Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A legal advocacy organization petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to update its mailing addresses, alleging that the VA continued to send correspondence to incorrect addresses despite repeated notifications of changes. The petitioner requested court intervention to ensure the VA updated its address records, ceased sending correspondence to wrong addresses, and imposed financial penalties for future errors.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims dismissed the petition as moot after the VA voluntarily corrected the addresses and created a policy to guide attorneys on updating their addresses. The VA also provided affidavits and a fact sheet to confirm these corrections. The petitioner subsequently sought attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), asserting that the Veterans Court’s order requiring affidavits constituted the necessary “judicial imprimatur” for prevailing-party status. The Veterans Court denied the application, relying on Cavaciuti v. McDonough, and found there was no court-mandated decision on the merits and no material alteration to the parties’ legal relationship.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed whether the Veterans Court erred in denying attorney fees under EAJA. The Federal Circuit held that a court order requiring a party only to confirm voluntary corrective actions for the purpose of assessing mootness does not constitute sufficient judicial imprimatur to confer prevailing-party status under EAJA. The court found that the Veterans Court’s order did not address the merits of the petition or alter the legal relationship between the parties. The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the Veterans Court’s denial of the EAJA application. View "VETERANS LEGAL ADVOCACY GROUP v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

The petitioner began working as an Operational Support Technician with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Miramar, Florida, in 1987. Her duties required her physical presence at the office, and she commuted daily from her home. In December 2016, she was found to have engaged in workplace misconduct—specifically, being under the influence while on duty—and was removed from her position in July 2018. In April 2019, she applied for Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS) disability retirement benefits, claiming that recurring seizures prevented her from commuting to work and performing the essential duties of her position.The Office of Personnel Management denied her application and subsequent request for reconsideration, determining that she had not established that her medical condition rendered her unable to provide “useful and efficient service” in her position. The petitioner appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board. An administrative judge affirmed OPM’s determination, finding insufficient evidence that she was unable to perform the essential functions of her job. The judge also rejected her argument that her inability to commute, due to seizures and lack of transportation options, should be considered in assessing her disability status. The full Board adopted the administrative judge’s findings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s final decision. The court held that, under 5 U.S.C. § 8451(a)(1)(B), the statutory definition of disability for FERS benefits does not include an employee’s ability to commute; only the refusal of reassignment to a position within the commuting area is governed by such considerations under § 8451(a)(2)(A). The court also ruled that it is statutorily barred from reviewing factual determinations underlying OPM’s disability findings. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision. View "CHAFIN v. OPM " on Justia Law

The petitioner, a former Legal Administrative Specialist at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), was diagnosed with major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and insomnia. Her treating psychiatrist determined she was unable to work, and OPM subsequently removed her from federal service, citing her medical inability to perform essential job functions. The removal decision relied on medical documentation from her psychiatrist, which described her symptoms and limitations. Following her removal, the petitioner applied for disability retirement benefits through OPM, submitting the same medical documentation.OPM denied the disability retirement application, stating that while it acknowledged her diagnoses and symptoms, there was insufficient “objective” medical evidence to demonstrate the degree of her impairment and her inability to work. On reconsideration, OPM repeated that the documentation lacked details such as test results, psychotherapy notes, and treatment records. The petitioner appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board), where OPM maintained its position that her evidence was inadequate. The Board’s administrative judge found that OPM had rebutted the presumption of disability—established when an employee is removed for medical inability—by asserting a lack of objective medical evidence. The Board weighed the evidence and affirmed OPM’s denial, making this its final decision.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed whether OPM and the Board could overcome the presumption of disability (as set out in Bruner v. Office of Personnel Management) simply by asserting the absence of objective medical evidence. The court held that such an assertion alone is insufficient to rebut the presumption of disability. Because the Board relied solely on this rationale, the court concluded the presumption was not rebutted, reversed the Board’s final order, and found the petitioner entitled to disability retirement benefits. View "Garland v. Office of Personnel Management" on Justia Law

