Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A veteran who served in the U.S. Navy sought service-connected disability benefits for several medical conditions, including asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), and an enlarged prostate. He claimed that GERD and prostate issues were secondary to COPD, which he alleged was caused by exposure to lead paint during his military service. The veteran submitted medical articles and sworn statements supporting the connection between lead exposure and these conditions in February 2022 during an appeal for asthma and COPD. When he later appealed the denial of benefits for GERD and prostate conditions, he attached an addendum to his Notice of Disagreement (NOD) directing the Board of Veterans’ Appeals to consider the previously submitted evidence.After the regional office denied his claim, the veteran sought higher-level review, which was also denied. He then appealed to the Board, selecting an appeal track that allowed submission of additional evidence without a hearing. The Board denied his appeal, stating that no “new and relevant” evidence had been presented and refusing to consider the February 2022 evidence because it had been submitted before the NOD for the current claim. The Board reasoned that evidence must be submitted anew with each NOD to be considered. The veteran appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board’s decision, relying on Cook v. McDonough to hold that evidence submitted between the agency decision and the NOD was excluded from consideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo and held that the veteran satisfied the evidentiary submission requirement by clearly and timely referencing the prior submission in his NOD addendum. The court reversed the Veterans Court's decision, concluding that the Board must consider the evidence previously submitted and clearly incorporated by reference with the NOD. View "CASH v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

David Hamill served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 2009 to 2013 and was discharged under “Other Than Honorable” conditions. After his discharge, he sought disability compensation for PTSD and other conditions, but the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) denied his application in 2014, citing that his discharge status barred him from most benefits. He did not appeal. In 2017 and again in 2021, Hamill filed new claims for disability benefits, which the VA interpreted as attempts to reopen his character of discharge determination. The VA ultimately granted service connection for PTSD in 2021, but did not address his discharge status, leaving Hamill without an appealable decision on that issue. Hamill’s attorney later requested an adjudication of his discharge characterization, but the VA replied that he should seek a change through the Service Department.Hamill then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for a writ of mandamus to compel the VA to adjudicate his character of discharge claim. The Secretary moved to dismiss the petition as moot after the VA sent a letter in February 2023 explicitly finding no new and material evidence to reopen the discharge determination. Hamill also requested class certification, arguing the petition was not moot due to certain exceptions. A divided panel of the Veterans Court dismissed Hamill’s petition, concluding it was moot based on the implicit denial doctrine, which held that the 2021 VA decision implicitly denied his claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and held that under the Appeals Modernization Act (AMA), the VA can no longer implicitly deny claims; decisions must explicitly identify adjudicated issues. The court vacated the Veterans Court’s order dismissing Hamill’s petition and remanded the case for further proceedings, including consideration of mootness exceptions. Costs were awarded to Hamill. View "HAMILL v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

A veteran sought compensation from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for a neck injury, initially filing his claim in 2007. The VA denied the claim, and in 2008, the veteran, with the help of a non-attorney representative, filed a notice of disagreement (NOD) to appeal the denial. In 2012, the veteran retained an attorney, who entered into a contingency fee agreement and subsequently filed an additional claim on the veteran’s behalf for service-connected post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The attorney also submitted new evidence and arguments to support both the neck injury claim and a claim for total disability based on individual unemployability (TDIU), referencing both the neck injury and PTSD.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals later found the neck injury was service connected and remanded the neck claim to the VA Regional Office for a rating decision, while referring the TDIU claim to the Regional Office, as it had not been addressed previously. The Regional Office ultimately granted past-due benefits for the neck injury, PTSD, and TDIU, but awarded attorney’s fees to the attorney only for the portion of benefits related to the neck injury—finding that the PTSD claim was not part of the appealed case under the relevant statute. The Board affirmed this determination, and the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims also affirmed, concluding that the PTSD claim was not connected to the original NOD regarding the neck injury.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1) (2012), attorney’s fees may only be paid for services provided after an NOD is filed, and only for the “case” addressed by that NOD. The court affirmed that the PTSD claim was not part of the same case as the neck injury claim appealed in the 2008 NOD, and therefore attorney’s fees were not authorized for services related to the PTSD claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Veterans Court. View "HOLSTEIN v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

