Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Monk served in the Marine Corps during the Vietnam War. In 2012, Monk sought VA disability benefits, alleging service-connected PTSD, diabetes, hypertension, and strokes. The VA denied the claim, finding that his discharge was “other than honorable.” Monk filed a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) and separately applied to the Board of Correction of Naval Records (BCNR) to upgrade his discharge status. In 2015, the VA informed Monk that it could not process his appeal until it received BCNR records. Monk sought a writ of mandamus with Veterans Court and requested that the court certify a class of all veterans who had applied for VA benefits, had timely filed an NOD, had not received a decision within 12 months, and had demonstrated medical or financial hardship (38 U.S.C. 7107(a)(2)(B)–(C)). The Veterans Court denied the request for class certification, denied another veteran’s request to join the action, and ordered the VA to respond to Monk’s petition regarding the denial of disability benefits. BCNR then granted Monk an upgraded discharge status. The Federal Circuit reversed the denial of class certification, finding that the Veterans Court has authority to certify a class for a class action and to maintain similar aggregate resolution procedures with respect to benefit denials. View "Monk v. Shulkin" on Justia Law

In 2014, the Board of Veterans Appeals denied Parrott’s claims for benefits on account of her veteran husband’s esophageal adenocarcinoma, with liver and peritoneal metastasis, and his ensuing death. The Veterans Court vacated and remanded. Parrott then timely sought attorney fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412. The Veterans Court awarded her $4,050. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that, in arriving at its award of attorney fees, the Veterans Court misinterpreted EAJA and adopted an incorrect approach for determining the cost of living adjustment to be used in calculating her attorney’s hourly rate and that the court then abused its discretion by not allowing her to resubmit her application using the approach the court had adopted. EAJA states that “attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living . . . justifies a higher fee.” The court properly rejected Parrott’s request for a cost of living increase, based on Washington D.C., based on the location of the Veterans Court and applied rates based on the locations of her attorney’s offices in San Francisco, Dallas, and Little Rock. View "Parrott v. Shulkin" on Justia Law

Within the Department of Defense, DRMS disposes of surplus military property at Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices (DRMOs). Property that cannot be reutilized is demilitarized and/or reduced to scrap that can be sold. A 2007 DRMS Request for Proposals sought performance of DRMO activities for up to five years. A referenced website showed DRMS’s historical workload and scrap weight; an amendment indicated that “the contractor may experience significant workload increases or decreases” and outlined a process to “renegotiate the price” if workload increased. DRMS awarded its first contract to Agility to operate six DRMOs for one base year with four option years at a fixed price of $45,233,914.92 per year. Upon commencing work in Arifjan, the largest of the DRMOs, Agility immediately fell behind. It inherited a backlog of approximately 30 weeks. From the start, the volume received at Arifjan was greater than Agility anticipated. The parties terminated their contract for convenience in 2010. Agility thereafter requested funding for its additional costs, claiming DRMS provided inaccurate workload estimates during solicitation. The contracting officer awarded Agility only $236,363.93 for its first claim and nothing for the second, noting that Agility received an offset from its scrap sales. The Federal Circuit reversed, as “clearly erroneous,” the Claims Court’s findings that DRMS did not inadequately or negligently prepare its estimates and that Agility did not rely on those estimates. Agility’s receipt of scrap sales and the parties’ agreement did not preclude recovery. View "Agility Defense & Government Services, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Kays served in the Navy, 1972-1976. In 2005, he sought benefits for disability caused by PTSD, allegedly caused by two non-combat stressors during his service. He was stabbed during a fight as he left an Enlisted Men’s Club, and while off-duty and taking diving lessons, he was asked to help with the recovery effort of a downed civilian helicopter; in the water, he was separated from the group and became stressed. Kays submitted a newspaper article, statements, records, and in-person testimony about those events. In 2005, the VA Regional Office denied Kays’s claim. The Board of Veterans Appeals remanded for further development of the record. The Regional Office again denied the PTSD claim. The Board affirmed. Meanwhile, the pertinent regulation, 38 C.F.R. 3.304(f), was amended and the Veterans Court held that the amendments were retroactive. On remand, the Board again denied Kays’s claim, finding that statements by Kays and his former spouse about the alleged stabbing were unsupported and contradicted by other evidence and that Kays’s testimony about the search and rescue was not credible because of the lack of supporting detail in the article, his delay in reporting the event, and his changing story. The Veterans Court found the Board’s decision to be a question of fact reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the Veterans Court applied the correct standard of review and correctly determined that the regulations require credible supporting evidence. View "Kays v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Kennedy enrolled at George Washington University (GWU) in 2003. He obtained a Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) scholarship in 2005, agreeing to complete Officer Candidate School (OCS), a requirement which is not waivable. The scholarship provided that if Kennedy failed to complete the requirements, he could become liable to reimburse the program. Kennedy subsequently suffered trauma and began to act abnormally. During his OCS course, his platoon commander recommended that Kennedy be disenrolled as emotionally unstable. In June 2006, a Commanding Officer’s Board disenrolled Kennedy from OCS without opportunity to return. NROTC stopped funding Kennedy’s education. In February 2007, the Assistant Secretary approved disenrollment with recoupment of $50,675. After graduation from GWU in 2007, Kennedy graduated from law school, was admitted to the bar, and filed suit. The Claims Court directed the case to the Board for Correction of Naval Records (BCNR), a civilian body that exists to correct Naval Records. The BCNR upheld Kennedy’s disenrollment, but held that Kennedy should be relieved from reimbursement because he had been dissuaded from appearing at a hearing. The Claims Court held that Kennedy’s disenrollment was lawful and that his breach-of-contract claims for monetary relief lacked merit. The Federal Circuit reversed. Given the government’s concession that Kennedy’s due process rights were violated when he was dissuaded from attending his hearing, the Claims Court erred in concluding that Kennedy’s disenrollment was inevitable. The court directed the case be returned to the BCNR. View "Kennedy v. United States" on Justia Law

