a hearing, found that Raniere’s testimony contradicted Raniere’s earlier representation that the shares had already been transferred and was “wholly incredible and untruthful,” concluded that Raniere was unlikely to be able to cure the standing defect, dismissed the case, and found that Raniere’s conduct demonstrated “a clear history of delay and contumacious conduct.” The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal and a subsequent award of prevailing parties attorney fees and costs, 35 U.S.C. 285. View "Raniere v. Microsoft Corp." on Justia Law

IH’s patent relates to a method of purchasing goods at a local point-of-sale system from a remote seller. IH sued Bed Bath & Beyond for infringement. Two months later, the district court granted BBB summary judgment, concluding that the Supreme Court’s intervening decision, Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, rendered the asserted claims invalid under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the asserted claims are directed to the abstract idea of “local processing of payments for remotely purchased goods.” The Federal Circuit affirmed. BBB moved for an award of attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. 285, arguing that, once Alice issued, IH should have reevaluated its case and dismissed the action. The district court granted BBB’s fees motion, holding that, “following the Alice decision, IH’s claims were objectively without merit,” and awarded BBB its attorney fees beginning from the date of the Alice decision, including fees incurred during the section 101 appeal. The Federal Circuit affirmed. IH’s claims were “dubious even before the Alice decision” and Alice was a significant change in the law as applied to the facts of this particular case. View "Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc." on Justia Law

Simmons contacted counsel in 2011, claiming that he developed Guillain-Barre Syndrome as a result of his 2010 flu vaccination. He provided his vaccination record. Counsel agreed to represent him. Counsel was subsequently unable to contact Simmons and sent a letter in 2013, stating that their attorney-client relationship had terminated. That letter was returned as undeliverable. Nearly two years later, shortly before the limitations period on his Vaccine Act claim would expire, Simmons contacted counsel’ and expressed that he would like to proceed. Counsel spoke with Simmons one additional time. The next day, on October 22, 2013, counsel filed Simmons’s petition, without any medical records or other supporting evidence. In January 2014, the special master ordered counsel to produce medical records. Counsel stated that counsel had again lost contact with Simmons and was unable to acquire those records. The master dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. Counsel then filed petitions seeking $8,267.89 in fees and costs. The master noted that because there was no direct evidence of bad faith and counsel had a vaccination receipt, counsel had satisfied the good faith and reasonable basis requirements and awarded fees. The Claims Court and Federal Circuit disagreed. The master erred in finding that counsel had a reasonable basis for Simmons’s claim. The fact that the statute of limitations was about to expire did not excuse counsel’s obligation to show some basis for the claim that Simmons suffered Guillain-Barre beyond their conversations. View "Simmons v. Secretary of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

Rumsey, a Department of Justice employee, protested grant-making decisions and ultimately went to the media and members of Congress and filed a complaint with the Inspector General, alleging fraud. Her efforts resulted in corrective action. Rumsey alleged that the agency subsequently gave her improperly low performance ratings, moved some of her job duties to other employees, and canceled her telework agreement. She prevailed in an individual right of action appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board, alleging whistleblower reprisal. Rumsey sought attorney’s fees under 5 U.S.C. 1221(g)(1)(B). At the time of that request, Rumsey and Slavet, one of the three lawyers that represented Rumsey during the Board proceedings, were in fee dispute before the District of Columbia Bar, Attorney/Client Arbitration Board. Rumsey “distanced herself from Slavet,” who had been Rumsey’s principal lawyer before and during the initial hearing before the administrative judge. The AJ had previously awarded sanctions based on Slavet’s failure to respond to discovery requests. The Board affirmed the AJ’s refusal to award attorney’s fees for Slavet’s services. Slavet and Rumsey settled their fee dispute, agreeing that Rumsey would pay $120,000 of the $145,445 sought by Slavet. The Federal Circuit reversed. Rumsey carried her burden of showing entitlement to some award of attorney’s fees. View "Rumsey v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

