Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Public Benefits
Cronin v. United States
Commander Cronin began active duty with the Navy in 1977. In 1978, she had a calcaneal spur in her heel. She had unsuccessful surgeries in 1979, 1993, 1994, and 1995. She was hospitalized for bipolar disorder in 1995. Beginning in 1998, medical professionals disagreed about whether she suffered from bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), or some combination. She was diagnosed with chronic pain. Cronin alleged that during her service, she was subjected to physical and sexual assaults, stalking, and “extreme sexual harassment.” A social worker described these incidents as supporting a PTSD diagnosis. She had periods of limited duty. The Navy had selected Cronin for promotion, but in a 1994 letter, a Navy physician found her not fit for full duty. Her promotion was delayed. The Physical Evaluation Board assigned her a disability rating of 60% and placed her on the Temporary Disability Retired List. The Board for Correction of Naval Records upheld the promotion delay. In 1996, Cronin was formally placed on the TDRL and promoted. She was reevaluated every 18 months to continue receiving benefits. In 2000, the Board declined to find a compensable claim of PTSD or chronic pain disorder, concluded that her conditions had stabilized, and placed her on the Permanent Disability Retired List. Cronin sued in 2006. On remand, the trial court concluded that the 2003 Relief Act tolls the limitations period during time on the TDRL, so that the claims were timely, but affirmed the refusal to increase her disability rating. The Federal Circuit held that most of her claims were time barred. As to claims alleging PTSD, there was no timeliness issue, but they were properly rejected on the merits.View "Cronin v. United States" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Military Law, Public Benefits
Johnson v. McDonald
Johnson served in the U.S. Army, 1970-197171. Years after leaving the service, he filed a claim for increased disability ratings for his service-connected disabilities, including rheumatic heart disease (then rated 10% disabling), and degenerative changes of the right and left knees (each knee rated 10% disabling). A VA regional office (RO) denied the claims, finding that he was not entitled to a rating of total disability based on individual unemployability. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed and denied his claim for extra-schedular consideration of the combined impact of his service-connected rheumatic heart disease and right knee disability under 38 CFR 3.321(b)(1). The Veterans Court affirmed, finding the CFR language ambiguous and deferring to the VA’s interpretation. The Federal Circuit reversed, citing plain language. Section 3.321(b)(1) entitles a veteran to consideration for referral for extraschedular evaluation based on an individual disability not adequately captured by the schedular evaluations; it also entitles a veteran to consideration for referral for extra-schedular evaluation based on multiple disabilities, the combined effect of which is exceptional and not captured by scheduler evaluations.View "Johnson v. McDonald" on Justia Law
Martin v. Shinseki
Martin, an Army veteran, applied for educational-assistance benefits under 38 U.S.C. 3011. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the application, concluding that Mr. Martin was ineligible for benefits because the basis for his honorable discharge in 1990 constituted “willful misconduct.” The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed. The officially declared reason for Martin’s discharge was “alcohol rehabilitation failure.” The Federal Circuit vacated, stating that “alcohol rehabilitation failure” cannot be said always to constitute or result from willful misconduct, regardless of circumstances. Neither the Board nor the Veterans Court made any determination of what particular conduct constituted misconduct, engaged in with the state of mind required for willfulness, that led to the rehabilitation-failure determination.View "Martin v. Shinseki" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Military Law, Public Benefits
Moore v. Dep’t of Justice
The survivors of eight firefighters who died in 2003 sought survivors’ benefits under the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Act, 42 U.S.C. 3796. The eight were employed by First Strike, a private company that works with governmental and private entities to help suppress wildfires, under agreements that characterized them as independent contractors. The Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Office denied the claims, and they requested redetermination by the Director of the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), which also denied the claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the BJA did not err in concluding that the firefighters were not public safety officers within the meaning of the Benefits Act. View "Moore v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law
Rusick v. Gibson
Mrs. Rusick is the surviving spouse of veteran George Rusick, who served on active duty in the U.S. military 1942-1943. In 1983, a Veterans Administration regional office issued a decision continuing a 30-percent rating for Rusick’s service-connected anxiety disorder. With a service-connected hearing loss rated at 40 percent, Rusick’s combined rating was 60 percent. In 1996, the regional office increased the rating for his anxiety disorder to 100 percent. Rusick died in April 2000, with no pending claims for benefits. In May 2000, Mrs. Rusick filed a claim seeking dependency and indemnity compensation (DIC) and accrued benefits. The Department of Veterans Affairs denied both claims and she did not appeal. In September 2006, Mrs. Rusick filed another claim, asserting clear and unmistakable error in that Rusick should have received a 100 percent rating in 1983 because he was unemployable. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals agreed that the regional office’s failure to assign a 100 percent rating in 1983 constituted CUE and that Mrs. Rusick was entitled to DIC benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1318. The regional office implemented the Board’s decision by awarding DIC, but it denied accrued benefits under 38 U.S.C. 5121. The Board, Veterans Court, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Rusick v. Gibson" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Military Law, Public Benefits
Robertson v. Gibson
