Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2000, Herbert, a Navy veteran, sought disability benefits for PTSD, which he alleged was connected to a typhoon that his ship encountered travelling to Japan in 1956. Ship logs and letters confirm that the USS Mount McKinley weathered a bad storm around that time. A 2002 VA medical examination revealed no PTSD; the Regional Office denied the claim. Herbert filed notice of disagreement, but his hearing did not occur until 2008. Herbert underwent a 2004 examination at the VA’s Veterans Center and a 2006 examination by a private psychologist that both produced diagnoses of PTSD. A 2006 VA examination and a 2007 examination conducted at the VA’s behest did not. The Board of Appeal denied service connection finding Herbert not credible in testifying to witnessing others go overboard. The Veterans Court remanded. A VA examiner concluded that experiencing the typhoon itself was an adequate stressor to support a PTSD diagnosis, but that Herbert’s symptoms did not meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD” In 2011, Herbert had another private medical examination, which diagnosed PTSD based on the storm alone. In 2012, the Board rejected Herbert’s claim, finding him “not credible in reporting his psychiatric symptoms or the stressors.” The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Herbert v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Mr. and Ms. Haynes divorced in 1995. Mr. Haynes died in 2000. Ms. Haynes sought Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC) benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1310, as a “surviving spouse.” Because Ms. Haynes was not married to Mr. Haynes at the time of his death, the VA Regional Office denied the claim. Ms. Haynes later requested that the Regional Office reopen her claim on the presentation of new documentation showing a decision by the Army Board of Correction of Military Records to award Ms. Haynes an annuity as a “former spouse” under the Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act , 10 U.S.C. 1447(10), which permits former spouses to receive annuities. The Regional Office denied the request. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals agreed, while acknowledging Ms. Haynes’ argument that because the basis for her divorce was physical abuse, she should not be required to demonstrate marriage at the time of Mr. Haynes’ death in order to receive DIC benefits. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. Although Mr. Haynes’ abusive actions were documented, the statute requires validly married spouses at the time of the veteran’s death. View "Haynes v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Toomer served in the Army, 1971 to 1974. He sought benefits for degenerative disc disease, claiming connection to a 1972 in-service back strain from lifting heavy objects. In 2004, a VA Regional Office denied the claim. In 2009, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed, relying on a 2007 VA examination. Although Toomer was treated for a back strain in 1972, there was no evidence from subsequent clinical visits that his current pain was connected to that injury: a 1972 x-ray was normal; after January 1973, there were no complaints of back pain during service; and there were potential post-service injuries, considering his occupation as a construction worker. The Decision was mailed on June 2, 2009. On July 27, Toomer informed the VA that he had not received it. On August 4, the VA mailed another copy, noting that the veteran has “120 days from the date this decision was mailed to you (as shown on the first page of this decision) to file a Notice of Appeal,” On October 28, more than 120 days from the decision date, but within 120 days of the August letter, Toomer appealed to the Veterans Court, which dismissed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that even if it disagreed with that court’s finding that dates on the correspondence were not misleading, and did not constitute “extraordinary circumstances,” revisiting this finding was beyond its jurisdiction. View "Toomer v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Wingard, a 20-year veteran, died in 2005, from causes unrelated to his military service. His daughter sought a burial-plot or interment allowance (38 U.S.C. 2303) and burial benefits (38 U.S.C. 2302(a)(1)), which provides for burial benefits only in the case of a deceased veteran “who at the time of death was in receipt of compensation . . . or was in receipt of pension.”. The Board of Veterans Appeals granted an interment allowance, but denied burial benefits. In 1989, the Department had assigned Wingard a 0% disability rating for a service-connected hernia that had been treated and showed no sign of recurrence. Wingard’s disability rating remained at 0%l. He never received disability compensation, had no claims pending, and never received a Veterans-related pension. The Veterans Court held that 8 U.S.C. 7252(b) did not preclude review and that sections 1110 and 1155 allowed the Department to find some disabilities noncompensable and assign a 0% rating. The court did not address whether “in receipt of compensation,” included “entitled to receive compensation.” The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that Congress has barred the Veterans Court and Federal Circuit from conducting such review, which must be conducted through a direct review of rulemaking determinations under 38 U.S.C. 502. View "Wingard v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Mrs. Dixon was the spouse of a veteran. A 1996 an Order of Support issued by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of Virginia ordered Mr. Dixon to pay Mrs. Dixon child support of $443.00 per month and spousal support of $1000.00 per month. Mrs. Dixon states that the Order required the Department of Veterans Affairs to garnish these sums from Mr. Dixon’s disability payments. Mr. Dixon did not make these payments. On Mr. Dixon’s death in 2004, Mrs. Dixon filed a claim with the VA Regional Office requesting the payments that she claims should have been paid to her from Mr. Dixon’s VA disability benefits, 1996-2004. The Veterans Court rejected the claim, finding that the VA was never served with legal process instructing garnishment, as required by 42 U.S.C. 659(i)(5); that Mrs. Dixon incorrectly asserted that the VA previously made partial payments pursuant to the Order; and that the $500 monthly payments she received were, instead made pursuant to 38 C.F.R. 3.452 (apportionment of