Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Beraud served on active duty in the U.S. Navy, 1974-1977, and in the reserves until 988. In 1985, Beraud filed a claim with a VA Regional Office for a headache disorder, allegedly caused by trauma suffered while on duty. Although Beraud did not appeal the RO’s denial of his claim, he sent a letter, indicating the location of additional service medical records. The RO never responded. The RO reopened the claim, but denied it on the merits in 1990, finding that Beraud did not incur the headache disorder, or aggravation thereof, during service. The RO did not refer to Beraud’s 1985 letter, nor did it mention the medical records that were the subject of the letter. Beraud did not appeal. The RO denied two later requests to reopen, finding that Beraud had not submitted new and material evidence. In 2004, Beraud submitted an informal claim for disability compensation for the same headache disorder. This time, the RO granted Beraud service connection and assigned a 50 percent disability rating, effective 2004. In 2010, the Board denied Beraud’s appeal, finding that the decisions on his 1985, 1990, 1992, and 2002 claims were final, so that an effective date prior to 2004 could not be granted. Beraud argued that his 1985 letter constituted new evidence, giving rise to a pending, unadjudicated claim. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit reversed. Because the VA failed to determine whether evidence Beraud timely submitted in 1985 claim was new and material under 38 C.F.R. 3.156(b), that claim remained pending, despite the subsequent final decision.View "Beraud v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Joyner served in the Marine Corps and completed a tour of duty in the Persian Gulf. During service, he was treated twice for neck pain. However, his separation from service examination indicated that his neck was “normal.” Joyner later filed a claim with the VA for disability compensation for chronic neck pain and other conditions. The VA regional office denied his claim for benefits for his neck pain. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed, concluding that Joyner did not have a diagnosed neck condition and was not entitled to service connection under 38 U.S.C. 1110, a general provision that provides compensation for disabilities suffered in the line of duty. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that the Veterans Court misinterpreted 38 U.S.C. 1117, an additional disability compensation provision that applies to Gulf War Veterans. Pain can evidence a disability under that section. View "Joyner v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Young served as an Army combat engineer from 1965-1967, including duty in Vietnam. In 1984, Young applied for benefits with the VA Regional Office, describing “‘anxiety,’ ‘bad nerves,’ and ‘unable to adjust to society.’” The RO interpreted the claim as seeking an award of service connection due to PTSD, but denied it after Young failed to report for a VA medical examination. In 1989, a VA psychiatrist submitted a letter, stating that Young had been under his care since 1989 and was suffering from PTSD. The RO denied Young’s claim in 1989, 1990, and 1991 because the record did not establish exposure to an in-service stressor. The Board’s 1991 denial became final because Young did not appeal. Young sought to have his claim reopened. The RO denied the request in 1992, 1993, 1995, and 1997. In 1998, the RO received service department records documenting Young’s exposure to an in-service stressor for PTSD that had not been previously associated with his file and reopened Young’s claim. The agency granted him service connection with a 100% disability rating, effective to August 1992. Young sought an effective date of September 1984. The Veterans Court concluded that the effective date should be March, 1989. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Young v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Commander Cronin began active duty with the Navy in 1977. In 1978, she had a calcaneal spur in her heel. She had unsuccessful surgeries in 1979, 1993, 1994, and 1995. She was hospitalized for bipolar disorder in 1995. Beginning in 1998, medical professionals disagreed about whether she suffered from bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), or some combination. She was diagnosed with chronic pain. Cronin alleged that during her service, she was subjected to physical and sexual assaults, stalking, and “extreme sexual harassment.” A social worker described these incidents as supporting a PTSD diagnosis. She had periods of limited duty. The Navy had selected Cronin for promotion, but in a 1994 letter, a Navy physician found her not fit for full duty. Her promotion was delayed. The Physical Evaluation Board assigned her a disability rating of 60% and placed her on the Temporary Disability Retired List. The Board for Correction of Naval Records upheld the promotion delay. In 1996, Cronin was formally placed on the TDRL and promoted. She was reevaluated every 18 months to continue receiving benefits. In 2000, the Board declined to find a compensable claim of PTSD or chronic pain disorder, concluded that her conditions had stabilized, and placed her on the Permanent Disability Retired List. Cronin sued in 2006. On remand, the trial court concluded that the 2003 Relief Act tolls the limitations period during time on the TDRL, so that the claims were timely, but affirmed the refusal to increase her disability rating. The Federal Circuit held that most of her claims were time barred. As to claims alleging PTSD, there was no timeliness issue, but they were properly rejected on the merits.View "Cronin v. United States" on Justia Law

