Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Aldridge served on active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps, 1984-1992, and was denied a disability rating higher than 10% for patellofemoral syndrome on his knees in 2013. The Board of Veterans Appeals informed Aldridge that he had 120 days to file a notice of appeal with the Veterans Court, 38 U.S.C. 7266(a), by April 23, 2014. The Veterans Court received his notice on October 27, 2014. Aldridge acknowledged that his appeal was late, but argued that deaths in his family and his resulting depressive state prevented him from timely filing. His mother died on September 27, 2013; his daughter gave birth to a stillborn child on December 16; and his sister died on January 14, 2014. He asked the court to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling. The court determined that Aldridge had failed to demonstrate that his family’s losses “themselves directly or indirectly affected the timely filing of his appeal,” noting that Aldridge closed the estates of his deceased mother and sister, became his father’s primary caregiver, maintained his job at a Veterans Affairs hospital, and attempted to hire a lawyer during the time at issue. The Federal Circuit affirmed, upholding the Veterans Court’s application of a legal standard that required proof of causation. View "Aldridge v. McDonald" on Justia Law

In 1985-1986, Kerrigan was a Navy carpenter. He injured his back and was awarded workers’ compensation benefits by the Office of Workers Compensation (OWCP). In 1993, Kerrigan raised concerns regarding his benefits. Over several years, Kerrigan made multiple requests, some of which were denied. In 2001, Kerrigan contacted the Department of Labor Office of Inspector General (OIG) alleging that DOL employees had based one denial on a form that they falsified or destroyed. The OIG did not investigate, but forwarded the letter to OWCP. Kerrigan pursued, over several years, a suit against DOL for illegal termination of benefits and a suit against the physician who reviewed his medical records. Both were dismissed. In 2013, Kerrigan filed a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, which chose not to investigate, but referred him to the Merit Systems Protection Board, where Kerrigan alleged retaliatory termination of benefits. The ALJ dismissed Kerrigan’s appeal, stating that the Whistleblower Protection Act only covers actions taken by an agency concerning its own employees. The Board stated that 5 U.S.C. 8128(b) provides that benefits determinations are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DOL and are unreviewable and that Kerrigan failed to nonfrivolously allege that his protected disclosures were a contributing factor in the decision to terminate benefits. The Federal Circuit affirmed. While 5 U.S.C. 8128(b) does not bar review, Kerrigan failed to nonfrivolously allege that his protected disclosure was a contributing factor in the decision. View "Kerrigan v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd." on Justia Law