The Budget Control Act of 2011 established spending limits for federal agencies and required automatic spending cuts (sequestration) if certain deficit reduction legislation was not enacted. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 required the President to issue a sequestration order near the middle of fiscal year 2013. Under President Obama’s sequestration the Department of Defense (DOD) 2013 budget was cut by approximately 37 billion dollars, to be absorbed over six months. The DOD reprogrammed funds, reduced facility maintenance, eliminated some military training exercises, and furloughed civilian workers. Calhoun is a non-excepted civilian Doctrine Defense Specialist for the Army Cyber Command (ACC). ACC Commander Lt. Gen. Hernandez, the deciding official, delegated that authority to his Chief of Staff, Col. Sanborn. Calhoun received a Notice of Proposed Furlough. Calhoun replied, including budget proposals she asserted would prevent furloughs. In responses to Calhoun, Col. Sanborn stated that he had read her submissions and that “[t]he furlough guidance … is clear.” Calhoun was furloughed for six nonconsecutive days. An administrative judge found that delegation to Col. Sanborn did not violate DOD policy; that Col. Sanborn appropriately considered Calhoun’s reply; and that evaluation of the merits of her proposals was beyond the scope of his review. The Merit Systems Protection Board and the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding no due process violation because Col. Sanborn considered Calhoun’s written reply and because a summary of her oral reply would not have altered the furlough decision. View "Calhoun v. Department of the Army" on Justia Law

Aldridge served on active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps, 1984-1992, and was denied a disability rating higher than 10% for patellofemoral syndrome on his knees in 2013. The Board of Veterans Appeals informed Aldridge that he had 120 days to file a notice of appeal with the Veterans Court, 38 U.S.C. 7266(a), by April 23, 2014. The Veterans Court received his notice on October 27, 2014. Aldridge acknowledged that his appeal was late, but argued that deaths in his family and his resulting depressive state prevented him from timely filing. His mother died on September 27, 2013; his daughter gave birth to a stillborn child on December 16; and his sister died on January 14, 2014. He asked the court to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling. The court determined that Aldridge had failed to demonstrate that his family’s losses “themselves directly or indirectly affected the timely filing of his appeal,” noting that Aldridge closed the estates of his deceased mother and sister, became his father’s primary caregiver, maintained his job at a Veterans Affairs hospital, and attempted to hire a lawyer during the time at issue. The Federal Circuit affirmed, upholding the Veterans Court’s application of a legal standard that required proof of causation. View "Aldridge v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Liberty’s 325 patent, issued in 2010, is “directed to a projectile structured to be discharged from a firearm and designed to overcome the disadvantages and problems associated with conventional firearm projectiles such as, but not limited to lead or steel jacketed projectiles.” The patent grew out of the U.S. military’s “Green Ammunition Program,” developed in response to concerns that lead-based ammunition was polluting military training ranges. The 325 patent sought to address “problems of lethality” with the conventional Army “green” ammunition. The Claims Court held that ammunition rounds used by the Army embody the claims of the patent, violating 28 U.S.C. 1498. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the trial court erred in construing claim terms: reduced area of contact; intermediate opposite ends. When the terms are construed correctly, the Army rounds do not embody the claimed invention. The court affirmed the Claims Court's rejection of a breach of contract claim based on a non-disclosure agreement signed by the named inventor of the 325 patent and an Army official during negotiations for a possible contract. The Army official did not have authority to enter into an NDA on behalf of the government. View "Liberty Ammunition, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2015, Jones, a veteran, filed 16 appeals with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), alleging that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301–4333, when it did not select him for various job vacancies. An administrative judge consolidated the appeals and ultimately denied relief in an Initial Decision. That Decision became the Final Decision of the MSPB when Jones did not timely file a petition for review. The Federal Circuit affirmed, first holding that it had jurisdiction, rejecting an argument that there was no . final MSPB decision from which Jones could appeal. The AJ properly found that neither direct nor circumstantial evidence supported Jones’s USERRA claim and failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that his military service was a motivating factor in HHS’s decision not to hire him for the subject job vacancies. View "Jones v. Dept. of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Zafer, an Ankara, Turkey, contractor, and the Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) entered into a firm-fixed-price contract to construct the MILCON Support Facility at the Bagram Air Force Field in Afghanistan. Zafer was responsible for delivering materials to the site, and assumed the risk “for all costs and resulting loss or profit.” After issuing notice to proceed, USACE recognized that it could not make the project site available immediately and increased the contract price and set a new completion date. In November 2011, Pakistan closed its border from the seaport city of Karachi along the land routes into Afghanistan in response to a combat incident with the U.S. and NATO. The route remained closed for 219 days, Zafer notified USACE that the closure would greatly impact its delivery of materials and requested direction on how to proceed. USACE replied that the closure was “purely the act of Pakistan governmental authorities,” that the U.S. government was “not responsible” and denied further compensation. Zafer subsequently, repeatedly, asked for payment for additional costs. In 2013, Zafer submitted an unsuccessful request for an equitable adjustment. The contracting officer found no evidence supporting a constructive change claim. The Claims Court granted USACE summary judgment. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Zafer failed to designate specific facts to establish a constructive change claim based on either a constructive acceleration theory or on a government fault theory. View "Zafer Taahhut Insaat v. United States" on Justia Law