Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Military Law
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Julien P. Champagne, a veteran who served from December 1953 to December 1956, filed a claim in September 1987 for benefits related to his cerebellar degenerative disorder (CDD) using VA Form 21-526. The VA regional office (RO) interpreted this as a pension claim and awarded a disability pension in December 1987. In 1999, Champagne sought service connection compensation for malaria and any residual illnesses, including CDD. The RO granted service connection for malaria at 0% in 2002 but did not grant compensation for CDD. Champagne filed a notice of disagreement in 2003, and after multiple proceedings, he was granted compensation for CDD at 100%, effective February 3, 2005. This effective date was later changed to July 14, 2003, but Champagne sought an earlier date, arguing it should be from 1987.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied an earlier effective date in October 2020, finding no indication in the 1987 application that Champagne intended to claim service connection compensation. Champagne appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board’s decision in July 2022. The Veterans Court held that under 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a), the VA may consider a pension claim as a compensation claim but is not required to do so.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the plain language of 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a) is permissive, allowing but not requiring the VA to consider a pension claim as a compensation claim. The court also found no merit in Champagne’s argument that the Veterans Court engaged in impermissible fact-finding, as the court had merely determined that any findings by the RO would not bind the Board. View "Champagne v. McDonough" on Justia Law

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Thomas Smith, a veteran, sought specially adapted housing (SAH) benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to build a home spa for his service-connected low back disability. Before receiving a response, he constructed the spa. His initial request was denied, and he did not appeal. Later, he sought reimbursement for the spa's construction costs, which was also denied by the VA and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. Smith appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims but died before the case was decided. His daughter, Karen Hicks, sought to substitute herself in the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims denied Hicks's motion for substitution, stating she was not entitled to pursue her father's claim. The court found that Hicks had not obtained a determination from the VA that she was an eligible accrued-benefits claimant, a prerequisite for substitution under the court's precedent in Breedlove v. Shinseki.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. Hicks argued that the Veterans Court should have made the determination of her eligibility for substitution without requiring a VA determination. She also contended that she should be allowed to pursue the claim under 38 C.F.R. § 36.4406, which governs SAH benefits, and under the equitable doctrine of nunc pro tunc. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court's decision, holding that the court did not err in requiring a VA determination for substitution eligibility and that Hicks did not meet the regulatory requirements for reimbursement. The court also upheld the application of the nunc pro tunc doctrine, which did not apply as Smith died before the case was submitted for decision. View "SMITH v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

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Kenneth Dojaquez, an attorney, appealed a decision regarding his entitlement to additional attorney's fees under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(3). Dojaquez represented a veteran, Billy Wayne Slaughter, who was awarded an increased disability rating by the Board of Veterans' Appeals. The agency assigned an effective date of August 1, 2012, for the increased rating in a decision dated March 2, 2019, but did not notify Slaughter of this decision until April 26, 2019. Dojaquez argued that his attorney's fees should be calculated up to the notification date, not the decision date.The Board of Veterans' Appeals concluded that Dojaquez was only entitled to attorney's fees through March 2, 2019, the date of the agency's decision. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed this decision, relying on the interpretation of 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(1) and established case law, specifically Snyder v. Nicholson, which defined the end date for calculating past-due benefits as the date of the award decision, not the notification date.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the "date of the final decision" under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(3) refers to the date of the agency's decision assigning an effective date, not the date the veteran was notified of the decision. This interpretation ensures that attorney's fees are calculated based on past-due benefits up to the date of the award decision, consistent with the statutory language and previous case law. The court rejected Dojaquez's argument that the notification date should be used, as it would conflict with the statutory scheme and potentially allow attorneys to receive more than 20% of the claimant's past-due benefits. View "DOJAQUEZ v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

