Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC
The 545 patent claims a method for distributing copyrighted products (songs, movies, books) over the Internet where the consumer receives a copyrighted product for free in exchange for viewing an advertisement, and the advertiser pays for the copyrighted content. The district court dismissed an infringement claim. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the patent claims a "process" within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 101. The Supreme Court vacated. The Federal Circuit subsequently held, again, that the district court erred in holding that the subject matter of the 545 patent is not a “process” within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 101. The claimed invention is a practical application of the general concept of advertising as currency and an improvement to prior art technology and is not “so manifestly abstract as to override the statutory language of section 101.” View "Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC" on Justia Law
Tierney v. Dep’t of Justice
Federal employees who are members of the National Guard are entitled to up to 15 days of annual military leave “without loss in pay, time, or performance or efficiency rating,” 5 U.S.C. 6323(a)(1). Before a 2000 amendment, the Office of Personnel Management interpreted the section as providing 15 calendar days of leave, rather than 15 workdays; federal employees who attended reserve training on non-work days were charged military leave. The Federal Circuit held that even before 2000, federal agencies were not entitled to charge employees military leave on non-workdays. Tierney worked at the DEA, 1974-2001, and was a member of the Air National Guard. He filed a Merit Systems Protection Board claim that the DEA charged him military leave for reserve duty on 44 non-workdays, so that he took annual leave or unpaid leave for military duty. An AJ ordered DEA to compensate Tierney for 17 days. The full Board reversed, finding that the Military Leave Summary and Tierney’s testimony were based solely on his military records and on speculation that DEA improperly charged military leave on intervening non-workdays and that the evidence was insufficient to prove that DEA charged him military leave on non-workdays or that he used annual leave for reserve duties. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence. View "Tierney v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law
Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co.
Levi Strauss has stitched the back pocket of its jeans with the “Arcuate” design since 1873 and holds multiple trademarks on the design. In 2005, Abercrombie sought to register a “mirror image stitching design” for use on clothing, stating no limitations on the goods’ nature, type, channels of trade, or class of purchasers. Levi Strauss initiated an opposition to the parent application (concerning jackets and seeking Principal Registration). Levi Strauss petitioned to cancel Supplemental Registration of the child application covering other clothing. Abercrombie began selling “Ruehl jeans” with the design. Levi Strauss sued. The PTO stayed proceedings. Abercrombie claimed that its products were sold in different channels, at different prices. A jury found no infringement; the court rejected a claim of dilution by blurring. Levi Strauss did not appeal concerning infringement. The Ninth Circuit remanded, holding that dilution by blurring does not require identity or near identity of marks. Meanwhile, Abercrombie shut down the Ruehl brand, but sought to register its mirror-image design on “clothing, namely bottoms,” disclosing use of the design on denim shorts sold as “Gilley Hicks,” at different prices, and through different channels. Levi Strauss sought to amend to include the Gilley Hicks products. The district court declined and dismissed the dilution claim. The PTO opposition and cancellation proceedings were dismissed on the ground of issue preclusion. The Federal Circuit reversed, reasoning that the registrations at issue in the PTO cover a broader range of uses than were the subject of the litigation. View "Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co." on Justia Law
Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharma. Labs., Ltd.
In 1990 Novo began experimenting with the drug repaglinide in monotherapy treatement of Type II diabetes, conducted a study to determine whether repaglinide might be more effective in combination with metformin, and concluded that the combination obtained fasting plasma glucose levels more than eight times lower than typically achieved by metformin alone. Novo filed a provisional patent application for the combination in 1997. The examiner rejected the initial application as obvious. In its fifth response, Novo included the Sturis report, concluding that the combination has synergistic properties in type 2 diabetic human patients. The examiner withdrew her rejection, based solely upon the Sturis declarations and reconsideration of the synergistic effects. The 358 patent issued in 2004. In 2005, pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman Act, Caraco filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application requesting FDA approval to sell a generic version of repaglinide, and certifying that the 358 patent was invalid or would not be infringed. Novo responded with an infringement lawsuit. The district court held that claim 4 of the patent was invalid because of obviousness and that the patent was not enforceable because of inequitable conduct. The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to obviousness but reversed with respect to inequitable conduct. View "Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharma. Labs., Ltd." on Justia Law
Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp.
