Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2004, the Army awarded Parsons the prime contract for work in Iraq. The contract incorporated Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), for reimbursement of sub-contractor costs. Parsons entered into a subcontract with Odell for health care facilities and medical equipment. After the Army terminated task orders for convenience, Odell attempted to collect reimbursement above the amount determined by the Defense Contract Audit Agency as its provisional indirect cost. Settlement for termination of the prime contract did not address the issue. Following an audit, Parsons submitted Odell’s revised invoice to the termination contract officer, who stated that it would not settle directly with Odell under FAR 49.108-8 because it was not in the best interest of the government. Parsons submitted a sponsored Certified Claim under the Contract Disputes Act on behalf of Odell to the Procurement Contracting Officer, who denied the claim. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeal held that the request was routine and, under 48 C.F.R. (FAR) 2.101, needed to be in dispute to constitute a claim over which it had jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Parsons made no argument that its request was in dispute. The record did not indicate that the PCO ever received a proper request for payment.View "Parsons Global Servs., Inc. v. McHugh" on Justia Law

Donnellan served in the National Guard from 1969 until 2000. In 1996, a portion of his sigmoid colon was removed as treatment for colon cancer. In March 1998, after diagnosis of acquired polyposis, he had a total colectomy. While on active duty for training in May-June 1998, he became ill and underwent emergency surgery to remove a portion of his small intestine because of a small bowel perforation. After surgery, his doctors treated a small bowel fistula. The DVA denied a service connection to ensuing complications. In 2007, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied benefits, finding by clear and unmistakable evidence that Donnellan’s disease and ensuing complications did not increase in severity beyond natural progression during his period of active duty for training. The Veterans Court remanded, holding that the statutory presumption of aggravation does not apply to an increase in the degree of a disability suffered by a member of the National Guard while on active duty for training who is not a veteran under 38 U.S.C. 101(2) and that his doctor’s medical opinion did not satisfy the Board’s instructions on remand. The Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal. The Veterans Court’s remand order is not a final decision. View "Donnellan v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

In 1992, at age 57, Navy veteran who served on active duty during the Korean Conflict began receiving pension benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1521(a) for non-service connected disabilities. He had a combined disability rating of 80% based on prostate cancer, osteoarthritis of both knees, glaucoma/cataracts, hypertension, hyperthyroidism, and major depressive disorder. The disabilities rendered him "permanently and totally disabled." In 2006, he applied for an enhanced pension under the special monthly rate (38 U.S.C. 1521(e)), seeking consideration for housebound status because he was older than 65 years of age and had a disability rating of more than 60%. The regional office denied the claim because he had received a pension under section 1521 before turning 65. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied an appeal. The Veterans Court reversed and remanded. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, overruling Veterans Court’s interpretation of 38 U.S.C. 1513(a) in Hartness v. Nicholson (2006). Veterans applying for special monthly pension benefits under section 1521(e) should be on equal footing regardless of when they apply for a pension, i.e., whether the veteran applies before or after turning 65 years old.View "Chandler v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Petitioner served 26 years in the U.S. Army. Following his discharge, he began working in a civil service position as a maintenance management specialist for the Department of the Navy. His appointment was subject to completion of a one-year probationary period. Petitioner had no previous federal civilian service. Before expiration of the probationary period, the agency notified petitioner that he would be terminated from his position for unacceptable performance. He sought to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board. The administrative judge found that petitioner had no statutory right of appeal to the Board and that, as a probationary employee, petitioner's rights before the Board were limited to those defined by OPM regulations allowing appeal only if the termination was based on partisan political reasons or was the result of discrimination based on marital status, 5 C.F.R. 315.806(b). The Board rejected petitioner's claim that his military service should count toward completion of the one-year period of continuous service needed to qualify for Board review. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that petitioner did not qualify as an employee within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 7511(a)(1)(A). View "Wilder v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

