Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and Defendant were competitors in the embedded non-volatile memory market. Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant alleging both literal infringement and infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. After striking evidence regarding Plaintiff’s theory of equivalence and ruling that Plaintiff had disavowed claim scope, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit summarily affirmed. While that appeal was pending, Defendant filed a motion for an award of attorneys’ fees. The district court denied the motion, concluding that although Defendant was the prevailing party in this case, Defendant failed to meet its burden of establishing that Plaintiff brought or maintained the prosecution of its patent infringement in bad faith. The Federal Circuit vacated the denial of Defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees, holding that the district court’s decision was premised on an incorrect legal standard. Remanded. View "Kilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp." on Justia Law

In 2010, Microsoft filed a complaint in the International Trade Commission against Motorola, alleging that that the importation and sale of certain Motorola mobile devices infringed nine Microsoft patents, including the 566 patent, which claims a mobile device containing a personal information manager (PIM). PIMs are applications that manage scheduling, communications and similar tasks. Microsoft Outlook is an example of a PIM. The Commission determined that Motorola violated the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 1337, by importing and selling mobile devices that infringe the 566 patent. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that substantial evidence supported determinations that Motorola did not show that the asserted claims are invalid and that Microsoft showed that it satisfied the domestic industry requirement.View "Motorola Mobility, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. 1201, imposes a fee to underwrite the costs of restoring lands damaged by mining. The fee is 28 cents per ton of coal produced by surface mining and the lesser of 12 cents per ton produced by underground mining, or 10 percent of the value of the coal at the mine. The reclamation fee for lignite coal is the lesser of eight cents per ton or two percent of the value of the coal at the mine. Lignite coal produces less than 8,300 British thermal units per pound, less energy than produced by bituminous, subbituminous, and anthracite coal. In the area of Wyodak’s strip mine near Gillette, Wyoming, coal transitions from subbituminous to lignite in the seams. The end product of the mine’s process is a mixture of subbituminous and lignite coal. Wyodak paid the higher reclamation fee for non-lignite coal. In 2005, Wyodak‘s consultant estimated that 12 percent of its coal was lignite and 88 percent was higher quality. The Office of Surface Mining denied a requested refund. The Claims Court first rejected claims not arising within six years of the filing date, then denied relief, holding that the fee is on coal as extracted. Because the BTU value of the blend was higher than 8300 BTUs per pound, Wyodak was not entitled to a refund for any lignite in the mix. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, noting that Wyodak had the burden of proving entitlement to and the amount of any refund. View "Wyodak Res. Dev. Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2008, the U.S. Department of Commerce found that woven laminated sacks exported from China were being sold in the U.S. at less than fair market value and issued an antidumping duty order under 19 U.S.C. 1673. In 2009, Commerce initiated administrative review of that order for periods, during which AMS had imported sacks made from fabric sourced in China, undisputedly subject to the order; and sacks made from fabric imported into China from other countries. Commerce investigated, but did not initiate formal scope inquiry. AMS argued that a ruling obtained from U.S. Customs and Border Protection provided that the sacks produced from non-Chinese fabric were deemed to be from the country of origin of the fabric, not subject to the order and declared a non-Chinese origin for sacks made with non-Chinese fabric. Commerce concluded that China was the country of origin of sacks made with non-Chinese fabric under a substantial transformation analysis, then issued a “clarification” of its instructions to Customs to “suspend liquidation of all [laminated woven sacks] from [China], regardless of the origin of the woven fabric,… on or after January 31, 2008.” The Trade Court sustained application of a country-wide rate; the Federal Circuit affirmed. Following a second administrative review, the trade court held that Commerce violated its own regulations by instructing Customs to retroactively suspend liquidation of entries of the sacks made with non-Chinese fabric The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "AMS Assocs, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

CBT sued Return Path and Cisco IronPort for infringement. The district court construed the claims at issue; CBT stipulated to noninfringement of the 114 patent and the district court granted summary judgment of indefiniteness of the one asserted claim of the 550 patent. After a remand, the district court held that CBT should pay the defendants their “costs,” which the clerk taxed at $49,824.60 for Return Path and $268,311.12 for Cisco. The same bills for electronic discovery had been submitted and had been the basis of an award prior to the remand. The Federal Circuit reversed part, finding that the district court erred in its interpretation of 28 U.S.C. 1920(4) governing the taxation of costs for “making copies” as applied to electronic document production. View "CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc." on Justia Law

