Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The claimant, a veteran who served in the United States Army in 1968, sought service-connected disability benefits for bilateral hearing loss. After applying for benefits in 2013, he was ultimately awarded service connection by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), but assigned a non-compensable (0%) disability rating. The claimant challenged this rating, contending that awarding a 0% rating for a service-connected disability contradicts statutory provisions that specify ten grades of disability (from 10% to 100%) for compensation purposes.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied his request for an initial compensable rating. The claimant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the relevant statutes required the Board to award at least a 10% rating and that the Secretary’s implementation of a 0% rating exceeded statutory authority. The Veterans Court determined it lacked jurisdiction to review substantive challenges to the rating schedule established by the Secretary under 38 U.S.C. § 1155, as expressly barred by 38 U.S.C. § 7252(b). The court concluded it could not consider the claimant’s argument because it amounted to a challenge to the validity of the rating schedule.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that, under its own jurisdictional statute (38 U.S.C. § 7292) and binding precedent in Wingard v. McDonald, it also lacked jurisdiction to review substantive statutory challenges to the VA’s rating schedule, including the claimant’s argument against the 0% disability rating. The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, affirming that such challenges are precluded from judicial review by both the Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit. No costs were awarded. View "GORDON v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

The appellant claimed injury from a vaccine on December 6, 2019, and sought compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. He mailed his petition to the United States Court of Federal Claims by certified first-class mail ten days before the statutory deadline, but the petition arrived and was filed one day late due to an unexplained delay by the U.S. Postal Service. He requested equitable tolling, arguing that the late delivery by USPS and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic were extraordinary circumstances preventing timely filing, and that he acted with reasonable diligence by mailing well before the deadline.A special master denied the request for equitable tolling, finding that the appellant was not reasonably diligent because he did not use a guaranteed or overnight delivery method, and that the postal delay did not qualify as an extraordinary circumstance. The United States Court of Federal Claims affirmed the special master’s finding regarding diligence and dismissed the petition, without addressing whether extraordinary circumstances were present.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It found that the special master and the Court of Federal Claims applied the wrong legal standard by requiring more than reasonable diligence—specifically, by effectively mandating the use of guaranteed delivery methods and monitoring of tracking information. The Federal Circuit held that equitable tolling requires only reasonable, not maximum, diligence, and that mailing a petition ten days before the deadline by certified mail can satisfy that standard. The court reversed the finding that the appellant was not reasonably diligent, vacated the special master’s determination regarding extraordinary circumstances, and remanded to the Court of Federal Claims to determine whether an extraordinary circumstance justifies equitable tolling under the proper standard. View "CHITLIK v. HHS " on Justia Law

A veteran who served in the Marine Corps, including a tour in Vietnam, began experiencing fatigue and underwent a medical evaluation at a Veterans Affairs Medical Center in 2010. His blood tests showed elevated lymphocyte counts. However, VA physicians in Florida diagnosed him with monoclonal B-cell lymphocytosis (MBL), not chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL), and did not inform him of a CLL diagnosis. Years later, after his condition worsened and he relocated to Tennessee, a VA oncologist diagnosed him with CLL and retroactively opined that his medical records met the diagnostic criteria for CLL since 2010. The veteran then applied for VA disability compensation. The VA assigned a 100% disability rating with an effective date of January 29, 2016, the date his claim was filed.The veteran appealed, arguing for an earlier effective date due to the alleged misdiagnosis and failure to inform him about his CLL. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals partially granted his request, assigning an effective date of January 29, 2015, but declined to go earlier, finding that the law did not allow equitable considerations to affect the effective date under 38 U.S.C. § 5110. The veteran then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, raising arguments that the VA should be equitably estopped from enforcing § 5110’s effective date restrictions, and that those restrictions were unconstitutional as applied to him. The Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s decision.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court. The Federal Circuit held that equitable estoppel cannot override the effective date limitations of 38 U.S.C. § 5110, and that § 7331 does not create a statutory precondition to enforcement of § 5110. It also held that the statute’s effective date limitations were not unconstitutional as applied to the veteran’s circumstances. View "LEY v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