Federal employees are entitled up to 15 days each year of military leave to attend training as a member of a reserve of the armed forces or National Guard. 5 U.S.C. 6323(a)(1). The Federal Circuit held that federal agencies cannot charge military leave on non-workdays. Duncan worked as a civilian for the Air Force until his retirement in 2005. From 1980 to 1998, he was also in the Air Force Reserve and performed 12 days each year of active duty plus additional duty for training. In 2009, he filed a claim with the Merit Systems Protection Board, alleging that the Air Force had charged his leave on non-workdays in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, seeking compensation for six days. An Administrative Law Judge granted the request, finding Duncan's recollection credible. The Board reversed, holding that it requires more than personal recollection and reliance on military documents. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The record did not show that all corroborating evidence was unavailable. View "Duncan v. Dep't of the Air Force" on Justia Law

The veteran served in Vietnam in the 1960s. He was honorably discharged and received service connection compensation for arthritis and hearing loss. In 1993, he had a malignant melanoma surgically removed; it continued to spread and he died in 1994. The surviving widow filed an Application for Dependency and Indemnity Compensation alleging that her husband’s death was service connected due to exposure to Agent Orange and extensive sunlight while serving in Vietnam. The Regional Office denied the claim. In 2004, she filed the current claim and submitted an internet article discussing an Air Force study that found an elevated risk of melanoma in veterans who were exposed to Agent Orange. The Board reopened and remanded the claim. On remand, a VA medical examiner determined that it was "at least as likely as not" that the melanoma was causally related to active duty service. The RO again denied the claim.. The Board affirmed. The Veterans Court vacated and remanded. The Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that there was no final decision.View "Ebel v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

A widow alleged that her husband developed cancer due to exposure to radiation while he was serving on active duty. Based on regulations that presume causation for certain diseases, the Board of Veterans' Appeals awarded service connection with an effective date of 1988. The Board did not determine whether she established a direct service connection that was not based on the presumptions. The Veterans Court remanded for such findings. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting the widow's argument that the evidence in the record supported reversal and an earlier effective date. View "Byron v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

In 2009, plaintiff applied for an IT specialist position with the Miami VA Healthcare System. He did not get the job and, after exhausting rights before the Department of Labor, filed an appeal, asserting that the VA violated his rights relating to veteran's preference. The AJ concluded that the Merit Systems Protection Board had no authority to review the merits of the VA’s non-selection of plaintiff. The Board agreed. The Federal Circuit vacated. There is no way to determine whether the Veterans' Preference Act (58 Stat. 390) has been violated without examining the grounds for non-selection. The Board has jurisdiction to determine whether the VA properly afforded plaintiff the right to compete for the job and properly determined, in accordance with 5 C.F.R. § 302.302(d), that he was not qualified for the position View "Lazaro v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Organizations challenged a rule issued by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs (amending 38 C.F.R 3.304(f)) with respect to claims for service-connected disability benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder. The new rule: allows a veteran to establish PTSD without supporting evidence; applies the lower evidentiary standard only if a VA psychologist or psychiatrist, or one contracted with the VA, confirms the claimed-stressor supports the diagnosis; and defines the veteran’s "fear of hostile military or terrorist activity" as involving a response characterized by "a psychological or psycho-physiological state of fear, helplessness, or horror." The Federal Circuit upheld the rule as not violating the statutory requirement that the Secretary consider all medical evidence and give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant when there is an approximate balance of evidence. There is a rational basis for the distinction between private practitioners and VA associated practitioners. View "Nat'l Org. of Veterans' Advocates, Inc. v. Sec'y Veterans Affairs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a veteran with a service-connected disability rated at 80 percent, which makes him a "preference eligible" veteran, 5 U.S.C. 2108(3)(C). He applied for attorney positions at the Social Security Administration and at the U.S. Attorney's Office, informing both that he was a preference eligible veteran. Both agencies selected other applicants, at least one of whom was not preference eligible. He filed complaints with the Department of Labor. The agencies concluded that 5 U.S.C. 3320 did not apply to require that agencies "file written reasons" and receive permission from the Office of Personnel Management if they pass over a preference eligible who is among the highest three eligibles available for appointment on a certificate furnished by OPM. The Board agreed that attorneys are exempt from any examination or rating requirements. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Board properly concluding that the agencies were exempt from the procedures and were not required to file written reasons with OPM and seek permission before selecting other candidates. View "Jarrard v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law