Johnson served in the U.S. Army, 1970-197171. Years after leaving the service, he filed a claim for increased disability ratings for his service-connected disabilities, including rheumatic heart disease (then rated 10% disabling), and degenerative changes of the right and left knees (each knee rated 10% disabling). A VA regional office (RO) denied the claims, finding that he was not entitled to a rating of total disability based on individual unemployability. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed and denied his claim for extra-schedular consideration of the combined impact of his service-connected rheumatic heart disease and right knee disability under 38 CFR 3.321(b)(1). The Veterans Court affirmed, finding the CFR language ambiguous and deferring to the VA’s interpretation. The Federal Circuit reversed, citing plain language. Section 3.321(b)(1) entitles a veteran to consideration for referral for extraschedular evaluation based on an individual disability not adequately captured by the schedular evaluations; it also entitles a veteran to consideration for referral for extra-schedular evaluation based on multiple disabilities, the combined effect of which is exceptional and not captured by scheduler evaluations.View "Johnson v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Martin, an Army veteran, applied for educational-assistance benefits under 38 U.S.C. 3011. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the application, concluding that Mr. Martin was ineligible for benefits because the basis for his honorable discharge in 1990 constituted “willful misconduct.” The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed. The officially declared reason for Martin’s discharge was “alcohol rehabilitation failure.” The Federal Circuit vacated, stating that “alcohol rehabilitation failure” cannot be said always to constitute or result from willful misconduct, regardless of circumstances. Neither the Board nor the Veterans Court made any determination of what particular conduct constituted misconduct, engaged in with the state of mind required for willfulness, that led to the rehabilitation-failure determination.View "Martin v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Mrs. Rusick is the surviving spouse of veteran George Rusick, who served on active duty in the U.S. military 1942-1943. In 1983, a Veterans Administration regional office issued a decision continuing a 30-percent rating for Rusick’s service-connected anxiety disorder. With a service-connected hearing loss rated at 40 percent, Rusick’s combined rating was 60 percent. In 1996, the regional office increased the rating for his anxiety disorder to 100 percent. Rusick died in April 2000, with no pending claims for benefits. In May 2000, Mrs. Rusick filed a claim seeking dependency and indemnity compensation (DIC) and accrued benefits. The Department of Veterans Affairs denied both claims and she did not appeal. In September 2006, Mrs. Rusick filed another claim, asserting clear and unmistakable error in that Rusick should have received a 100 percent rating in 1983 because he was unemployable. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals agreed that the regional office’s failure to assign a 100 percent rating in 1983 constituted CUE and that Mrs. Rusick was entitled to DIC benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1318. The regional office implemented the Board’s decision by awarding DIC, but it denied accrued benefits under 38 U.S.C. 5121. The Board, Veterans Court, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Rusick v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Robertson voluntarily enlisted in the Army in 1963.After serving confinement for being absent without leave on two occasions for a total of about 340 days, Robertson was discharged in 1967 under conditions other than honorable, a character of discharge that can foreclose the receipt of veterans’ benefits. He later participated in President Ford’s clemency program, completed alternative service, and received a presidential pardon and a new clemency discharge. Despite his pardon and clemency discharge, the Department of Veterans Affairs has continued to deny Robertson’s claim for veterans’ benefits. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the Department of Veterans Affairs properly considered the misconduct underlying his pardoned offense to deny his application for benefits. Entitlement to veterans’ benefits under the clemency program was meant to be the exception, not the rule. View "Robertson v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Erickson was a U.S. Postal Service employee from 1988 to 2000, and also a member of the Army National Guard Reserve. He was absent from the Postal Service for lengthy periods while on active duty with the National Guard. Between 1991 and 1995 he was absent for more than 22 months, and between 1996 and 2000, he worked at the Postal Service for only four days. The Postal Service inquired whether he intended to return. Erickson replied that he would not return until he completed his tour of duty in September 2001. The Postal Service removed him for excessive use of military leave. Erickson re-enlisted with the Guard and remained on active duty through 2005. In 2006, he appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board alleging violation of his rights under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). The Board rejected his claim under 38 U.S.C. 4312, holding that he had not made a timely request for reemployment and that military service was not a motivating factor in the termination. The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to his reemployment claim, but reversed with respect to his discrimination claim. On remand, the Board found that Erickson had waived his USERRA rights by abandoning his civilian career, but on a second remand, ruled in favor of Erickson and granted him reinstatement with back wages and benefits. The Federal Circuit denied his application for recovery of attorney fees and expenses for the two appeals.View "Erickson v. U.S. Postal Serv." on Justia Law

Matthews enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1990. In 2006, while on active duty, he pled guilty to computer pornography and solicitation of a child. He was sentenced to 21 years plus 10 months in prison. In 2007, an administrative separation board imposed an “other than honorable” discharge on Matthews. In 2010, Matthews sought back pay from the date of his arrest and “retainer” pay, based on a total of 20 years of active duty, reached while incarcerated. He claimed he was not properly discharged, citing the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. 552b; the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552; the Military Whistleblower Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. 1034; and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706. The Claims Court of held that it lacked jurisdiction over claims founded on the four statutes because they are not money-mandating and held that Matthews failed to state claims for back pay under 37 U.S.C. 204(a) and retainer pay under 10 U.S.C. 6330(b). The statute prohibits service members from receiving pay for absences without leave that are not unavoidable; an absence due to civilian incarceration is not unavoidable. When he was arrested Matthews had not reached the 20 years of active duty service required to receive retainer pay. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Matthews v. United States" on Justia Law