veteran’s benefits if the veteran is not residing with his spouse or children). The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Dixon v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Moffitt served in the Army, 1944-1946, and was discharged due to injuries sustained during service. The VA awarded him a combined disability rating of 100%, which was later reduced to a combined 60% rating, effective 1953. Moffitt died in 1982. If a veteran’s death is not service-connected, the surviving spouse may qualify for dependency and indemnity compensation (DIC) if the veteran received, or was “entitled to receive,” benefits for a service-connected disability that was rated totally disabling for the 10-year period prior to the veteran’s death, 38 U.S.C. 1318. Mrs. Moffitt sought DIC benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1151, which provides that, when a veteran suffers an additional disability or death as the result of VA hospitalization, treatment, or examination, benefits shall be awarded as if such disability or death were service-connected. The Board concluded that Moffitt’s death was the result of injury incurred during hospitalization at a VA facility and posthumously granted Moffitt’s pending claim for total disability based on individual unemployability with a 1979 effective date. After several related decisions, the Board of Appeals denied Mrs. Moffitt enhanced DIC benefits, finding that regulations, amended while the claim was pending, precluded her hypothetical entitlement theory (38 C.F.R. 20.1106). The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed, applying the amendment retroactively. View "Moffitt v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Following nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate, Brigadier General Schwalier was scheduled to be appointed to major general in 1997. His appointment was delayed and the President later chose not to appoint him, 10 U.S.C. 624(c). Schwalier argued that he was appointed by operation of law after the delay of his appointment expired and before the President’s decision. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court finding that the appointment process for senior military officers does not allow for automatic appointments, and a President’s decision not to appoint an officer is unreviewable. The Air Force and the Department of Defense did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by not retroactively appointing Schwalier. View "Schwalier v. Hagel" on Justia Law

Navarro served in the Army from 1958-1960. He is not a combat veteran, but served near the demilitarized zone after the Korean War. In 2005, Navarro sought service connection for PTSD. He established the condition under 38 C.F.R. 4.125(a). He provided testimony about hearing shots, seeing injured soldiers, and hearing noises while on night guard duty. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the claim in 2008. While appeal was pending, the VA amended 38 C.F.R. 3.304(f) with respect to evidence required to establish claimed in-service stressors for PTSD claims. The Veterans Court vacated. On remand, the Board found that revised 3.304(f) did not apply because Navarro had been diagnosed by a therapist, not a “VA psychiatrist or psychologist” and that Navarro was not entitled to a VA medical examination because “none of his claimed stressor events have been sufficiently corroborated by credible supporting evidence and his account of having a continuity of PTSD symptomatology since service is not deemed credible.” The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit remanded for determination of whether Navarro’s “claimed stressor[s are] consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the veteran’s service.” If so, he is entitled to examination by a VA psychiatrist or psychologist. View "Sanchez-Navarro v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Blubaugh served in the Army, 1964-1966 and was a gunner in Vietnam. In 1988, he sought service connection for multiple medical conditions, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The VA denied service connection, finding that his VA psychological examination did not support a diagnosis of PTSD. Blubaugh did not appeal, but in 1992, sought to reopen his claim. The VA concluded that a second examination did not support a PTSD diagnosis and noted the “absence of a definitive confirmable stressor.” In 2008, Blubaugh filed a second request to reopen. Unlike his previous submissions, this request included a statement describing his experiences in Vietnam and post-service difficulties. The VA also received, for the first time, medical documentation showing a positive diagnosis of PTSD. The VA granted service connection for PTSD and assigned a 10 percent disability rating effective 2008. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The effective date for a disability rating is generally determined by the date the disabling condition arose, or the date the claim was submitted, whichever is later. An exception for claims granted based on certain service department records that were associated with the veteran’s claims file after the claim was first decided does not apply to Blubaugh’s case. View "Blubaugh v. McDonald" on Justia Law

O’Bryan served in the Marine Corps from 1973-1976. His eye problems were not noted upon his entry into service. Upon discharge, he was listed as having 20/20 vision. In 1977, he filed a claim for service-connected optic disease. In medical examinations, he variously reported that his vision started to blur in1974 or 1976. He was legally blind due to Leber’s optic atrophy within one year of discharge. Certain conditions manifesting within one year after discharge are treated as though manifested during service, 38 U.S.C. 1112(a). O’Bryan argued that his symptoms began during service; that he is suffering from a “disease”; and that, because his condition was not noted upon entry, he is entitled to a presumption that the disease was incurred in service, 38 U.S.C. 1111. The VA regional office denied O’Bryan’s claim because Leber’s is not a “disease,” but a “hereditary disorder.” The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed. In 2010, O’Bryan attempted to reopen the case, but the Board rejected his contention that it had committed clear and unmistakable error. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that the lower court misinterpreted the law on when a congenital or developmental condition is a non-compensable defect. View "O'Bryan v. McDonald" on Justia Law