A veteran who suffered a traumatic brain injury from an improvised explosive device while deployed sought financial assistance under the Traumatic Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance (TSGLI) program after experiencing a stroke within two years of the injury. The Army denied his claim, determining the stroke was a physical illness or disease, not a qualifying traumatic injury as defined by the relevant statute and regulations. The veteran then petitioned the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to amend its rules to include coverage for illnesses or diseases caused by explosive ordnance, arguing these conditions are analogous to those already covered under existing exceptions for injuries resulting from chemical, biological, or radiological weapons.The VA initially denied the rulemaking petition but agreed to further review as part of a program-wide assessment. After several years, extensive consultation with medical experts, and consideration of the petition and supporting materials, the VA issued a final denial. It concluded that expanding coverage to delayed illnesses or diseases linked to explosive ordnance would be inconsistent with TSGLI’s purpose, which focuses on immediate injuries, would deviate from the insurance model underlying the program, and could threaten its financial stability. The VA also found insufficient evidence of a direct causal relationship between explosive ordnance, traumatic brain injury, and downstream illnesses like stroke.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the VA’s denial under the highly deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that the VA provided a reasoned explanation addressing the petitioner’s arguments and the record, and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. The petition for review was therefore denied. View "MCKINNEY v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS " on Justia Law

James Young, a veteran who served in the military during the mid-1980s, initially filed a claim for service-connected disability benefits in 1988, alleging head injuries from an in-service car accident. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regional office denied his claim in 1991, and after several years of proceedings, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the claim in 1999, citing Young’s failure to appear for scheduled medical examinations. Young did not appeal the Board’s 1999 denial. Years later, in 2017, following a new claim and medical examinations, the VA granted service connection for his head injuries effective August 17, 2012.Seeking an earlier effective date linked to his original 1988 claim, Young filed a motion in 2022 with the Board to vacate its 1999 denial, alleging due process violations because the Board had failed to ensure the regional office complied with orders to search for certain records. The Board denied the motion, characterizing the alleged error as a “duty to assist error” rather than a due process error. Young appealed this denial to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which dismissed the appeal. The Veterans Court found that while the appeal was timely regarding the denial of the motion to vacate, such a denial was not an appealable decision under its jurisdictional statute.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court’s dismissal. The Federal Circuit held that the Board’s denial of a motion to vacate under 38 C.F.R. § 20.1000(a), when based solely on alleged material error known at the time of the original decision, does not constitute an appealable “decision” under 38 U.S.C. § 7252. The court determined that allowing appeals from such procedural denials would undermine the statutory time bar and permit indefinite judicial review of Board decisions. View "YOUNG v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

The appellant, a Navy veteran who served as a flight deck signalman from 1984 to 1988, filed claims with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in 2009 seeking service connection for bilateral hearing loss and tinnitus. The VA regional office denied both claims in 2010. Upon appeal, a VA medical examination in 2011 found the appellant’s hearing to be within normal limits during service and opined that his tinnitus was likely associated with hearing loss, but did not address whether the tinnitus itself was service connected. The regional office again denied both claims in 2012.In 2017, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals granted service connection for tinnitus, finding the veteran credible in reporting symptoms since service, and remanded the hearing loss claim for further medical opinion. After additional examinations, the Board denied service connection for bilateral hearing loss in 2021, with no discussion of whether the hearing loss could be connected to the now service-connected tinnitus. The appellant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the Board erred by not discussing secondary service connection for hearing loss. That court affirmed the Board, finding no clear error in denying direct service connection for hearing loss and concluding that the record did not reasonably raise the theory of secondary service connection.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that to establish secondary service connection under 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a), a veteran must show a causal link between the secondary condition and an underlying primary condition for which service connection was granted, not merely a direct link to an in-service event. The Federal Circuit found no error in the Veterans Court’s interpretation of the regulation or its treatment of the facts and affirmed the decision. View "GOLDEN v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

