Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Entities (Cencast) that remit payroll and employment taxes on behalf of motion picture and television production companies filed Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and the Federal Insurance Contribution Act employment tax returns, treating each employee as being in an “employment” relationship with Cencast rather than with the production companies. This reduced the overall tax payments because of statutory caps on FUTA and FICA taxes. The amount of tax that was avoided is equal to the additional amounts of FUTA and FICA tax that individual production companies would have been liable for had they conducted their own payroll services and filed their own returns. The United States Court of Federal Claims rejected Cencast’s refund claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the scope of Cencast’s liability for employment taxes under the (FICA) is determined by reference to the employees’ “employment” relationships with the common law employers for which Cencast remits taxes (the production companies). Those common law employers cannot decrease their liability by retaining entities such as Cencast to actually make wage payments to the employees. The court further noted that some of the individuals classified as employees were independent contractors, so that Cencast was barred from seeking refunds. View "Cencast Servs., L.P. v. United States" on Justia Law

Boeri, a citizen of Italy, has never lived or worked in the U.S. He worked for Verizon in Italy for 11 years, Brazil for 5 years, Argentina for 5 years, and the Dominican Republic for 15 years. In 2003 Boeri chose to participate in Verizon’s Management Voluntary Separation Plan, and was awarded a gross separation payment of $247,177 in 2004. Verizon withheld a total of $70,559, including U.S. income tax withholding, Social Security tax, and Medicare tax. In 2009 Boeri filed a nonresident alien income tax return for the 2004 tax year, seeking a refund. The IRS denied the request as untimely. The IRS Appeals Office denied an administrative appeal in 2011. Boeri appealed to the Claims Court, arguing that he is not seeking a refund of a tax overpayment, but correction of erroneous withholding and that these circumstances are not within the scope of the three-year look-back provision of 26 U.S.C. 6511(b)(2)(A). The Claims Court dismissed, reasoning that sections 6513(b)(1) and (c)(2) specify when advance payments of income tax and social security and Medicare taxes are deemed paid, and that the payments for which Boeri sought a refund were deemed paid on April 15, 2005. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Boeri v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2003, after more than a decade of litigation, the IRS assessed penalties under now-repealed I.R.C. 6621(c), which penalizes “substantial” underpayments of tax “attributable to tax motivated transactions” against the 19 partners of the Dillon Oil Technology Partnership in tax years 1983 and 1984. The partners paid the tax and penalties in 2004, and, in 2006, initiated a refund suit. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, 1 I.R.C.7422(h), which provides that individual partners may not bring tax challenges relating to subject matter “attributable to a partnership item.” Such claims must be brought in a partnership-level suit by the partnership representative or Tax Matters Partner. The Federal Circuit affirmed, calling the claim an impermissible collateral attack. View "Bush v. United States" on Justia Law

Deckers imported UGG® Classic Crochet boots having a knit upper portion and a rubber sole. They do not have laces, buckles, or fasteners, can be pulled on by hand, and extend above the ankle. At liquidation, Customs classified the boots under Subheading 19.35, covering: “Footwear with outer soles of rubber, plastics, leather or composition leather and uppers of textile materials: Footwear with outer soles of rubber or plastics: Other: Footwear with open toes or open heels; footwear of the slip-on type, that is held to the foot without the use of laces or buckles or other fasteners, the foregoing except footwear of subheading 6404.19.20 and except footwear having a foxing or foxing-like band wholly or almost wholly of rubber or plastics applied or molded at the sole and overlapping the upper” and subject to a duty rate of 37.5 percent. Deckers sought reclassification under subheading 6404.19.90, covering“[f]ootwear with outer soles of rubber . . . uppers of textile materials” that is “[v]alued [at] over $12/pair,” subject to a duty rate of nine percent. Customs rejected an argument that the term “footwear of the slip-on type” only encompasses footwear that does not extend above the ankle. The Trade Court granted the government summary judgment. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

In its tax return for the year 1997, ConEd claimed multiple deductions pertaining to a lease-in/lease-out (LILO) tax shelter transaction under which a Dutch utility, EZH, a tax-indifferent entity because it is not subject to U.S. taxation, conveyed to ConEd a gas-fired cogeneration plant that delivers power to customers in the Netherlands, then leased it back, followed by a reconveyance to EZH and a sublease. The stated purpose of the arrangement was tax avoidance. LILO transactions accelerate losses to the taxpayer and defer gains. The transaction provided several upfront deductions that allowed ConEd to pay lower taxes in 1997 (and in later years) than it otherwise would have. The IRS disallowed these claimed deductions and assessed a deficiency of $328,066. ConEd paid the deficiency and filed a refund claim; when this claim was denied, ConEd filed suit. The Claims Court awarded ConEd a full refund. The Federal Circuit reversed, applying the substance-over-form doctrine to conclude that ConEd’s claimed deductions must be disallowed. There was a reasonable likelihood that EZH would exercise its purchase option at the conclusion of the ConEd sublease, thus rendering the master lease illusory. View "Consol. Edison Co. of NY v. United States" on Justia Law