AdjustaCam’s patent, which issued in 1999, discloses a camera clip that supports a camera both on a flat surface and when attached to a computer monitor. AdjutaCam’s infringement litigation against Newegg included a Markman order, indicating that AdjustaCam's suit was baseless, and extended expert discovery. Just before summary judgment briefing, AdjustaCam voluntarily dismissed its infringement claims against Newegg with prejudice. Newegg then sought attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. 285. Following a remand in light of intervening Supreme Court precedent clarifying what constitutes an exceptional case, the district court again denied Newegg’s motion for fees. The Federal Circuit reversed. Based on the circumstances presented here, the wholesale reliance on the previous judge’s fact-finding was an abuse of discretion. The record points to this case as standing out from others with respect to the substantive strength of AdjustaCam’s litigating position. Where AdjustaCam may have filed a weak infringement lawsuit, accusing Newegg’s products of infringing the patent, AdjustaCam’s suit became baseless after the district court’s Markman order. View "AdjustaCam, LLC v. Newegg, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2001, Dr. Klingemann filed a patent application directed to a method of treating cancer by administering natural killer cells. After years of examination, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) rejected the application on obviousness grounds. The Patent and Trial Appeal Board affirmed that rejection. Nantkwest, as assignee of the application, appealed to the district court under 35 U.S.C. 145, in lieu of an immediate appeal to the Federal Circuit 35 U.S.C. 145. The statute provides that the applicant must pay “[a]ll of the expenses of the proceeding,” “regardless of the outcome.” After prevailing in the district court, the USPTO sought to recover $111,696.39 in fees under section 145. Although the district court granted the USPTO’s expert fees, it denied its requested attorneys’ fees, citing the “American Rule,” under which litigants pay their own attorneys’ fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise. The district court concluded that the “[a]ll expenses” provision of the statute was neither sufficiently specific nor explicit enough for the authorization of attorneys’ fees. The Federal Circuit reversed. Section 145 entitles the USPTO to compensation for the diversion of its resources in the defense of section 145 appeals. View "Nantkwest, Inc. v. Matal" on Justia Law

The 555 patent relates to anti-theft tags that are attached to merchandise and deactivated when the goods are purchased. The accused tags are manufactured in Europe and imported into the U.S. Checkpoint brought an infringement suit. A jury found the patent not infringed, invalid, and unenforceable. The court found the case to be “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. 285 because Checkpoint’s expert witness based his infringement opinion on an examination of tags that were manufactured by All–Tag in Switzerland, although the accused tags were manufactured in Belgium, and awarded the defendants $6.6 million in attorney fees, costs, and interest. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit instructed the district court "that tests or experiments on the actual accused products are not always necessary to prove infringement.” The district court again found the case exceptional, citing the same ground, and found Checkpoint’s pre-suit investigation, based on a European infringement verdict against All–Tag on a 555 patent counterpart and infringement opinions from counsel, inadequate because the opinions “were given years before filing.” The court cited Checkpoint’s “improper motivation.” The Federal Circuit reversed, noting that the tags tested by the expert were produced on the same machines that were transferred to Belgium. The claim of infringement was reasonable and the litigation was not brought in bad faith or with abusive tactics. View "Checkpoint Systems, Inc. v. All-Tag Security S.A." on Justia Law

Rothschild alleged that ADS’s home security system infringed its 090 patent. Rothschild has filed numerous lawsuits against others alleging infringement of the 090 patent. ADS filed an answer and counterclaims and sent Rothschild an email alleging that the patent covered patent-ineligible subject matter (35 U.S.C. 1011) and that prior art anticipated claim 1 (35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1)). ADS offered to settle if Rothschild paid ADS $43,330 for attorney fees and costs. Rothschild rejected ADS’s offer. ADS moved for judgment on the pleadings, sending Rothschild an FRCP 11(c)(2) Safe Harbor Notice, with copies of a proposed Rule 11(b) motion for sanctions and prior art that purportedly anticipated the claim. Rothschild voluntarily moved to dismiss. ADS opposed and filed a cross-motion for attorney fees, arguing that Rothschild’s suit was objectively unreasonable because Rothschild knew or should have known that claim 1 covers patent-ineligible subject matter and was anticipated. The Federal Circuit reversed the holding that Rothschild had not engaged in conduct sufficient to make the litigation “exceptional” for purposes of section 285 attorney fees. Whether a party avoids or engages in sanctionable conduct under Rule 11(b) is not the appropriate benchmark; a court may award fees in the rare case in which a party’s unreasonable conduct—while not necessarily independently sanctionable—is so exceptional as to justify an award. View "Rothschild Connected Devices Innovations, LLC v. Guardian Protection Services, Inc." on Justia Law

District court properly awarded “exceptional case” legal fees. In 2005, Dow filed an infringement action against NOVA, which argued that its product did not infringe and that Dow lacked standing because it had transferred ownership of the patents. In 2010, the district court entered judgment against NOVA for $61 million. The Federal Circuit affirmed. In a separate appeal from an award of supplemental damages, the Federal Circuit found the asserted claims invalid as indefinite under the Supreme Court’s intervening “Nautilus” standard, but did not disturb the 2010 judgment relating to preverdict infringement. NOVA became aware of evidence allegedly showing that Dow had committed fraud in obtaining the 2010 judgment but was time-barred from moving to set aside that judgment. In 2013, NOVA filed a separate action in equity for relief from the 2010 judgment, asserting misrepresentation of Dow’s ownership of the asserted patents, based on the testimony of a former Dow employee in an unrelated tax case and on the testimony of Dow’s expert, about testing on the accused product during separate Canadian litigation. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal. The district court awarded Dow $2.5 million under 35 U.S.C. 285, which allows courts to award “reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party” in “exceptional cases.” The court noted the weakness of NOVA’s litigating position and the manner in which NOVA pursued the case. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Nova Chemicals Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co." on Justia Law