The case concerns a veteran who served in the Army in Vietnam and Kuwait. He applied for disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in December 2011, specifically seeking compensation for hypertension, which he claimed was directly related to his military service. Supporting his claim, he provided personal statements and a letter from a flight surgeon detailing hypertension during deployment. The VA Regional Office denied his claim, and after a lengthy appeals process, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals granted him benefits for hypertension under the PACT Act, a law enacted in 2022 that provides presumptive service connection for certain conditions, including hypertension for Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange. However, the Board did not address his original claim for direct service connection.After the Board’s decision, Mr. Hepler appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”), contending that the Board failed to adjudicate his direct service-connection claim for hypertension, which could have resulted in an earlier effective date for benefits. The Veterans Court dismissed his appeal as moot, reasoning that his entitlement to benefits under the PACT Act resolved the issue and any dispute over the effective date was a downstream matter requiring a separate appeal. Mr. Hepler’s motion for reconsideration was denied.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that the Veterans Court’s decision was incorrect. The Federal Circuit held that the Board was required to adjudicate the veteran’s direct service-connection claim, even after granting benefits under the PACT Act, because the claims are distinct and the direct claim could entitle the veteran to additional, earlier benefits. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, instructing the Veterans Court to require the Board to grant, deny, or remand the direct service-connection claim. View "HEPLER v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

The case concerns an attorney who represented a veteran in seeking disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The veteran originally filed a claim in 2007 for a bilateral hip disability and received a rating in 2008, which was later increased. In 2018, the Board issued a final denial for a higher rating for the left hip, which was not appealed and thus became final. In 2021, after the veteran underwent left hip replacement surgery, the attorney assisted with a new claim, resulting in a significantly increased rating and an award of past-due benefits. The attorney sought fees from this award, arguing that her work fell within the statutory scheme permitting attorney’s fees for representation after notice of the agency’s initial decision.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the attorney’s request for fees, reasoning that the December 2021 rating decision was the initial decision for the increased rating claim, and since the attorney had not performed compensable work after that decision, she was not entitled to fees under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1). The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed, concluding that the September 2021 claim for increased compensation was a new claim, not part of the same “case” as the original 2007 claim, and thus the attorney’s work prior to the December 2021 decision was not compensable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the matter de novo and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The court held that, for purposes of attorney’s fees under § 5904(c)(1), a new claim for increased disability based on new evidence and circumstances is not part of the same “case” as the original claim. The attorney was not entitled to fees for work performed prior to the December 2021 rating decision. The judgment was affirmed. View "JACKSON v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

A legal advocacy organization petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to update its mailing addresses, alleging that the VA continued to send correspondence to incorrect addresses despite repeated notifications of changes. The petitioner requested court intervention to ensure the VA updated its address records, ceased sending correspondence to wrong addresses, and imposed financial penalties for future errors.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims dismissed the petition as moot after the VA voluntarily corrected the addresses and created a policy to guide attorneys on updating their addresses. The VA also provided affidavits and a fact sheet to confirm these corrections. The petitioner subsequently sought attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), asserting that the Veterans Court’s order requiring affidavits constituted the necessary “judicial imprimatur” for prevailing-party status. The Veterans Court denied the application, relying on Cavaciuti v. McDonough, and found there was no court-mandated decision on the merits and no material alteration to the parties’ legal relationship.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed whether the Veterans Court erred in denying attorney fees under EAJA. The Federal Circuit held that a court order requiring a party only to confirm voluntary corrective actions for the purpose of assessing mootness does not constitute sufficient judicial imprimatur to confer prevailing-party status under EAJA. The court found that the Veterans Court’s order did not address the merits of the petition or alter the legal relationship between the parties. The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the Veterans Court’s denial of the EAJA application. View "VETERANS LEGAL ADVOCACY GROUP v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

The petitioner began working as an Operational Support Technician with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Miramar, Florida, in 1987. Her duties required her physical presence at the office, and she commuted daily from her home. In December 2016, she was found to have engaged in workplace misconduct—specifically, being under the influence while on duty—and was removed from her position in July 2018. In April 2019, she applied for Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS) disability retirement benefits, claiming that recurring seizures prevented her from commuting to work and performing the essential duties of her position.The Office of Personnel Management denied her application and subsequent request for reconsideration, determining that she had not established that her medical condition rendered her unable to provide “useful and efficient service” in her position. The petitioner appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board. An administrative judge affirmed OPM’s determination, finding insufficient evidence that she was unable to perform the essential functions of her job. The judge also rejected her argument that her inability to commute, due to seizures and lack of transportation options, should be considered in assessing her disability status. The full Board adopted the administrative judge’s findings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s final decision. The court held that, under 5 U.S.C. § 8451(a)(1)(B), the statutory definition of disability for FERS benefits does not include an employee’s ability to commute; only the refusal of reassignment to a position within the commuting area is governed by such considerations under § 8451(a)(2)(A). The court also ruled that it is statutorily barred from reviewing factual determinations underlying OPM’s disability findings. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision. View "CHAFIN v. OPM " on Justia Law