Cross Match claimed that Suprema and Mentalix violated 19 U.S.C. 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) by importing articles that infringe or are used to infringe its patents. The International Trade Commission entered a limited exclusion order barring importation of certain optical scanning devices, finding that Mentalix directly infringed a method claim by using its own software with imported Suprema scanners and found that Suprema induced that infringement and that certain of Suprema’s imported optical scanners directly infringe other claims of the 993 patent. The Commission found no infringement of the 562 patent. The Commission held that Suprema and Mentalix failed to prove that the 993 patent was invalid as obvious over two prior art patents. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for revision of the order to bar only a subset of the scanners. An exclusion order based on a section 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) violation may not be predicated on a theory of induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. 271(b) where direct infringement does not occur until after importation of the articles the exclusion order would bar. View "Suprema, inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

Tolmar’s filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) seeking approval to market a generic version of Differin® Gel, 0.3%, a topical medication containing 0.3% by weight adapalene approved for the treatment of acne. Galderma sued Tolmar, alleging that Tolmar’s ANDA product infringed its patents. The district court ruled against Tolmar, finding the Galderma patents not invalidity for obviousness under 35 U.S.C.103. The Federal Circuit reversed, after examining prior art. While the comparable tolerability of 0.1% and 0.3% adapalene was unexpected in view of the prior art, a skilled artisan would have expected that tripling the concentration of adapalene would have resulted in a clinically significant increase in side effects, so the result does not constitute an unexpected result that is probative of nonobviousness. The commercial success of Differin® is of “minimal probative value.” View "Galderma Labs, L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1941, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers completed the Prado Dam on the Santa Ana River near Corona, California. Plaintiffs’ predecessors purchased property in the flood control basin. The Corps anticipated inundation of property in that basin and paid for flowage easements to an elevation of 556 feet. In the 1970s, the Corps planned to modify the Dam, raising its height, increasing the size of the spillway, and enlarging the reservoir. The project was expected to raise the flood inundation line by 10 feet. Under a 1989 agreement, local agencies undertook to acquire or condemn needed property and easements. In 1999, the Orange County Flood Control District offered to purchase the plaintiffs’ property. No agreement was reached. In 2003 the Corps issued new flood-plain maps. Local governmental agencies recorded a survey showing the 566-foot flood inundation line and arranged for placement of small surveyor’s markers at the 566-foot line. Chino rezoned the plaintiffs’ property below the 566-foot line for “passive recreation and open space use.” There has not been any flooding above the 556-foot line before or after the dam level was raised. In 2011, the plaintiffs sued, claiming a taking of a flowage easement over their property between the 556-foot and 566-foot lines. The Claim Court Claims dismissed, holding that absent actual flooding, the plaintiffs could not sustain their claim. The governmental actions, at most, support apprehension of future flooding. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Stueve Bros. Farms, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

Nguyen is an employee at the Department of Homeland Security. In his former position as a Deportation Officer, GS-12, he worked closely with the U.S. Attorney’s Office and was often required to testify as a witness during grand jury proceedings and criminal prosecutions. In 2008, Nguyen was subject to an Office of Professional Responsibility investigation and admitted to making false statements during a police investigation. DHS initiated a removal proceeding, ultimately imposing a 14-day suspension after three of the five charges were sustained. Two years later, the USAO determined that Nguyen’s disciplinary history impaired his credibility as a witness and notified DHS that it would no longer allow Nguyen to testify in criminal prosecutions or swear out complaints. DHS initiated another removal proceeding, charging “Inability to Perform Full Range of Duties.” Finding the charge was sustained, DHS mitigated the proposed penalty and demoted Nguyen to Detention and Removal Assistant, GS-7. The Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed, holding DHS did not impermissibly subject Nguyen to double punishment, and that Nguyen’s due process rights were not violated. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Nguyen v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

Sneed is the surviving spouse of Reginald, who served on active duty 1964-1968 and suffered service-connected disabilities, including post-traumatic stress syndrome, post-concussion syndrome, degeneration of the vertebrae, narrowing of the spinal column, tinnitus, a perforated tympanic membrane, and scarring of the upper extremities. In 2001, Reginald fell and suffered a spinal cord contusion, rendering him a quadriplegic. In 2003, he was living in a nursing home for paralyzed veterans. There was a fire and all of the residents died of smoke inhalation. Sneed sought dependency and indemnity compensation, 38 U.S.C. 1310, alleging that her husband’s service-connected disabilities were a cause of his death. The VA denied the claim. The Board affirmed. Sneed’s notice of appeal was due by August 3, 2011. Sneed retained attorney Eagle, communicated with Eagle’s office “for a year or longer” and stated that “Eagle knew that there was a deadline.” On August 2, 2011 Sneed received a letter stating that Eagle would not represent Sneed in her appeal. Failing to find new counsel, Sneed filed notice of appeal on September 1, 2011, with a letter explaining her late filing. The Veterans Court dismissed the appeal as untimely. The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that attorney abandonment can justify equitably tolling the deadline for filing an appeal. View "Sneed v. Shinseki" on Justia Law