In 2008, Bosch sued Pylon for patent infringement. Pylon asserted patent infringement counterclaims against Bosch. Pylon moved to bifurcate the issues of liability and damages. The district court granted the motion and stayed discovery on damages issues including willfulness. After the district court entered judgment on the liability issues, both parties appealed. Bosch then moved to dismiss both its appeal and Pylon’s cross-appeal on the grounds that the appeals court lacked jurisdiction. On rehearing, en banc, the Federal Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. 1292(c)(2) does confer jurisdiction to entertain appeals from patent infringement liability determinations when a trial on damages has not yet occurred and when willfulness issues are outstanding and remain undecided. View "Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp." on Justia Law
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Pirkl v. Shinseki
Pirkl served in the Navy, 1947-1949. Effective in 1949, the VA awarded him disability benefits for paranoid schizophrenic reaction, evaluated as 10% disabling. A regional office increased his disability rating to 100%, effective in 1952. In 1953, the office reduced the rating to 70%. Pirkl did not appeal. In 1956, the office reduced Pirkl’s rating to 50%, based on a newly acquired medical examination and changes in Pirkl’s employment status. Pirkl did not appeal. In 1966, the office reduced the rating to 30%. The Board of Appeals affirmed. In 1991, Pirkl was awarded a 100% disability rating, effective 1988. In 2001, Pirkl unsuccessfully sought to revise the 1953, 1956, and 1966 rating decisions based on clear and unmistakable error (CUE). In 2005, Pirkl filed Notice of Disagreement with respect to the 1953 rating. The Board found CUE. The regional office awarded a 100% rating for 1952 to 1957, when the 1956, decision made effective a 50% rating. The Board dismissed Pirkl’s claim for 100% disability for the entire period between 1952 and August 30, 1988. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, concluding that the Board did not consider the effect of certain regulations governing a reduction of a total disability rating. View "Pirkl v. Shinseki" on Justia Law
Rack Room Shoes v. United States
The companies, which import clothing and footwear, filed suit in the Court of International Trade, alleging that classifications in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States discriminated on the basis of age or gender in violation of the equal protection clause of the Due Process Clause. Those classifications assess different tariff rates depending on whether footwear or clothing is subcategorized as being for youth, men, or for women. The Trade Court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Where a law is facially neutral, a party pleading discrimination under equal protection must show that the law has a disparate impact resulting from a discriminatory purpose. Proving discriminatory intent requires more than mere awareness of consequences; it would require proving that Congress enacted the classifications “because of, not merely in spite of, [their] adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” View "Rack Room Shoes v. United States" on Justia Law
Crawford v. Dep’t of the Army
Crawford began working for the Department of the Army in 1986, with credit for military service. In 2006, when called to uniformed service, Crawford was an IT Specialist, GS-2210-11, in the Corps of Engineers. The Army subsequently outsourced many IT functions and abolished Crawford’s position, but formed a new organization, the Corps of Engineers Information Technology (ACE-IT). When Crawford completed uniformed service, the Army briefly returned him to an IT Specialist position, but reassigned him as Program Support Specialist, GS-0301-11. Crawford claimed violation of reemployment protections for those in uniformed service under 38 U.S.C. 4313(a)(2). The administrative judge ordered the Army to place Crawford in a position of “like status” to an IT Specialist. The Army later submitted notice that it was not able to find a position of “like status” and had requested the Office of Personnel Management’s placement assistance. Crawford sought enforcement with the Merit Systems Protection Board, claiming that the search for positions was limited to vacant positions. The AJ agreed. The Army then reassigned Crawford to a position as an IT Specialist within ACE-IT, with the same duty station, title, and grade as his old position. The Board concluded that the Agency was in compliance and dismissed Crawford’s appeal. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Crawford v. Dep't of the Army" on Justia Law
Organic Seed Growers & Trade Assoc. v. Monsanto Co.
The patented technologies incorporate traits into agricultural crops, conferring resistance to the active ingredient in Monsanto’s herbicide, Roundup. Farmers using the seeds are able to eliminate weeds by spraying the herbicide over their crops, which would kill conventional seeds. Monsanto sells seed under a license for a single generation of genetically modified seeds. Between 1997 and 2010, Monsanto brought 144 infringement suits for unauthorized use of its seed; about 700 other cases settled without litigation. A coalition of farmers, seed sellers, and agricultural organizations that grow, use, or sell conventional seed, concerned that their product could become contaminated by modified seed and that they could be accused of patent infringement, sought declaratory judgments that the patents were invalid, unenforceable, and not infringed. Monsanto referred to its website, which states: It has never been, nor will it be Monsanto policy to exercise its patent rights where trace amounts of our patented seeds or traits are present in farmer’s fields as a result of inadvertent means. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that Monsanto has made binding assurances that it will not take action where crops inadvertently contain traces of Monsanto biotech genes; the plaintiffs did not allege circumstances placing them beyond the scope of those assurances. There is no justiciable case or controversy. View "Organic Seed Growers & Trade Assoc. v. Monsanto Co." on Justia Law
Hall v. Shinseki
Hall entered active duty in the Army in 1990, but refused to go to basic training and asked to go home. He made threats and admitted to an arrest for carrying a gun. A psychiatric evaluation showed that Hall was believed to suffer from an “avoidant personality disorder” and he was discharged after 15 days in service. In 2006, Hall sought VA disability benefits, claiming that he suffered post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of an in-service sexual assault perpetrated by a superior officer. The claim was denied because Hall was not regarded as credible and could not prove the assault. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Hall v. Shinseki" on Justia Law