The petitioner, a former Legal Administrative Specialist at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), was diagnosed with major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and insomnia. Her treating psychiatrist determined she was unable to work, and OPM subsequently removed her from federal service, citing her medical inability to perform essential job functions. The removal decision relied on medical documentation from her psychiatrist, which described her symptoms and limitations. Following her removal, the petitioner applied for disability retirement benefits through OPM, submitting the same medical documentation.OPM denied the disability retirement application, stating that while it acknowledged her diagnoses and symptoms, there was insufficient “objective” medical evidence to demonstrate the degree of her impairment and her inability to work. On reconsideration, OPM repeated that the documentation lacked details such as test results, psychotherapy notes, and treatment records. The petitioner appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board), where OPM maintained its position that her evidence was inadequate. The Board’s administrative judge found that OPM had rebutted the presumption of disability—established when an employee is removed for medical inability—by asserting a lack of objective medical evidence. The Board weighed the evidence and affirmed OPM’s denial, making this its final decision.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed whether OPM and the Board could overcome the presumption of disability (as set out in Bruner v. Office of Personnel Management) simply by asserting the absence of objective medical evidence. The court held that such an assertion alone is insufficient to rebut the presumption of disability. Because the Board relied solely on this rationale, the court concluded the presumption was not rebutted, reversed the Board’s final order, and found the petitioner entitled to disability retirement benefits. View "Garland v. Office of Personnel Management" on Justia Law

A veteran who suffered a traumatic brain injury from an improvised explosive device while deployed sought financial assistance under the Traumatic Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance (TSGLI) program after experiencing a stroke within two years of the injury. The Army denied his claim, determining the stroke was a physical illness or disease, not a qualifying traumatic injury as defined by the relevant statute and regulations. The veteran then petitioned the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to amend its rules to include coverage for illnesses or diseases caused by explosive ordnance, arguing these conditions are analogous to those already covered under existing exceptions for injuries resulting from chemical, biological, or radiological weapons.The VA initially denied the rulemaking petition but agreed to further review as part of a program-wide assessment. After several years, extensive consultation with medical experts, and consideration of the petition and supporting materials, the VA issued a final denial. It concluded that expanding coverage to delayed illnesses or diseases linked to explosive ordnance would be inconsistent with TSGLI’s purpose, which focuses on immediate injuries, would deviate from the insurance model underlying the program, and could threaten its financial stability. The VA also found insufficient evidence of a direct causal relationship between explosive ordnance, traumatic brain injury, and downstream illnesses like stroke.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the VA’s denial under the highly deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that the VA provided a reasoned explanation addressing the petitioner’s arguments and the record, and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. The petition for review was therefore denied. View "MCKINNEY v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS " on Justia Law

James Young, a veteran who served in the military during the mid-1980s, initially filed a claim for service-connected disability benefits in 1988, alleging head injuries from an in-service car accident. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regional office denied his claim in 1991, and after several years of proceedings, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the claim in 1999, citing Young’s failure to appear for scheduled medical examinations. Young did not appeal the Board’s 1999 denial. Years later, in 2017, following a new claim and medical examinations, the VA granted service connection for his head injuries effective August 17, 2012.Seeking an earlier effective date linked to his original 1988 claim, Young filed a motion in 2022 with the Board to vacate its 1999 denial, alleging due process violations because the Board had failed to ensure the regional office complied with orders to search for certain records. The Board denied the motion, characterizing the alleged error as a “duty to assist error” rather than a due process error. Young appealed this denial to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which dismissed the appeal. The Veterans Court found that while the appeal was timely regarding the denial of the motion to vacate, such a denial was not an appealable decision under its jurisdictional statute.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court’s dismissal. The Federal Circuit held that the Board’s denial of a motion to vacate under 38 C.F.R. § 20.1000(a), when based solely on alleged material error known at the time of the original decision, does not constitute an appealable “decision” under 38 U.S.C. § 7252. The court determined that allowing appeals from such procedural denials would undermine the statutory time bar and permit indefinite judicial review of Board decisions. View "YOUNG v. COLLINS " on Justia Law