The IRS assigned a taxpayer identification number to Crystal Cascades, LLC. The company changed its name to Crystal Cascades Civil, LLC (CCC), but did not notify the IRS and continued using the original number. A Nevada bank made loans to CCC and recorded trust deeds. CCC failed to pay employment taxes in 2003 and 2004. The IRS filed tax lien notices in 2004-2005, under the identification number and directed to “Crystal Cascades, LLC.” In 2005 RHB made loans to CCC. The Nevada bank initiated foreclosure. CCC filed under Chapter 11. RHB argued seniority over the tax liens. During foreclosure, RHB purchased the property. Under I.R.C. 7452(d), the IRS may redeem properties against which it has a valid tax lien. The parties negotiated for RHB to pay $100,000; the IRS released its right of redemption. The bankruptcy court concluded that the lien notices did not impart constructive notice to third parties and awarded RHB surplus sale proceeds. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. RHB sought return of the $100,000, asserting that the agreement was void for lack of consideration because the right of redemption was illusory. The Court of Federal Claims held that RHB failed to prove that the IRS acted in bad faith. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Rd. & Hwy. Bldrs., LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

As a partner of E&Y, Hartman received restricted shares in Cap Gemini as part of a 2000 sale. The agreement provided for an initial sale of 25 percent of the shares to satisfy each partner’s tax liability as a result of the transaction. In 2001 Hartman received a Form 1099-B reflecting that he was deemed to have received $8,262,183, valuing his unsold Cap shares at $148 per share. Hartman’s return for 2000, reported the entire amount as capital gains income. After closing, the value of Cap shares dropped to $56 per share. Hartman voluntarily terminated his employment, forfeiting 10,560 shares of stock. He received a credit for taxes paid on those shares under I.R.C. 1341. In 2003, Hartman filed an amended return for 2000, claiming that he had received only the 25 percent of Cap shares that had been monetized in 2000, with the remainder received in 2001 and 2002. He sought a refund of $1,298,134. The IRS failed to act on the claim. The Claims Court found that Hartman had constructively received all 55,000 shares in 2000 and was not entitled to a tax refund. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Hartman v. United States" on Justia Law

Bancorp owns the 792 and 037 patents, for tracking value of life insurance policies in separate accounts, under which the policy owner pays a premium beyond that required for the death benefit and specifies types of assets in which additional funds are invested. Corporations use the policies to insure employees’ lives and fund retirement benefits on a tax-advantaged basis. The value of a separate account policy fluctuates; owners must report the value of their policies. The patents provide a computerized means for tracking book and market values and calculating stable value guarantee. Bancorp sued Sun Life for infringement. In another suit, the court invalidated the 792 patent for indefiniteness. Bancorp and Sun Life stipulated to conditional dismissal on collateral estoppel. The Federal Circuit reversed the other case. The district court vacated dismissal then granted summary judgment of invalidity under section 101 (ineligible abstract ideas) without addressing claim construction and analyzing each claim as a process claim. Applying “the machine-or-transformation test,” specified computer components are only objects on which claimed methods operate, and the central processor is a general purpose computer programmed in an unspecified manner for a process that can be completed manually. The claims “do not transform the raw data into anything other than more data and are not representations of any physically existing objects.” The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada" on Justia Law

Normally, if a partner contributes property, his basis in the partnership increases, and, when the partnership assumes a partner’s liability, his basis decreases. A Son-of-BOSS transaction recognizes acquisition (here, short-sale proceeds) and disregards acquisition of offsetting liability (obligation to close out the short-sale), to generate tax loss or reduce gain from sale of an asset. In their first such transaction, plaintiffs used partnerships to convert $66 million in taxable gain anticipated from stock sales into capital losses. Their partnership interests were held by tax-exempt charitable remainder unitrusts at the time of sale so that gain would escape taxation. The CRUTs terminated thereafter and assets were distributed to plaintiffs, purportedly tax free. The IRS determined that transfers to the CRUTs were shams to be disregarded; imposed basis and capital gain/loss adjustments, and alternative penalties; and asserted that the transactions did not increase amounts at risk under I.R.C. 465. Plaintiffs conceded capital gain and loss adjustments, but otherwise challenged the determinations. The Claims Court dismissed the determination that trust transfers were shams, believing it lacked jurisdiction; entered summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on the ground that their concession to adjustments rendered valuation misstatement penalties moot; granted the government summary judgment on penalties for negligence, substantial under-statement, and failure to act in good faith; and imposed a penalty. The Federal Circuit reversed the dismissal, vacated summary judgment for plaintiff, and held that plaintiffs’ appeal was premature. View "Alpha I, L.P. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1996, Dominion, a power company, replaced coal burners in two of its plants, temporarily removing the units from service for two to three months. During that time, Dominion incurred interest on debt unrelated to the improvements. On its tax returns, Dominion deducted some of that interest. The IRS disagreed, citing Treasury Regulation 1.263A-11(e)(1)(ii)(B), as requiring Dominion to capitalize half ($3.3 million) of that interest over several years, instead of deducting it in a single tax year. The Claims Court granted summary judgment to the IRS. The Federal Circuit reversed. The associated property rule in Treasury Regulation 1.263A-11(e)(1)(ii)(B), as applied to property temporarily withdrawn from service, is not a reasonable interpretation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, I.R.C. 263A (Capitalization and Inclusion in Inventory Costs of Certain Expenses). Treasury acted contrary to 5 U.S.C. 706(2) in failing to provide a reasoned explanation when it promulgated that regulation. View "Dominon Res., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law