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The case involves veterans' benefits appeals that were erroneously deactivated by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) due to a computer program error. The VA operates two adjudicatory systems for benefits claims, and the legacy system is relevant here. Under this system, a claimant must file a Notice of Disagreement and, if unresolved, a Substantive Appeal. The VA's electronic database, VACOLS, automatically closed appeals if no timely Substantive Appeal was noted, leading to approximately 3,000 erroneously closed appeals. This affected U.S. Army veterans J. Roni Freund and Marvin Mathewson, whose successors are the named petitioners in this class action.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims dismissed the petitions and denied class certification. The court found the case moot as to the individual petitioners after the VA reactivated their appeals. It also held that the petitioners failed to meet the commonality and adequacy requirements for class certification under Rule 23. The court did not address whether the case was moot as to the class or the superiority of class resolution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that the Veterans Court abused its discretion in its commonality and adequacy findings. The Federal Circuit held that the inherently transitory exception to mootness applied, as the VA's practice of reactivating appeals quickly made it likely that individual claims would become moot before class certification could be ruled upon. The court also rejected the Secretary's argument that the class was not ascertainable due to the difficulty in identifying class members.The Federal Circuit vacated the Veterans Court's order denying class certification and remanded the case for further consideration of class certification and appropriate relief. View "FREUND v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

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Eric Mote, a former Captain in the United States Air Force, sought the removal of a Letter of Admonishment (LOA) and a Non-Judicial Punishment (NJP) from his military records, along with back pay for the fine associated with the NJP. The LOA and NJP were issued following Mote's repeated requests for a "White Heritage Month" at Hill Air Force Base, which were denied by his superiors. Mote's subsequent communications, which were deemed disrespectful, led to the LOA and NJP.The United States Court of Federal Claims reviewed Mote's case and granted judgment on the administrative record in favor of the government, upholding the decision of the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR). The Claims Court found that the AFBCMR's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. The court also held that the LOA and NJP were not illegal reprisals.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Claims Court's decision regarding the NJP, finding that the AFBCMR's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence. However, the appellate court vacated the portion of the Claims Court's decision that reviewed the LOA and remanded the case for a determination of whether the Claims Court had jurisdiction over the LOA claim under the Tucker Act. The appellate court emphasized that the Claims Court's jurisdiction to grant non-monetary relief is limited to cases where such relief is incident to a money judgment. View "MOTE v. US " on Justia Law

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Norah R. Lewis, Sr., a U.S. Army veteran, had his disability rating for PTSD increased from 30 percent to 70 percent in 2009. However, in 2016, the VA Regional Office (RO) reduced his rating back to 30 percent, citing evidence from a 2015 VA examination and outpatient treatment records. Mr. Lewis appealed this decision, arguing that the reduction was improper.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals initially sustained the RO's decision in 2018, but the Veterans Court vacated and remanded the case, requiring the Board to address favorable evidence. The Board issued a second decision in 2019, which was again vacated and remanded by the Veterans Court for failing to comply with the prior remand order. On the second remand, Mr. Lewis argued that the 2016 rating decision was void ab initio because the RO did not make a required finding under 38 C.F.R. § 3.344(a) that the improvement in his condition would be maintained under ordinary conditions of life.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board's March 2021 decision, which had found that Mr. Lewis’s PTSD had materially improved and that the improvement was likely to be maintained under ordinary conditions of life. The Veterans Court held that the RO was not required to make specific findings in its initial decision, as long as the Board made the necessary findings on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court's decision. The Federal Circuit held that while the RO failed to make the required findings under 38 C.F.R. § 3.344(a) in its initial decision, the Board's subsequent findings cured this deficiency. The Board's de novo review and ultimate decision on Mr. Lewis’s disability rating were consistent with its role in the statutory scheme, satisfying the VA’s duty to follow procedural protections for rating reductions. View "LEWIS v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

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Sean Ravin, an attorney, sought fees for representing Curtis D. Skogsbergh, a veteran claiming disability benefits. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) initially granted Skogsbergh a 10% disability rating, later increased to 20%. Skogsbergh, acting pro se, appealed for a higher rating and submitted a claim for total disability based on individual unemployability (TDIU). The VA denied TDIU, and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) did not address it in their decision. Skogsbergh retained Ravin, who represented him in an appeal to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court), which vacated the Board’s decision for not addressing TDIU.The Board later remanded the TDIU claim, and the VA granted TDIU with past-due benefits. However, the VA denied Ravin’s attorney fees, leading him to appeal to the Board, which found the fee agreement valid but denied fees, stating the Board’s decision was not final. Ravin appealed to the Veterans Court, which vacated the Board’s decision, finding the Board’s interpretation of finality incorrect but remanding for clarification on whether all fee award requirements were met.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the Veterans Court’s decision was non-final, as it remanded the case for further proceedings. The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that the remand did not meet the criteria for a final decision and that the Veterans Court was within its authority to remand for clarification. View "RAVIN v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

