Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Navarro served in the Army from 1958-1960. He is not a combat veteran, but served near the demilitarized zone after the Korean War. In 2005, Navarro sought service connection for PTSD. He established the condition under 38 C.F.R. 4.125(a). He provided testimony about hearing shots, seeing injured soldiers, and hearing noises while on night guard duty. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the claim in 2008. While appeal was pending, the VA amended 38 C.F.R. 3.304(f) with respect to evidence required to establish claimed in-service stressors for PTSD claims. The Veterans Court vacated. On remand, the Board found that revised 3.304(f) did not apply because Navarro had been diagnosed by a therapist, not a “VA psychiatrist or psychologist” and that Navarro was not entitled to a VA medical examination because “none of his claimed stressor events have been sufficiently corroborated by credible supporting evidence and his account of having a continuity of PTSD symptomatology since service is not deemed credible.” The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit remanded for determination of whether Navarro’s “claimed stressor[s are] consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the veteran’s service.” If so, he is entitled to examination by a VA psychiatrist or psychologist. View "Sanchez-Navarro v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Blubaugh served in the Army, 1964-1966 and was a gunner in Vietnam. In 1988, he sought service connection for multiple medical conditions, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The VA denied service connection, finding that his VA psychological examination did not support a diagnosis of PTSD. Blubaugh did not appeal, but in 1992, sought to reopen his claim. The VA concluded that a second examination did not support a PTSD diagnosis and noted the “absence of a definitive confirmable stressor.” In 2008, Blubaugh filed a second request to reopen. Unlike his previous submissions, this request included a statement describing his experiences in Vietnam and post-service difficulties. The VA also received, for the first time, medical documentation showing a positive diagnosis of PTSD. The VA granted service connection for PTSD and assigned a 10 percent disability rating effective 2008. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The effective date for a disability rating is generally determined by the date the disabling condition arose, or the date the claim was submitted, whichever is later. An exception for claims granted based on certain service department records that were associated with the veteran’s claims file after the claim was first decided does not apply to Blubaugh’s case. View "Blubaugh v. McDonald" on Justia Law

O’Bryan served in the Marine Corps from 1973-1976. His eye problems were not noted upon his entry into service. Upon discharge, he was listed as having 20/20 vision. In 1977, he filed a claim for service-connected optic disease. In medical examinations, he variously reported that his vision started to blur in1974 or 1976. He was legally blind due to Leber’s optic atrophy within one year of discharge. Certain conditions manifesting within one year after discharge are treated as though manifested during service, 38 U.S.C. 1112(a). O’Bryan argued that his symptoms began during service; that he is suffering from a “disease”; and that, because his condition was not noted upon entry, he is entitled to a presumption that the disease was incurred in service, 38 U.S.C. 1111. The VA regional office denied O’Bryan’s claim because Leber’s is not a “disease,” but a “hereditary disorder.” The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed. In 2010, O’Bryan attempted to reopen the case, but the Board rejected his contention that it had committed clear and unmistakable error. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that the lower court misinterpreted the law on when a congenital or developmental condition is a non-compensable defect. View "O'Bryan v. McDonald" on Justia Law

In a 2011 memorandum, the Secretary of the Navy explained that the Navy would be “challenged to reduce enlisted manning to meet future planned end strength controls due to record high retention in the current economic environment.” To address these concerns and to “optimize the quality” of the Navy, the Secretary initiated an Enlisted Retention Board (ERB) to identify 3,000 sailors for separation. The Navy notified all personnel, outlined a timeline, and identified particular pay grades and occupational classifications or specialties that would be subject to review. Sailors were informed that if their job rating was over-manned and slated for review, they could apply for conversion to an undermanned rating that would not be subject to review. The Navy also published the quotas for each overmanned rating that would be subject to the ERB to give the sailors information about competition among the different ratings and to enable them to make informed decisions about their careers. The ERB selected 2,946 sailors for honorable discharge. A putative class of about 300 of those discharged challenged their dismissal and sought back pay. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the merit-based claims as nonjusticiable and denied remaining claims on the administrative record. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Anderson v. United States" on Justia Law

Wilson served in the Navy 1986-1990 and again 1992-1994. He was given a 70% disability rating for several service-connected physical conditions. In 2001, Wilson was found guilty of attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm and was sentenced to concurrent life terms. His convictions and sentences were affirmed. Wilson then pursued unsuccessful state and federal collateral attacks. For veterans who have service-connected disabilities rated at 20% or more and who are incarcerated for than 60 days for a felony,” 38 U.S.C. 5313(a)(1) requires reduction in compensation to the level of 10% disability, effective the 61st day of incarceration. The VA informed Wilson by letter that his rate of compensation would be reduced to 10%, effective back to December 20, 2001 and requested refund of overpayment of $15,464.50. The Regional Office Committee on Waivers and Compromises denied a waiver. Wilson was also denied a “total disability evaluation based on individual unemployability due to service-connected disabilities” (TDIU) rating on the basis that his unemployability was due to his incarceration The Board of Veterans’ Appeals applied the multi-factor test from 38 C.F.R. 1.965 to determine that recovery of the overpayment would not be against “equity and good conscience” and agreed that Wilson was not entitled to a TDIU rating. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit upheld the decision.View "Wilson v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Spicer served on active duty in the Navy from 1984 until 1987. In 1986, Spicer fractured his left little finger when a door closed on his hand while aboard ship. The fracture required surgery, which resulted in the finger joint fusing. In 2007, a VA examiner diagnosed Spicer as having degenerative arthritis of the distal interphalangeal joint in that finger. A VA regional office denied Spicer a compensable rating. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals found that although Spicer’s left finger disability was manifested by pain and limitation of motion, he failed to meet the criteria for a compensable evaluation for a left finger disability under either Diagnostic Code (DC) 5227 or 5230. The Veterans Court rejected Spicer’s argument that DC 5003 assigns a 10% rating for either a single affected major joint or a group of affected minor joints and that 38 C.F.R. 4.45(f) does not mandate that multiple minor joints be involved. The Veterans Court stated that “the DIP joint is not a major joint or minor joint group for the purpose of rating disabilities from arthritis.” The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Spicer v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