Robertson voluntarily enlisted in the Army in 1963.After serving confinement for being absent without leave on two occasions for a total of about 340 days, Robertson was discharged in 1967 under conditions other than honorable, a character of discharge that can foreclose the receipt of veterans’ benefits. He later participated in President Ford’s clemency program, completed alternative service, and received a presidential pardon and a new clemency discharge. Despite his pardon and clemency discharge, the Department of Veterans Affairs has continued to deny Robertson’s claim for veterans’ benefits. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the Department of Veterans Affairs properly considered the misconduct underlying his pardoned offense to deny his application for benefits. Entitlement to veterans’ benefits under the clemency program was meant to be the exception, not the rule. View "Robertson v. Gibson" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Military Law, Public Benefits
Gilbert v. Shinseki
Gilbert served in the Navy. His reported medical history upon entry into service revealed no psychiatric defects. After leaving service, Gilbert was diagnosed with major depression and required treatment for psychiatric illness and alcohol dependence. Gilbert acknowledged that he experienced depressive episodes and suicidal ideation throughout his life, that he has been abusing drugs and alcohol since he was a teenager, and that he continued to abuse alcohol while in the Navy. Gilbert sought compensation for psychiatric disability and other conditions with the VA. Multiple psychiatric examinations produced conflicting opinions. The VA denied service connection; the Board affirmed. The statutory “[p]resumption of sound condition” was applicable because no psychiatric condition was noted upon entry into service, 38 U.S.C. 1111; to rebut the presumption, the government had to provide clear and unmistakable evidence demonstrating that the disease existed before enrollment and was not aggravated by service. Based on Gilbert’s acknowledged history, the Board concluded that the government proved that his psychiatric illness pre-existed enrollment, but that the government failed to establish that Gilbert’s “pre-existing depression was not aggravated by active service,” and did not rebut the presumption of soundness. The Board nevertheless denied service connection, concluding that Gilbert failed to prove that his post-service psychiatric conditions “were correlated to [his] military experiences.” The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Gilbert v. Shinseki" on Justia Law
Checo v. Shinseki
Checo sought an increased disability rating for lumbosacral spinal stenosis, including disk bulges, which was rated at a 20% disability. On July 6, 2011, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied her request. Checo was homeless, residing in shelters and temporary housing without the ability to receive mail. On September 27, 2011, she contacted the VA to provide a new address, and received a copy of the adverse decision on October 6, 2011; 91 days of the 120-day filing period under 38 U.S.C. 7266 had passed. On December 7, 2011, Checo filed a Notice of Appeal, 33 days late. She wrote: “Due to economic hardship, I’ve been homeless for extensive periods of time since July 2009 … and did not learn about the hearing and subsequent decision until” October 2011. The Clerk of the Veterans Court ordered the Secretary to file a response discussing whether the circumstances warranted equitable tolling of the judicial appeal period. In its response, the Secretary noted that “it appears that [Ms. Checo’s] homelessness was due to circumstances beyond her control” and that homelessness “would have delayed her filing of her NOA.” After the Veterans Court accepted the Secretary’s concession that Checo’s homelessness qualified as an extraordinary circumstance, it dismissed, finding that Checo failed to prove two other necessary elements, due diligence and direct causation,—to warrant equitable tolling. The Federal Circuit vacated. The Veterans Court used an inappropriate due diligence standard and erred in determining that homelessness did not cause the delay.View "Checo v. Shinseki" on Justia Law
Bowers v. Shinseki
Bowers served in the Army National Guard 1972-1978, with a continuous period of active duty for training from August 1972 to February 1973. His records do not reflect that he incurred any injury or disease during service. In 2009, shortly after his diagnosis with Lou Gehrig’s disease (ALS), Bowers sought benefits for ALS and secondary conditions. A VA Regional Office denied the claim, finding that his ALS was not incurred or aggravated in service. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals rejected his argument that he was entitled to presumptive service connection for ALS under 38 C.F.R. 3.318, noting that reserve duty and active duty for training of the type Bowers performed does not generally entitle an individual to evidentiary presumptions. While his appeal to the Veterans Court was pending, Bowers died and his wife was substituted as the appellant. The Veterans Court affirmed, finding that Bowers did not achieve “veteran status,” and was not entitled to presumptive service connection. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Bowers v. Shinseki" on Justia Law
LaLonde v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.
M.L. was born in 2003. At his 15-month well-child visit, his pediatrician noted that M.L. was walking and generally developing normally but did not “want to talk.” In 2005, M.L. received several immunizations, including the DTaP vaccination. Hours later, M.L. allegedly began experiencing an abnormally high fever and swelling. He was admitted to the hospital with a diagnosis of “vaccine adverse reaction with secondary fever, angiodema, and anaphylactoid reaction.” The morning after his discharge, M.L.’s mother called an ambulance because M.L. was exhibiting signs of hypothermia and seizure-like episodes. In the months that followed, M.L.’s vocabulary allegedly decreased. An MRI of M.L.’s brain with and without contrast was normal. After observing M.L.’s developmental delays and repetitive behaviors, a pediatric neurologist placed M.L. in the autism spectrum disorder category. A special master rejected claims under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. 300aa-1 to -34, and the Claims Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed. While the DTaP vaccination likely caused the initial anaphylactic reaction, there was no reliable medical theory that the M.L.’s anaphylaxis caused a focal brain injury. View "LaLonde v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law