Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A civilian employee of the Department of Defense retired in 2007 then served as a re-employed annuitant for a two-year term ending January 3, 2009. Like many Department employees, he was subject to the National Security Personnel System, and eligible for performance-based bonuses and salary increases until the system was repealed in 2009. He qualified in 2008, but was ineligible for a salary increase because of his two-year contract; by regulation, the effective date of any salary increase would be the first day of the first pay period on or after January 1. The Department denied a bonus, arguing that the effective date was the same as the effective of a salary increase. The employee argued that the effective date should be either the end of the appraisal period (September 30, 2008) or the first day of the following year. In his class action under the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, the district court ruled in favor of the Department. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the court had jurisdiction under the Act and deferring to the agency's interpretation of its own regulation. View "Price v. Panetta" on Justia Law

Olivia, born in 2000, apparently healthy, became ill after her first vaccinations. Her condition required extensive hospitalization; she still requires a ventilator and a wheelchair. Her parents filed a petition with the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. 300aa-1 to34. Olivia's injuries are not covered by a table of injuries presumed to be caused by vaccines, so the parents were required to show that one of the administered vaccines caused or significantly aggravated her condition. They submitted two reports by experts. The special master identified unanswered questions, but the parents took the position that it was unreasonable to require such detail at the pre-hearing stage. Based on failure to submit a supplemental report and failure to identify a clear theory of causation, the special master dismissed. The claims court affirmed. The Federal Circuit reversed. The special master did not appropriately review the evidence of causation under the summary judgment standard. View "Simanski v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

A widow alleged that her husband developed cancer due to exposure to radiation while he was serving on active duty. Based on regulations that presume causation for certain diseases, the Board of Veterans' Appeals awarded service connection with an effective date of 1988. The Board did not determine whether she established a direct service connection that was not based on the presumptions. The Veterans Court remanded for such findings. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting the widow's argument that the evidence in the record supported reversal and an earlier effective date. View "Byron v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

In 2009, plaintiff applied for an IT specialist position with the Miami VA Healthcare System. He did not get the job and, after exhausting rights before the Department of Labor, filed an appeal, asserting that the VA violated his rights relating to veteran's preference. The AJ concluded that the Merit Systems Protection Board had no authority to review the merits of the VA’s non-selection of plaintiff. The Board agreed. The Federal Circuit vacated. There is no way to determine whether the Veterans' Preference Act (58 Stat. 390) has been violated without examining the grounds for non-selection. The Board has jurisdiction to determine whether the VA properly afforded plaintiff the right to compete for the job and properly determined, in accordance with 5 C.F.R. § 302.302(d), that he was not qualified for the position View "Lazaro v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Organizations challenged a rule issued by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs (amending 38 C.F.R 3.304(f)) with respect to claims for service-connected disability benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder. The new rule: allows a veteran to establish PTSD without supporting evidence; applies the lower evidentiary standard only if a VA psychologist or psychiatrist, or one contracted with the VA, confirms the claimed-stressor supports the diagnosis; and defines the veteran’s "fear of hostile military or terrorist activity" as involving a response characterized by "a psychological or psycho-physiological state of fear, helplessness, or horror." The Federal Circuit upheld the rule as not violating the statutory requirement that the Secretary consider all medical evidence and give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant when there is an approximate balance of evidence. There is a rational basis for the distinction between private practitioners and VA associated practitioners. View "Nat'l Org. of Veterans' Advocates, Inc. v. Sec'y Veterans Affairs." on Justia Law