In 1996, the Air Force entered into a contract under which SUFI would install and operate telephone systems in guest lodgings on bases in Europe at no cost to the government; the Air Force agreed that SUFI network was to be the exclusive method available to a guest placing telephone calls at the lodging. The contract permitted SUFI to block other networks and required the Air Force to remove or disable preexisting Defense Switched Network (DSN) telephone lines in hallways and lobbies, but DSN phones remained in place. Call records showed that, with Air Force assistance, guests often placed multiple or lengthy individual calls. After the Air Force declined to implement controls to curb DSN and patched-call abuse, SUFI blocked guest-room access to the DSN operator numbers but permitted morale calls from lobby phones, monitored by sign-in logs. Air Force personnel failed to require guests to sign the logs and gave guests new DSN access numbers, to circumvent SUFI’s charges. After failed attempts to resolve the situation, including through the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, SUFI sold the telephone system to the Air Force for $2.275 million and submitted claims, totaling $130.3 million, to the contracting officer. The officer denied the claims, except for $132,922 on a claim involving use of calling-cards. The Board later awarded $7.4 million in damages, plus interest. In an action under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491, the Court of Federal Claims awarded $118.76 million in damages, plus interest. The Federal Circuit vacated in part and remanded for additional findings.View "SUFI Network Servs, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Norma married veteran Glenn Dodson in 1949. They remained married until Glenn’s death in 1992 from cardiac arrhythmia due to amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). Norma did not seek Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC) benefits as the “surviving spouse” of a veteran whose death resulted from a service-related injury or disease, 38 U.S.C. 1310–1318. Her eligibility for DIC benefits terminated upon her remarriage at age 64 in 1994. The Veterans Benefits Act of 2003 amended Title 38 to authorize DIC benefits for surviving spouses who remarry after attaining age 57 but before enactment of the amendment. Norma, who was over the age of 57 when she remarried in 1994, did not seek DIC benefits during the amendment’s one-year window. During that time, ALS was recognized as a condition that could be service-related, though not presumptively so. In 2008 the VA established a presumption of service connection for ALS. In 2009, Norma filed an application for DIC benefits as Glenn’s widow. The regional office denied the claim. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals, the Veterans Court, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding the claim untimely and holding that the amendment did not contemplate shifting circumstances. View "Carroll v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Beraud served on active duty in the U.S. Navy, 1974-1977, and in the reserves until 988. In 1985, Beraud filed a claim with a VA Regional Office for a headache disorder, allegedly caused by trauma suffered while on duty. Although Beraud did not appeal the RO’s denial of his claim, he sent a letter, indicating the location of additional service medical records. The RO never responded. The RO reopened the claim, but denied it on the merits in 1990, finding that Beraud did not incur the headache disorder, or aggravation thereof, during service. The RO did not refer to Beraud’s 1985 letter, nor did it mention the medical records that were the subject of the letter. Beraud did not appeal. The RO denied two later requests to reopen, finding that Beraud had not submitted new and material evidence. In 2004, Beraud submitted an informal claim for disability compensation for the same headache disorder. This time, the RO granted Beraud service connection and assigned a 50 percent disability rating, effective 2004. In 2010, the Board denied Beraud’s appeal, finding that the decisions on his 1985, 1990, 1992, and 2002 claims were final, so that an effective date prior to 2004 could not be granted. Beraud argued that his 1985 letter constituted new evidence, giving rise to a pending, unadjudicated claim. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit reversed. Because the VA failed to determine whether evidence Beraud timely submitted in 1985 claim was new and material under 38 C.F.R. 3.156(b), that claim remained pending, despite the subsequent final decision.View "Beraud v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Joyner served in the Marine Corps and completed a tour of duty in the Persian Gulf. During service, he was treated twice for neck pain. However, his separation from service examination indicated that his neck was “normal.” Joyner later filed a claim with the VA for disability compensation for chronic neck pain and other conditions. The VA regional office denied his claim for benefits for his neck pain. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed, concluding that Joyner did not have a diagnosed neck condition and was not entitled to service connection under 38 U.S.C. 1110, a general provision that provides compensation for disabilities suffered in the line of duty. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that the Veterans Court misinterpreted 38 U.S.C. 1117, an additional disability compensation provision that applies to Gulf War Veterans. Pain can evidence a disability under that section. View "Joyner v. McDonald" on Justia Law