A veteran who suffered a traumatic brain injury from an improvised explosive device while deployed sought financial assistance under the Traumatic Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance (TSGLI) program after experiencing a stroke within two years of the injury. The Army denied his claim, determining the stroke was a physical illness or disease, not a qualifying traumatic injury as defined by the relevant statute and regulations. The veteran then petitioned the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to amend its rules to include coverage for illnesses or diseases caused by explosive ordnance, arguing these conditions are analogous to those already covered under existing exceptions for injuries resulting from chemical, biological, or radiological weapons.The VA initially denied the rulemaking petition but agreed to further review as part of a program-wide assessment. After several years, extensive consultation with medical experts, and consideration of the petition and supporting materials, the VA issued a final denial. It concluded that expanding coverage to delayed illnesses or diseases linked to explosive ordnance would be inconsistent with TSGLI’s purpose, which focuses on immediate injuries, would deviate from the insurance model underlying the program, and could threaten its financial stability. The VA also found insufficient evidence of a direct causal relationship between explosive ordnance, traumatic brain injury, and downstream illnesses like stroke.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the VA’s denial under the highly deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that the VA provided a reasoned explanation addressing the petitioner’s arguments and the record, and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. The petition for review was therefore denied. View "MCKINNEY v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS " on Justia Law

James Young, a veteran who served in the military during the mid-1980s, initially filed a claim for service-connected disability benefits in 1988, alleging head injuries from an in-service car accident. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regional office denied his claim in 1991, and after several years of proceedings, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the claim in 1999, citing Young’s failure to appear for scheduled medical examinations. Young did not appeal the Board’s 1999 denial. Years later, in 2017, following a new claim and medical examinations, the VA granted service connection for his head injuries effective August 17, 2012.Seeking an earlier effective date linked to his original 1988 claim, Young filed a motion in 2022 with the Board to vacate its 1999 denial, alleging due process violations because the Board had failed to ensure the regional office complied with orders to search for certain records. The Board denied the motion, characterizing the alleged error as a “duty to assist error” rather than a due process error. Young appealed this denial to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which dismissed the appeal. The Veterans Court found that while the appeal was timely regarding the denial of the motion to vacate, such a denial was not an appealable decision under its jurisdictional statute.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court’s dismissal. The Federal Circuit held that the Board’s denial of a motion to vacate under 38 C.F.R. § 20.1000(a), when based solely on alleged material error known at the time of the original decision, does not constitute an appealable “decision” under 38 U.S.C. § 7252. The court determined that allowing appeals from such procedural denials would undermine the statutory time bar and permit indefinite judicial review of Board decisions. View "YOUNG v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