A.M. was born in1993, and was raised in a predominately Polish-speaking household. At A.M.’s 15-month routine examination, the pediatrician noted that A.M. was a “well child.” When A.M. was two years old, his pediatrician noted that A.M. used 4 to 10 words and walked independently. When A.M. was four years old, he received his second MMR vaccination. Days later, A.M. returned to the office with a sore throat. Later episodes concerned limping and limited language skills. A doctor gave A.M. a provisional diagnosis of “Ataxia/Unsteadiness and Developmental Delay.” An MRI showed “diffuse white matter demyelination which is consistent with demyelinating process most likely some form of leukodystrophy.” By 2011, A.M. was wheelchair-bound and unable to care for himself. In 2012, at age 18, A.M. saw a specialist who opined that “[t]he finding of apparently normal development followed by a sudden loss of abilities following an insult with severe demyelination is suggestive of vanishing white matter disease. This often presents during childhood with ataxia following infection or fright.” A special master denied compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. 300aa, finding that the Miliks failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a vaccine caused A.M.’s conditions. The Claims Court and Federal Circuit upheld the denial as not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion. View "Milik v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Hudgens injured his right knee while serving on active duty in the U.S. Army. In 2003, Hudgens had partial knee replacement surgery; in 2006, he sought VA benefits. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied him a disability rating of greater than 10 percent for degenerative joint disease in the right knee and denied him entitlement to a compensable disability rating for instability in the right knee for a prior time period. The Veterans Court vacated those decisions; held that Hudgens was not entitled to compensation for his prosthetic knee replacement under 38 C.F.R. 4.71a, Diagnostic Code 5055; and remanded for determination of whether his knee replacement could be rated by analogy to that code. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that Hudgens may be compensated under DC 5055 based on his partial knee replacement. Hudgens’s interpretation of DC 5055 is consistent with the beneficence inherent in the veterans’ benefits scheme and with the majority of Board decisions that have interpreted the regulation. View "Hudgens v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Sneed, who served on active duty 1964-1968, suffered service-connected disabilities. In 2001, Sneed suffered a spinal cord contusion from a fall, leaving him quadriplegic. In 2003, he died of smoke inhalation while living in a home for paralyzed veterans. His widow sought dependency and indemnity compensation, 38 U.S.C. 1310, alleging that Sneed’s service-connected spondylosis and spinal stenosis contributed to quadriplegia and that his service-connected PTSD and hearing loss prevented him from exiting during the fire. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed denial,mailing notice on April 5. Sneed’s notice of appeal was due 120 days after that mailing. On April 13, Sneed contacted attorney Eagle, requesting representation. According to Sneed, at the request of Eagle’s secretary, she transmitted case materials to and had oral communications with that office. On August 2, Sneed received a letter from Eagle, stating that the claim “does not meet the criteria,” declining representation, and stating that notice of appeal was due "no later than August 5.” The correct deadline was August 3. Several lawyers declined her case. Sneed filed notice on September 1, explaining her circumstances. The Veterans Court dismissed the appeal as untimely. On remand, Sneed argued attorney abandonment, warranting equitable tolling. The Veterans Court held, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, that equitable tolling was not warranted absent an agreement between Eagle and Sneed and that Sneed did not act diligently. View "Sneed v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Veterans’ Groups challenged regulations issued in 2014 by the Department of Veterans Affairs pursuant to its notice-and-comment rulemaking authority. The Final Rule amended the VA’s adjudication and appellate regulations to require that all claims for compensation “[f]or disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, or for aggravation of a preexisting injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty . . . during a period of war” and related appeals originate on standard VA forms. The VA’s prior regulation provided that “[a]ny communication or action, indicating an intent to apply for . . . benefits[,] . . . may be considered an informal claim,” 38 C.F.R. 3.155(a). The Federal Circuit denied the petitions and found the Final Rule valid because it accords with applicable rulemaking procedures and is not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law. The Rule does not contravene Congress’s mandate that the VA has a duty to develop veterans’ claims. View "Veterans Justice Grp., LLC v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Dover served in the Navy, 1956-1960, and, in 1968, filed a claim for service-connected disability benefits. His claim for a hand injury was denied; he did not appeal. In 2004, the VA regional office (RO) denied Dover's motion to reopen. In 2008, Dover requested clear and unmistakable error (CUE) review of both the 1968 decision and the 2004 refusal to reopen. In 2009, the RO granted service connection based on new medical evidence and assigned an effective date of March, 2006, the date of another request to reopen. In 2009, Dover appealed for an earlier effective date of 1968, but the RO found no CUE. In 2011, Dover provided more detailed arguments. The Board for Veterans’ Appeals issued a final ruling of no CUE. On appeal, the VA conceded that it erred by failing to dismiss Dover’s non-specific CUE claim. The Veterans Court remanded with instructions to allow and consider additional evidence and argument in support of the claim. The Board dismissed Dover’s 2008 claim without prejudice but treated the 2011 submission of additional arguments as a separate CUE claim and remanded to the RO. Dover moved under the Equal Access to Justice Act for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d). The Veterans Court rejected the motion because it believed that its remand was for dismissal. The Federal Circuit reversed, stating that the remand expressly contemplated, and the appellant received, further proceedings, sufficient for prevailing party status. View "Dover v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Eilise was born in 1996 and had problems with gross motor skills and language development. After therapy, Eilise showed dramatic improvement. In 2001, Eilise received three vaccinations, including her second dose of the measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine. Five days later, Eilise’s brother witnessed her arching her back, thrusting her head back, rolling her eyes, and jerking. He did not know what was happening. Her parents, who did not witness the seizure, noted that Eilise was feverish and lethargic. Eilise had a grand mal seizure at school. She was taken to a hospital. She had another seizure there. Eilise’s MRI results were generally normal, but her EEG results were “consistent with a clinical diagnosis of epilepsy.” She continued to suffer seizures until she started a ketogenic diet. Her parents filed suit under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. 300aa, alleging that Eilise suffered from autism as a result of her vaccinations; they later amended to allege, instead, that Eilise suffered from a “seizure disorder and encephalopathy.” The Claims Court affirmed denial of her petition. The Federal Circuit vacated: in certain cases, a petitioner can prove a logical sequence of cause and effect between a vaccination and the injury with a physician’s opinion where the petitioner has proved that the vaccination can cause the injury and that the vaccination and injury have a close temporal proximity. View "Moriarty v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

In 2012, one in five female veterans and one in 100 male veterans reported that they experienced sexual abuse in the military, and an estimated 26,000 service members “experienced some form of unwanted sexual contact.” The trauma stemming from sexual abuse in the military (military sexual trauma (MST)) can result in severe chronic medical conditions, including Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, depression, and anxiety. Generally, veterans with service-connected disabilities are entitled to disability benefits, 38 U.S.C. 1110, 1131. In response to what they viewed as the VA’s inadequate response to MST-based disability claims, veterans’ groups submitted a petition for rulemaking which requested that the VA promulgate a new regulation regarding the adjudication of certain MST-based disability claims. The Secretary of Veterans Affairs denied the petition. The Federal Circuit upheld the denial, noting its limited and deferential review and stating that the Secretary adequately explained its reasons for denying the petition. The court rejected a claim that in denying the petition, the Secretary violated the equal protection clause by intentionally discriminating against women without providing an exceedingly persuasive justification or discriminating against survivors of MST-based PTSD without providing a legitimate reason. View "Serv. Women's Action Network v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Bozeman served in the Army, 1967-1970, including one year in Vietnam. In 1993, Bozeman sought disability benefits after substance abuse treatment at a VA Medical Center. The VA awarded him service-connected benefits for PTSD, rated as 10 percent disabling. Bozeman’s condition deteriorated. His disability rating was increased to a 50 percent rating in 1999. In 2000, the VA denied an increased rating. Bozeman underwent a VA Compensation and Pension Examination (C&P) in 2002. Bozeman submitted a Notice of Disagreement with its conclusion. He was hospitalized in 2003 and 2004, for “suicidal and homicidal thoughts[,] . . . severe depression.” In 2005 a C& P examiner concluded that Bozeman suffered from “chronic PTSD symptomatology off and on for the last 25 years” and that he would have “difficulty . . . work[ing] in gainful employment.” In 2006, Bozeman’s rating was increased to 70 percent, effective February 2003, with a temporary 100 percent rating for the hospitalization. The Board denied a rating in excess of 50 percent prior to February 2003, and a rating in excess of 70 percent after February 2003, but granted a rating of 100 percent, effective November 2010. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated. Bozeman’s argument that the Board failed to consider relevant evidence was not a new legal argument raised for the first time on appeal; the Board’s reliance on issue exhaustion was improper View "Bozeman v. McDonald" on Justia Law