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Charles J. Love, Jr. appealed a decision regarding the reduction of his disability rating for service-connected prostate cancer. Initially rated at 100% due to active cancer, his rating was reduced to 20% after his cancer went into remission. Love argued that the procedural protections of 38 C.F.R. § 3.344, which require certain steps before reducing long-standing disability ratings, should apply to his case.The Veterans Benefits Administration Regional Office (RO) proposed the reduction in February 2019, which was finalized in September 2019. Love appealed to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which upheld the RO’s decision. He then appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the reduction was improper without following § 3.344. The Veterans Court, referencing its decision in Foster v. McDonough, ruled that the procedural protections of § 3.344 did not apply to disabilities rated under diagnostic code 7528 for prostate cancer, as the diagnostic code itself provided specific procedures for rating changes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the Veterans Court, holding that the specific procedures outlined in diagnostic code 7528 for prostate cancer, which include a mandatory VA examination six months after treatment cessation, supersede the general procedural protections of § 3.344. The court found that applying § 3.344 would create conflicting standards and redundancy. Therefore, the reduction of Love’s rating was affirmed as proper under the specific guidelines of diagnostic code 7528. The court affirmed the decision of the Veterans Court, concluding that the procedural protections of § 3.344 do not apply to diagnostic code 7528. View "Love v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Posted in: Military Law
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Louis Frantzis, a U.S. Army veteran, appealed a decision by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) that denied his claim for an increased disability rating for his service-connected headaches. The Board's decision was made by a member who did not conduct the hearing, which Frantzis argued was a violation of 38 U.S.C. § 7102. He contended that the same Board member who conducts a hearing should also issue the resulting decision. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) affirmed the Board's decision, concluding that the Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017 (AMA) does not require the Board member conducting the hearing to also decide the appeal.The Veterans Court's decision was based on the removal of pre-AMA language in 38 U.S.C. § 7107(c) that required the same judge conducting the hearing to issue a final determination. The court also rejected the argument that 38 U.S.C. § 7102 supports the same judge requirement because its language did not change with the enactment of the AMA. The court declined to consider the fair process doctrine because Mr. Frantzis did not raise the argument himself.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court's decision. The court agreed with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs that the AMA eliminated the same judge requirement because it removed the language expressly requiring the same judge for the hearing and final determination. The court also disagreed with Mr. Frantzis' argument that 38 U.S.C. § 7102 supplies a same Board member requirement, stating that the unchanged language of § 7102 cannot be the basis for the same member requirement in the AMA system. The court concluded that the statutory scheme and its history are clear—the same judge is not required to both conduct the hearing and author the final determination under the AMA. View "FRANTZIS v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

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The case involves Mark W. Smith, a U.S. Navy veteran, who appealed a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. Smith had initially filed a claim for service connection for deep vein thrombosis (DVT) after his discharge from the Navy in 1991. However, his request was denied by the Regional Office of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in 1992, and this denial was affirmed by the Board of Veterans Appeals in 1996. Smith did not appeal this decision, and it became final.In 2012, Smith filed a new claim for service connection for DVT, which was granted by the VA in 2013. In 2016, Smith filed a motion to revise the 1996 Board Decision, alleging that it was tainted by clear and unmistakable error (CUE). He argued that there was sufficient evidence in 1996 to show he had DVT, and thus his claim should have been allowed to proceed with the VA's duty to assist. However, the Board denied his motion, and this denial was affirmed by the Veterans Court.The case was then brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Smith argued that the Veterans Court had erred in its interpretation of the CUE standard in 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403, claiming that the court had incorrectly limited CUE-eligible errors to those that would have led to a grant of service connection. However, the Federal Circuit Court disagreed with Smith's interpretation and affirmed the decision of the Veterans Court. The court held that a revision or reversal based on CUE requires an error that, once corrected, alters the merits outcome of a veteran’s claim with absolute clarity. View "SMITH v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law