The claimant served in the U.S. Navy and, upon his voluntary separation in 1992, received a lump sum Special Separation Benefit (SSB) under 10 U.S.C. § 1174a. Many years later, in 2017, he was awarded VA disability compensation with entitlement to a total disability rating, effective from late 2016. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) notified him that it would withhold a portion of his monthly disability benefits to recoup the SSB payment, which the claimant contested, arguing that SSB payments are not subject to recoupment and that the relevant statutory authority did not apply to his situation.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals found that the VA acted properly in withholding his disability compensation to recoup the SSB payment. The claimant then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board’s decision. He sought reconsideration, asserting that the court had relied upon the wrong statutory provision. The Veterans Court granted reconsideration, but in its new decision, it again held that the relevant statute required recoupment of his SSB payment from his VA disability compensation, and affirmed the Board’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The court held that 10 U.S.C. § 1174(h)(2) applies to SSB payments received under 10 U.S.C. § 1174a, requiring such payments to be deducted from VA disability compensation. The court rejected the claimant’s alternative statutory interpretation, finding it inconsistent with the statutory text and structure. The court also dismissed for lack of jurisdiction arguments that were not addressed by the Veterans Court. The judgment was affirmed in part and dismissed in part. View "COLAGE v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Albert Lobo, a Deputy Sheriff in San Bernardino County, California, contracted pneumonia in early 2010, which progressed to sepsis and resulted in multiple amputations, leaving him permanently and totally disabled. He received disability retirement and workers' compensation benefits at the county and state levels between 2012 and 2014. In March 2015, Lobo filed a claim for disability-based benefits under the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Act of 1976 (PSOB Act) with the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Office (PSOB Office) of the Bureau of Justice Assistance (Bureau) of the U.S. Department of Justice.The PSOB Office denied Lobo's claim in May 2016, a decision upheld by a hearing officer in October 2017 and the Bureau’s Director in August 2023. The denials were based on the finding that Lobo had not proven he contracted pneumonia in the line of duty. The Bureau's Director emphasized the lack of evidence showing that Lobo caught pneumonia at the jails where he worked, despite acknowledging that Lobo was permanently and totally disabled due to pneumonia.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Bureau had not made sufficient efforts to obtain potentially crucial information about whether there were pneumonia-infected individuals at the jails where Lobo worked. The court noted that such information could be highly material to determining the origin of Lobo's pneumonia. Consequently, the court vacated the Director’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the Bureau to make reasonable efforts to obtain the necessary information from the jails and to reassess the claim in light of any new evidence obtained. View "Lobo v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Edward Amezquita, a U.S. Navy veteran, appealed a decision denying service connection for his left shoulder disability. Prior to his service entrance examination in June 2003, Amezquita had undergone Bankart repair surgery on his left shoulder due to a motor vehicle accident. The service entrance examination noted the surgery but stated he was asymptomatic with no physical limitations. Amezquita served from July 2003 to March 2005. Shortly before his separation, he reported a shoulder injury, which was diagnosed as a sprain. In June 2005, he filed a claim for service connection for his left shoulder disability, which was denied by the VA in September 2005, citing no evidence of aggravation due to service.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied Amezquita’s claim in August 2021, finding that the presumption of soundness did not apply because his preexisting condition was noted upon service entry. The Board analyzed the claim under the aggravation standard and found no evidence of in-service aggravation. Amezquita appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that his asymptomatic condition should not be considered a noted defect. The Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s decision, relying on precedent that an asymptomatic condition can be noted as a preexisting defect.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the Veterans Court’s interpretation that an asymptomatic condition can be noted as a preexisting defect under 38 U.S.C. § 1111. The court dismissed Amezquita’s arguments regarding the factual determination that his condition was resolved upon service entry, as it lacked jurisdiction to review factual findings. The decision was affirmed in part and dismissed in part. View "AMEZQUITA v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

The case revolves around a group of Texans who were receiving Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) until the Texas governor informed the Department of Labor that Texas would withdraw from its agreement with the Secretary of Labor to participate in the PUA program. The plaintiffs argued that the Federal Government violated the mandate in PUA that the Secretary of Labor “shall provide . . . assistance” to “any covered individual.”The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed the case, agreeing with the magistrate judge's recommendation. The judge reasoned that the CARES Act, which established the PUA, required the existence of an agreement with a state for the payment of benefits. The judge also noted that the Act did not provide a mechanism for the Secretary to pay out benefits in the absence of an agreement with the relevant state. The judge concluded that Congress intended for the funds to be administered solely by the states.The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, stating that the PUA does not require the Secretary to pay PUA benefits to individual citizens; rather, the Secretary must provide assistance through agreements with the states. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Little Tucker Act. View "CREAGER IRELAND v. US " on Justia Law

Bell served on active duty from 1952-1954 in the Army, and from 1955-1957 in the Air Force. During service, Bell sustained a lower back injury. Years later Bell filed a VA claim for entitlement to service connection for a lumbar spine disability and received a 20% disability rating, effective March 2017. In a December 2019 internal memorandum, the agency requested an administrative review by the Director of Compensation Service on the issue of entitlement to an extra-schedular rating for Bell’s lumbar spine disability under 38 C.F.R. 3.321(b)(1); the agency recommended denying entitlement to an extra-schedular rating. The Director issued an advisory opinion denying entitlement, finding that the “lumbar spine disability picture does not demonstrate an unusual or exceptional disability pattern that would render application of the regular rating criteria impractical.” The regional office denied entitlement to an extra-schedular disability evaluation.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals the Veterans Court, and the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision. Bell “d[id] not present any argument, under any applicable authority,” why the denial should be reversed. The regulation authorizing the Director of Compensation Service to approve an extra-schedular rating does not prohibit the Director from considering recommendations from agency officials before making this decision. View "Bell v. McDonough" on Justia Law