The veteran, discharged in 1966, suffered service-related loss of use of an arm and both legs and injuries to buttocks, thighs, hips, and torso. In 1967 a regional office awarded compensation at the total disability rate (38 U.S.C. 314(j) (now 1114)), additional special compensation at the rate between subsections (l) and (m), and under subsection (k); it did not award aid and attendance because then-law required a special compensation rating of (o). In 1970, the office awarded special compensation under subsections (m) and (k), retroactive to 1966. With changes in the law, his rating increased to (n). A 1979 amendment provided that a veteran is eligible for a&a if rated under subsection (o) or between (n) and (o) and under (k). In 1992, the office granted service connection for a seizure disorder. This qualified for a full-step increase to (o) (38 C.F.R. 3.350(f)(4)), and the veteran was awarded a&a effective 1991, the date of the diagnosis. The Board refused to assign an effective date before 1991. On second remand the Veterans Court affirmed the Board's rejection of a claim concerning a&a for the injuries assessed in 1966. The Federal Circuit affirmed, characterizing the claim as disagreement with the regional office's factual findings. View "Pimentel v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's husband served in the U.S. Army, 1958-1959, and was discharged due to rheumatic heart disease. The Board of Veterans' Appeals denied a claim for service-related benefits in 1959 and denied subsequent claims. In 1985, husband died of an acute myocardial infarction. The Board denied plaintiff dependency and indemnity compensation, 38 U.S.C. 1310. In 1992, plaintiff sought to reopen the 1986 decision. The request was denied in 1999; the Veterans Court affirmed in 2002. The Federal Circuit remanded, holding that the government failed to rebut the presumption of soundness, 38 U.S.C. 1111 with evidence that husband's heart disease was not aggravated by his military service. On remand, the Veterans Court affirmed the denial on alternate grounds; the Federal Circuit again remanded. Plaintiff's claim was then granted and she sought attorney fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412. The Veterans Court denied the claim, finding that the VA's position was supported by then-existing precedent. The Federal Circuit reversed. The Veterans Court failed to consider all of the factors surrounding the erroneous denial, particularly that the government had adopted an interpretation of section 1111 that was unsupported by the plain language of the statute or legislative history. View "Patrick v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

In 1996 petitioner, who had served in the Marine Corps from 1965 to 1968, filed a claim for compensation for post-traumatic stress disorder. The VA Regional Office granted the claim and assigned a disability rating of 30%, effective October 1996. Petitioner requested an increase in the percentage and made multiple submissions before 2000, when the Office increased the rating to 70%, effective July 1999. The Veterans Court affirmed as to the rating, but remanded with instructions for assigning an effective date. On remand, the Board found that a February 1998 submission met the requirements for an informal claim for TDIU and assigned an effective date of February 11, 1998 that was affirmed by the Veterans Court. The Federal Circuit vacated. To comply with the directive of 38 C.F.R. 3.156(b) that new and material evidence be treated as having been filed in connection with the pending claim, the VA must evaluate submissions received during the relevant period and determine whether they contain new evidence relevant to a pending claim, whether or not the relevant submission might otherwise support a new claim; the VA failed to make such a determination.

Petitioner married in 2001. Her husband had retired unmarried under the Civil Service Retirement System and elected to receive an annuity payable during his lifetime with no survivor benefits. He died in 2003, and petitioner's application for survivor annuity benefits was denied. After considering evidence about a conversation that husband purportedly had with one of its employees, the Office of Personnel Management affirmed, stating that husband could have elected to receive a reduced lifetime annuity with survivor benefits for a new wife only by notifying OPM of his intentions in a signed writing within two years of his marriage, 5 U.S.C. 8339(k)(2)(A). An administrative judge upheld the decision, stating that the decision would become final on June 21, 2004, unless a petition for review was filed. Petitioner did not file until 2010, claiming disability made her unable to attend to the matter. The Board denied her petition for review as untimely filed, finding no credible medical evidence regarding her condition. The Federal Circuit affirmed.

In 1971 the veteran unsuccessfully sought benefits. In 1979, he sought to reopen and provided a psychiatric evaluation. The veteran took steps to appeal the regional office's refusal to reopen. The regional office requested form I-9 to "reactivate" the appeal. He responded that he had already sent the form. The VA responded in 1980 that no further action would be taken unless he submitted the form within 30 days. The veteran did not respond. In 1994, he again sought to reopen. The regional office granted him service connection for bipolar disorder with an effective date of 1994. He contended that the effective date should be 1979. In 2005 the Board rejected his "pending claim" argument because he had not filed Form 1-9 within one year of the 1979 decision. The veterans court agreed. The Federal Circuit reversed. An appeal should set out specific allegations of error of fact or law, such allegations related to specific items in the statement of the case (38 U.S.C. 7105(d)(3) ); the statute must be construed liberally. Since there was a single issue identified in the statement of the case, the 1980 letters were sufficient to identify the issue on appeal and satisfy the statute.