The claimant served in the U.S. Navy and, upon his voluntary separation in 1992, received a lump sum Special Separation Benefit (SSB) under 10 U.S.C. § 1174a. Many years later, in 2017, he was awarded VA disability compensation with entitlement to a total disability rating, effective from late 2016. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) notified him that it would withhold a portion of his monthly disability benefits to recoup the SSB payment, which the claimant contested, arguing that SSB payments are not subject to recoupment and that the relevant statutory authority did not apply to his situation.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals found that the VA acted properly in withholding his disability compensation to recoup the SSB payment. The claimant then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board’s decision. He sought reconsideration, asserting that the court had relied upon the wrong statutory provision. The Veterans Court granted reconsideration, but in its new decision, it again held that the relevant statute required recoupment of his SSB payment from his VA disability compensation, and affirmed the Board’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The court held that 10 U.S.C. § 1174(h)(2) applies to SSB payments received under 10 U.S.C. § 1174a, requiring such payments to be deducted from VA disability compensation. The court rejected the claimant’s alternative statutory interpretation, finding it inconsistent with the statutory text and structure. The court also dismissed for lack of jurisdiction arguments that were not addressed by the Veterans Court. The judgment was affirmed in part and dismissed in part. View "COLAGE v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Rodney Wright, a totally disabled veteran, sought additional compensation for his adult daughter, B.W., under 38 U.S.C. § 1115(1)(F) after she elected to receive benefits from the Survivors’ and Dependents’ Educational Assistance (DEA) program. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) ceased paying Wright additional compensation for B.W. once she began receiving DEA benefits, citing 38 U.S.C. § 3562(2), which bars increased rates or additional amounts of compensation when a dependent elects DEA benefits.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied Wright’s request for additional compensation, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board’s decision. The Veterans Court held that section 3562 permanently barred Wright from receiving additional compensation under section 1115 once B.W. elected to receive DEA benefits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the nonduplication provision of section 3562 bars a disabled veteran from receiving additional compensation under section 1115(1)(F) once the veteran’s child begins receiving DEA benefits. The court also determined that this bar is permanent and does not lift after the exhaustion of DEA benefits. The court rejected Wright’s argument that the bar should only apply to concurrent receipt of benefits, finding no statutory basis for such an interpretation. The court concluded that section 3562 imposes a permanent bar on a veteran’s receipt of additional compensation under section 1115(1)(F) once the veteran’s child elects to receive DEA benefits. View "WRIGHT v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Annette R. Deal served in the U.S. Navy and Army and filed a claim for compensation for Cushing’s syndrome and a nervous condition in 1991, which was denied in 1992. She received treatment within the appeal period, resulting in a 1993 medical record being added to her file. The VA did not address whether this record met the requirements to be considered new and material evidence until 2021. Mrs. Deal did not appeal the 1992 decision. She filed another claim in 1995, which was partially granted, and a third claim in 2003, leading to a 2016 decision granting service connection for her psychiatric disorder with an effective date of August 1, 2003.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals granted an effective date of March 10, 1995, for her psychiatric disorder, ruling that new and material evidence was presented in 1997. However, it denied an effective date of October 1991, ruling that the 1993 record was not material. Mrs. Deal appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board’s decision, finding a plausible basis for ruling that the 1993 record was not material.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. Mrs. Deal argued that the VA’s failure to address the 1993 record before the 2016 decision meant her 1991 claim remained open, entitling her to an earlier effective date. The court disagreed, stating that the VA’s delay does not automatically entitle a claimant to an earlier effective date unless the evidence is determined to be new and material. The court affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision, holding that the 1993 record was not material and the 1992 decision was final. View "Deal v. Collins" on Justia Law

Anthony Stuart, a Navy veteran, appealed a decision by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) that denied him credit for his military service in computing his civilian retirement annuity. Stuart served in the Navy during three periods between 1974 and 1991 and was placed on the Permanent Disability Retirement List in 1994 with a 60% disability rating. He later entered federal civilian service and retired in 2015. Stuart did not waive his military retired pay to receive credit for his military service toward his Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS) annuity.The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) initially decided that Stuart’s military service was not creditable toward his FERS annuity because he was receiving military retired pay. OPM explained that by statute, Stuart could not receive both military retired pay and FERS credit for his military service unless his military retired pay was awarded for specific reasons, which did not apply to him. Stuart sought reconsideration, but OPM affirmed its decision. Stuart then appealed to the MSPB, where an administrative judge upheld OPM’s decision, and the full Board affirmed, modifying the initial decision to clarify the analysis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the MSPB’s decision. The court held that under 5 U.S.C. § 8411(c)(2), Stuart’s military service could not be credited toward his FERS annuity because he was receiving military retired pay and did not meet any statutory exceptions. The court rejected Stuart’s argument that his military retired pay, calculated based on his disability percentage, was not “based on” his military service. The court found that the statute clearly barred double crediting of military service for both military retired pay and a civilian retirement annuity. View "STUART v. OPM " on Justia Law